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LIBRARY 


UNIVERSITY   OF  CALIFORNIA 

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jic»««».-.  i 

Accessions  No.    <?2'3_-3&  Shelf  .\\>. 


THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  OF  Ij82  AND  1 783. 


DELIVERED    BEFORE   THE 


NEW   YORK    HISTORICAL    SOCIETY 


SEVENTY-NINTH  ANNIVERSARY, 
TUESDAY,  NOVEMBER  27,  1883. 


BY 


JOHN     JAY. 


NEW    YORK: 
PRINTED    FOR   THE    SOCIETY 

1884. 


OFFICERS    OF  THE   SOCIETY,   1884. 


PRESIDENT, 

AUGUSTUS    SCHELL. 

FIRST   VICE-PRESIDENT, 

HAMILTON    FISH,    LL.D. 

SECOND  VICE-PRESIDENT, 

BENJAMIN    H.     FIELD. 

FOREIGN  CORRESPONDING  SECRETARY, 

WILLIAM    M.    EVARTS,    LL.D 

DOMESTIC    CORRESPONDING   SECRETARY, 

EDWARD    F.    DE    LANCEY. 

RECORDING   SECRETARY, 

ANDREW    WARNER. 


TREASURER, 

BENJAMIN    B.    SHERMAN 


LIBRARIAN, 

JACOB    B.    MOORE. 


EXECUTIVE   COMMITTEE. 


FIRST  CLASS— FOR  ONE  TEAR,    ENDING  1885. 

JOHN  A.  WEEKES,  WILLIAM  LIBBEY, 

ROYAL  PHELPS. 

SECOND  CLASS — FOR  TWO  YEARS,    ENDING  1886. 

EDWARD  F.  DE  LANCEY,  JACOB  D.  VERMILYE, 

WILLARD  PARKER,  JR.,  M.D. 

THIRD  CLASS — FOR  THREE   YEARS,    ENDING   1887. 

JOHN  TAYLOR  JOHNSTON,      ROBERT  LENOX  KENNEDY, 
JOHN  C.  BARRON,  M.D. 

FOURTH  CLASS— FOR  FOUR   YEARS,    ENDING  1888. 

BENJAMIN  H.  FIELD,  WILLIAM  DOWD, 

GEORGE  H.  MOORE,  LL.D. 

JOHN  A.  WEEKES,  Chairman. 
JACOB  B.  MOORE,  Secretary. 

[The  President,  Recording  Secretary,   Treasurer,  and  Librarian  are  members, 
ex-ojfficio,  of  the  Executive  Committee.] 

32-33  .b 


COMMITTEE   ON  THE   FINE  ARTS. 

ASHER  B.  DURAND,  DANIEL  HUNTINGTON, 

ANDREW  WARNER,  CEPHAS  G.  THOMPSON, 

JOELS  A.  WEEKES,  GEORGE  H.  MOORE,  LL.D. 

ASHER  B.  DURAND,  Chairman. 
ANDREW  WARNER,  Secretary. 

[The  President,  Librarian,  and  Chairman  of  the  Executive  Committee  are  mem 
bers,  ex-ojtftcio,  of  the  Committee  on  the  Fine  Aits.] 


CORRESPONDENCE. 


NEW  YORK  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY, 
NEW  YORK,  February  6,  1883. 

HON.  JOHN  JAY,  191  Second  Avenue. 

SIR  : — We  have  the  honor,  in  behalf  of  the  New  York  Historical 
Society,  to  invite  you  to  deliver  the  Address  at  the  Celebration  of  the 
Seventy-ninth  Anniversary  of  the  Founding  of  the  Society,  on  Tuesday 
evening,  November  27,  1883. 

The  time  at  which  this  Anniversary  will  occur  suggests,  as  a  fitting 
subject  for  the  occasion,  the  history  of  that  important  treaty  by  which 
Great  Britain  recognized  the  freedom  and  independence  of  the  United 
States,  a  recognition  alike  unqualified  and  irrevocable,  notwithstanding 
the  efforts  to  make  it  otherwise,  and  subject  it  to  the  contingencies  of 
the  policy,  influence,  and  authority  of  France. 

The  part  which  your  honored  ancestor  had  in  all  these  transactions 
will  give  peculiar  interest  to  the  results  of  studies  in  which  you  have  an 
hereditary  interest ;  and  we  trust  that  you  will  not  be  reluctant  to  render 
this  service  to  history  in  setting  out  the  fair  record  of  so  great  a  son  of 
New  York  in  connection  with  so  great  an  event.  "The  glory  of  children 
are  their  fathers,"  and  New  York  desires  to  do  honor  to  the  best  mem 
ories  of  her  best  men,  in  full  sympathy  with  all  the  reverence  of  filial 
piety. 

We  have  the  honor  to  be, 

Your  obedient  servants, 

AUGUSTUS  SCHELL,  President. 
ANDREW  WARNER,  Recording  Secretary. 
ROYAL  PHELPS,  Chairman  pro  tern,  of  the  Ex 
ecutive  Committee. 
WILLIAM  DOWD, 
JACOB  D.  VERMILYE, 
JOHN  TAYLOR  JOHNSTON, 

JACOB  B.   MOORE,   Secretary  of  the  Executive 
Committee. 


No.  191  SECOND  AVENUE, 

NEW  YORK,  February  14,  1883. 

To  the  Honorable  AUGUSTUS  SCHELL,  President ;  Messrs.  ANDREW 
WARNER,  Recording  Secretary  ;  ROYAL  PHELPS,  Chairman  of  the 
Executive  Committee ;  WILLIAM  DOWD,  JACOB  D.  VERMILYE, 
JOHN  TAYLOR  JOHNSTON,  and  JACOB  B»  MOORE,  Secretary  of  the 
Executive  Committee. 

GENTLEMEN  : — I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  your  letter  of  Feb 
ruary  6th,  in  which,  on  behalf  of  the  New  York. Historical  Society,  you 
invite  me  to  deliver  the  Address  at  the  Celebration  of  the  Seventy-ninth 
Anniversary  of  the  Founding  of  the  Society,  on  Tuesday  evening,  No 
vember  27,  1883. 

You  remark  that  the  time  at  which  this  Anniversary  will  occur  sug 
gests  as  a  fitting  subject  for  the  occasion  the  history  of  the  important 
treaty  of  peace  negotiated  with  Great  Britain,  notwithstanding  the 
effort  to  subject  it  to  the  policy,  influence,  and  authority  of  France. 
You  allude  to  the  part  borne  by  my  grandfather  in  that  transaction,  as 
having  given  an  interest  to  my  studies  in  that  direction,  and  in  terms  of 
graceful  courtesy  you  express  your  trust  that  I  will  not  be  reluctant  to 
render  the  service  which  you  ask. 

Permit  me  to  say  that  I  very  highly  appreciate  the  honor  of  being 
asked  to  deliver  the  Anniversary  Address,  and  still  more  the  generous 
confidence  with  which  you  ask  me  to  present  before  our  honored  and 
venerable  Society  "the  fair  record"  of  that  negotiation,  which  as  re 
gards  the  sufficiency  of  the  grounds  on  which  the  American  Commis 
sioners,  under  the  lead  of  Jay,  violated  the  instruction  of  Congress  to 
undertake  nothing  in  the  negotiation  without  the  knowledge  or  concur 
rence  of  the  ministers  of  the  King  of  France,  and  ultimately  to  govern 
themselves  by  their  advice  and  opinion,  has  been  for  a  century  a  subject 
of  controversy. 

Had  no  new  light  been  thrown  upon  the  subject,  I  might  well  have 
hesitated,  even  at  your  request,  weighted  alike  with  persuasion  and 
authority,  to  undertake  a  task  so  delicate  ;  but,  as  you  are  aware,  impor 
tant  historic  material,  bearing  directly  on  the  question,  and  which  has 
not  yet  been  collated,  has  been  recently  furnished,  partly  by  our  historic 
collections  and  in  part  by  the  governmental  archives  of  England  and  the 
Continent.  Among  them  is  the  report  in  the  Thomson  Papers  in  your 
collections  for  1878,  of  the  secret  proceedings  in  the  Continental  Con 
gress  in  July  and  August,  1782,  on  a  motion  to  revoke  the  instructions  to 
the  Commissioners  of  Peace,  which,  it  was  admitted,  had  been  a  sacrifice 
of  the  national  dignity  to  national  policy,  but  which,  it  was  contended, 
could  not  safely  be  revoked. 

Then  there  is  the  interesting  sketch  of  the  peace  negotiations  from 
an  English  point  of  view,  given  by  Lord  Edmond  Fitzmaurice  in  the 


life  of  his  grandfather,  Lord  Shelburne,  with  a  note  of  the  effort  of  M. 
de  Rayneval,  in  his  visit  to  that  minister,  to  defeat  the  American  claim 
to  the  fisheries,  the  Mississippi,  and  the  Ohio. 

Lastly,  we  have  the  volume  of  unedited  documents  from  European 
archives,  published  at  Paris  in  1876,  by  the  Count  Adolphe  de  Circourt, 
containing  confidential  correspondence  on  the  American  claims  to  be 
recognized  by  treaty,  between  the  Count  de  Vergennes  and  his  diplo 
matic  agents — the  Count  de  Montmorin  at  Madrid,  M.  Gerard  and  the 
Count  de  la  Luzerne  at  Philadelphia,  and  his  secretary,  M.  de  Rayneval, 
at  London 

These  new  disclosures,  and  especially  the  instructions  of  the  Count 
de  Vergennes  to  the  French  ministers  in  America,  are  of  the  highest 
authority,  for  they  were  gathered  by  our  associate,  Mr.  Bancroft,  and 
they  definitely  settle  the  questions  of  fact  which  have  been  raised  as  to 
the  correctness  of  the  views  officially  expressed  by  the  American  Com 
missioners  in  regard  to  the  policy  of  France  ;  views  that  impelled  them 
to  break  the  instructions  which  would  have  made  the  French  king 
"  master  of  the  terms  of  peace." 

It  only  remains  to  interweave  this  additional  material  with  that  which 
had  been  already  gathered,  to  round  and  complete  the  story  of  the  nego 
tiation,  and  to  end  the  speculations  and  controversies  of  the  past  by  a 
simple  presentation  of  the  truth  of  history.  The  task  will  be  rendered 
the  more  easy  for  me  by  the  kind  expressions  of  your  letter,  whose  in 
vitation  to  deliver  the  Anniversary  Address,  and  whose  suggestion  of 
the  subject  I  have  the  honor  to  accept. 

With  sincere  thanks  for  your  friendly  courtesy, 

I  am,  Gentlemen, 

Faithfully  yours, 

JOHN  JAY. 


PROCEEDINGS. 


At  a  meeting  of  the  New  York  Historical  Society,  held  at 
the  Academy  of  Music,  in  this  city,  on  Tuesday  evening,  No 
vember  27,  1883,  to  celebrate  the  Seventy-ninth  Anniversary  of 
the  founding  of  the  Society, 

The  President  of  the  Society,  Hon.  Augustus  Schell,  on  in 
troducing  Mr.  Jay,  remarked: 

Our  distinguished  fellow-citizen,  a  member  of  this  Society,  the  Hon. 
John  Jay,  has  accepted  the  invitation  of  the  Society  to  deliver  the  Ad 
dress  on  this  occasion. 

Mr.  Jay  is  a  descendant  of  that  eminent  jurist  and  accomplished 
statesman,  John  Jay,  who,  with  his  distinguished  associates,  Franklin 
and  Adams,  as  Commissioners  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  nego 
tiated  the  treaty  with  Great  Britain  which  recognized  the  independence 
of  America  and  established  peace  between  the  two  countries. 

The  subject  of  the  Address  is  "The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and 
1783." 

I  have  now  the  pleasure  to  introduce  to  you  Mr.  Jay. 

Mr.  Jay  then  delivered  the  Address  on  "  The  Peace  Nego 
tiations  of  1782  and  1783." 

Upon  its  conclusion,  George  H.  Moore,  LL.D.,  submitted, 
with  remarks,  the  following  resolution  : 

Resolved,  That  the  thanks  of  the  Society  be  presented  to  Mr.  Jay  for 
his  eloquent  and  instructive  discourse  delivered  this  evening,  and  that 
he  be  requested  to  furnish  a  copy  for  publication. 

The  resolution  was  seconded  by  the  Hon.  William  M. 
Evarts,  with  remarks. 

The  resolution  was  then  adopted  unanimously. 

Extract  from  the  minutes. 

ANDREW  WARNER, 

Recording  Secretary. 


THE    PEACE    NEGOTIATIONS    OF    1782 
AND    1783. 


MR.  PRESIDENT,  MEMBERS  OF  THE  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY, 

LADIES  AND  GENTLEMEN  : 

WE  are  assembled  on  the  seventy-ninth  anniversary  of  THE 
NEW  YORK  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY  to  commemorate  the  treaty 
of  peace  which  a  hundred  years  ago  gave  to  our  country  its 
name  and  place  among  the  powers  of  the  world.  That  treaty 
marked  the  triumphant  close  of  the  Revolution,  and  invested 
the  young  Republic  with  boundaries  and  resources  imperial  in 
their  extent  ;  it  is  an  event  which,  for  Americans,  is  fraught 
with  sacred  memories  of  the  past,  with  pride  and  thankfulness 
in  the  present,  and  with  the  highest  incentives  and  hopes  for 
the  future. 

Negotiated  and  signed  in  Paris,  it  fixed  the  destinies  of 
America.  It  was  received  by  our  countrymen  with  thanks 
givings  and  rejoicings,  of  which  we  were  strikingly  reminded 
yesterday,  when  the  vast  population  of  this  metropolis,  swelled 
by  thousands  of  citizens  and  citizen-soldiers,  by  the  Presi 
dent  and  the  Cabinet  from  Washington,  and  by  the  Gov 
ernors  and  representatives  of  the  old  thirteen  States,  joined  in 
commemorating  the  final  departure  of  the  British  flag  ;  on 
the  day  when,  as  the  silver-toned  orator'*  at  the  unveiling  of 
the  statue  of  Washington  on  the  spot  where  he  was  inaugu 
rated  so  picturesquely  described,  Colonial  and  Provincial 
America  had  ended  and  National  America  had  begun. 

*  The  Honorable  George  William  Curtis. 


io  TJie  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

Take  the  famous  diplomatic  councils  and  congresses  of 
modern  times  which  rank  as  historic  events  ;  which  have 
helped  to  shape  the  law  of  nations,  to  modify  the  map  of  the 
world,  or  to  promote  the  advance  of  civilization  and  the  hap 
piness  of  mankind  ;  take  the  peace  of  Westphalia,  with  its 
political  and  religious  results,  concluded  after  a  session  of 
some  five  years, *  attended  by  representatives  of  most  of  the 
European  powers,  and  ending  the  thirty  years'  war  that  had 
desolated  so  much  of  Europe.  Look  at  other  treaties  of  im 
portance,  the  peace  of  Utrecht,  the  several  treaties  of  Vienna 
arranging  and  rearranging,  for  a  brief  season,  dynasties  and 
boundary  lines  and  petty  sovereignties.  Which  one  of  them, 
in  simple,  permanent  grandeur  and  far-extending  results,  com 
pares  with  our  part  of  the  general  peace  negotiated  at  Paris 
in  1782  and  '83,  to  which  England,  France,  Spain,  and  Holland 
were  parties,  when  the  future  of  this  continent  was  at  stake, 
and.  when  the  treaty  of  peace^ushered  into  power  the  Amer 
ican  Republic,  with  a  territory  secured  for  Christianity  and 
free  civilization  :  and  made  it  from  its  birth  independent,  not 
only  of  Great  Britain,  but  of  the  world,  and  so  far  as  human 
judgment  could  provide,  not  for  a  day  but  for  all  time  ? 

While  we  are  commemorating  that  treaty,  the  echoes  have 
hardly  ceased  of  the  joyful  thanksgivings  which,  in  divers  lands 
and  tongues,  have  hailed  the  four  hundredth  anniversary  of 
the  birth  of  Luther,  and  we  begin  to  hear  the  note  of  prepara 
tion  for  the  approaching  commemoration,  in  the  Old  World 
and  in  the  New,  of  the  four  hundredth  anniversary  of  the  dis 
covery  of  America.  Looking  not  at  religious  differences, 
which  were  laid  aside  in  our  war  of  the  Revolution,  when 
Americans  and  Frenchmen,  Protestants  and  Romanists,  fought 
side  by  side,  calling  forth  a  cordial  tribute  from  Washington 
to  the  patriotic  part  Roman  Catholics  had  borne,  and  the  im 
portant  assistance  we  had  received  from  France  :  but  looking 
at  the  great  political  results  of  the  Reformation  as  regards 
free  government  and  popular  institutions,  there  should  be  no 
discord  between  the  thoughts  awakened  by  the  names  of 
Luther  and  Columbus  and  those  which  are  to-night  aroused 

*  The  Congress  of  Westphalia  lasted  from  July,  1643,  to  October,  1648. 


Tlie  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1/83.  11 

by  the  remembrance  of  the  treaty  of  1783.  Both  recall  the 
founders  of  the  thirteen  colonies,  representing  the  best 
and  bravest  blood  in  Europe,  who  came  here  to  lay  deep 
and  strong  in  the  world  of  Columbus  the  foundations  of 
civil  and  religious  liberty  with  the  freedom  of  conscience 
and  the  right  and  duty  of  private  judgment,  the  open  Bible  and 
the  common  school,  that  constitutional  birthright  of  citizens 
of  whatever  creed  which  form  the  glory  and  the  bulwark  of 
the  Republic  whose  birth  we  celebrate  to-night. 

Indeed,  although  the  fact  has  been  scarcely  appreciated  by 
the  present  generation — and  it  has  been  unappreciated  simply 
because  it  was  unknown — one  of  the  most  striking  features  of 
the  American  peace  negotiation,  that  closely  connects  it  with 
the  subject  of  the  great  principles  of  the  Reformation  which 
lie  at  the  basis  of  our  own  and  all  other  free  governments,  is 
the  fact  that  it  directly  involved  the  destiny  of  the  great  Valley 
of  the  Mississippi.  It  involved  the  question  whether  that  vast 
and  fertile  region,  and  that  great  river  which  has  been  called 
the  guardian  and  pledge  of  the  American  Union,  should  pass 
under  the  shadow  of  the  rule  which  has  darkened  and  en 
feebled  Spain  and  her  colonies,  or  whether  it  should  be  in 
cluded  within  the  boundaries  of  our  happier  land,  and  enriched 
with  the  light  and  life  of  American  institutions  ? 

In  alluding  to  the  fate  then  impending  of  the  Mississippi 
River,  Mr.  Bancroft  says  :  * 

"  States  larger  than  kingdoms  flourish  where  he  passes, 
and  beneath  his  step  cities  start  into  being  more  marvellous 
in  their  reality  than  the  fabled  creations  of  enchantment.  His 
magnificent  valley,  .  .  .  salubrious  and  wonderfully  fer 
tile,  is  the  chosen  muster-ground  of  the  most  various  elements 
of  human  culture,  brought  together  by  men  summoned  from 
all  the  civilized  nations  of  the  earth,  and  joined  in  the  bond 
of  common  citizenship  by  the  strong  invisible  attraction  of  re 
publican  freedom. 

"  From  the  grandeur  of  destiny  foretold  by  the  possession 

*  Bancroft's  History,  x.,  p.  193.  Lecky  (iv.,  277)  speaks  of  this  valley  as 
u  the  great  field  in  which  the  ultimate  expansion  of  the  English  race  might  be 
anticipated." 


12         \[T/ie  Peace  Negotiations  0/1782  and  1783. 

of  that  river  and  the  land  drained  by  its  waters,  the  Bourbons 
of  Spain,  hoping  to  act  in  concert  with  Great  Britain  as  well 
as  France,  would  have  excluded  the  United  States  totally 
and  forever." 

That  attempt  to  exclude  the  United  States  from  the  great 
Valley  of  the  Mississippi,  planned  and  elaborated  by  the  most 
noted  diplomats  of  the  French  and  Spanish  Courts,  was  but  a 
part  of  the  larger  scheme  to  exclude  the  Republic  also  from 
the  great  Northwestern  territory  beyond  the  Ohio,  to  deprive 
it  of  the  New  England  fisheries,  to  restrict  the  extent  and 
influence  of  the  young  Republic,  and  render  it  easily  con 
trollable  by  the  powers  of  Europe.  That  was  the  scheme  of 
which  the  instructions  of  Congress  dictated  by  the  French 
Minister  formed  so  notable  a  part,  and  whose  discovery  and 
defeat  by  the  American  Commission  has  given  a  singular  in 
terest  and  importance  to  the  negotiations  at  Paris. 

The  assembling  at  the  French  capital,  in  1782,  of  the  Peace 
Commissioners  from  Great  Britain,  the  United  States,  and 
Spain,  was  a  reminder  to  the  world  of  the  part  which  France 
had  borne  in  the  war  for  American  independence,  from  the 
date  of  her  treaty  of  alliance  with  the  United  States.*  Made 
immediately  after  the  surrender  of  Burgoyne,  whatever  the 
motives  which  inspired  the  policy  on  the  part  of  France,  the 
alliance  was  greeted  in  America  with  enthusiasm  ;  and  if 
the  explanation  given  by  the  Court  of  France  to  that  of  Lon 
don  presented  only  interested  reasons  as  having  induced  the 
move,  that  explanation  was  little  noted  by  the  Americans 
rejoicing  in  the  accession  of  so  great  an  ally,  when  on  July 
II,  1780,  the  French  fleet  of  Admiral  de  Ternay,  with  the 
army  of  Rochambeau,  arrived  at  Newport  with  over  five  thou 
sand  men,  in  regiments  commanded  by  nobles  of  ancient  and 
historic  names,  of  Laval-Montmorenci,  Saint  Maime,  Deux- 
Ponts,  de  Custine,  d'Aboville,  and  de  Lauzun,  with  general 
officers  and  aids  like  Viomenil,  de  Chastellux,  de  Fersen, 
de  Dumas,  de  Noailles,  and  Montesquieu  —  never  forget- 

*  February  6,  1778. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  13 

ting  our  early  and  faithful  friend,  the  youthful  and  gallant 
Lafayette. 

Their  distinguished  services,  and  those  of  the  French  fleet 
under  Admiral  the  Count  De  Grasse,  who  sailed  from  Brest 
(March  22,  1781)  with  a  convoy  of  one  hundred  and  fifty 
ships,*  form  a  brilliant  chapter  in  our  history,  crowned  by 
the  decisive  affair  at  Yorktown.  The  centennial  commemora 
tion  of  that  event  and  the  welcome  given  to  our  guests  bearing 
the  names  of  Rochambeau,  Lafayette,  and  the  other  heroes 
of  France  whose  fame  is  intertwined  with  that  of  Washington 
and  his  generals,  showed  the  continuing  warmth  and  fresh 
ness  on  the  part  of  this  generation  of  the  feeling  of  gratitude 
and  good-will  with  which  Americans  of  the  last  century  re 
garded  the  aid  given  them  by  the  Court  of  Louis  XVI.  and 
Marie  Antoinette,  whose  portraits,  asked  for  by  Congress  and 
presented  by  the  King,  held  an  honorable  place  in  the  Con 
gressional  chamber  of  our  Federal  Hall.  The  tragedy  of  the 
French  Revolution  softens  all  thoughts  of  the  unhappy  sover 
eigns.  We  still  read  with  sadness  the  apostrophe  of  Burke  to 
the  young  Queen  of  France,  as  he  had  last  seen  her  decorat 
ing  and  cheering  the  elevated  sphere  she  had  just  begun  to 
move  in,  glittering  like  the  morning  star  full  of  life  and  splen 
dor  and  joy.  We  recall  her  gracious  words  to  the  youthful 
Lafayette  on  his  first  return  from  America,  "Tell  us  good 
news  of  our  dear  Republicans,  of  our  beloved  Americans," 
and  we  do  not  wonder  that  grave  historians  linger  for  a 
moment  on  the  touching  spectacle  of  the  sovereigns  of  that 
brilliant  Court  espousing  with  gayety  and  enthusiasm  the 
cause  of  freedom  in  the  rising  Republic  of  the  West.t 

Bancroft  says  that  when  they  embarked  for  the  liberation 
of  America,  pleasure  on  the  prow  and  the  uncertain  hand  of 
youth  at  the  helm,  they  might  have  cried  out  to  the  young 
Republic  which  they  fostered  :  <l  Morituri  te  salutant " — the 
doomed  to  die  salute  you. 

But  the  thought  is  the  sadder  that,  unlike  the  gladiators 

*  Yorktown  Centennial  Hand-Book,  by  John  Austin  Stevens,   p.  1 1.     New 
York,  1881. 

f  Lecky,  iv.,  p.  53;  Bancroft,  x.,  p.  47. 


14  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

who  saluted  Caesar,  Louis  and  his  fair  queen  were  smilingly 
unconscious  of  the  impending  terror  and  the  final  stroke. 

Soulavie,  the  author  of  "  Historical  and  Political  Memoirs 
of  the  Reign  of  Louis  XVI.,"  asserts  that  Congress  voted  a 
statue  to  the  King  at  Philadelphia,  and  he  gives  a  copy  of 
the  inscription  it  was  to  bear,  which  he  says  was  received  by 
him  from  Mr.  Franklin.* 

John  Adams  wrote  in  181 1  :  "  The  King  was  the  best  and 
sincerest  friend  we  had  in  France. "f 

However  unfriendly  or  disingenuous  the  policy  of  the 
French  Court  toward  America  in  reference  to  the  conditions 
of  the  peace,  it  was  the  policy  of  the  Court  and  not  of  the 
people  ;  and  whether  that  policy  was  due  to  the  weakness  or 
the  exigencies  of  the  Court,  the  conditions  of  the  Spanish 
alliance,  dynastic  influences  or  family  compacts,  the  intent 
of  that  unfriendly  policy  was  happily  arrested  ;  it  worked  no 
harm  to  the  success  and  prosperity  of  the  Republic  ;  while 
the  assistance  which  France  gave  us  in  the  war  had  the  most 
beneficial  and  permanent  results,  and  justified  the  cordial 
sentiment  which  exists  to-day  between  the  two  nations,  and 
which  Congress  has  fitly  recognized  by  appropriating  a  site 
and  providing  for  the  care  of  the  gigantic  statue  about  to  be 

*  The  work  of  Soulavie,  translated  from  the  French,  was  published  at  London, 
1802,  in  six  volumes.     The  inscription,  as  given  by  M.  Soulavie,  is  as  follows  : 

"  POST  DEUM 
Diligenda  et  servanda  est  libertas, 

Maximis  empta  laboribus 
Humanique  sanguinis  flumine  irrigata 
Per  imminentia  belli  pericula 

Juvante 
Optimo  Galliarum  principe  rege, 

LUDOVICO  XVI. 
Hanc  Statuam  principi  Augustissimo 

Consecravit. 
Et  seternam  pretiosamque  beneficii. 

Memoriam 
Grata  Reipublioe  veneratio 

Ultimis  tradit  nepotibus." — P.  343. 
f  Adams'  Works,  i. ,  p.  657. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  15 

presented  to   us  for  erection   in   the  harbor  of  New  York, 
representing  Liberty  enlightening  the  world. 


THE  HISTORIC  QUESTION. 

In  view  of  the  pre-eminent  and  permanent  importance  of 
the  treaty  of  peace,  our  review  of  its  negotiation  may  be 
preceded  by  a  glance  at  the  very  curious  rise  and  fall  of  the 
great  historic  question  which  has  so  long  been  agitated  as  to 
the  position  occupied  by  the  Court  of  France :  whether  that 
Court  really  favored  or  secretly  opposed  our  claims  to  the 
boundaries  toward  the  south,  the  west,  and  the  north,  to  the 
Mississippi  and  the  fisheries. 

Touching  that  question,  when  Jay  first  became  convinced 
that  France  was  opposed  to  us  on  the  points  most  essential 
to  the  dignity  and  interest  of  America  :  the  recognition  of 
our  independence  in  the  Commission  to  Oswald,  on  the  fish 
eries,  the  boundaries,  and  compensation  to  the  loyalists  ;  and 
that  the  instruction  of  Congress  to  be  guided  by  the  opinion 
of  the  French  Court  no  longer  applied  to  the  situation,  Frank 
lin  differed  with  Jay  as  to  the  correctness  of  his  views  and 
the  propriety  of  his  proposed  action.  When  in  pursuance 
of  Jay's  resolve  to  conduct  the  negotiation  without  consulting 
with  the  French  Cabinet — a  resolve  which  John  Adams  on 
his  arrival  thoroughly  approved,  and  in  which  Franklin  pres 
ently  acquiesced — terms  were  obtained  by  the  Provisional 
Articles  so  favorable  that  Vergennes  expressed  the  astonish 
ment  of  the  Government  of  France,  and  Secretary  Livingston 
the  joy  of  the  people  of  America,  the  latter  nevertheless 
doubted  the  correctness  of  the  ideas  of  the  Commissioners  in 
regard  to  France,  and  Congress  debated  the  matter  till  the 
signing  of  a  general  peace.*  Next,  Washington  and  his  Cab 
inet,  in  1797,  reviewed  at  length  the  entire  subject  in  a  mas 
terly  letter  by  Mr.  Secretary  Pickering  in  answer  to  a  charge 
of  ingratitude  made  by  the  French  Minister  Adet,  and  said  : 

"  We  see  then  that  in  forming  connection  with  us  in  1788 
the  Court  of  France,  the  actual  organ  of  the  nation,  had  no 

*  Rives'  Madison,  i.,  363.     See  also  Appendix. 


1 6  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

regard  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States,  but  that  their 
object  was,  by  seizing  the  occasion  of  dismembering  the 
British  empire,  to  diminish  the  power  of  a  formidable  rival,  and 
that  when,  after  we  had  carried  on  a  distressing  war  for  seven 
years,  the  great  object  for  which  we  had  contended,  inde 
pendence,  was  within  our  reach,  that  Court  endeavored  to 
postpone  the  acknowledgment  of  it  by  Great  Britain,  and 
eventually  to  deprive  us  of  its  fairest  fruits — a  just  extent  of 
territory,  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  and  the  fisheries." 

Mr.  Pickering  also  quoted  the  instructions  given  to  Mr. 
Genet  when  he  was  coming  to  the  United  States  as  Minister 
of  the  French  Republic  in  1793,  which  said  :  "  The  executive 
council  has  called  for  the  instructions  given  to  citizen  Genet's 
predecessor  in  America,  and  has  seen  in  them  with  indigna 
tion,  that  at  the  very  time  the  good  people  of  America  ex 
pressed  their  gratitude  to  us  in  the  most  feeling  manner  and 
gave  us  every  proof  of  their  friendship,  Vergennes  and 
Montmorin  thought  that  it  was  right  for  France  to  hinder 
the  United  States  from  taking  that  political  stability  of  which 
they  were  capable,  because  they  would  soon  acquire  a  strength 
which  it  was  probable  they  would  be  eager  to  abuse. 
The  same  Machiavellian  principle  influenced  the  operations  of 
the  war  for  independence  ;  the  same  duplicity  reigned  over 
the  negotiations  for  peace."* 

Two  editions  of  that  letter,  about  fifteen  hundred  copies, 
were  widely  distributed  in  Europe, t  and  it  placed  the  subject 
at  rest  until  the  year  1830,  when  Mr.  Jared  Sparks,  in  editing 
for  the  Government  the  diplomatic  correspondence  of  the 
Revolution,  introduced  into  the  eighth  volume  the  well-known 
note  \  in  which  he  stated  that  he  had  "  read  in  the  French 
Office  of  Foreign  Affairs  the  entire  correspondence  of  the 
Count  de  Vergennes  during  the  whole  war  with  the  French 
Ministers  in  this  country,  developing  the  policy  and  designs 

*  Pickering  to  Pinckney,  communicated  to  Congress  by  Washington,  by  spe 
cial  message,  January  19,  1797:  Am.  State  Papers,  i.,  pp.  559,  576. 

f  Gen.  Pinckney  to  the  Department,  Hague,  June  28,  1797:  Trescott's  Dip 
lomatic  History,  180. 

\  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  American  Revolution,  viii.,  pp.  208,  212. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  17 

of  the  French  Court  in  regard  to  the  war  and  the  object  to 
be  obtained  by  the  peace  ;  "   and  that  after  examining  these 
and  other  papers  with  care  and  accuracy  he  was  "  prepared  to 
express  his  belief  most  fully  that  Mr.  Jay  was  mistaken  both 
in  regard  to  the  aims  of  the  French  Court  and  the  plans  pur 
sued  by  them  to  gain  their  supposed  ends."     .      .     .     This 
note  was  followed  by  similar  and  perhaps  yet  stronger  state 
ments  in  his  "  Life  of  Gouverneur  Morris,"  his  "Life  of  Frank 
lin"  *  and  in  the  North  American  Review -.t     In  none  of  these 
is  any  reference  made  to  the  review  of  the  matter  by  the  Gov 
ernment  of  Washington,  nor  to  the   statement,  in  Marshall's 
"  Life  of  Washington,"  that  Genet  had  exhibited  to  our  Gov 
ernment  official  documents  disclosing  France's  opposition  to 
our  claims  at  the  peace  ;  and  the  correctness  of  Sparks'  state 
ment  of  the   character  of  the  Vergennes  correspondence,  as 
read  by  himself,  was  received  by  many  as  settling  the  question. 
Successive  historians  followed  his  lead.      Among  them  have 
been   Schlosser,   the  German    author  of  a  "  History   of  the 
Eighteenth  Century;"!  Mr.  Parton  in  his  "  Life  of  Frank- 
in;"  §   Mr.  Rives  in  his  "  Life  of  Madison  ;  "||    Mr.  George 
Ticknor  Curtis  in  his  recent  paper  on  the  "Treaty  of  Peace 
and  Independence  "   in  Harper's   Magazine^  and  a  recent 
writer  in  Leslie  s  Popular  Magazine  **    The  extent  to  which 
the  history  of  the  negotiation  has  been  caricatured  is  shown 
in  the  last-named  paper,  where  Jay  and  Adams  are  gravely 
arraigned  for  having  interfered  with  the  designs  of  France 
and  Spain.     The  author  says,  "  John  Jay's  persistent  refusal 
to  accede  to  the  demands  of  Spain,  aided  and  abetted  by 
Adams,  led  to  more  delays"  (p.  259). 

"  England  and  France,"  adds  the  writer,  "  were  harmo 
nious  in  nearly  every  respect,  and  finally  matters  were  arranged 
through  the  strenuous  efforts  of  Rayneval  the  French  pleni 
potentiary,  Franklin,  and  Count  d'Aranda." 

As  the  articles  were  negotiated  without  the  knowledge  of 

*  Vol.  iv.,  34.  f  For  January,  1830,  No.  Ixvi.,  p.  15. 

\  Vol.  v.,  p.  297,  of  Davidson's  translation.     London,  1845. 

§Vol.  ii.,  484.  ||  Vol.  L,  359. 

1[  For  April  and  May,  1883.  **  For  September,  1883. 


1 8  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

the  agents  of  France  and  Spain,  and  secured  for  America 
the  great  territories,  the  Mississippi,  and  the  fisheries,  of 
which  Rayneval  and  the  Count  d'Aranda  would  have  de 
prived  us,  the  statement  is  as  luminous  and  exact  as  if  the 
author  had  referred  to  the  brilliant  victory  won  by  Burgoyne 
at  Saratoga,  or  to  the  surrender  of  Washington's  army  and 
the  French  fleet  to  Lord  Cornwallis  at  Yorktown. 

Such  being  the  confused  position  of  the  matter  to-day, 
the  Historical  Society  has  done  me  great  honor  in  asking 
me  to  address  you  on  this  subject,  and  on 'this  occasion.  It 
was  a  request  enforced  by  weighty  names,  and  the  most 
graceful  courtesy  gave  it  the  force  of  a  command.*  And  yet 
I  might  have  hesitated  to  assume  the  task,  if  I  had  not 
recently  gathered,  at  home  and  abroad,  newly  discovered 
and  conclusive  evidence  upon  the  points  at  issue,  including 
much  from  the  secret  correspondence  of  Vergennes  in  the 
French  archives,  which  has  been  partially  published,  and 
which  seemed  to  be  as  yet  little  known  or  understood  in  this 
country. 

THE  QUESTION  SETTLED  BY  CONCLUSIVE  EVIDENCE. 

The  evidence  has  come,  happily,  in  the  last  decade  of  the 
century,  to  end,  let  us  hope  forever,  the  dispute  which,  after 
the  calm,  judicial  review  by  Washington  and  his  Cabinet, 

*  The  letter  of  invitation,  bearing  the  signature  of  the  President  of  the  His 
torical  Society  and  other  venerable  and  distinguished  names,  said  : 

*'  The  time  at  which  this  anniversary  will  occur  suggests  a  fitting  subject  for 
the  occasion — the  history  of  that  important  treaty  by  which  Great  Britain  recog 
nized  the  freedom  and  independence  of  the  United  States,  a  recognition  alike 
unqualified  and  irrevocable,  notwithstanding  the  efforts  to  make  it  otherwise, 
and  subject  it  to  the  contingencies  of  the  policy,  influence,  and  authority  of 
France. 

u  The  part  which  your  honored  ancestor  had  in  all  these  transactions  will  give 
peculiar  value  to  the  results  of  studies  in  which  you  have  an  hereditary  interest, 
and  we  trust  that  you  will  not  be  reluctant  to  render  this  service  to  history  in 
setting  out  the  fair  record  of  so  great  a  son  of  New  York  in  connection  with  so 
great  an  event.  '  The  glory  of  children  are  their  fathers,'  and  New  York  desires 
to  do  honor  to  the  best  memories  of  her  best  men,  in  full  sympathy  with  all  the 
reverence  of  filial  piety." 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  19 

should  never  have  been  re-opened.  Had  that  review,  with 
its  reference  to  official  proofs  in  the  French  archives,  been 
studied  and  verified,  instead  of  accepting  with  haste  and  cre 
dulity  personal  suggestions  and  assurances  from  any  person, 
however  respectable,  we  should  have  been  spared  the  traves 
ties  of  the  history  of  the  peace  negotiations  which  for  half  a 
century  have  misled  the  world. 

In  the  peace  negotiations  was  fought  a  diplomatic  battle, 
on  the  result  of  which  was  to  depend  the  fairest  fruits  of  the 
seven  years'  war  of  the  Revolution. 

As  in  that  war  we  were  aided  by  France  and  Spain, 
anxious  to  secure  the  separation  of  the  American  colonies 
from  England,  to  weaken  the  power  and  effect  the  humilia 
tion  of  their  ancient  rival ;  so,  in  the  negotiations  for  peace, 
when  we  were  seeking  to  secure  a  vast  extent  of  territory  at 
the  South,  West,  and  North,  with  the  Newfoundland  fisheries, 
all  essential  to  our  national  dignity,  independence,  and  power, 
we  stood  alone.  Our  allies  in  the  war  had  no  further  interest 
in  our  success:  The  situation  had  become  changed.  They 
had  become  our  active  and  determined  opponents.  It  was 
no  longer  America,  France,  arrd  Spain  against  England,  but 
it  was  England,  France,  and  Spain  against  the  young  Re 
public,  whose  future  greatness  loomed  unpleasantly  upon  the 
troubled  vision  of  the  Continental  statesmen. 

The  position  of  Spain  to  those  familiar  with  our  own 
diplomatic  records  requires  no  explanation.  She  entered  into 
the  war  with  hesitation  and  reluctance,  and  only  upon  the 
agreement  of  France  to  assist  her  in  enlarging  her  American 
possessions,  and  in  restricting  the  limit  of  the  young  Republic 
whose  future  influence  she  feared  and  whose  approaching 
independence  she  saw  with  grief.  The  devotion  of  Spain  to 
her  own  interests  as  pictured  by  the  Count  de  Vergennes,  the 
diplomatic  chief  of  her  great  ally,  was  conspicuous  even 
among  the  grasping  powers  of  Europe.  "We  never,"  he 
said,  "  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  Spain  will  strive  to  set  her 
own  interests  before  everything  else." 

The  Count  de  Montmorin,  a  year  later,  described  the 
feeling  of  Spain  toward  American  independence  as  one  "  of 


2O  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

indifference  or  even  actual  repugnance,"  and  he  refers  to 
Spain's  having  brought  the  American  delegates  to  the  brink 
of  bankruptcy  for  a  matter  of  forty  or  fifty  thousand  dollars' 
worth  of  exchange,  which  had  been  accepted  in  consequence 
of  some  hopes  having  been  held  out.* 

The  aim  of  France  in  aiding  the  American  colonies  ex 
tended  beyond  the  blow  which  their  loss  would  be  to  the 
power  and  prestige  of  Great  Britain.  The  instructions  given 
to  M.  Gerard  when  he  was  sent  to  the  United  States  as 
resident  agent  advised  him  that  "  the  independence  of  North 
ern  America,  and  its  permanent  -union  with  France,  have 
been  the  King's  principal  object."  f 

This  distinct  avowal  goes  far  toward  explaining  the  desire 
of  the  Court  of  France  to  confine  the  United  States  to  narrow 
boundaries,  to  surround  them  with  European  powers,  to  de 
prive  them  of  the  fisheries  which  would  constitute  a  nursery 
for  seamen, $  to  exclude  them  from  the  navigation  of  the  Mis 
sissippi,  to  prevent  their  extension  at  the  North  beyond  the 
Ohio,  to  keep  alive  the  jealousy  of  England,  and  "make  it 
feel,"  in  the  words  of  Vergennes,  "  the  need  of  sureties,  allies, 
and  protectors."  § 

The  sources  from  which  the  proofs  have  come  are  now 
open  to  almost  all  the  world,  the  principal  proofs  are  already 
accessible. 

In  London  I  had  the  opportunity,  through  the  courtesy 
of  Lord  Salisbury,  and  of  our  late  lamented  friend,  Lord 
Tenterden,  of  the  High  Commission,  of  examining  all  papers 
relating  to  the  treaty  in  the  State  Office,  which,  on  special 
application,  are  generously  opened  to  inspection,  including 

*  Count  de  Vergennes  to  Count  de  Montmorin,  January  22,  1781,  III.  de 
Circourt,  319;  and  Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  Madrid,  March  30,  1782,  III.  de 
Circourt,  327. 

f  Memoire  pour  servir  d'instruction  au  Sieur  Gerard,  Secretaire  du  Conseil 
.  d'£tat,  allant  resider  de  la  part  du  roi,  aupres  du  Congres  general  des  £tats  Unis, 
29  Mars,  1778  ;  III.  de  Circourt,  Documents  originaux  inedits,  p.  255. 

\  Lord  St.  Helens  :  Memoranda  on  Jay's  Life,  quoted  in  the  New  York  Re 
view,  Vol.  IX.,  pp.  306-7,  cited  in  the  text  supra. 

§  Le  Comte  de  Vergennes  auComtede  Montmorin,  October  30,  1788,  III.  de 
Circourt,  310. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  21 

the  minute  and  valuable  letters  of  Mr., .Oswald,  of  which  there 
is  now  a  copy  among  the  Franklin  papers  in  the  State  De 
partment  of  Washington.  I  had  collected  also  historic  evi 
dence,  not  yet  reprinted  here,  afforded  by  secret  and  confi 
dential  correspondence  from  the  French  archives,  of  the  Count 
de  Vergennes  with  his  skilful  diplomatic  agents,  the  Count 
de  Montmorin  at  Madrid,  M.  Gerard  and  M.  de  la  Luzerne 
at  Philadelphia,  and  M.  de  Rayneval  at  London.  These 
authentic  documents  while  exhibiting  the  resolve  of  France 
which  even  the  Court  of  Spain  could  not  shake,  to  guarantee 
the  actual  independence  of  the  United  States  of  the  English 
dominion  (but  not  its  acknowledgment  by  that  power),  a 
resolve  which  had  been  carried  out  faithfully  and  generously 
during  the  war,  exhibits  also  with  equal  clearness  her  policy 
in  connection  with  the  Court  of  Spain,  to  which  she  was 
bound  by  the  Bourbon  family  compact,  as  well  as  by  the 
special  alliance,  to  subject  American  interests  to  those  of  the 
Spanish  colonial  system  ;  to  restrict  our  boundaries  and  our 
future  power  ;  to  shut  us  off  from  the  Gulf,  the  Mississippi, 
and  the  Lakes  ;  to  bound  us  on  the  north  by  the  Ohio, 
and,  in  fact,  to  confine  the  new  Republic  to  a  narrow  strip 
along  the  Atlantic,  and  to  deprive  us  of  the  Newfoundland 
fisheries. 

After  the  statement  officially  and  repeatedly  made  by  the 
late  Dr.  Sparks,*  that  nothing  of  this  policy  was  to  be  found 
in  the  entire  correspondence  of  the  Count  de  Vergennes,  dur 
ing  the  whole  war,  with  the  French  Ministers  in  this  country, 
which  he  had  read  with  care  and  accuracy,  some  doubt  might 
perhaps  be  naturally  felt  as  to  the  authenticity  of  the  corre 
spondence  now  brought  to  light,  which  sustains  by  accumulat 
ing  proof  the  views  expressed  by  Franklin,  Adams,  and  Jay 
in  their  joint  letters,  and  by  Adams  and  Jay  in  their  separate 
letters,  in  regard  to  the  policy  of  the  two  courts.  But  the  fact 
that  the  documents  in  question  were  gathered  from  the  French 
archives  by  our  learned  associate  Dr.  George  Bancroft,  and 
that  they  were  given  by  him  to  the  Count  de  Circourt  of  the 
French  Diplomatic  Service,  by  whom  they  were  printed  at 

*  Dip.  Cor.,  vol.  vii.,  p.  208  et  seq.     Boston,  1830. 


22  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

Paris,*  divests  them  of,  doubt  and  entitles  them  to  entire  con 
fidence.  To  Mr.  Bancroft  and  the  Count  de  Circourt  all 
thanks  are  due  for  placing  the  correspondence  of  Vergennes 
before  the  world  in  a  shape  that  the  facts  it  discloses  can 
never  more  be  successfully  misrepresented.  Next  in  import 
ance  to  these  Paris  documents  is  the  evidence  afforded  by 
the  papers  of  Lord  Shelburne,  whose  life  has  been  published 
by  his  grandson,  Lord  Edmond  Fitzmaurice,  now  (1883)  As 
sistant  Secretary  in  the  Foreign  Office,  of  which  his  illus 
trious  ancestor  was  the  chief.  The  third  volume  contains  a 
very  valuable  and  interesting  sketch  of  the  negotiation  from 
the  British  point  of  view.  It  is  illustrated  with  maps,  one 
of  which  (p.  294)  shows  the  two  northern  frontier  lines  "  as 
settled  in  October  and  November,  1782,  respectively,  by  Mr. 
Oswald,"  and  another  (p.  170),  a  map  of  part  of  "  North 
America,  showing  the  boundaries  of  the  United  States,  Can 
ada,  and  the  Spanish  possessions,  according  to  the,  proposals 
of  the  Court  of  France."  This  map  shows  at  a  glance  what 
our  boundaries  would  have  been  had  the  instructions  of  Con 
gress  been  obeyed.  The  volume  also  discloses  the  part  taken 
by  Rayneval  in  his  conference  with  Lord  Shelburne  and  Lord 
Grantham  against  the  American  claims  to  the  fisheries,  the 
boundaries,  and  the  Mississippi  ;  and  the  effect  upon  Lord 
Shelburne  of  the  almost  simultaneous  arrival  of  Vaughan, 
who  had  been  dispatched  by  Jay,  to  counteract  the  opposi 
tion  of  Rayneval,  and  who  brought  back  the  new  commission 
to  Oswald,  and  the  result  of  whose  visit  marks  it  as  the  turn 
ing-point  of  our  success.  Through  the  obliging  courtesy  of 
Mr.  Bancroft  I  have  also  had  the  opportunity  of  examining  in 
his  library  at  Washington  his  very  valuable  MS.  volumes 
-entitled  "  America,  France,  and  England." 

The  tenth  volume  of  Bancroft's  History  contains  many 
important  extracts  from  the  French  documents,  not  contained 
in  the  volume  of  Circourt,  and  an  interesting  sketch  of  the 

*  The  title  of  the  work  is  Histoire  de  P Action  commune  de  la  France  et  de 
I'Amerique  pour  P  Independence  des  Etats-Unis,  par  George  Bancroft,  etc. 
Traduit  et  annote  par  le  comte  Adolphe  de  Circourt,  etc.  Tome  troisieme. 
Documents  originaux  inedits.  Paris  :  F.  Vieweg.  1876. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  23 

formation  by  Vergennes  of  the  alliance  with  Spain,  and  of  the 
concessions  or  pledge  which  to  secure  it  he  consented  to 
make,  in  regard  to  the  American  claims,  in  agreeing  to  adopt 
and  further  the  policy  of  Spain,  which  tended  to  limit  our 
boundaries  and  restrain  our  power. 

Mr.  Bancroft,  in  the  preface,  remarks  that  the  embarrass 
ments  of  Vergennes,  arising  alike  from  his  entanglements  re 
specting  Gibraltar  and  the  urgency  of  his  king  for  peace, 
"  explain  and  justify  the  proceedings  of  the  American  Com 
mission  in  signing  preliminaries  of  peace  in  advance,"  and 
that  "the  requirement  of  the  change  in  Oswald's  commission, 
so  grateful  to  the  self-respect  of  America,  is  due  exclusively 
to  Jay." 

Mr.  Bancroft  had  not  then  seen  the  "  Life  of  Lord  Shel- 
burne,"  by  his  grandson,  Lord  Edmond  Fitzmaurice,  with 
its  disclosure  of  the  efforts  of  Rayneval  in  his  interview 
with  Shelburne  and  Grantham  to  prejudice  the  American 
claims,  and  the  complete  success  of  the  mission  of  Vaughan, 
who  returned  with  the  new  commission  to  treat  with  the 
United  States,  leaving  the  British  Ministry  resolved  upon  a 
policy  that  should  relieve  America  from  dependence  upon 
French  and  Spanish  influence.  When  advised  of  this,  Mr. 
Bancroft  remarked  that  he  would  carefully  review  his  state 
ment  on  this  subject  for  his  revised  edition. 

It  would  be  impossible  within  the  limits  of  an  address 
suited  to  tbis  occasion  to  give  more  than  an  outline  of  the 
negotiation,  leaving  much  to  be  supplied  by  notes  and  appen 
dices.  With  your  kind  permission  I  will  briefly  recall  its 
leading  features,  which  are  well  known  from  the  records  of 
our  own  Commissioners,  and  you  can  then  judge  of  the  im 
portance  of  the  new  evidence,  showing  that  France  and  Spain 
were  united  against  us  on  the  fisheries,  the  boundaries,  and 
the  Mississippi,  and  exhibiting  the  difficulties  and  dangers 
of  the  negotiation,  arising  from  their  opposition  and  the  in 
struction  of  Congress,  and  the  singular  skill  with  which  these 
difficulties  were  not  merely  avoided,  but  made  to  contribute 
to  our  success. 


24  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 


THE  POSITION  IN  ENGLAND. 

The  surrender  of  Cornwallis  on  November  25,  1781,  which 
was  received  by  Lord  North  with  the  exclamation  "  O  God  ! 
all  is  over,"  created  in  England  a  conviction  of  the  hopeless 
ness  of  conquering  America.  Burke,  Fox,  and  the  younger 
Pitt  assailed  the  Government ;  public  meetings  in  London  and 
Westminster  strengthened  the  opposition  ;  and  after  a  series 
of  debates  in  Parliament,  Lord  North,  on  March  20,  1782, 
anticipated  his  dismissal  by  announcing  his  resignation,  and 
with  North  fell  the  Tory  party  and  their  system  of  government. 
The  king,  after  a  threat  of  abdication  and  a  return  to  Han 
over,  reluctantly  accepted  as  his  Minister  that  respectable  and 
honorable  statesman  Lord  Rockingham,  and  it  was  said  by 
Lord  North  that  while  the  late  opposition  had  often  accused 
him  of  issuing  lying  Gazettes  he  had  never  issued  any  Gazette 
which  was  half  s6  false  as  that  in  which  his  successors  an 
nounced  their  installation  to  office,  with  the  words  "  His 
Majesty  has  been  pleased  to  appoint."  * 

The  Cabinet  of  Rockingham  was  divided  into  two  parts, 
of  which  Fox  said  one  belonged  to  the  king  and  the  other  to 
the  public. 

Fox  as  Secretary  for  the  Foreign,  and  Shelburne  for 
Home  and  Colonial  Department,  showed  for  each  other 
personal  dislike  and  political  hostility,  and  this  variance  dis 
turbed  their  efforts  to  inaugurate  a  negotiation  for  peace. 

Shelburne  sent,  in  April,  Mr.  Richard  Oswald  to  confer 
with  Franklin,  who  alone  of  the  American  Commission  was  at 
Paris.  Fox  sent  Mr.  Thomas  Grenville  to  communicate  with 
the  Count  de  Vergennes,  and  a  memorandum  for  Oswald 
(dated  April  28,  1782)  showed  this  significant  instruction  : 
"  Insist  in  the  strongest  manner  that,  if  America  is  inde 
pendent,  she  must  be  so  of  the  whole  world.  No  secret, 
tacit,  or  ostensible  connection  with  France." 

On  April  22d  Franklin  wrote  to  Jay,  at  Madrid  :  "  Here 
you  are  greatly  wanted,  for  messengers  begin  to  come  and 

*  Lecky's  History  of  England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  iv. ,  p.  221.  * 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  25 

go,  and  there  is  much  talk  of  a  treaty  proposed,  but  I  can 
neither  make  nor  agree  to  propositions  of  peace  without  the 
assistance  of  my  colleagues.  Mr.  Adams,  I  am  afraid,  can- 
not  just  now  leave  Holland.  Mr.  Jefferson  is  not  in  Europe, 
and  Mr.  Laurens  is  a  prisoner,  though  abroad  upon  parole. 
I  wish,  therefore,  that  you  would  render  yourself  here  as 
soon  as  possible.  You  would  be  of  infinite  service.  Spain 
has  taken  four  years  to  consider  whether  she  should  treat- 
with  us  or  not.  Give  her  forty,  and  let  us  in  the  meantime 
mind  our  own  business.  ...  I  am  ever,  my  dear  friend, 
most  affectionately  yours,  .  .  '  ."* 

On  May  28th  the  Cabinet  authorized  Grenville  to  make 
certain  propositions  of  peace  to  the  belligerent  powers. 
When  the  news  of  the  great  victory  of  Rodney  had  materially 
modified  the  situation,  the  Cabinet  authorized  Grenville  to 
propose  the  independency  of  America  in  the  first  instance, 
instead  of  making  it  a  condition  of  general  treaty. 

On  June  4th  Grenville  wrote  to  Fox  a  letter,  which  showed 
that  the  jealousy  and  hostility  of  the  two  secretaries  had  ex 
tended  to  their  agents  in  Paris.  The  fact  that  Shelburne 
had  received  from  Franklin  a  confidential  paper  of  impor 
tance  to  the  negotiation  of  which  he  had  not  advised  the 
Cabinet,  was  referred  to  by  Fox  as  "this  duplicity  of  con 
duct."  The  unsatisfactory  language  of  Vergennes  had  led 
them  to  think  that  he  desired  to  postpone  the  negotiation, 
and  "  they  imagined  that  peace  might  still  be  made  separately 
with  America,  or  at  least  that  America  might  become  so  far 
neutral  that  the  whole  energies  of  England  might  be  concen 
trated  on  her  European  enemies." 

On  June  3Oth  Fox,  greatly  displeased  at  this,  moved  in 
the  Cabinet  that  the  independence  of  America  should  be  un 
conditionally  acknowledged.  The  motion,  if  carried,  would 
have  placed  the  negotiation  with  America  in  the  province  of 
the  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs.  It  was  lost  by  a  majority 
of  four.  Fox  at  once  announced  to  his  colleagues  that  ' '  his 
part  was  taken  to  quit  his  office,"  but  the  next  day  Rocking- 

*  Jay's  Life,  ii.,  p.  4. 


26  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

ham  died  ;  *  and  Walpole  remarked  that,  upon  the  death  of 
Rockingham,  the  crown  devolved  upon  the  King  of  England. 

Rockingham  was  succeeded  by  Shelburne,  to  whom  the 
King  the  same  day  offered  with  the  post  the  fullest  political 
confidence.  \ 

Fox,  whose  sympathies  had  been  so  strongly  with  the 
Americans  that  when,  ten  years  later,  he  expressed  to  his 
nephew  his  joy  at  the  defeat  of  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  by 
the  French  at  the  battle  of  Valmy,  he  said:  "  No  public 
event,  not  excepting  Saratoga  and  Yorktown,  ever  happened 
that  gave  me  such  delight, "f — declined  to  remain  in  the 
Cabinet,  taking  the  first  step  toward  the  restoration  to 
power  of  Lord  North  and  the  Tories  by  what  a  late  and 
much  lamented  English  historian  calls  "the  most  unscrupu 
lous  coalition  known  in  our  history. "$  His  resignation  was 
followed  by  those  of  Lord  Cavendish,  Lord  Althorpe,  and 
Mr.  Montague,  of  the  Treasury  Board  ;  by  Burke  and  Sheri 
dan,  the  Duke  of  Portland,  Fitzpatrick,  and  Solicitor-General 
Lee.  The  vacant  offices  were  filled  by  William  Pitt  as  Chan 
cellor  of  the  Exchequer ;  Thomas  Townsend  in  the  Home 
and  Colonial  Department,  with  the  lead  in  the  House  of 
Commons ;  Lord  Grantham,  for  many  years  minister  at 
Madrid,  whose  long  diplomatic  experience  was  expected  to 
prove  of  invaluable  service  ;  Richmond  and  Conway  in  their 
old  places ;  Lord  Camden  as  President  of  the  Council  ; 
Pepperarden,  Solicitor -General.  Of  the  eleven  ministers 
who  formed  the  Cabinet,  three  were  Chathamist  Whigs,  the 
followers  of  Rockingham,  Grantham  of  no  political  party,  and 
the  Chancellor  representing  the  King.j 

This  was  the  Cabinet  which,  however  unfortunate  they 
may  have  been  deemed  when  overthrown  by  a  coalition 
which  English  historians  condemn  as  infamous,  have  the  great 
honor  on  the  page  of  history  of  having  solved  the  American 

*  Shelburne's  Life,  iii.,  p.  221.     July  I,  1783. 

flbid.,  p.  222,  "The  King  to  Shelburne,"  July  i,  1782. 

\  Lecky,  iv.,  335,  note  i. 

§  Green's  History  of  England,  p.  760. 

I  Shelburne's  Life,  iii.,  p.  227,  8,  9. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  27 

question  by  a  treaty  which,  at  the  end  of  a  long  and  em 
bittered  civil  war,  laid  the  foundation  of  a  permanent  and 
cordial  friendship  between  the  two  great  English-speaking 
nations,  on  whose  harmonious  action  depend  in  no  small 
degree  the  progress  of  civilization  and  the  peace  and  happi 
ness  of  the  world. 

Surprise  has  sometimes  been  intimated  or  expressed  by 
both  English  and  American  writers,  that  the  negotiation 
should  have  been  entrusted  to  a  diplomat  as  inexperienced 
as  Mr.  Oswald,  and  one  so  little  fitted  to  cope  with  men  of  the 
marked  ability  and  training  of  Franklin,  Adams,  and  Jay.  But 
the  interests  of  Great  Britain  were  but  measurably  entrusted 
to  Mr.  Oswald,  whose  common  sense,  honesty,  and  good-will 
were  admirably  calculated  to  smoothethe  path  of  negotiation, 
and  whose  intelligence  and  indefatigable  industry  kept  Lord 
Shelburne  and  his  associates  advised  of  each  varying  phase  of 
the  negotiation,  of  everything  said  by  the  American  Ministers, 
jointly  or  separately,  as  nearly  as  possible  in  their  own  words, 
and  with  a  note,  whenever  they  were  significant,  of  their  tone 
and  manner.  Mr.  Oswald's  personal  suggestions  as  that  the 
Americans  could  not  be  expected  to  make  compensation  to 
the  loyalists,  or  that  he  was  himself  in  favor  of  ceding  Canada, 
carried  little  weight  with  the  Cabinet  at  London,  and  every 
concession  made  to  the  American  Commission,  whether  in 
the  change  of  the  Commission  to  the  form  prepared  by  Jay, 
or  in  the  course  of  the  negotiation  when  Oswald  was  alone, 
or  when  assisted  by  Fitzherbert  and  later  also  by  Strachey 
before  the  Provincial  Articles  were  adopted  and  signed,  was 
made  by  Lord  Shelburne  and  his  accomplished  secretaries, 
Thomas  Townsend  and  Lord  Grantham.  And  these  eminent 
diplomats,  supported  by  William  Pitt,  the  Duke  of  Richmond, 
and  the  rest  of  the  Shelburne  Cabinet,  were  in  the  peace 
negotiations  the  able  champions  of  the  honor  and  interests  of 
Great  Britain,  and  the  real  antagonists  whom  the  American 
Commission  had  to  deal  with  and  convince. 

When  Fox  resigned,  Grenville  followed  his  example,  al 
though  Shelburne  wished  him  to  remain,  and  Mr.  Alleyne 
Fitzherbert,  the  English  minister  at  Brussels,  was  appointed 


28  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

in  his  place  ;  and  Franklin  intimated  to  Oswald  that,  until 
some  acknowledgment  was  made  and  the  treaty  formally 
began,  propositions  and  discussions  seemed,  on  consideration, 
to  be  untimely.* 

Jay,  owing  to  unavoidable  delays,  did  not  arrive  at  Paris 
until  June  23d.  He  waited  that  afternoon  on  Doctor  Franklin 
at  Passy,  by  whom  he  was  cordially  welcomed.  On  the  24th 
they  went  together  to  see  Vergennes,  who  gave  Jay  "  a  very 
friendly  reception,"  and  on  the  29th  they  both  waited  by  ap 
pointment  on  the  Count  d'Aranda,  who  received  them  in  a 
friendly  manner,  and  expressed  his  wishes  that  close  connec 
tion  might  be  formed  between  our  countries  on  terms  agree 
able  to  both.  The  Count  returned  their  visit  and  invited  them 
to  dinner,  but  on  the  day  named  Jay  was  taken  sick  and  con 
tinued  so  for  many  weeks,  and  he  wrote  in  September  that  he 
was  not  yet  perfectly  recovered,  t 

His  first  impression  of  Paris  was  favorable.  To  the  Count 
de  Montmorin,  the  French  Ambassador  at  Madrid,  he  wrote  :  \ 
"  What  I  have  seen  of  France  pleases  me  exceedingly.  Doc 
tor  Franklin  has  received  some  late  noble  proofs  of  the  King's 
liberality  in  the  liquidation  of  his  accounts,  and  the  terms  and 
manner  of  paying  the  balance  due  on  them.  No  people  un 
derstand  doing  civil  things  so  well  as  the  French.  The  aids 
they  have  afforded  us  received  additional  value  from  the  gen 
erous  and  gracious  manner  in  which  they  were  supplied,  and 
that  circumstance  will  have  a  proportionable  degree  of  influ 
ence  in  cementing  the  connection  formed  between  the  two 
countries." 

Of  Vergennes,  Jay  wrote  to  Livingston  :  "  His  answer  to 
the  British  minister  appeared  to  me  ably  drawn.  It  breathes 
great  moderation,  and  yet  is  so  general  as  to  leave  room  for 
such  demands  as  circumstances  at  the  time  of  the  treaty  may 
render  convenient."  Of  Franklin  he  wrote  :  "  I  have  en 
deavored  to  get  lodgings  as  near  to  Doctor  Franklin  as  I  can. 

*  Shelburne  (iii.,  p.  246)  quoting   Franklin  to  Oswald,   July  12;   Oswald  to 
Shelburne,  July  12,  1782. 

f  Jay  to  Livingston,  Dip.  Cor.,  viii.,  p.  149. 

|  Jay  to  Montmorin,  June  26,  1782,  Jay's  Life,  ii.,  p.  100. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  29 

He  is  in  perfect  good  health,  and  his  mind  appears  more 
vigorous  than  that  of  any  man  of  his  age  I  have  known.  He 
certainly  is  a  valuable  minister  and  an  agreeable  companion."  * 
On  July  Qth  Franklin  communicated  to  Oswald  the  outline 
of  the  condition  for  a  treaty,  including  an  essential,  complete 
independence,  a  settlement  of  the  boundaries,  a  confinement 
of  the  boundaries  of  Canada,  and  a  freedom  of  fishing  on  the 
banks  of  Newfoundland.  Parliament  rose  on  July  nth  and 
Shelburne,  in  the  words  of  his  biographer,  despatched  to  Paris 
Benjamin  Vaughan,  the  political  economist  and  intimate 
friend  of  Franklin,  "  to  give  private  assurances  to  the  latter 
that  the  change  of  administration  brought  with  it  no  change 
of  policy,  t 

THE  FIRST  COMMISSION  TO  OSWALD. 

On  July  2/th  Shelburne  wrote  to  Oswald  :  "A  com 
mission  will  be  immediately  forwarded  to  you  containing  full 
power  to  treat,  to  conclude  ;  with  instructions  ...  to 
make  the  independency  of  the  Colonies  the  bases  and  pre 
liminaries  of  the  treaty  now  depending;  you  will  find  the 
ministry  united,  in  full  possession  of  the  King's  confidence, 
and  strongly  devoted  to  peace  if  it  can  be  had  on  reasonable 
terms  ;  if  not,  determined  to  have  recourse  to  every  means  of 
arousing  the  kingdom  to  the  most  determined  efforts."  f 

By  the  commission  drawn  by  the  Attorney-General,  Os 
wald  was  empowered  "  to  treat,  consent,  and  conclude  with 
any  commissioner  or  commissioners  named  or  to  be  named 
by  the  said  Colonies  or  Plantations,  and  any  body  or  bodies 
whatever,  a  peace  or  truce  with  the  said  Colonies  or  Planta 
tions,  or  any  of  them,  or  any  part  or  parts  thereof."  § 

*  Jay  to  Livingston,  June  25th,  Dip.  Cor.,  viii.,  pp.  114,  115. 

f  Shelburne's  Life,  iii.,  p.  243. 

\  Bancroft's  MSS.,  America,  France,  and  England,  1781-82,  vol.  i. 

§  By  the  instructions  to  Oswald  given  at  the  same  time,  he  was  told,  "In 
case  you  find  the  American  Commissioners  are  not  at  liberty  to  treat  on  any  terms 
but  that  of  independence,  you  are  to  declare  to  them  that  you  have  authority  to 
make  that  concession." 

He  was  directed  fck  to  claim,  as  a  matter  of  absolute  justice,  all  debts  incurred  to 


30  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

Mr.  Oswald,  writing  to  his  Government  on  August  7, 
1782,  said  that  the  courier  arrived  with  the  commission  the 
day  before,  and  he  had  carried  a  copy  of  it  to  Dr.  Franklin, 
at  Passy.  He  added  that  Dr.  Franklin,  "  after  perusal,  said 
he  was  glad  it  had  come  ;  that  he  had  been  at  Versailles  yes 
terday  and  Mons.  de  Vergennes  had  asked  about  it,  and 
upon  the  Doctor  telling  him  it  had  not  come  he  said  he 
could  do  nothing  with  Mr.  Fitzherbert  till  it  arrived,  as  both 
treaties  must  go  on  together,  hand  in  hand.  ...  I  pro 
posed  calling  on  Mr.  Jay,  the  only  other  Commissioner,  in 
Paris.  The  Doctor  said  it  was  right  and  returned  me  the 
copy  of  the  commission  to  be  left  with  Mr.  Jay,  which  he 
would  bring  back  to  the  Doctor  as  he  was  to  dine  at  Passy. 
I  accordingly  returned  to  Paris  and  called  on  Mr.  Jay.  He  is 
a  man  of  good  sense,  of  frank,  easy  and  polite  manners.  .  .  . 
After  reading  the  commission  he  said  he  hoped  some  good 
would  be  done.  I  replied  if  I  did  not  think  so  I  would  not 
be  here.  He  said  he  was  so  informed  by  Dr.  Franklin,  and 
then  began  upon  the  Article 'of  Independence,  and  continued 
the  conversation  in  the  manner  as  has  been  mentioned,  in  the 
coolest  unreserved  method  and  determined  style  of  language 
that  any  common  subject  could  be  treated,  and  with  a  free 
dom  of  expression  and  disapprobation  at  home  and  abroad 
respecting  America,  as  shows  we  have  little  to  expect  from 
him  in  the  way  of  indulgence,  and  I  may  venture  to  say  that 
although  he  has  lived  till  now  as  an  English  subject,  though 
he  has  never  been  in  England,  he  may  be  supposed  (by  any 
thing  I  could  perceive)  as  much  alienated  from  any  particular 

the  subjects  of  Great  Britain  before  1775,  and  the  interposition  of  Congress  with 
the  several  provinces  to  procure  an  ample  satisfaction  upon  this  point ;  to  demand 
the  restitution  of  the  confiscated  property  of  the  Loyalists  or  an  indemnification  ;  to 
claim  New  York,  which  was  still  in  possession  of  the  English  troops,  and  the  un- 
granted  domains  in  each  province  as  a  possible  means  of  obtaining  this  indemnifi 
cation  ;  to  do  everything  in  his  power  to  prevent  the  United  States  entering  into 
any  binding  connection  with  any  other  power  ;  to  propose  an  unreserved  system 
of  naturalization  as  the  foundation  of  a  future  amicable  connection  ;  to  act  in  per 
fect  harmony  with  the  envoy  sent  to  negotiate  with  the  European  belligerents  (Mr. 
Fitzherbert),  and  if  necessary,  to  dispose  the  American  Commissioners  towards  a 
separate  negotiation."  * 

*  Shelburne's  Life,  iii.,  p.  250. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  31 

regard  for  England  as  if  he  had  never  heard  of  it  in  his  life. 
I  sincerely  trust  I  may  be  mistaken,  but  I  think  it  proper  to 
make  the  remark,  as  Mr.  Jay  is  Dr.  Franklin's  only  colleague, 
and  being  a  much  younger  man  and  bred  to  the  law,  will  of 
course  have  a  great  share  of  the  business  assigned  to  his 
care."  * 

Mr.  Oswald's  power  was  promptly  communicated  by 
Franklin  and  Jay,  in  conformity  with  their  instructions,  to  the 
Count  de  Vergennes.  The  Count,  in  a  note  of  August  8th, 
promised  to  examine  it  with  the  greatest  attention,  and  to 
confer  with  them  on  the  subject  on  the  loth.  On  that  day 
the  Count  advised  the  American  Commissioners,  for  reasons 
which  Jay  deemed  singular  and  fallacious,  that  it  would  do  : 
and  the  Count  subsequently  communicated  that  advice  to 
Mr.  Fitzherbert,  the  British  Minister. 

Franklin  "believed  the  commission  would  do,"  but  Jay 
was  clear  that  it  would  not.  He  wrote  to  Livingston  :  "  On 
returning,!  could  not  forbear  observing  to  Doctor  Franklin  that 
it  was  evident  the  Count  did  not  wish  to  see  our  indepen 
dence  acknowledged  by  Britain  until  they  had  made  all  their 
use  of  us.  It  was  easy  for  them  to  foresee  difficulties  in  bring 
ing  Spain  into  a  peace  on  moderate  terms,  and  that  if  we 
once  found  ourselves  standing  on  our  own  legs,  our  inde 
pendency  acknowledged  and  all  our  terms  ready  to  be  granted, 
we  might  not  think  it  our  duty  to  continue  in  the  war  for  the 
attainment  of  Spanish  objects.  But  on  the  contrary,  as  we 
were  bound  by  treaty  to  continue  the  war  till  our  indepen 
dence  should  be  attained,  it  was  the  interest  of  France  to  post 
pone  that  event  until  their  own  views  and  that  of  Spain  could 
be  gratified  by  a  peace,  and  that  I  could  not  otherwise  ac 
count  for  the  Minister  advising  us  to  act  in  a  manner  incon 
sistent  with  our  dignity,  and  for  reasons  which  he  himself 
had  too  much  understanding  not  to  see  the  fallacy  of. 

"The  Doctor  imputed  this  conduct  to  the  moderation  of 
the  Minister  and  to  his  desire  of  removing  every  obstacle  to 
speedy  negotiations  for  peace.  He  observed  that  this  Court 
had  hitherto  treated  us  very  fairly,  and  that  suspicions  to  their 

*  III.  Bancroft's  MS.  volumes :   America,  France,  and  England,  p.  25. 


32  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

disadvantage  should  not  be  readily  entertained.  He  also 
mentioned  our  instructions  as  further  reasons  for  our  acqui 
escence  in  the  advice  and  opinions  of  the  Minister."  * 

Jay  wrote  to  Livingston  when  enclosing  a  copy  of  a  trans 
lation  of  the  intercepted  letter  of  Marbois  :  f 

"  I  am  persuaded,  and  you  shall  know  my  reason  for  it, 
that  this  Court  chooses  to  postpone  an  acknowledgment  of 
our  independence  by  Britain  to  the  conclusion  of  a  general 
peace,  in  order  to  keep  us  under  their  direction  until  not  only 
their  and  our  objects  are  attained,  but  also  until  Spain  shall 
be  gratified  in  Jier  demands  to  exclude  everybody  from  the 
Gulf,  etc.  .  .  This  Court  as  well  as  Spain  will  dispute  our 
extension  to  the  Mississippi.  .  .  I  ought  to  add  that  Doc 
tor  Franklin  does  not  see  the  conduct  of  this  Court  in  the  light 
I  do,  and  that  he  believes  they  mean  nothing  in  their  proce 
dure  but  what  is  friendly,  fair,  and  honorable.  Facts  and  fu 
ture  events  must  determine  which  of  us  is  mistaken.  .  . 
Let  us  be  honest  and  grateful  to  France,  but  let  us  think  for 
ourselves." 

The  justice  of  Jay's  view  that  Vergennes  foresaw  difficul 
ties  in  bringing  Spain  to  a  peace  on  moderate  terms,  and  was 
unwilling  that  the  United  States  should  be  released  from 
their  engagement  to  continue  the  war  by  an  immediate  ac 
knowledgment  of  her  independence,  is  confirmed  by  the  in 
teresting  account  given  by  Mr.  Bancroft  in  the  eighth  chap 
ter  of  his  tenth  volume  of  the  negotiation  between  France 
and  Spain,  which  resulted  in  the  treaty  of  alliance  signed  on 
April  12,  1779. 

On  August  1 7th  Oswald  wrote  that  he  had  advised 
Franklin  and  Jay  of  the  arrival  of  the  Commission  under  the 
great  seal,  and  he  quoted  Jay  as  saying  : 

"  And  upon  the  whole  they  would  not  treat  at  all  until  their 
independence  was  so  acknowledged  as  that  they  should  have 
an  equal  footing  with  us  and  might  take  rank  as  parties  to  an 
agreement.  .  .  .  He  also  hoped  that  a  happy  conciliation 

*  Dip.  Cor.,  pp.  135,  136. 

f  Jay  to  Livingston,  September  18,  1782,  Dip.  Cor.,  viii.,  p.  127.  For  the 
letter  of  Marbois  to  Vergennes,  dated  March  18,  1782,  see  Jay's  Life,  i.,  490. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  33 

and  friendship  would  be  restored  and  perpetuated  between 
the  countries  notwithstanding  all  that  had  happened,  which 
he  said  would  give  him  great  pleasure. 

"  But  that  if  we  neglected  this  opportunity  and  continued 
our  hesitation  on  that  head,  we  should  then  convince  them 
of  the  justice  of  their  suspicions  of  designs  which  he  would 
not  name,  and  should  force  them  into  measures  which  he 
supposed  I  had  discernment  enough  to  guess  at  without  com 
ing  to  further  explanation.  That  he  should  be  extremely 
sorry  to  see  things  run  into  that  strain,  and  therefore  as  the 
method  proposed  was  indispensable,  he  could  not  but  se 
riously  advise  and  recommend  it.  A  good  deal  more  this 
gentleman  said  to  the  same  purpose,  and  without  any  ap 
pearance  of  excitement  or  disguise  ;  on  the  contrary  he  de 
livered  his  sentiments  in  a  manner  the  most  expressive  of 
sincere  and  friendly  interest  in  Great  Britain."  * 

Mr.  Oswald  recognized  the  reasonableness  of  the  objection 
raised  by  Jay,  and  he  recommended  his  Government,  but 
without  effect,  to  adopt  a  declaration  of  the  independence 
of  the  colonies  which  Jay  had  prepared  at  his  request  and 
corrected  with  Dr.  Franklin.  Jay  then  suggested  the  issuing 
of  a  new  Commission  to  treat  with  "  Commissioners  vested 
with  equal  powers  by  and  on  the  part  of  the  United  States 
of  America."  In  this  Oswald  concurred,  and  Jay  prepared 
the  draft  of  a  joint  letter  to  Oswald,  in  which  it  was  among 
other  points  suggested,  that  the  referring  an  acknowledgment 
of  their  independence  to  the  first  article  of  a  treaty  would 
imply  that  they  were  not  to  be  considered  in  that  light  until 
after  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty,  and  their  acquiescing  would 
be  to  admit  the  propriety  of  their  being  considered  in  another 
light  during  that  interval. 

"  I  submitted  this  draft,"  wrote  Jay,  "  to  Doctor  Franklin. 
He  thought  it  rather  too  positive,  and  therefore  rather  im 
prudent,  for  that  in  case  Britain  should  remain  firm,  and 
future  circumstances  should  compel  us  to  submit  to  their 
mode  of  treating,  we  should  do  it  with  an  ill  grace  after  such 
a  decided  and  peremptory  refusal.  Besides,  the  Doctor 

*  III.  Bancroft  MS.  volumes :  America,  France,  and  England. 


34  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

seemed  to  be  much  perplexed  and  fettered  by  our  instructions 
to  be  guided  by  the  advice  of  this  Court.  Neither  of  these 
considerations  had  weight  with  me  ;  for  as  to  the  first  I  could 
not  conceive  of  any  event  which  would  render  it  proper, 
and  therefore  possible  for  America  to  treat  in  any  other  char 
acter  than  as  an  independent  nation  ;  and  as  to  the  second, 
I  could  not  believe  that  Congress  intended  we  should  follow 
any  advice  which  might  be  repugnant  to  their  dignity  and 
interest."  * 

The  draft  of  this  letter  was  at  his  request  given  to  Oswald, 
who  approved  of  it,  and  wished  to  submit  it  to  his  Government. 
No  satisfactory  reply,  however,  came  from  London,  and  Jay 
attributed  the  ill  success  of  Oswald's  request  for  a  new  com 
mission  to  the  announcement  by  Fitzherbert  that  France  held 
the  first  to  be  sufficient. 

VAUGHAN  SENT  TO  LONDON. 

Three  other  incidents  occurring  in  quick  succession  com 
bined  to  induce,  on  the  part  of  Jay,  an  extraordinary  step,  the 
sending  of  a  special  messenger  to  Lord  Shelburne. 

The  first  was  a  letter  from  M.  de  Rayneval,  the  confiden 
tial  secretary  of  Vergennes,  addressed  to  Jay  as  Minister  to 
Spain,  giving  what  he  called  his  "  personal  ideas  "  about  the 
manner  of  terminating  his  discussions  with  the  Count 
d'Aranda  f  about  boundaries.  The  memoir  enclosed  by 
Rayneval  proposed  as  "  a  reasonable  conciliation,"  a  line 
excluding  us  from  a  vast  territory,  from  which  Jay  drew  the 
conclusions  :  J 

1.  That  the   French  Court  would  at   a   peace  oppose  our 
extension  to  the  Mississippi. 

2.  That  they  would  oppose  our  claim  to  the  free  naviga 
tion  of  that  river. 

3.  That  they  would  probably  support  the  British  claim  to 
all  that  country  above   the  3 1st  degree  of  latitude,  and  cer 
tainly  to  all  that  country  north  of  the  Ohio. 

*  Dip.  Cor.,  Jay  to  Livingston,  viii.,  p.  146. 

f  Dip.  Cor.,  viii.,  p.  156.  %  Dip.  Cor.,  viii.,  p.  160. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  35 

He  was  clear  that  the  first  and  confidential  secretary  of  the 
Count  de  Vergennes  would  not  without  his  knowledge  and 
consent  declare  such  sentiments  and  offer  such  propositions, 
and  that  too  in  writing. 

The  second  incident  was  the  secret  departure  of  Rayneval 
for  England,  of  which  Jay  learned  on  September  9th,  with  an 
advice  that  it  was  pretended  that  he  had  gone  to  the  country, 
and  that  several  precautions  had  been  taken  to  prevent  his 
real  destination  from  being  known.  In  regard  to  the  at 
tempts  to  keep  the  visit  a  secret,  Mr.  Charles  F.  Adams 
alludes  to  his  having  travelled  under  an  assumed  name,  and 
M.  Rayneval  himself,  in  his  letter  to  Mr.  Monroe,*  after 
remarking  that  the  object  of  the  mission  was  to  learn  the 
truth  of  propositions  of  peace,  said  to  have  been  made  to 
Admiral  de  Grasse,  distinctly  says  that  it  was  decided  that 
he  should  be  sent  secretly  to  England.  Jay  learned,  also, 
that  on  the  morning  of  Rayneval's  departure,  Count  d'Aranda 
had  gone  to  Versailles,  and  had  an  interview  with  Rayneval 
and  Vergennes. 

The  third  incident,  which  occurred  on  September  loth, 
was  the  receipt  of  a  translation  of  the  famous  letter  of 
Marbois,  the  French  Secretary  at  Philadelphia,  against  our 
sharing  in  the  fisheries. 

The  facts  in  reference  to  M.  Rayneval  led  Jay  to  conjec 
ture  that  M.  Rayneval's  visit  to  England  was  connected  with 
the  question  of  the  American  claims,  and  that  he  was  in 
tended,  among  other  things,  to  let  Lord  Shelburne  know 
that  the  demand  of  America  to  be  treated  by  Britain  as  in 
dependent  previous  to  a  treaty  were  not  approved  or  coun 
tenanced  by  the  French  Court  ;  to  sound  Lord  Shelburne  on 
the  subject  of  the  fishery,  and  to  discover  whether  Britain 
would  agree  to  divide  it  with  France,  to  the  exclusion  of  all 
other  nations  ;  and  to  impress  Lord  Shelburne  with  the  de 
termination  of  Spain  to  possess  the  exclusive  navigation  of 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  of  their  desire  to  keep  us  from  the 
Mississippi,  and  also  to  limit  the  propriety  of  such  a  line  as, 

*  Dated  November  14,  1795,  published  in  the  Appendix  D,  vol.  i.,  page  655, 
of  Rives'  Life  of  Madison.     Boston,  1859. 


36  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

on  the  one  hand,  would  satisfy  Spain,  and  on  the  other,  leave 
to  Great  Britain  all  the  country  north  of  Ohio. 

Having,  after  much  consideration,  become  persuaded  that 
such  were  M.  Rayneval's  objects,  Jay  mentioned  his  journey 
to  Mr.  Oswald  with  some  degree  of  caution  ;  but  reflecting 
upon  the  importance  of  Lord  Shelburne  knowing  the  aroused 
sentiments  and  resolutions  respecting  that  matter,  he  con 
cluded  that  it  would  be  prudent  to  send  over  Mr.  Benjamin 
Vaughan,  who  was  strongly  attached  to  the  American  cause, 
and  who  had  been  confidentially  employed  by  Lord  Shel 
burne.  Mr.  Vaughan  agreed  to  go,  and  in  advance  wrote  to 
Lord  Shelburne  "  desiring  that  he  would  delay  taking  any 
measures  with  M.  Rayneval  until  he  should  either  see  onhear 
further  from  him." 

The  substance  of  the  points  which  Mr.  Vaughan  was 
desired  to  communicate  to  Lord  Shelburne  is  given  in  Jay's 
despatch  to  Livingston.* 

Those  relating  to  the  acknowledgment  of  independence  in 
advance,  as  had  already  been  suggested  to  Oswald,  could  be 
arranged  simply  by  authorizing  the  commissioner  to  treat 
of  peace  with  commissioners  with  equal  powers  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States  of  America. 

The  entire  success  of  Mr.  Vaughan's  mission,  as  disclosed 
by  the  biographer  of  Lord  Shelburne,  gives  new  interest  to 
the  views  set  forth  in  the  memorandum  with  which  he  was 
entrusted.  On  the  point  relating  to  the  treaty  with  America, 
it  was  suggested  that  Britain  by  a  peace,  looked  forward 
doubtless  to  other  advantages  than  a  mere  cessation  of  hos 
tilities — to  cordiality,  confidence,  and  commerce — and  that 
the  first  step  to  making  friends  of  those  whom  she  could 
not  subdue,  was  to  treat  with  them  on  an  equal  footing,  in 
spiring  them  with  confidence,  and  showing  that  the  charge 
of  insincerity  made  by  her  enemies  was  groundless. 

That  any  expectations  grounded  on  the  affected  modera 
tion  of  France  would  be  fruitless,  although  they  might  pro 
duce  delay,  for  America  would  never  treat  except  on  an 
equal  footing. 

*Dip.  Cor.,  viii.,  pp.  165  et  seq. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  37 

That  a  little  reflection  must  convince  Lord  Shelburne  that 
it  was  the  interest,  and  consequently  the  policy,  of  France  to 
postpone,  if  possible,  the  acknowledgment  of  our  indepen 
dence  to  the  conclusion  of  a  general  peace,  and  by  keeping  it 
suspended  until  after  the  war,  oblige  the  Americans  by  the 
terms  of  the  treaty,  and  by  regard  to  their  safety,  to  continue 
in  it  to  the  end.  That  it  hence  appeared  to  be  the  obvious 
intent  of  Britain  immediately  to  cut  the  cords  which  tied  us 
to  France,  for  that  though  we  were  determined  faithfully  to 
fulfil  our  treaty  and  engagement  with  this  Court,  yet  it  was 
a  different  thing  to  be  guided  by  their  or  our  construction  of 
them. 

That,  among  other  things,  we  were  bound  not  to  make  a 
separate  peace  or  truce,  and  that  the  assurance  of  our  inde 
pendence  was  avowed  to  be  the  object  of  our  treaty.  While, 
therefore,  Great  Britain  refused  to  yield  this  object,  we  were 
bound,  as  well  as  resolved,  to  go  on  with  the  war,  although 
perhaps  the  greatest  obstacles  to  a  peace  arose  neither  from 
the  demands  of  France  nor  America  ;  whereas,  that  object 
being  conceded,  we  should  be  at  liberty  to  make  peace  the 
moment  that  Great  Britain  should  be  ready  to  accede  to  the 
terms  of  France  and  America,  without  our  being  restrained 
by  the  demands  of  Spain,  with  whose  views  we  had  no 
concern. 

The  rest  of  the  memorandum  touched  upon  the  fact  that 
America  would  not  conclude  a  peace  without  the  fisheries, 
and  that  an  attempt  to  exclude  them  would  irritate  America 
and  tend  to  perpetuate  her  resentment.  That  our  right  to 
extend  to  the  Mississippi  was  proven  by  our  charter,  and  our 
right  to  its  navigation  was  deducible  from  nature. 

That  the  true  object  of  an  European  commercial  nation 
was  to  secure  the  profits  of  an  extensive  and  lucrative  com 
merce,  and  not  the  possession  of  vast  tracts  of  wilderness. 
That  to  attempt  to  retain  that  country  by  extending  Canada, 
would  be  to  sow  the  seeds  of  future  war  in  the  very  treaty  of 
peace.  And  that  it  certainly  could  not  be  wise  for  Britain 
"  to  lay  in  it  the  foundation  of  such  distrust  and  jealousies  as 
on  the  one  hand,  would  ever  prevent  confidence  and  real 


38  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

friendship,  and  on  the  other,  naturally  lead  us  to  strengthen 
our  security  by  intimate  and  permanent  alliances  with  other 
nations." 

The  last  suggestion  touched  a  subject  on  which  the  confi 
dential  correspondence  of  the  British  Cabinet  shows  them  to 
have  been  extremely  sensitive,  and  no  consideration,  perhaps, 
had  more  weight  in  determining  the  policy  of  acceding  to 
our  claims,  to  an  extent  that  induced  Vergennes  to  say  that 
England  had  bought  a  peace  rather  than  made  one,  than  the 
conviction  that  the  American  Commissioners  were  thoroughly 
in  earnest,  and  that  the  only  way  to  secure  our  friendship  and 
prevent  other  alliances  was  to  grant  our  reasonable  demands. 

Mr.  Vaughan  set  off  on  the  evening  of  September  nth, 
and  Jay  wrote,  "  It  would  have  relieved  me  from  much  anx 
iety  and  uneasiness  to  have  concerted  all  these  steps  with  Doc 
tor  Franklin,  but  on  conversing  with  him  about  M.  Rayneval's 
journey,  he  did  not  concur  with  me  in  sentiment  respecting 
the  object  of  it,  but  appeared  to  me  to  have  a  great  degree 
of  confidence  in  this  Court,  and  to  be  much  embarrassed  and 
constrained  by  our  instructions."  * 

Doctor  Franklin,  however,  agreed  with  Jay  as  to  the  pro 
priety  of  writing  a  letter  to  the  Count  de  Vergennes,  on  the 
question  of  the  commission.  The  letter,  which  Trescott  de 
scribes  as  "a  masterly  vindication  of  the  position,"  was 
drawn  by  Jay,  and  was  under  revision  by  Franklin  when  the 
news  of  their  success  in  England  rendered  it  unnecessary. 

JAY'S  DECISION  STOPS  THE  GENERAL  NEGOTIATIONS. 

Before  quoting  from  the  "  Life  of  Shelburne  "  the  account 
given  by  him  of  Rayneval's  remarks  on  American  matters, 
and  the  result  of  Vaughan's  visit,  it  may  be  proper  to  revert 
to  the  effect  which  Jay's  refusal  to  proceed  under  a  commis 
sion  which  did  not  recognize  the  equal  sovereignty  of  the 
United  States,  had  upon  the  negotiation  at  Paris  with  the 
other  powers. 

When   on   August  6th,  Oswald  waited   on   Franklin  with 

*  Dip.  Cor.,  viii.,  p.  169. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  39 

the  copy  of  the  first  commission,  Franklin  said,  that  the  day 
before,  at  Versailles,  Vergennes  had  said  he  could  do  nothing 
till  its  arrival,  as  both  treaties  must  go  on  together  hand  in 
hand. 

On  August  i8th,  Oswald*  wrote  to  Shelburne  :  "  Your 
lordship  will  see  that  the  American  Commissioners  will  not 
move  a  step  until  the  independence  is  acknowledged  .  .  .  . 
Until  the  Americans  are  contented  Mr.  Fitzherbert  cannot 
proceed." 

The  same  day  Oswald,  who  was  working  in  great  intimacy 
with  Fitzherbert,  wrote  to  Secretary  Townsend  that  the  de 
mand  of  the  Commissioners  must  be  complied  with  to  avoid 
the  worst  consequences,  either  respecting  them  in  particu 
lar  or  the  object  of  the  general  pacification,  "as  to  which 
nothing  can  be  done  until  the  American  independence  is 
settled." 

On  September  loth,  Oswald  wrote  to  Secretary  Town- 
send,  that  he  had  seen  Jay  frequently,  and  had  used  every 
argument  to  get  him  over  his  objection  to  treating  without  a 
separate  and  absolute  acknowledgment  of  their  independ 
ence. 

The  correspondence  shows  that  Jay's  decision,  not  to  treat 
except  as  an  independent  power,  in  stopping  not  only  the 
American  negotiation  but  the  entire  plan  of  pacification,  had 
created  great  concern  in  England,  and  had  given  to  the 
American  Commissioners  a  position  of  control,  which  made 
them  to  some  extent  masters  of  the  situation. 

On  September  1st,  Townsend  wrote  to  Oswald  t  that 
"  His  Majesty  is  pleased,  for  the  salutary  purpose  of  preclud 
ing  all  further  delay  and  embarrassment  of  negotiation,  to 
waive  any  stipulation  by  the  treaty  for  debts  accrued  before 
the  year  1/75,  and  also  further  claims  of  the  refugees  for 
compensation  for  their  losses.  .  .  . 

"  But  upon  the  whole,  it  is  his  Majesty's  express  com 
mand  that  you  do  exert  your  greatest  address  to  the  purpose 

*  Oswald's  Minutes  of  Conversation   with  American  Commissioners.     Paris, 
August  7,  1782,  S.  P.  O.,  France,  p.  536.     Bancroft  MSS. 
f    Quoted  in  Slielburne's  Life,  iii.,  pp.  255,  256. 


4O  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1/83. 

of  prevailing  upon  the  American  Commissioners  to  proceed 
in  the  treaty  and  to  admit  the  article  of  independence  as  a 
part,  or  as  one  only  of  the  other  articles  which  you  are  hereby 
empowered  to  conclude." 

From  this  it  would  appear  that  the  English  Cabinet,  while 
ready  to  grant  independence  as  the  first  article  of  the  treaty, 
and  so  anxious  to  proceed  that  they  were  willing  to  sacrifice 
the  debts  of  their  subjects  and  the  claims  of  the  refugees, 
still  shrank  from  dealing  with  their  former  colonies  as  an  in 
dependent  power.  When  Vergennes  proposed  a  truce  in 
1778,  Adams  declined,  partly  on  the  ground  that  <(  it  was  to 
play  the  part  of  an  insurgent  endeavoring  to  make  terms  with 
a  superior  power,  instead  of  one  sovereign  contracting  on 
equal  footing  with  others."  Adams  was  in  correspondence 
with  Jay  in  regard  to  Oswald's  first  commission,  which  he 
equally  disapproved,  and  he  suggested  the  simple  modifica 
tion  which  Franklin  and  Jay  approved,  by  which  it  should 
confer  authority  to  treat  with  the  Ministers  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  f 

It  would  seem  that  the  English  Cabinet  began  to  under 
stand  slowly,  the  policy  of  France  in  advising  the  American 
Commissioners  to  treat  under  the  commission  which  described 
the  United  States  as  colonies.  Secretary  Grantham  wrote 
to  Fitzherbert,  September  3,  1782,  "  I  should  see  with  much 
greater  concern  the  several  instances  of  disingenuousness  which 
the  French  Minister  has  betrayed  in  treating  with  you,  if  I 
did  not  at  the  same  time  mark  the  acuteness  with  which  you 
do  not  suffer  them  to  escape  you.  ...  I  have  reason  to 
believe  that  even  the  independency  of  America,  however 
ultimately  advantageous  to  France,  would  not,  if  accepted 
now  by  the  Commissioners,  be  a  means  agreeable  to  her,  as 
the  band  between  them  would  thereby  be  loosened  before 
the  conclusion  of  a  peace." 

Fitzherbert  replied  on  September  nth,  "Your  lordship 
was  founded  in  your  suspicion  that  the  granting  of  indepen- 

*  Adams,  i.,  341. 
[f  Ibid.,  367,  with  references  to  vol.  vii.,  580,  and  vol.  vii.,  606. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  41 

dence  to  America  as  a  previous  measure  is  a  point  which  the 
French  have  by  no  means  at  heart,  and  perhaps  are  not  en 
tirely  averse  from." 

OSWALD,  SPARKS,  AND  C.  F.  ADAMS  ON  RAYNEVAL'S 

MISSION. 

On  September  nth,  the  same  day  that  Vaughan  left  for 
England,  Oswald  wrote  to  Shelburne,  that  it  was  said  that 
Vergennes  was  to  send  his  secretary  to  London  on  some 
particular  negotiation — it  was  thought  in  favor  of  Spain. 
"The  Count,"  he  added,  "  wishes  to  have  the  whole  of  the 
country  from  West  Florida  of  a  certain  width  quite  up  to 
Canada,  so  as  to  have  such  cession  from  England  before  a 
cession  to  the  Colonies  takes  place.  If  that  gentleman  goes 
over  there  can  be  no  difficulty  in  amusing  him." 

The  suggestion  does  not  appear  to  have  been  overlooked. 
After  Rayneyal's  return  to  Paris,  Fitzherbert  wrote  to  Shel 
burne  (October  13,  1782),  "  M.  de  Rayneval  talks  to  me  in 
raptures  of  your  lordship's  reception  of  him,  both  in  regard 
to  your  personal  marks  of  kindness  and  in  regard  to  the  great 
candour,  frankness  and  liberality  of  your  sentiments  which 
he  met  with  from  you  in  your  conversation  upon  business." 

Recurring  to  the  tone  and  object  of  M.  Rayneval's  con 
versation  in  London  with  the  British  Minister,  Dr.  Sparks,  in 
his  note  to  the  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  quotes  from  Ray 
neval's  instructions  a  passage  to  the  effect  that  "as  it  is  pos 
sible  that  the  English  Minister  may  speak  to  M.  de  Rayneval 
concerning  the  affairs  of  America  and  the  United  Provinces, 
he  will  declare  that  he  has  no  authority  to  treat  on  those 
topics,"  and  again,  and  this  time  with  a  grave  error,*  he 

*  Dr.  Sparks,  in  his  "Observations"  on  Mr.  Jay's  letter  (Dip.  Corresp.,  viii., 
210),  attempts  to  show  that  Rayneval's  visit  to  London  had  nothing  to  do  with 
the  claims  of  the  United  States  respecting  the  fisheries  and  boundaries,  and  quotes 
from  Rayneval's  letter  from  London  to  Vergennes,  a  passage  purporting  to  be 
Rayneval's  reply  to  a  remark  of  Shelburne  :  "  Without  doubt  the  Americans  will 
also  form  pretensions  to  the  fisheries,  but  he  trusted  the  King  (of  France)  would 
not  sustain  them."  Dr.  Sparks  says:  "To  which  M.  de  Rayneval  replied — that 
he  was  ignorant  of  the  views  of  Congress  concerning  the  object  in  question,  but 


42  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

quotes  from  a  letter  written  by  Rayneval  himself,  professing 
to  state  what  he  did  say  on  American  affairs ;  and  Dr.  Sparks 
then  says  that  the  above  extracts,  which  might  be  combined 
by  testimony  from  other  sources,  "  show  most  clearly  that 
Mr.  Jay's  suspicions  were  in  reality  erroneous,  on  whatever 
grounds  he  might  at  the  time  suppose  them  to  rest.  M.  de 
Rayneval's  visit  had  nothing  to  do  with  American  affairs  ex 
cept  to  insist  on  unconditional  independence." 

Among  later  writers  who  have  discussed  this  topic,  no  one 
has  considered  it  with  such  breadth  of  view  and  careful  dis 
crimination  as  the  Hon.  Charles  Francis  Adams,  whose  diplo- 

thought  he  might  venture  to  say  that  the  King  would  never  support  unjust  de 
mands  ;  that  he  was  not  able  to  judge  whether  those  of  the  Americans  were  such 
or  not  ;  and  that  besides,  he  was  without  authority  in  this  respect." 

The  passage  in  italics  is  so  emphasized  in  Dr.  Sparks1  note,  but  it  does  not  ap 
pear  in  the  original  French  as  given  by  Circourt,  iii.,  p.  46,  where  the  passage  is 
as  follows  :  "  Est  venu  enfin  le  tour  de  1'Amerique.  Mylord  Shelburne  a  prevu 
qu'ils  auraient  beaucoup  de  difficultes  avec  1'Amerique,  tant  par  rapport  aux  lim- 
ites  que  par  rapport  a  la  peche  de  Terre-Neuve  ;  mais  il  espere  que  le  roi  ne  les 
soutiendra  pas  dans  leur  demande.  J'ai  repondu  que  je  ne  doutais  pas  de  1'em- 
pressement  du  roi  a  faire  ce  qui  dependra  de  lui  pour  contenir  les  Americfiins  dans 
les  bornes  de  la  justice  et  de  la  raison.  Et  Mylord  ayant  desire  savoir  ce  que  je 
pensais  de  leur  preventions,  j'ai  repondu  que  j'ignorais  celles  relatives  a  la  peche, 
mais  que  telles  qu'elles  puissent  etre,  il  me  semblait  qu'il  y  avait  un  principe  stir  a 
suivre  sur  cette  matiere,  savoir :  que  la  peche  en  haute  mer  est  res  millius,  et  que 
la  peche  sur  les  cotes  appartenait  de  droit  aux  proprietaries  des  cotes,  a  moins  de 
derogations  fondees  sur  des  conventions.  Quant  a  1'etendue  des  limites,  j'ai  sup 
pose  que  les  Americains  la  prendraient  dans  leur  chartes,  c'es-ta-dire  qu'ils  vou- 
dront  aller  de  1'ocean  a  la  mer  du  sud.  Mylord  Shelburne  a  traite  les  chartes  de 
sottises,  et  la  discussion  n'a  pas  ete  plus  loin  parce  que  je  n'ai  voulu  ni  soutenir  la 
prevention  Americaine,  ni  1'aneantir ;  j'ai  seulement  dit  que  le  ministere  Anglais 
devait  trouver  dans  les  negotiations  de  1754,  relative  a  POhio,  les  limites  que 
1'Angleterre,  alors  Souveraine  de  Treize  £tats-Unis,  croyait  devoir  leur  assigner." 

"The  Canadian  frontier,"  as  Mr.  Lecky  remarks  (vol.  iv.,  p.  274),  "had  al 
ways  been  a  matter  of  doubt,"  and  M.  Rayneval's  own  version  of  the  manner  in 
which  he  attempted  to  persuade  England  to  adopt  in  treating  with  the  United 
States,  the  boundary  which  she  had  attempted  to  assign  to  Canada  in  1754,  when 
Canada  belonged  to  France,  in  opposition  to  the  pretence  that  almost  the  whole 
course  of  the  Ohio  made  a  part  of  Louisiana,  enables  us  to  understand  the  argu 
ment  on  which  he  based  the  strong  opinion  which  he  expressed  to  Shelburne  and 
Grantham  against  the  claims  of  the  Americans  to  the  Valley  of  the  Ohio.  M.  de 
Rayneval's  memoir  on  the  boundaries  authorized  by  M.  Vergennes  throws  light 
upon  this  subject  as  well  as  upon  the  pretences  on  which  France  sought  to  deprive 
us  of  the  Valley  of  the  Mississippi"  (Dipl.  Corresp.,  viii.,  pp.  156-160). 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  43 

matic  abilities  and  success,  and  whose  wide  experience  and 
observation  of  European  finesse  under  circumstances  where 
the  highest  American  interests  were  concerned,  give  to  his 
conclusions  on  such  a  question  an  unusual  weight  of  authority. 

Mr.  Adams,  from  a  careful  analysis  of  M.  Rayneval's  con 
fidential  letter  to  Vergennes,  came  to  a  conclusion  directly 
opposite  to  that  of  Dr.  Sparks,  and  said  that :  "  Without  ut 
tering  a  single  word  that  could  be  used  to  commit  him  or  his 
government  with  America,  M.  de  Rayneval  had  succeeded  in 
making  Lord  Shelburne  comprehend  that  France  was  not  in 
clined  to  prolong  the  war  by  supporting  America  in  unjust 
claims  ;  what  sense  M.  de  Rayneval  attached  to  the  word  un 
just  will  appear  as  the  negotiations  proceed." 

Mr.  Adams  in  a  note  *  remarks  that  a  doubt  may  be  per 
mitted  whether  a  national  publication  like  the  "  Diplomatic 
Correspondence,"  is  the  right  medium  through  which  to  dis 
seminate  arguments  and  inferences  to  sustain  any  peculiar 
views  of  the  action  of  those  times.  Of  the  two  extremes, 
he  adds,  "  the  course  adopted  by  Mr.  Force  in  the  '  Amer 
ican  Archives,'  of  literally  adhering  even  to  obvious  errors, 
seems  the  safest  and  most  satisfactory." 

I  am  informed  by  Mr.  Bancroft  that  Mr.  Edward  Everett 
was  of  the  same  opinion  on  this  subject,  and  Mr.  John  Quincy 
Adams  intimates  distinctly  his  own  view  when  he  speaks  of 
"  the  Diplomatic  Correspondence  recently  published  by  Con 
gress  and  somewhat  incorrectly  edited  by  Mr.  Sparks,  I  mean 
by  the  notes  with  which  it  is  impoverished  from  the  hand  of 
the  editor."  t 

Mr.  Donne,  the  editor  of  "  George  the  Third's  Letters  to 
Lord  North,"  $  speaks  of  the  golden  rule,  that  an  editor  should 
regard  himself  as  simply  the  servant  of  the  author.  If  to 
this  rule  there  may  be  exceptions,  it  seems  at  least  preferable 
to  one  which  allows  an  editor  to  constitute  himself  at  once 
the  accuser,  prosecutor,  witness,  and  judge,  of  governmental 
commissioners,  whose  correspondence  he  is  appointed  to  pub 
lish,  and  to  incorporate  his  individual  views  in  the  official 

*  Adams,  i.,  368.  f  J.  Q.  Adams,  to  William  Jay,  August  18,  1882. 

{Vol.  ii.,  450. 


44  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

volumes  in  a  way  to  deceive  his  readers  by  the  boldness  of 
his  assertions,  and  induce  them  to  accept  his  personal  opinion 
as  the  verdict  of  impartial  history. 


THE  PART  TAKEN  BY  RAYNEVAL  AGAINST  AMERICA. 

The  biographers  of  Jay  and  Adams  have  both  alluded  to 
the  possibility  that  the  part  actually  taken  by  Rayneval 
might  never  become  known.  But  a  single  paragraph  in  the 
"  Life  of  Lord  Shelburne"  discloses  the  truth,  and  shows  the 
opinion  expressed  by  Rayneval  on  the  American  claims. 

Lord  Edmond  Fitzmaurice,  after  giving  a  sketch  of  the 
interviews  between  Rayneval  and  Lord  Shelburne,  who  was 
accompanied  by  Lord  Grantham,  a  fact  noticeable  in  view  of 
Mr.  C.  F.  Adams'  suggestion  that  Lord  Shelburne  was  be 
lieved  for  a  time  "  to  have  kept  the  information  of  the  visit 
secret  from  all  his  colleagues,"*  makes  this  statement,  which 
exactly  confirms  Jay's  anticipations  of  the  tone  that  Rayneval 
would  assume  on  the  American  question,  and  which  sug 
gested  the  expediency  as  a  counter-move  of  the  sending  of 
Mr.  Vaughan  : 

"  They  then  proceeded  to  speak  about  America.  Here 
Rayneval  played  into  the  hands  of  the  English  ministers  by 
expressing  a  strong  opinion  against  the  American  claims  to 
the  Newfoundland  fishery,  and  to  the  Valley  of  the  Missis 
sippi  and  the  Ohio.  These  opinions  were  carefully  noted  by 
Shelburne  and  Grantham.  The  conversation  then  became 
general."  f 

Before  proceeding  to  the  effect  of  Vaughan's  mission  on 
the  attempt  of  Rayneval  which  had  been  so  correctly  foreseen, 
to  prejudice  the  American  claims  on  the  three  points  most 
important  to  the  Republic,  it  may  be  proper  to  refer  to  M. 
Rayneval's  attempt  to  explain  away  the  part  he  played  on 
that  occasion.  In  a  note  to  Mr.  Monroe,  written  at  Paris, 
November  14,  1795,  and  published  by  Mr.  Rives  in  the  "  Life 

*  Adams'  Works,  i.,  369.  f  Shelburne's  Life,  iii.,  263. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  45 

of  Madison,"*  he  replied  to  a  letter  from  that  gentleman,  dated 
October  3Oth.  Mr.  Monroe  had  referred  to  the  fact  that  the 
American  Commissioners  had  signed  the  Preliminary  Articles, 
which  were  not  to  take  effect  until  a  peace  was  concluded  be 
tween  France  and  England,  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
French  Cabinet,  and  against  the  instructions  they  had  re 
ceived  from  Congress,  and  he  had  then  said  : 

"  When  the  motives  of  this  proceeding  was  asked,  I  have 
often  heard  it  said  that  France,  showing  indifference  on  several 
points  of  our  claims  against  England  then  contended  for  by 
our  Ministers,  had  even  taken  the  part  of  that  power  against 
us,  seeking  to  discard  our  claims  relating  to  the  fisheries,  the 
boundaries,  and  the  Mississippi ;  and  that  you  had  been 
sent  to  England  for  the  purpose  of  deciding  the  Marquis  of 
Lansdowne  in  his  opposition  to  our  demands  on  these  points, 
which  you  accomplished  in  your  personal  interview  with  that 
minister  ;  and  finally,  that  if  our  negotiators  succeeded  in  the 
points  which  I  have  named,  they  owed  their  success  to  the 
liberal  policy  of  England,  which  in  rejecting  the  counsels  of 
France  preferred  to  accede  to  what  we  asked." 

M.  de  Rayneval  in  a  rather  long  reply  said  that  he  had 
been  sent  secretly  to  England  to  learn  the  truth  about  the 
overtures  to  Admiral  de  Grasse. 

"  My  instructions,"  he  said,  "  were  as  simple  as  they  were 
laconic.  They  asked  that  I  should  demand  the  admission 
or  disavowal  of  the  note  communicated  to  M.  de  Grasse. 
The  first  article  of  the  note  concerned  the  independence  of 
America.  I  have  annexed  an  extract  from  the  statement 
which  I  made  on  my  return.  ...  It  was  written  at  the 
end  of  September,  1782.  You  will  find  there  the  first  funda 
mental  article  of  my  instructions,  the  independence  of  the 
United  States,  and  that  nothing  was  prescribed  in  relation 
to  the  other  conditions  to  be  made  with  the  American  Com 
missioners." 

This,  it    may  be   remarked   in    passing,   disposes    of  Dr. 
Sparks'  suggestion  that  it  is  not  improbable  that  the  change 
in  Oswald's  commission  was  effected   in  consequence  of  M. 
*  Appendix  D,  vol.  i.,  p.  655. 


46  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

de  Rayneval's  representations.*  The  actual  independence  of 
the  United  States  was  always  insisted  on  by  Vergennes,  even 
to  Spain,  who  so  persistently  opposed  it  ;  and  it  was  already 
known  that  England  was  ready  to  acknowledge  it  by  the 
treaty;  the  demand  of  Jay,  which  Vergennes  opposed,  was 
that  the  independence  should  be  acknowledged  by  the  Com 
mission  in  advance  of  the  treaty  ;  and  even  before  the  ap 
pearance  of  the  secret  French  correspondence  and  of  Lord 
Shelburne's  Life,  Mr.  Charles  Francis  Adams,  with  an  intel 
ligence  and  judgment  now  confirmed  by  proof,  had  shown 
the  groundlessness  of  Mr.  Sparks'  inference,  and  the  proba 
bility  that  it  was  Mr.  Vaughan's  verbal  communication  held 
after  his  arrival  in  England  which  had  turned  the  scale  in 
favor  of  the  concession,  t 

M.  de  Rayneval  further  said  in  his  letter  to  Monroe,  that 
he  encouraged  no  conversation  or  discussion  on  the  other 
American  conditions,  that  when  the  English  minister  intro 
duced  the  point  he  took  refuge  in  his  ignorance  and  his  lack 
of  instructions  ;  and  that  in  the  opinions  which  he  did  express, 
he  rather  strengthened  than  weakened  the  demands  of  the 
American  Commissioners. 

M.  de  Rayneval,  in  his  letter  to  Jay  dated  September  6th, 
with  the  memoir  prepared  by  instruction  from  Vergennes, 
had  contended  that  those  demands  were  unfounded,  and  that 
they  should  consent  to  a  line  which  would  confine  them  to 
a  narrow  strip  along  the  Atlantic,  and  he  added  to  this 
note  this  postscript.  "  P.S. — As  I  shall  be  absent  for  some 
days,  I  pray  you  to  address  your  answer  to  Mr.  Stenin,  Sec 
retary  to  the  Council  of  State  at  Versailles."  "  I  must  desire 
you,"  said  Jay  to  Livingston,  "  not  to  let  the  perusal  of  the 
following  memoir  make  you  forget  the  postscript  of  the  above 
letter,  for  in  the  sequel  you  will  find  it  of  some  importance.":}: 

It  proved,  in  aiding  to  bring  about  the  mission  of  Mr. 
Vaughan,  of  even  more  importance  than  Jay  anticipated. 
In  his  letter  to  Monroe,  Rayneval  says  that  Mr.  Jay  having 
been  charged  with  a  negotiation  with  the  Count  d'Aranda, 
the  two  negotiators  had  chosen  him  to  bring  them  to- 

*  Dip.  Cor.,  viii.,  211.          f  Adams'  Works,  i.,  368.  \  Dip.  Cor.,  viii.,  156. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  47 

gether  (pour  les  rapprocher],  that  he  had  given  his  advice 
in  writing,  and  that  Mr.  Jay  had  agreed  with  him  as  to 
its  justice  and  solidity.  Mr.  Charles  Francis  Adams,  in 
his  discussion  of  the  earlier  treaty  negotiations,  referred  to 
Vergennes'  solemn  declaration  to  Gr&nville,  in  the  presence 
of  Franklin,  who  records  it  without  a  word  of  comment, 
that  "France  had  never  given  the  least  encouragement  to 
America  until  long  after  the  breach  was  made  and  inde 
pendence  declared.  There  sat  Mr.  Franklin,"  added  he, 
"  who  knows  the  fact  and  can  contradict  me  if  I  do  not  speak 
the  truth."* 

Mr.  Adams  speaks  plainly  of  the  falsehood,  and  of  the 
audacity  of  placing  Doctor  Franklin  "  under  such  difficult  cir 
cumstances  that  even  his  silence  was  equivalent  to  an  affirma 
tion  of  the  fraud  "  and  remarks  that  the  audacity  of  the  false 
hood  is  not  exceeded  even  by  the  deliberate  denial  of  the 
family  compact  made  by  the  Count  de  Bussy  to  Lord  Chat 
ham  which  Flassan  describes  as  a  "  mensonge  politique" 
Mr.  Adams  did  not  admit  that  when  the  attempt  to  deceive 
exists,  a  lie  changes  its  character  by  being  called  "  a  political 
lie." 

In  this  case  the  known  inexactness  of  M.  de  Rayneval's 
statements  that  Jay  had  requested  his  intervention  in  the 
negotiation  with  the  Spanish  Minister,  and  that  Jay  had 
approved  of  the  solidity  and  justice  of  the  views  expressed 
in  his  memoir,  shows,  to  say  the  least,  a  facile  and  con 
venient  memory,  which  may  explain  also  his  declaration 
that,  in  what  he  said  to  Lord  Shelburne,  he  "  rather  strength 
ened  than  weakened  the  demands  of  the  American  Commis 
sioners." 

Why  should  he  have  attempted  to  strengthen  their  de 
mands  in  London  when  he  had  striven  to  reduce  them  at 
Paris,  and  why  if  such  was  his  intention,  did  both  Shelburne 
and  Grantham  regard  him  as  playing  into  their  hands  by  ex 
pressing  a  strong  opinion,  not  only  against  the  claims  df  the 
Americans  to  the  Valley  of  the  Mississippi,  but  against  their 
claims  to  the  fisheries  and  the  Ohio  ?  On  his  return  to  Paris, 

*  Adams,  i.,  307,  308,  and  note. 


48  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

M.  de  Rayneval  again  urged  upon  Jay  "  the  conciliatory  line 
which  he  had  proposed,"  *  which  was  to  restrict  so  largely 
our  western  frontier,  in  accord  with  the  policy  of  Spain,  and 
with  Vergennes'  agreement  to  maintain  it. 

THE  EFFECT  UPON  THE  BRITISH  MINISTRY. 

What  might  have  been  the  effect  upon  the  English  policy 
toward  America  of  the  disclosure  by  Rayneval  of  the  part 
which  France  was  playing  in  regard  to  each  of  the  American 
claims,  had  the  American  Commissioners  shown  themselves 
either  incredulous  or  indifferent,  and  ready  to  obey  their  in 
structions,  and  to  recognize  the  King  of  France  as  the  master 
of  the  terms  of  peace,  may  be  matter  of  speculation.  What 
its  actual  effect  was  upon  Shelburne  and  Grantham,  when 
accompanied  by  the  proofs  afforded  by  the  letters  of  Oswald 
and  Vaughan,  and  now  by  the  presence  of  the  latter,  that  the 
disposition  of  France  to  restrict  the  boundaries  of  America, 
and  subject  her  interests  to  those  of  Spain,  was  understood 
and  resented,  and  would  be  firmly  resisted  on  the  part  of  the 
American  Commission,  is  a  matter  of  history. 

The  doubts  which  had  so  long  vexed  the  English  Cabinet 
and  delayed  the  issuing  of  a  new  commission,  were  at  once 
dismissed,  and  from  that  time  their  policy  was  marked  by  a 
confidence  in  the  American  Commissioners  unknown  before. 
The  history  of  diplomacy  has  rarely  taught  a  finer  lesson  of 
what  intelligence,  courage,  and  good  faith  can  accomplish 
against  the  trained  experience  of  those  most  accomplished  in 
European  intrigue  and  finesse. 

It  is  to  be  remarked  that  both  Franklin  and  Jay  were  kept 
well  advised  of  the  varying  phases  of  English  politics  ;  they 
knew  that  the  ministry  were  aware  of  the  necessity  of  being 
prepared  for  the  approaching  Parliament,  and  were  gradually 
becoming  aware  of  the  importance,  could  it  be  effected,  of 
closing  if  possible  the  American  question  before  concluding 
with  France  and  Spain.  The  advantage  of  eliminating  the 
American  element  from  the  general  pacification  seems  to  have 

*  Diplomatic  Corresp,  viii.,  209. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  49 

been  brought  into  prominence,  however  unconsciously,  by 
Rayneval  ;  and  Shelburne's  view  of  Parliament  may  perhaps 
be  gathered  from  his  remarks  to  Fitzherbert  a  little  later  (Octo 
ber  2  ist).  "  It  is  our  determination  that  it  shall  be  either 
War  or  Peace  before  we  meet  the  Parliament,  for  I  need  not 
tell  you  that  we  shall  have  there  to  meet  many  opinions  and 
passions." 

Of  the  effect  of  Vaughan's  mission  the  biographer  of 
Shelburne  says  :  "  Benjamin  Vaughan  had  arrived  almost 
simultaneously  with  Rayneval.  It  became  clear 'to  the  Cabi 
net  that  a  profound  feud  had  sprung  up  between  the  Ameri 
cans  and  their  European  allies,  and  that  all  they  had  to  do 
was  to  avail  themselves  of  it.  They  at  once  decided  to  accept 
the  American  proposition  as  to  the  terms  of  the  commission 
to  Oswald.  Lord  Ashburton  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that  it 
came  within  the  terms  of  the  Enabling  Act.  The  new  com 
mission  was  then  made  out  at  once  and  despatched  to  Paris 
by  Vaughan."  "  Having  said  and  done  everything,"  Shel 
burne  wrote  to  Oswald,  "  which  has  been  desired,*  there  is 
nothing  for  me  to  trouble  you  with  except  to  add  that  we  have 
put  the  greatest  confidence,  I  believe,  ever  placed  in  man,  in 
the  American  Commissioners.  It  is  now  to  be  seen  how  far 
they  or  America  are  to  be  depended  upon.  I  will  not  detain 
you  with  enumerating  the  difficulties  which  have  occurred. 
There  never  was  greater  risk  known  ;  I  hope  the  public  will 
be  the  gainer  by  it,  else  our  heads  must  answer  for  it,  and  de 
servedly." 

This  tribute  to  the  American  Commissioners  from  the  chief 
Minister  of  George  the  Third  is  the  more  remarkable  that  it 
was  paid  by  Shelburne  himself,  amidst  the  prevailing  system 
of  diplomatic  duplicity. 

The  simple,  manly,  straightforward  conduct  of  the  Am 
erican  Commission  at  Paris,  having  regard  only  to  the  dignity 
and  rights  of  their  country,  and  standing  with  quiet  firm 
ness  on  that  basis,  unmoved  alike  by  solicitation  or  menace  : 
indifferent  to  the  complaint  that  the  American  stubbornness 
was  blocking  the  general  pacification,  and  calmly  refusing 

*  Shelburne  to  Oswald,  September  23,  1782  :    Shelburne's  Life,  iii.,  pp.  267-68. 
4 


50  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

to  treat  with  Great  Britain  excepting  on  a  footing  of  equal 
sovereignty  and  independence,  inspired  the  respect,  regard, 
and  confidence  implied  in  those  remarkable  words :  '  We 
have  put  the  greatest  confidence,  I  believe,  ever  placed  in 
man,  in  the  American  Commissioners.'  '  That  confidence 
settled  the  main  question  whether  England  should  adopt  the 
part  so  much  desired  by  France  and  Spain  in  regard  to 
the  crippling  of  American  power,  or  whether  she  should 
endow  the  rising  nation  with  the  territories  and  resources 
which  her  position  demanded.  However  skilfully  M.  Rayne- 
val  may  have  played  into  their  hands  by  expressing  his 
strong  opinion  against  the  American  claims  to  the  fisheries 
and  to  the  Valley  of  the  Mississippi  and  the  Ohio,  the  argu 
ments  of  Jay  and  Franklin,  repeated  to  Shelburne  in  the 
letters  of  Oswald  and  by  Vaughan,  as  the  special  agent  of 
the  Americans,  proved  more  real  and  effective,  and,  as 
Vaughan  wrote  nearly  fifty  years  afterward,  he  was  asked 
but  a  single  question  : 

"  L.  (Lansdowne)  only  asked  me,  Is  the  new  Commission 
necessary  ?  and  when  I  answered  yes,  it  was  instantly  or 
dered,  and  I  was  desired  to  go  back  with  it,  which  I  did,  carry 
ing  the  messenger  who  had  charge  of  it  in  my  chaise.  The 
grant  of  the  Commission,"  he  added,  "showed  how  things 
stood,  and  I  departed  joyfully."* 

Lord  Edmund  Fitzmaurice  closes  his  chapter  from  which 
the  account  of  Rayneval  and  Vaughan  is  taken  with  the 
remark  : 

"  It  remained  to  be  seen  whether  the  separation  thus 
successfully  accomplished  of  the  two  negotiations  could  be 
maintained,  and  what  effect  it  would  have  on  the  tone  of 
France  and  Spain."  The  wish  for  a  "  separate  negotiation" 
with  the  United  States  seems  to  have  been  cherished  by  the 
British  Cabinet  for  a  long  time,  and  a  letter  from  Grenville 
to  Fox  suggests  that  Franklin  had  given  color  to  the  idea 
by  his  course  in  reference  to  his  paper,  which  he  gave  to 
Oswald  in  April.  1782,  suggesting  the  cession  of  Canada  and 

*  Benjamin  Vaughan  to  Peter  Augustus  Jay,  January  14,  1830.  MS.  letter 
in  the  possession  of  Miss  E.  C.  Jay,  of  New  York. 


The  Peace   Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  51 

also  reparation  to  the  Tories,  of  which  Franklin  says  in  his 
diary  that,  in  giving  to  Mr.  Adams  a  narrative  of  what  had 
transpired,  he  omitted  all  notice  to  this  paper,  and  "  the  rea 
son,"  he  added,  "of  my  omitting  it  was  that  on  reflection  I 
was  not  pleased  at  my  having  hinted  a  reparation  to  Tories 
for  their  forfeited  estates,  and  I  was  a  little  ashamed  of  my 
weakness  in  permitting  this  paper  to  go  out  of  my  hands."  * 

Grenville  had  said  to  Fox  :  "This  paper  under  the  title  of 
'  Notes  of  a  Conversation,'  contained  an  idea  of  Canada  being 
spontaneously  ceded  by  England  to  the  Thirteen  Provinces  in 
order  that  Congress  might  sell  the  unappropriated  lands,  and 
make  a  fund  thereby  in  order  to  compensate  the  damages 
done  by  the  English  army,  and  even  that  too  sustained  by 
the  Loyalists  ;  this  paper,  given  with  many  precautions  for 
fear  of  its  being  known  to  the  French  Court,  to  whom  it  was 
supposed  not  to  be  agreeable,  Mr.  Oswald  showed  to  Lord 
Shelburne,  who  after  keeping  it  a  day,  as  Mr.  Oswald  sup 
posed  to  show  it  to  the  King,  returned  it  to  him,  and  it  was 
by  him  brought  back  to  Franklin.  I  say  nothing  to  the 
proposition  itself,  to  the  impolicy  of  bringing  a  strange 
neighborhood  to  the  Newfoundland  fisheries,  or  to  the  little 
reason  that  England  would  naturally  see  in  having  lost 
thirteen  provinces,  to  give  away  a  fourteenth  ;  but  I  mention 
it  to  show  an  early  trace  of  separate  negotiation  which  per 
haps  you  did  not  know  before."  f 

The  secret  correspondence  of  Vergennes  affords  ample 
proof  of  the  correctness  of  Doctor  Franklin's  supposition,  that 
the  cession  of  Canada  to  the  United  States  would  not  be 
agreeable  to  the  French  Court.  To  Montmorin,  Vergennes 
suggested j:  that  it  was  "important  that  the  English  should 
remain  masters  of  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia ;  they  will  keep 
alive  the  jealousy  of  this  nation,  which  might  otherwise  turn 
somewhere  else,  and  will  make  it  feel  the  need  of  sureties, 
allies,  and  protectors." 

*  Life  of  Franklin,  ii. ,  460.    See  the  paper  also  as  taken  from  the  Lansdowne 
MSS.  in  Shelburne,  in.,  180-182. 
f  Lecky,  iv.,  250,  June  4,  1782. 
JCircourt,  iii.,  311,  October  30,  1778. 


52  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

Again,  on  November  2,  1778,*  Vergennes  wrote  to  Mont- 
morin  : 

"  But  you  may  assure  him  (the  minister  of  the  King  of 
Spain)  that  it  is  not  on  our  part  he  will  meet  with  difficulties 
with  regard  to  the  reservation  and  guaranteeing  of  Canada 
and  Nova  Scotia  to  England," 

The  proposal  of  Doctor  Franklin  for  the  cession  of  Canada, 
which  Oswald  seems  to  have  regarded  with  some  approval, 
found  no  favor  with  the  British  Cabinet ;  but  the  suggestion 
of  compensation  to  the  Tories,  and  what  they  thought  a  trace 
of  separate  negotiation,  were  not  readily  forgotten.  A  nota 
ble  incident  of  Franklin's  proposal  was  the  injunction  that  it 
should  be  kept  secret  even  from  France,  an  injunction  in  vio 
lation  of  the  instructions  of  Congress  ;  and  it  may  be  remem 
bered  that  it  was  the  accidental  disclosure  of  the  secret  by 
Oswald  to  Grenville  which  intensified  the  quarrel  between 
Shelburne  and  Fox,  who  was  about  resigning  his  position  in 
the  Cabinet  when  it  was  dissolved  by  the  death  of  Rockingham. 

Another  noticeable  point  in  connection  with  Vaughan's 
visit  is  alluded  to  by  Mr.  C.  F.  Adams, f  where  he  says  of  the 
Marbois  letter  : 

"  The  object  of  its  disclosure  on  the  part  of  England  was 
to  make  Mr.  Jay  willing  to  surrender  his  objection  to  imme 
diate  negotiation  on  the  terms  of  Oswald's  commission.  Its 
effect  was  directly  the  reverse  of  this,  for  Mr.  Jay  made  it 
the  basis  of  the  strongest  representations,  communicated 
through  Mr.  Vaughan  to  Lord  Shelburne,  to  secure  the  modi 
fication  which  was  required.  It  was  this  last  view,  reinforced 
by  the  written  representations  made  before  and  the  verbal 
communication  held  after  Mr.  Vaughan's  arrival  in  England, 
which  probably  turned  the  scale  in  favor  of  the  concession." 

Nor  is  it  to  be  forgotten,  in  considering  broadly  the  situa 
tion  of  England  when  she  suddenly  adopted  a  more  friendly 
policy  toward  America,  that  she  was  at  the  time  without  an 
ally  in  Europe,  and  that  if  the  attempt  for  a  general  pacifica 
tion  should  fail,  she  would  have  to  continue  the  war  at  no 
slight  disadvantage. 

*  Circourt,  iii.,  p.  311.  f  Adams,  i.,  368. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  53 

ARRIVAL  OF  THE  NEW  COMMISSION. 

On  the  24th  September  Townsend  wrote  to  Oswald  :  "I 
now  send  you  the  commission,  which  has  met  with  no  delay 
more  than  was  absolutely  necessary  for  the  forms  through 
which  it  would  pass.  I  hope  the  frankness  with  which  we 
deal  will  meet  with  a  suitable  return."  * 

"  On  the  27th  of  September,"  wrote  Jay  to  Livingston, 
"  Mr.  Vaughan  returned  here  from  England  with  the  courier 
that  brought  Mr.  Oswald's  new  commission,  and  very  happy 
were  we  to  see  it."  And  he  added  an  assurance  that  "  Mr. 
Vaughan  greatly  merits  our  acknowledgments."  t 

It  was  on  September  24th  that  Jay  was  informed  of  the 
intention  of  the  British  court  to  give  Mr.  Oswald  such  a  new 
commission  fes  had  been  recommended,  and  on  September 
26th  Jay  visited  the  Count  de  Vergennes  at  Versailles,  and 
met  there  Lafayette  and  the  Ambassador  of  Spain.  The 
latter  desired  to  enter  upon  the  negotiation  of  a  treaty  with 
Spain,  and  wished  Jay  to  accept  the  assurance  of  the  Count 
de  Florida  Blanca  that  he  was  authorized  to  treat,  and  not  to 
insist  upon  an  exchange  of  powers,  for  the  reason  that  Spain 
had  not  yet  recognized  the  independence  of  the  United 
States.  Jay  replied,  that  they  had  declared  their  indepen 
dence  ;  that  France,  Holland,  and  Britain  had  acknowledged 
it ;  and  Lafayette  made  a  remark  with  which  the  Spanish  Am 
bassador  was  little  pleased — that  it  would  not  be  consistent 
with  the  dignity  of  France  for  her  ally  to  treat  otherwise 
than  as  independent.  The  Ambassador  observed  that  Spain 
did  not  deny  our  independence,  and  he  could  perceive  no 
other  reason  for  Jay's  declining  to  confer  with  the  Ambassa 
dor  about  a  treaty  without  saying  anything  about  our  inde 
pendence,  an  acknowledgment  of  which  would  naturally  be 
the  effect  of  the  treaty  proposed  to  be  formed.  "  I  told  the 
Count,"  wrote  Jay,  "  that  being  independent  we  should 
always  insist  on  being  treated  as  such,  and  therefore  it  was 
not  sufficient  for  Spain  to  forbear  denying  our  independence, 

*  Townsend  to  Oswald,  Whitehall,  September  24,  1782. 
f  Dip.  Corves.,  viii.,  201. 


54  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

while  she  declined  to  admit  it  ;  and  that  notwithstanding  my 
respect  for  her  Ambassador  and  my  desire  of  a  treaty  with 
Spain,  both  the  terms  of  my  commission  and  the  dignity  of 
America  forbade  my  treating  on  any  other  than  an  equal 
footing"* 

The  Count  Vergennes  carried  the  Ambassador  to  his 
Cabinet,  and  when  he  retired  explained  to  Jay  the  reason  of 
sending  Rayneval  to  England,  to  learn  if  Shelburne  were 
really  inclined  to  peace,  which  he  believed  to  be  the  case, 
and  observed  in  reference  to  the  new  commission  that,  as  it 
removed  their  former  objection,  they  might  now  go  on  to 
prepare  the  preliminaries,  and  he  recommended,  as  regarded 
Spain,  that  they  should  endeavor  to  approach  and  meet  each 
other. 

From  the  Count  Jay  went  to  see  Rayneval,  \yho  gave  the 
same  reason  for  his  journey,  and  talked  of  his  memoir,  say 
ing  much  in  favor  of  the  conciliatory  line  he  had  proposed, 
which  would  have  greatly  reduced  the  lands  toward  the  Mis 
sissippi.  When  Jay  repeated  to  him  a  remark  which  he 
had  just  made  to  Vergennes  about  the  recent  date  of  the 
Spanish  claims,  Rayneval  imputed  their  former  ideas  to 
their  ignorance,  making  it  evident  to  Jay  that  their  present 
ideas  had  been  suggested  to  them  by  the  French  Court, 
and  affording  additional  proof  that  that  Court  was  actively 
opposed  to  the  American  claims,  treating  them  as  ill-founded 
and  unjust,  f 

On  the  arrival  of  the  new  commission  empowering  Oswald 
to  "  treat  of,  consult,  and  conclude  with  any  commissioners, 
or  persons  by  and  on  the  part  of  the  Thirteen  United  States 
of  America,"  the  American  Commissioners,  recognized  at 
last  as  the  representatives  of  an  independent  power,  pro 
ceeded  to  business. 

The  result  thus  accomplished  by  a  disregard  of  the  in 
struction  of  Congress  suggested  and  urged  by  the  French 
Minister,  that  the  Commission  should  be  governed  by  the 
advice  of  France,  recalls  the  fact  that  by  the  instructions 

*  Dip.  Corres.,  viii.,  202. 

•J-  See  Mr.  Chas.  Francis  Adams'  remarks  on  Rayneval's  views,  Adams,  i.,  373. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  55 

resolved  upon  by  Congress  (August  14,  1779),  the  American 
Minister  was  to  make  it  "  a  preliminary  article  to  any  ne 
gotiation,  that  Great  Britain  shall  agree  to  treat  with  the 
United  States  as  free,  sovereign,  and  independent  States."  * 

On  October  5th,  after  a  slight  delay  caused  by  the  illness 
of  Franklin,  Jay  handed  to  Oswald  the  plan  of  a  treaty, 
which  included  the  clauses  relating  to  independence,  the 
boundaries,  and  the  fisheries.  The  boundaries  were  accepted 
by  Oswald,  with  an  amendment  proposed  by  Franklin  for 
the  settlement  of  the  Massachusetts  boundary  by  a  commis 
sion,  and  Oswald  explained  to  Townsend  that  the  draft  so 
favorable  to  the  Americans,  was  drawn  avowedly  with  the 
object  of  laying  the  foundation  of  future  good-will,  and  leav 
ing  as  few  causes  of  future  differences  as  possible  between  the 
two  nations.  The  map  which  accompanied  the  draft  treaty 
is  stated  by  Lord  Edmond  Fitzmaurice  to  be  the  same  which 
was  afterward  found  among  the  Jay  papers,  and  which  now 
belongs  to  the  New  York  Historical  Society. 

The  next  day,  October  6th,  Vergennes  handed  to  Fitz- 
herbert  two  memorials  containing  the  demands  of  France  A 
and  Spain,  whose  business  had  waited  until  the  Americans 
were  satisfied  with  Oswald's  commission.  On  the  8th,  Os 
wald  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  State  :  "  Mr.  Jay  said  to  me 
last  night,  once  we  have  signed  this  treaty  we  shall  have  no 
more  to  do  but  to  look  on  and  see  what  people  are  about 
here.  They  will  not  like  to  find  we  are  so  far  advanced,  and 
have  for  some  time  appeared  anxious  and  inquisitive  as  to 
our  plans  of  settlement,  upon  which  subject  I  was  lately  tried 
by  a  certain  marquis  ;  but  I  gave  him  no  satisfaction,  and 
wish  that  for  some  time  as  little  may  be  said  about  it  as  pos 
sible,  "f 

THE  SENDING  OF  MR.  STRACHEY. 

Oswald  received  no  opinion  from  his  Court  on  the  Articles 
until  October  23d,  when  he  was  told  that  the  extent  of  the 
boundaries  and  the  situation  of  the  Tories  raised  some  objec- 

*  Secret  Journal,  Debates,  ii.,  137-236. 

f  From  Oswald's  letter  in  the  Bancroft  collection. 


56  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

tions,  and  that  the  Minister's  secretary  was  coming  to  confer 
with  them. 

The  object  of  this  move,  as  Lord  Edmond  Fitzmaurice 
shows  in  the  life  of  Shelburne,  was  to  gain,  if  possible,  a 
modification  of  the  American  demands  in  favor  of  the  English 
creditors  and  loyalists — points  to  which  Shelburne  attached  a 
larger  importance  than  some  of  his  colleagues — and  as  Oswald 
had  acted  in  conformity  with  the  express  direction  of  the 
Cabinet,  they  proposed  to  send  an  additional  negotiator  to 
assist  him. 

The  great  victory  of  Rodney  over  the  French  in  the  West 
Indies  in  April,  1782,  had  been  followed  in  September  by 
the  memorable  defeat  of  the  French  and  Spanish  forces  gath 
ered  for  the  capture  of  Gibraltar,  and  the  burning  of  the  fleet 
of  battering  ships. 

This  victory  stiffened  the  British  Cabinet  in  opposition 
to  the  demands  of  France  and  Spain  ;  but  realizing  that  the 
United  States  would  in  no  case  continue  the  war  for  purely 
Spanish  objects,  they  resolved  to  attempt  a  modification  of 
the  American  demands  as  well  in  regard  to  the  northeastern 
boundary  as  in  favor  of  the  English  creditors  and  the  loyalists, 
on  which  Oswald  had  yielded. 

Oswald  had  already  been  assisted  by  Mr.  Fitzherbert, 
who  had  been  sent  to  Paris  from  Brussels,  and  of  whom  Mr. 
Secretary  Townsend  had  written  to  Oswald  *  (July  26,  1782) : 
"  I  have  great  pleasure  in  recommending  him  to  your  con 
fidence,  as  he  is  a  person  of  whose  talents  and  discretion  I 
have  the  highest  opinion,  founded  on  a  long  acquaintance." 
And  the  royal  instructions  to  Mr.  Oswald,  dated  July  31, 
1782,  said  :  "  Our  will  and  pleasure  is  that  you  preserve  the 
most  constant  and  intimate  communication  from  time  to  time 
with  the  said  colleague  Fitzherbert." 

It  was  resolved  to  send  a  new  negotiator  to  their  aid, 
and  Lord  Shelburne  selected  for  this  purpose  Mr.  Henry 
Strachey,  who  had  been  the  secretary  of  Clive,  and  of  Lord 
Howe's  Commission  when  it  met  at  Staten  Island,  where 

*  MS.  in  English  Record  Office — volume,  "  France.  Mr.  Wai  pole,  Mr.  Oswald, 
Mr.  Fitzherbert,  and  Mr.  Grenville,  January  to  December,  1782.  No.  557." 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and 


Franklin  and  Adams  went  for  a  conference.  Strachey  had 
served  also  as  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  under  Lord  Rocking- 
ham,  and  then  as  Under-Secretary  in  Townsend's  depart 
ment,  where,  Lord  Edmond  Fitzmaurice  says,  "  he  was 
known  as  a  man  of  great  discretion,  accuracy,  and  learning."  * 

The  English  Cabinet  had  begun  to  realize  the  difficulty,  if 
not  the  impossibility,  of  obtaining  what  they  thought  con 
cerned  the  honor  of  England — restitution  and  compensation 
for  the  royalist  refugees — and  Mr.  Strachey  left  with  "in 
structions  to  urge  the  claims  of  England,  under  the  Proclama 
tion  of  1763,  to  the  lands  between  the  Mississippi  and  the 
western  boundary  of  the  States,  and  to  bring  forward  the 
French  boundary  of  Canada.  .  .  .  He  was  to  urge  their 
claims  and  the  right  of  the  King  to  the  ungranted  domain, 
not  indeed  for  their  own  sake  but  in  order  to  gain  some  com 
pensation  for  the  refugees." 

"  I  trust  and  hope,"  wrote  Shelburne  to  Oswald,  an 
nouncing  the  departure  of  Strachey,  "  you  are  well  founded  in 
your  judgment  of  the  American  Commissioners  now  at  Paris. 
I  am  disposed  to  expect  everything  from  Dr.  Franklin's 
comprehensive  understanding  and  character  ;  and  as  I  know 
nothing  to  the  contrary,  I  am  open  to  every  good  impression 
you  give  us  of  Mr.  Jay."  \ 

After  referring  to  the  refugees  and  the  debts,  Shelburne 
added  : 

"But  I  beg  to  recommend  the  question  of  policy  to  your 
most  serious  reflection.  If  we  are  to  look  to  regain  the  af 
fection  of  America,  to  reunion  in  any  shape,  or  even  to  com 
merce  and  friendship,  is  it  not  of  the  last  degree  of  consequence 
to  retain  every  means  possible  to  gratify  America  at  a  future, 
I  hope  not  very  distant,  day  ?  " 

RAYNEVAL'S  RENEWED  OBJECTIONS. 

October  24th  Jay  dined  with  Doctor  Franklin  at  Passy, 
meeting  M.  de  Rayneval,  who  desired  to  know  the  state  of 
the  negotiations  with  Oswald,  and  was  told  that  some  ques- 

*  Shelburne' s  Life,  iii.,  281. 

f  Shelburne  to  Oswald,  October  21,  1782  :  Shelburne's  Life,  iii.,  283. 


58  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

tions  had  arisen  about  the  boundaries,  and  that  a  secretary 
was  coming  with  books  and  papers.  On  asking  and  being 
told  what  boundaries  we  claimed,  he  argued  that  the  claim 
was  ill-founded,  and  objected  also  to  our  claim  to  the  fisher 
ies.  On  Doctor  Franklin's  explaining  their  great  importance 
to  the  Eastern  States,  he  softened  his  manner  and  observed, 
"  that  it  was  natural  for  France  to  wish  better  to  us  than  to 
England  ;  but  as  the  fisheries  were  a  great  nursery  for  sea 
men,  we  might  suppose  that  England  would  be  disinclined  to 
admit  others  to  share  in  it." 

This  remark  recalls  one  made  by  Lord  St.  Helens  (the 
Mr.  Fitzherbert  of  the  negotiation),  in  memoranda  on  Jay's 
life  addressed  to  Sir  George  Rose  in  1838.*  After  referring 
to  the  British  official  discussions  with  France  touching  the 
French  fisheries,  Lord  St.  Helens  added  :  "  But  in  the  course 
of  these  discussions  M.  de  Vergennes  never  failed  to  insist  on 
the  expediency  of  a  concert  of  measures  between  France  and 
England  for  the  purpose  of  excluding  the  American  States 
from  the  fisheries,  lest  they  should  become  a  nursery  for  sea 
men." 

THE  ARRIVAL  OF  MR.  ADAMS— UNANIMOUS  ACTION  OF 
THE  COMMISSION. 

Saturday,  October  25th,  was  an  eventful  day  in  the  his 
tory  of  the  negotiation,  as  Mr.  Adams  arrived  from  Holland, 
bringing  to  the  work  of  the  Commission  his  experience  and 
ability,  energy,  and  courage.  l(  He  had  studied,"  says 
Trescott,  "  profoundly  and  philosophically  the  capacities  of 
the  country  he  represented,  and  had  an  enthusiastic  convic 
tion  not  only  of  its  future  power,  but  of  the  influence  which 
it  might  exert  in  the  present  condition  of  political  affairs." 
He  came  from  the  Hague,  where  he  had  negotiated  a  treaty 
with  the  Netherlands. 

He  had  been  originally  appointed  the  sole  Commissioner 
to  negotiate  a  peace,  and  when  his  habit  of  independent 

*  Quoted  in  the  New  York  Review,  ix.,  pp.  306,  307.  From  a  copy  furnished 
to  the  author,  the  late  Dr.  John  McVickar,  of  Columbia  College,  by  the  Hon. 
William  Jay.  See  also  Flanders'  Chief  Justices,  i.,  343. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  59 

thought  and  action  dissatisfied  the  French  Minister,  and  Con 
gress  had  consented  to  add  in  succession  Jay,  Franklin, 
Laurens,  and  Jefferson,  he  wrote  to  a  friend  who  thought  it 
might  be  disagreeable  :  "  It  is  more  honorable  than  before 
and  much  more  easy.  .  .  .  The  measure  is  right.  It  is 
more  respectful  to  the  powers  of  Europe  concerned  and  more 
likely  to  give  satisfaction  in  America."  * 

On  Monday,  October  28th,  Jay  says  in  his  diary,  "  Mr. 
Adams  was  with  us  three  hours  this  morning.  I  mentioned 
to  him  the  progress  and  present  state  of  the  negotiation 
with  Britain,  my  conjectures  of  the  views  of  France  and 
Spain,  and  the  part  which  it  appeared  to  me  advisable  for  us 
to  act ;  he  concurred  with  me  in  sentiment  on  all  these 
points." 

After  the  preliminary  articles  had  been  signed,  Adams 
wrote  of  this  interview  with  Jay:  "  Nothing  that  has  hap 
pened  since  the  beginning  of  the  controversy  in  1761,  has  ever 
struck  me  more  forcibly,  or  affected  me  more  intimately  than 
that  entire  coincidence  of  principles  and  opinions  between  him 
and  me." 

October  29th  Oswald  wrote  to  Shelburne  :  "  Mr.  Strachey 
arrived  here  yesterday.  Introduced  Strachey  to  Jay,  and 
was  joined  by  Adams,  who  is  come  from  Holland.  .  .  .  We 
then  went  out  to  Doctor  Franklin's.  .  .  .  To-morrow  at 
eleven  o'clock  the  three  Commissioners  have  agreed  to  meet 
at  my  quarters  to  examine  maps  and  papers,  and  thereafter 
are  to  dine  together  at  Mr.  Jay's.  We  are  now  at  night  again 
employed  in  that  way  so  as  to  be  the  better  prepared  for 
them,  at  least  as  well  as  can  be  done  from  material  of  such 
indefinite  instructions." 

Three  days  later  Adams  spent  the  evening  with  Doctor 
Franklin  at  Passy. 

"  I  told  him,"  writes  Adams,  "  without  reserve  my  opin 
ion  of  the  policy  of  this  Court,  and  of  the  principles,  wisdom, 
and  firmness  with  which  Mr.  Jay  had  conducted  the  negotia 
tion  in  his  sickness  and  my  absence,  and  that  I  was  deter 
mined  to  support  Mr.  Jay  to  the  utmost  of  my  power  in  the 

*  Adams,  i.,  342. 


60  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

pursuit  of  the  same  system.  The  Doctor  heard  me  patiently 
but  said  nothing. 

"The  first  conference  we  had  afterwards  with  Mr.  Oswald, 
in  considering  one  point  and  another,  Doctor  Franklin  turned 
to  Mr.  Jay  and  said,  '  I  am  of  your  opinion,  and  will  go  on  with 
these  gentlemen  in  the  business  without  consulting  this  Court. ' 
He  has  accordingly  met  us  in  most  of  our  conferences,  and  has 
gone  on  with  us  in  entire  harmony  and  unanimity  through 
out,  and  has  been  able  and  useful,  both  by  his  sagacity  and 
his  reputation,  in  the  whole  negotiation."  * 

Mr.  Adams,  who  in  his  absence  had  assisted  by  his  sug 
gestions  in  securing  the  second  commission,  thus  signalized 
his  arrival  by  removing  the  objections  of  Doctor  Franklin,  and 
securing  the  united  action  of  the  Commission  in  setting  aside 
the  instruction  of  Congress  that  the  Commission  should  be 
governed  by  the  opinions  of  France. 

Mr.  Jay's  elaborate  despatch, t  bringing  the  history  of  the 
negotiations  to  the  arrival  of  Mr.  Adams,  closed  with  a  care 
ful  review  of  the  situation,  and  especially  of  the  policy  of 
the  French  Court,  which  is  confirmed  by  their  secret  corres 
pondence. 

"They  are  interested,"  he  said,  "  in  separating  us  from 
Great  Britain,  and  on  that  point  we  may,  I  believe,  depend 
upon  them  ;  but  it  is  not  their  interest  that  we  should  be 
come  a  great  and  formidable  people,  and  therefore  they  will 
not  help  us  to  become  so." 

Mr.  Adams,  in  his  valuable  diary,  has  recorded  interest 
ing  particulars  of  the  later  negotiations,  and  now  the  letters 
of  Mr.  Oswald  and  Mr.  Strachey,  and  the  valuable  sketch  of 
the  negotiation  given  by  the  biographer  of  Lord  Shelburne, 
advise  us  as  thoroughly  of  the  views  and  impressions,  the 
hopes  and  fears  of  the  English  negotiators,  as  the  confidential 
correspondence  of  M.  de  Vergennes,  and  his  agents,  of  the 
wishes  and  schemings  of  the  French  court  to  accomplish  the 
policy  of  Spain  at  the  cost  of  the  Republic.  Strachey  wrote 
to  Townsend  on  November  29th  :  "  It  appears  as  if  we  shall 
be  able  to  gain  something."  On  October  3Oth  and  the  three 

*  Adams,  iii.,  336.  f  Dip.  Corresp.,  viii.,  129,  218. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  61 

following  days  formal  interviews  were  held,  and  Oswald 
wrote  to  Townsend  on  November  5th  : 

"  On  all  the  material  points  in  question  he  (Strachey)  has 
from  day  to  day  taken  up  the  subject  apart,  and  has  enforced 
our  pretensions  by  every  argument  that  reason,  justice  or 
humanity  could  suggest,  and  even  sometimes  to  the  point  of 
almost  exciting  those  insinuations  of  menace  which  I  had 
been  so  long  accustomed  to,  as  reported  by  me  on  several 
occasions,  and  to  which  we  have  nothing  to  oppose  of  reser 
vation  on  our  part,  but  an  alternative  which  we  did  not  think 
advisable  on  the  present  occasion  to  offer  directly  to  their 
consideration  and  option." 

The  American  Commissioners,  guarding  their  great  inter 
ests  in  the  boundaries  and  the  fisheries,  made  some  minor  con 
cessions,  Adams  and  Jay  overruling  the  objection  of  Frank 
lin  to  the  recovery  of  debts  contracted  before  the  war; 
accepting  for  the  drying  of  fish  the  unsettled  coast  of  Nova 
Scotia  in  place  of  Newfoundland,  and  giving  the  British  the 
choice  of  two  lines  on  the  Northeastern  boundary.'*  On  No 
vember  6th  and  9th  Oswald  wrote  to  Townsend  :  "  Mr.  Jay 
said  he  hoped  we  would  not  let  this  opportunity  slip,  but  re 
solve  speedily  to  wind  up  the  long  dispute  so  as  we  might  be 
again  as  one  people. 

"  That  they  had  hitherto  acted  in  the  negotiation  under 
instructions  of  the  year  1779,  when  their  affairs  were  not  in 
quite  so  good  a  situation  as  at  present,  and  had  gone  to  the 
full  stretch  of  them  and  farther. 

"  But  if  we  broke  up  now  we  might  be  assured  of  their 
receiving  new  instructions,  and  of  a  very  different  kind  from 
the  present ;  in  which,  among  other  things,  he  made  no 
doubt  they  would  be  directed  to  state  all  the  depredation, 
plunder,  and  unnecessary  destruction  of  property  over  all  their 
country  as  charged  against  the  British  demands  of  bona  fide 
creditors.  .  .  .  That  with  respect  to  the  British  debts, 
he  had  conjointly  with  his  colleague  at  all  times  declared  that 
all  that  were  contracted  before  the  war  must  be  duly  paid  ;  yet 
if  the  States  by  our  refusal  of  accommodation  should  be  con- 

*  A  copy  of  the  map  with  these  lines  is  given  in  Shelburne's  Life,  iii.,  294. 


62  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

tinued  under  their  present  expensive  establishment,  he  would 
not  answer  for  the  same  favorable  determination  hereafter." 

A  cabinet  paper,  entitled  "  Preliminaries  with  America," 
bearing  date  November  5th,  and  appearing,  from  an  en 
dorsement  in  Lord  Shelburne's  hand,  to  have  been  approved 
by  Mr.  Townsend  and  Mr.  Pitt,  is  interesting  as  seeming  to 
suggest  a  possible  appeal  to  France  to  compel  the  American 
negotiators  to  recognize  the  claims  of  the  refugee  loyalists. 
It  says  : 

"  .  .  .  To  order  Mr.  Oswald  to  sign  whenever  Mr.  Fitz- 
herbert,  Mr.  Strachey  and  himself  agree  in  holding  it  ex 
pedient.  Care  must  be  taken  to  refer  to  Mr.  Oswald's  in 
struction,  that  there  may  be  no  doubt  as  to  his  power  to 
empower  Mr.  Fitzherbert  to  avail  himself  of  France  so  far  as 
he  may  judge  prudent  from  circumstances. 

"  Mr.  Fitzherbert's  interposition  will  be*useful,  if  for  no 
other  purpose  than  to  let  the  Americans  see  the  possibility 
of  an  appeal  on  our  part." 

A  second  set  of  articles  was  agreed  upon  for  submission  to 
the  British  Cabinet,  and  the  papers  were  forwarded  with  a 
marked  map.  Strachey  wrote  :  "  You  will  see  by  the  treaty 
all  that  could  be  obtained  ;  the  debts  prior  to  1775  appear  to  be 
safe."  Mr.  Strachey  said  with  truth  that  the  recovery  of  the 
property  of  the  refugees  had  been  "  most  obstinately  fought 
for,"  and  on  November  4th  Strachey  addressed  a  letter  to  the 
American  Commissioners,  making  a  last  appeal  for  "  stipula 
tion  for  the  restitution,  compensation,  .and  amnesty  above  be 
fore  we  proceed  further  in  this  negotiation."  On  November 
5th  Mr.  Strachey  announced  to  them  his  intended  departure 
for  London  on  the  same  day,  and  repeated  his  former  assur 
ance  that  "  a  refusal  on  this  point  would  be  the  great  obstacle 
to  a  conclusive  ratification  of  that  peace  which  is  meant  as  a 
solid,  perfect,  permanent  reconciliation  and  reunion  between 
Great  Britain  and  America.* 

"  .  .  .  It  affects  equally,  in  my  opinion,  the  honor  and 
humanity  of  your  own  country  and  of  ours.  How  far  you 

*  Am.  Dip.  Corresp.,  x.,  pp.  98  and  99  ;  the  Articles,  p.  88  et  seq.,  and  Os 
wald's  letter,  p.  92.  The  reply  of  the  Commissioners,  November  5,  1782,  p.  99. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of.\J%2  and  1783.  63 

will  be  justified  in  risking  every  favorite  object  of  America 
by  contending  against  those  principles  is  for  you  to  deter 
mine.  Independence  and  more  than  a  reasonable  possession 
of  territory  seem  to  be  within  your  reach.  Will  you  suffer 
them  to  be  outweighed  by  the  gratification  of  resentment 
against  individuals  ?  I  venture  to  assert  that  such  a  con 
duct  has  no  parallel  in  the  history  of  civilized  nations." 

The  reply  of  the  Commissioners,  dated  also  November 
5th,  after  stating  the  impracticability  of  restoring  the  estates 
of  refugees  which  had  been  confiscated  by  laws  of  particular 
States  pertaining  to  their  internal  polity  with  which  Congress 
had  no  authority  to  interfere,  thus  calmly  and  courteously, 
but  with  a  significance  which  was  appreciated  at  London,  re 
sponded  to  the  plain  words  and  blunt  suggestions  of  the  Brit 
ish  negotiators  : 

"  As  to  your  demand  of  compensation  to  those  per 
sons,  we  forbear  enumerating  our  reasons  for  thinking 
them  ill-founded.  In  the  moment  of  conciliatory  over 
tures  it  would  not  be  proper  to  call  certain  scenes  into 
view  over  which  a  variety  of  circumstances  should  induce 
both  parties  at  present  to  draw  a  veil.  .  .  .  We  should 
be  sorry  if  the  absolute  impossibility  of  our  complying 
further  with  your  proposition  should  induce  Great  Brit 
ain  to  continue  the  war  for  the  sake  of  those  who  caused 
and  prolonged  it.  But  if  that  should  be  the  case,  we  hope 
that  the  utmost  latitude  will  not  again  be  given  to  its 
rigors. 

"  Whatever  may  be  the  issue  of  this  negotiation,  be  as 
sured,  sir,  that  we  shall  always  acknowledge  the  liberal, 
manly,  and  candid  manner  in  which  you  have  conducted  it, 
and  that  we  shall  remain,  with  the  warmest  sentiments  of  es 
teem  and  regard,  sir,  your  most  obedient  and  very  humble 
servants." 

On  November  8th  Oswald  wrote  to  Strachey  :  "  Mr.  Jay 
sent  to  me  yesterday  for  a  copy  of  the  proposed  treaty.  I 
compared  it  with  him.  .  .  .  He  was  greatly  attentive  to 
all  the  particulars,  and  did  not  admit  of  the  least  alteration 
from  the  words  of  his  own  plan."  After  referring  to  three 


64  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

corrections  of  this  sort  made  by  Mr.  Jay,  Mr.  Oswald  adds  : 
"  I  would  also  beg  leave  to  add  that  from  this  gentle 
man's  precision  and  attention  to  the  identity  of  these  copies 
in  comparison  with  the  original  draft,  I  would  advise  that 
there  should  not  be  the  least  alteration,  not  a  single  word 
different  from  that  draft. 

•  " .     .     .      I  did  not   expect  to  find   Mr.  Jay   so   uncom 
monly  stiff  about  the  matter." 

The  difficulties  of  Lord  Shelburne  with  his  Cabinet  from 
the  firmness  of  the  American  negotiators  on  the  question  of 
the  loyalists,  were  enhanced  by  the  doubts  and  fears  of  the 
King,  who,  as  the  moment  approached  when  the  ties  between 
the  Colonies  and  England  were  about  to  be  formally  severed, 
grew  more  and  more  restive,*  and  wrote  to  Shelburne  of  his 
"  most  frequent  prayers  to  heaven  to  guide  me  so  to  act,  that 
posterity  may  not  lay  the  downfall  of  this  once  respectable 
empire  at  my  door ;  and  that  if  ruin  should  attend  the 
measures  that  may  be  adopted,  I  may  not  long  survive 
them."  Shelburne's  associates  in  the  Cabinet,  Richmond  and 
Keppel,  were  very  bitter  against  Oswald,  whom  they  de 
clared  was  only  an  additional  American  negotiator.  They 
proposed  to  recall  him.  But  this  Shelburne  and  Townsend  re 
fused  to  do,  as  they  especially  desired  that  Oswald  should  be 
in  Paris  to  negotiate  a  commercial  treaty  when  the  necessary 
acts  of  Parliament  had  been  passed.  The  main  question  was 
what  they  would  do  in  regard  to  the  loyalists,  who  the  public 
voice  demanded  in  unmistakable  terms  should  not  be  aban 
doned  :  and  on  the  other  hand,  says  Lord  Edmond  Fitzmaur- 
ice,t  "  there  was  the  risk  that  persistence  might  throw  the 
Americans  back  into  the  arms  of  the  French."  Shelburne  in 
clined  to  the  bolder  course,  notwithstanding  the  persuasions  of 
Vaughan,  who  came  again  from  Paris,  and  Strachey  was  in 
structed  to  return  and  make  one  more  effort. 

In  the  meanwhile  Oswald  wrote  to  Townsend,  November 
1 5th,  reporting  a  conversation  with  Jay  and  Adams  separately 

*  Lord  Edmond  Fitzmaurice  :  Shelburne's  Life,  Hi.,  297. 
f  Shelburne's  Life,  iii. ,  298. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and:  1783.  65 

about  the  loyalists,  each  returning  the  same  answer,  that  they 
would  not  agree  to  any  measure  for  the  restoration  of  those 
who  had  been  instrumental  in  encouraging  the  war,  and 
"  that  if  peace  with  Great  Britain  was  not  to  be  had  on  any 
other  terms  than  their  agreeing  to  these  provisions,  the  war 
must  go  on,  although  it  should  be  for  seven  years  to  come, 
and  that  neither  they  nor  the  Congress  had  any  power  in  the 
matter.  .  .  .  Mr.  Adams  said  that  he  had  been  sent  for 
last  week  to  Versailles,  and  that  M.  de  Vergennes  had  talked 
to  him  strongly  in  their  favor." 

On  November  23d  Vergennes  wrote  to  Luzerne  that 
the  King  was  not  obliged  "to  prolong  the  war  in  order 
to  sustain  the  ambitious  pretensions  which  the  United  States 
may  form  in  reference  to  the  fishery  or  the  extent  of  bound 
aries."  t  On  November  25th  the  King  was  writing  to  Shel- 
burne  urging  him  to  confide  in  Vergennes  his  "ideas  con 
cerning  America,"!  and  on  November  2Qth  Secretary 
Grantham  wrote  to  Fitzherbert :  "If  you  find  .  .  .  that 
there  is  a  real  dependency  to  be  made  upon  the  pacific  dis 
positions  of  France,  you  will  not  fail  to  avail  yourself  of 
a  communication  of  them  to  Mr.  Oswald,  that  he  may  be 
strengthened  thereby  in  pressing  the  American  Commission 
ers  to  the  conclusion  of  the  peace  upon  safe  and  honorable 
terms." 


THE  CLOSING  NEGOTIATIONS. 

November  28th  the  negotiators  met  at  Oswald's  lodgings, 
and  were  joined  by  Mr.  Laurens,  who  had  been  exchanged 
for  Lord  Cornwallis,  and  arrived  in  time  to  interline  in  the 
articles  the  only  clause  which  detracted  from  their  dignity — 

*  Shelburne,  despite  the  efforts  of  Vaughan,  was  not  ready  to  surrender  the 
claims  of  the  loyalists.  "It  is  no  idea  of  interest,"  he  wrote  to  Oswald,  "  which 
actuates  us  in  regard  to  the  refugees  ;  it  is  a  higher  principle."  And  he  suggested 
that  unless  the  American  Commissioners  yielded  he  would  bring  the  whole  matter 
before  Parliament.  Strachey  was  ordered  to  return  to  Paris,  and  his  instructions 
bore  date  November  2ist. 

fDe  Circourt,  iii.,  294.  \  Bancroft,  x.,  589. 

5 


66  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

that  which  prohibited  the  British  troops  from  "  carrying  away 
any  negroes  or  other  property  of  the  inhabitants." 

Mr.  Oswald,  by  his  instructions,  was  advised  to  sign  when 
ever  Mr.  Fitzherbert,  Mr.  Strachey,  and  himself  agreed  in 
thinking  it  expedient,  and  Mr.  Fitzherbert's  interposition 
was  deemed  useful,  if  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  let  the 
Americans  see  the  possibility  of  an  appeal  to  France.  And 
a  note  from  Townsend  to  Oswald  (Whitehall,  November  19, 
1782)  apprised  him  of  the  unanimous  resolution  of  the  Cabi 
net  to  adhere  to  the  treaty  then  proposed,  and  seemed  to 
indicate  a  possible  peril  in  the  remark,  "  I  do  not  choose  to 
prognosticate  the  danger  of  the  effects  of  the  refusal  of  the 
Crown  on  that  spirit  of  conciliation  which  has  now  for  some 
time  prevailed  in  this  country,  if  it  prevents  the  treaty  being 
signed  before  the  meeting  of  Parliament." 

At  the  first  conference  the  American  Commissioners  were 
advised  that  the  Ministry  conceded  the  boundaries,  although 
they  deemed  them  too  far  extended,  and  Mr.  Strachey  ex 
plained  the  changes  in  the  article  on  the  fisheries,  and  presented 
"  the  restitution  of  the  property  of  the  loyalists  as  the  grand 
point  on  which  a  final  settlement  depended."  Jay  asked  if 
the  proposition  submitted  was  the  ultimatum  of  the  Ministry, 
and  Strachey  reluctantly  answered  "  no,"  and  admitted,  too, 
that  Oswald  had  absolutely  authority  to  conclude  and  sign. 
''We  agreed,"  says  Mr.  Adams  in  his  diary,  "that  these 
were  good  signs  of  sincerity." 

Townsend  wrote  to  Oswald  on  November  22d  :  "  The 
Parliament  is  postponed  to  December  5th  next,  to  give  time 
to  receive  a  final  answer  from  the  powers  with  whom  we  are 
in  negotiation." 

Shelburne  himself  had  written  :  *  "  It  is  our  determination 
that  it  shall  be  either  war  or  peace  before  we  meet  the  Par 
liament,  for  I  need  not  tell  you  that  we  shall  have  there  to 
meet  many  opinions  and  passions."  With  the  complications 
of  the  entire  situation  and  the  exigencies  of  the  Ministry  at 
home,  our  Commissioners  wisely  hastened  to  secure  the 
vast  advantages  within  their  grasp,  making  the  slight  con- 

*  Shelburne  to  Fitzherbert,  October  21,  1782. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  67 

cessions   which    seemed    necessary   and    could    be   properly 
yielded.  Q 

The  boundaries  and  the  fisheries  were  the   great  points 
which  interested  America  ;  the^ecovery  of  British  defrtsrand 
for  the  refugees  were  the  points  which  con- 


cerned  the  British  Ministry. 

On  the  question  of  the  Northern  and  Eastern  boundary, 
Mr.  Adams  was  naturally  strong  ;  on  the  question  of  British 
debts  he  led  the  way  in  adjusting  that  point  to  the  satisfac 
tion  of  England  ;  on  the  fisheries  he  exhibited  great  skill  and 
energy  in  maintaining  our  rights,  and  although  Congress  had 
abandoned  the  fisheries  as  an  ultimatum,  the  Commissioners, 
knowing  that  it  had  been  done  under  French  influence,  stood 
firmly  for  the  right,  and  the  English  yielded.  "Such  a  vic 
tory,"  writes  Mr.  C.  F.  Adams,  "  is  not  often  recorded  in  the 
annals  of  diplomacy."  * 


THE  PROVISIONAL  ARTICLES. 

A  final  agreement  was  come  to  November  29,  1782,  when 
Fitzherbert,  Oswald,  and  Strachey  met  Franklin,  Laurens, 
and  Jay  at  Jay's  apartment  in  the  Hotel  d'Orleans,  and 
passed  the  entire  day  in  discussion  on  the  fisheries  and  the 
Tories,  in  whose  behalf  the  American  Commissioners  agreed 
to  a  clause  of  recommendation  by  Congress  to  the  States,  and 
another  guaranteeing  them  against  future  confiscation,  pros 
ecution,  or  loss. 

The  articles  were  ten  in  number.  The  first,  an  acknowl 
edgment  by  his  Britannic  Majesty  of  the  thirteen  Colonies  as 
free,  sovereign,  and  independent  States,  and  a  relinquishment 
of  all  claims  to  the  Government  property  and  territorial 
rights. 

The  second,  an  agreement  upon  the  boundaries  extending 
to  the  Mississippi  and  including  the  northwest  territory  north 
of  the  Ohio. 

The  third,  securing  to  the  United  States  the  right  to  the 

*  Adams'  Works,  i.,  p.  387. 


68  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

Newfoundland  fishery  and  elsewhere,  and  to  dry  their  fish  on 
Nova  Scotia,  Magdalen  Islands,  and  Labrador. 

The  fourth,  for  the  payment  of  creditors  on  either  side. 

The  fifth,  that  Congress  should  recommend  to  the  State 
Legislatures  to  restore  the  estates,  rights,  and  properties  of 
real  British  subjects,  they  refunding  the  bona  fide  prices  paid 
since  the  confiscation,  and  a  revision  of  all  laws  regarding  the 
premises. 

The  sixth,  that  no  future  confiscation  or  prosecutions 
should  be  made — persons  confined  on  charges  by  reason  of 
the  war  to  be  set  at  liberty. 

The  seventh,  that  there  should  be  a  firm  and  perpetual 
peace  between  the  countries,  and  providing  for  the  with 
drawal  of  the  British  troops,  etc. 

The  eighth,  that  the  Mississippi  River  should  be  forever 
open  to  the  citizens  of  both  countries. 

The  ninth,  that  any  place  or  territory  of  either  country 
conquered  by  the  arms  of  the  other  before  the  arrival  of  the 
articles  in  America  should  be  given  up. 

The  tenth,  that  the  ratification  of  the  treaty. should  be  ex 
changed  within  six  months. 

A  " separate  article"  defined  the  boundary  line  between 
the  United  States  and  West  Florida,  should  Great  Britain 
possess  the  latter  province  at  the  end  of  the  war. 

The  English  Commissioners  indulged  no  enthusiastic 
hopes  that  the  articles  would  be  warmly  approved  at  home. 
Mr.  Strachey  wrote  the  same  day  :  *  "The  fishery  we 
have  been  obliged  to  alter  considerably,  but  there  could  be 
no  treaty  at  all  without  it.  ...  Now,  are  we  to  be 
hanged  or  applauded  for  thus  rescuing  you  from  the  Ameri 
can  war  ?  .  .  .  I  am  half  dead  with  perpetual  anxiety. 
I  shall  not  be  at  ease  till  I  see  how  the  great  men  receive  it. 
If  this  is  not  as  good  a  peace  as  was  expected,  I  am  confident 
it  is  the  best  that  could  have  been  made." 

The  same  night  Oswald  wrote  :  f  "A  very  few  hours  ago 

*  Strachey  to  Nepean,  November  29,  1782. 

\  Oswald  to  Shelburne — "  Paris,  November  29,  1782,  eleven  at  night." 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  69 

we  thought  it  impossible  that  any  treaty  could  be  made. 
We  have,  however,  at  last  brought  matters  to  a  conclusion, 
so  that  we  have  agreed  upon  articles  and  are  to  meet  to-mor 
row  for  the  purpose  of  signing.  .  .  .  The  article  of  the 
fishery  has  been  particularly  difficult  to  settle,  as  we  thought 
the  instructions  were  rather  limited.  It  is,  however,  beyond 
a  doubt  that  there  could  have  been  no  treaty  at  all  if  we  had 
not  adopted  the  article  as  it  now  stands.  Mr.  Fitzherbert 
was  satisfied  that  it  would  not  interfere  with  the  French  ne 
gotiation,  and  we  all  three  concurred  in  opinion  that  this  ar 
ticle,  and  all  the  others  as  in  the  enclosed  paper,  should  be  con 
cluded  upon.  .  .  .  We  attempted  to  have  the  ninth  article 
in  more  explicit  terms,  but  could  not  contend  farther  than 
as  it  now  stands  without  raising  a  suspicion  of  what  we  really 
meant,  and  it  was  evident  that  the  American  Commission 
had  yet  received  no  advices  concerning  Bermuda." 

On  Saturday,  November  3Oth,  St.  Andrew's  Day,  records 
Mr.  Adams  in  his  diary,  "the  Commissioners  met  first  at 
Mr.  Jay's,  then  at  Mr.  Oswald's,  examined,  compared  ; 
then  the  treaties  were  signed,  sealed,  and  delivered,  and 
we  all  went  out  to  Passy  to  dine  with  Doctor  Franklin.  Thus 
far  has  proceeded  this  great  affair.  The  unravelling  of  the 
plot  has  been  to  me  the  most  affecting  and  astonishing  part 
of  the  whole  piece."  * 

The  Provisional  Articles  of  Peace  so  signed  were  to  be 
inserted  in  and  to  constitute  the  Treaty  of  Peace  proposed 
to  be  concluded  between  the  Crown  of  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States,  but  it  was  declared  that  such  treaty  should 
not  be  concluded  until  terms  of  peace  should  be  agreed  upon 
between  Great  Britain  and  France,  and  his  Britannic  Majesty 
shall  be  ready  to  conclude  such,  treaty  accordingly.! 

*  Adams,  Hi.,  p.  334. 

f  Provisional  Articles,  Dip.  Corres.,  x.,  p.  109. 


70  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 


RECEPTION  OF  THE  ARTICLES  IN  AMERICA. 

The  articles  were  received  with  great  satisfaction  in  Amer 
ica,  but  the  conduct  of  the  negotiation  was  not  unanimous 
ly  approved  at  Philadelphia.  The  Commissioners,  Adams, 
Franklin,  Jay,  and  Laurens,  in  communicating  the  Provisional 
Articles,  had  said:  "  We  knew  this  Court  and  Spain  to  be 
against  our  claims  to  the  western  country.  ...  As  we 
had  reason  to  imagine  that  the  articles  respecting  the  boun 
daries,  the  refugees,  and  fisheries  did  not  correspond  with 
the  policy  of  this  Court,  we  did  not  communicate  the  prelimi 
naries  to  the  Minister  until  after  they  were  signed,  and 
not  even  then  the  separate  article.  We  hope  that  these  con 
siderations  will  excuse  our  having  so  far  deviated  from  the 
spirit  of  our  instructions."  *  Mr.  R.  R.  Livingston,  the  Sec 
retary,  while  approving  their  steadiness  in  not  treating  without 
an  express  acknowledgment  of  independence,  and  approving 
the  boundaries  of  the  fisheries  and  acknowledging  their  firm 
ness,  perseverance,  and  success,  expressed  pain  at  the  dis 
trust  manifested  in  the  conduct  of  the  negotiation,  and  es 
pecially  in  signing  the  articles  without  communicating  them 
to  the  Court  of  Versailles,  and  in  concealing  the  separate  ar 
ticle  after  its  signature. f  The  task  of  framing  a  reply, \  says 
Mr.  C.  F.  Adams,  was  devolved  upon  Jay,  and  a  brief  ex 
tract  will  give  an  idea  of  its  tone. 

"  We  perfectly  concur  with  you  in  the  sentiment,  sir, 
that  '  honesty  is  the  best  policy.''  But  until  it  be  shown  that 
we  have  trespassed  on  the  rights  of  any  man  or  body  of  men, 
you  must  excuse  our  thinking  that  this  remark,  as  applied 
to  our  proceedings,  was  unnecessary. 

"  Should  any  explanations,  either  with  France  or  Spain, 
become  necessary  on  this  subject,  we  hope  and  expect  to 

*  Dip.  Corresp.,  x.,  pp.  118-120:  The  Commissioners  to  Livingston,  Paris, 
December  14,  1782. 

f  Dip.  Corresp.,  x.,  pp.  129,  130:  Livingston  to  the  Commissioners,  Philadel 
phia,  March  25,  1783. 

{Dip.  Corresp.,  x.,  pp.  187-193,  dated  Passy,  July  18,  1783.  See  also  Jay  to 
Livingston,  dated  Passy,  July  19,  1783  (Jay's  Life,  i.,  174). 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  71 

meet  with  no  embarrassment.  We  shall  neither  amuse  them 
nor  perplex  ourselves  with  flimsy  excuses,  but  tell  them 
plainly  that  it  was  not  our  duty  to  give  them  the  informa 
tion.  We  considered  ourselves  at  liberty  to  withhold  it,  and 
we  shall  remind  the  French  Minister  that  he  has  more  reason 
to  be  pleased  than  displeased  at  our  silence.  Since  we  have 
assumed  a  place  in  the  political  firmament,  let  us  move  like  a 
primary  and  not  a  secondary  planet." 

Mr.  Livingston,  before  writing  to  the  Commissioners  his 
letter  of  March  25th,  had  on  the  i8th  of  that  month  made  a 
communication  to  Congress,  recommending  that  he  be  au 
thorized  to  communicate  the  "  separate  article"  to  the 
French  Minister  at  Philadelphia. 

Four  successive  days,  March  I2th  to  i$th  inclusive,  had 
been  employed  by  Congress  in  reading  the  despatches  and 
preliminary  articles,  and  hearing  that  the  French  Minister, 
M.  Marbois,  had  said  that  the  King  had  been  surprised  and 
displeased.  When  asked  if  he  intended  to  complain  to  Con 
gress,  M.  Marbois  had  answered  that  great  powers  never 
complained  but  they  felt  and  remembered.  Touching  Mr. 
Livingston's  propositions,  Mr.  Wolcott  premised  that  Con 
gress  would  never  censure  men  who  had  obtained  such  terms 
for  the  country. 

In  the  debate  which  followed,  Mr.  Rutledge  held  that 
the  Ministers  had  adhered  religiously  to  the  spirit  and  letter 
of  our  Treaty  with  France,  that  the  separate  article  did 
not  concern  France,  and  that  Spain  had  no  claim  to  our  good 
offices.  Colonel  Mercer,  of  Virginia,  who  threatened  to  pub 
lish  the  articles  and  was  called  to  order  by  the  President, 
held  that  the  Ministers  had  insulted  Congress  by  sending 
their  assertions  without  proof  as  reasons  for  violating  their 
instructions,  approved  the  conduct  of  the  Count  de  Ver- 
gennes  in  promoting  a  treaty  under  the  first  Commission  to 
Oswald,  declared  the  conduct  of  the  Ministers  a  tragedy  to 
America  and  a  comedy  to  the  world,  and  that  they  proved 
that  America  had  at  once  the  follies  of  youth  and  the  vices 
of  age. 


72  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

He  was  followed  by  Messrs.  Hamilton,  Peters,  Bland,  Wil 
son,  Higgins,  and  Madison.  The  letter  of  the  Secretary, 
with  the  despatches  and  propositions,  were  referred  to  a 
committee  of  Mr.  Wilson,  Mr.  Gorham,  Mr.  Rutledge,  Mr. 
Clark,  and  Mr.  Hamilton,  who  on  March  22d  reported  res 
olutions  of  thanks  to  the  Ministers,  that  the  separate  article 
be  communicated  to  France,  and  that  Congress  wished  that 
the  articles  had  been  communicated  before  signing. 

A  further  debate  occurred  on  a  motion  to  recommit  the 
report,  but  no  vote  was  had,  it  being  late,  "  and  a  large  pro 
portion  of  members  pre-determined  against  every  measure 
which  seemed  in  any  way  to  blame  the  Ministers,  and  the 
Eastern  delegates  in  general  extremely  jealous  of  the  honor 
of  Mr.  Adams."  * 

The  next  day,  Sunday,  intelligence  was  received  of  the 
signing  of  the  preliminaries  of  peace  on  January  2Oth,  the 
news  being  brought  by  a  French  cutter  from  Cadiz,  de 
spatched  by  the  Count  d'Estaing  to  notify  vessels  at  sea,  and 
engaged  by  Lafayette  to  convey  the  news  to  Congress.  Con 
gress  took  no  further  action  in  the  matter.  The  Secretary 
wrote  his  views  to  the  Commissioners,  who  replied  with 
spirit;  and  Hamilton  wrote  to  Jay,t  "  the  peace,  which  ex 
ceeds  in  the  goodness  of  its  terms  the  expectations  of  the 
most  sanguine,  does  the  highest  honor  to  those  who  made  it." 


RECEPTION  OF  THE  ARTICLES  BY  THE  FRENCH  COURT, 

From  the  day  when  the  Commissioners,  including  Frank 
lin,  agreed  to  treat  with  Mr.  Oswald  without  consulting  the 
French  Court,  they  seem  to  have  guarded  the  privacy  of 
their  negotiations  with  more  success  than  attended  the  efforts 
of  the  French  Ministry  to  keep  secret  from  the  Americans 
the  visit  of  Rayneval  to  Shelburne,  which  was  promptly  dis- 

*  A  sketch  of  the  debates  is  given  in  Madison's  Debates,  vol.  i.,  and  they  are 
quoted  in  the  interesting  twelfth  chapter  of  the  first  volume  of  Rives'  Life  of 
Madison,  p.  363  et  seq. 

t  July  25,  1783. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  73 

covered  by  Jay  and  its  unfriendly  aim  turned  to  our  ad 
vantage  by  the  mission  of  Vaughan. 

During  the  same  month  of  September,  when  Rayneval 
was  in  London,  playing  into  the  hands  of  the  English  Min 
isters  and  denouncing  the  Americam  claims  to  the  fishery 
and  the  Valley  of  the  Mississippi  and  the  Ohio,  Luzerne  was 
assuring  Congress,  whose  amiable  credulity  seems  to  have 
been  regarded  as  boundless,  that  "  the  King  would  most 
readily  employ  his  good  offices  in  support  of  the  United 
States  in  all  points  relating  to  their  prosperity."  *  The  Pro 
visional  Articles  slowly  approached  completion,  without  as  it 
would  seem  arousing  a  single  doubt  at  Versailles  that  the 
Americans  had  awakened  to  their  danger  :  still  less  that  they 
had  taken  their  affairs  into  their  own  hands,  and  were  rapidly 
becoming  masters  of  the  situation. 

On  October  14,  1782,  in  a  letter  to  Luzerne,  Vergennes 
said  :  "It  behooves  us  to  leave  them  to  their  illusions,  to  do 
everything  we  can  to  make  them  fancy  that  we  share  them, 
and  unostentatiously  to  defeat  any  attempts  to  which  these 
illusions  may  carry  them  if  our  co-operation  is  required." 

In  the  same  letter  he  assumed  that  the  United  States 
"  had  no  right"  to  the  lands  which  border  on  Lake  Ontario, 
and  that  Mr.  Jay's  system  was  "  un  pareil  delire :  "  an  aber 
ration  undeserving  of  serious  refutation  ;  and  then  came  the 
remark  that  the  American  agents  "  have  all  the  presump 
tion  of  ignorance,"  with  the  addition,  "  but  there  is  reason 
to  expect  that  experience  will  ere  long  enlighten  and  im 
prove  them."  f 

When  a  little  later  the  copy  of  the  Provisional  Articles 
handed  to  him  by  Doctor  Franklin  enlightened  his  view  of 
the  practical  statesmanship  of  the  American  Commissioners, 
he  frankly  wrote  to  Rayneval  in  England  that  the  conces 
sions  granted  by  England  exceeded  all  that  he  had  believed 
possible,  and  Rayneval  responded  that  the  treaty  seemed  to 
him  like  a  dream.  The  treaty,  provisional  though  it  was,  ap 
peared  as  a  complete  and  final  check  to  that  part  of  the  French 

*  September  23,  1782. 

f  Vergennes  to  Luzerne,  October  14,  1782:   De  Circourt,  iii.,  288. 


74  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

policy  which  concerned  the  position  of  the  United  States 
in  the  pending  negotiations,  and  its  future  position  as  a  na 
tional  power.  It  ended  the  schemes  shared  if  not  inspired 
by  Spain  for  depriving  the  Americans  of  the  western  and 
northwestern  territories  and  of  the  Newfoundland  fisheries, 
and  of  compensation  to  Spain  for  her  services  and  losses,  by 
securing  her  ascendancy  on  the  Mississippi.  It  ended  the 
game  of  playing  into  the  hands  of  English  Ministers  against 
America  on  these  points  and  on  the  loyalists,  and  so  estab 
lishing  a  claim  to  concessions  in  return.  It  ended  all  hope 
of  establishing  in  America  the  balance  of  power  principle 
which  obtained  in  Europe  ;  enabling  England  and  Spain  to 
hold  in  check  the  New  Republic ;  and  it  presented  that 
Republic  triumphant  in  diplomacy  as  in  war,  magnificently 
endowed,  and  the  future  mistress  of  the  Western  Continent. 

As  regards  the  disappointment  to  Spain,  however  severe, 
Vergennes  perhaps  felt  it  less  sensibly,  from  the  fact  that  the 
Spanish  Court,  to  whose  narrow  selfishness  he  had  alluded 
with  so  much  contempt,  irritated  by  the  failure  of  the  special 
objects  of  Spanish  ambition,  and  most  of  all  by  the  mortify 
ing  failure  of  the  attack  upon  Gibraltar,  had  been  betrayed 
into  ungenerous  and  unwarrantable  insinuations  against  the 
French  soldiers  who  had  taken  part  in  the  siege,  insinuations 
which  had  aroused  at  Paris  a  national  resentment.* 

The  American  Commissioners,  in  communicating  the  ar 
ticles  to  Congress, t  said  :  "  The  Count  de  Vergennes,  on  pe 
rusing  the  articles,  appeared  surprised  but  not  displeased  at 
their  being  so  favorable  to  us." 

A  few  days  later  the  Count,  in  communicating  the  articles 
to  M.  de  Luzerne,  remarked  in  a  less  contented  tone  toward 
the  Commissioners,  that  "  according  to  the  instructions  of 
Congress  they  ought  to  have  done  nothing  without  our  par 
ticipation  ;  "  and  as  if  the  reserve  of  the  American  Commis 
sioners  might  be  attributed  to  some  unwarranted  interference 

*  Lecky's  History  of  England,  iv.,  283. 

f  The  Commissioners  to  R.  R.  Livingston,  December  14,  1782  :  Dip.  Corres., 
x.,  1 20. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  75 

with  the  American  negotiations  by  the  French  Court,  he 
added  :  "  I  have  informed  you  that  the  King  did  not  seek  to 
influence  the  negotiations  any  further  than  his  offices  might 
be  necessary  to  his  friends." 

The  secret  correspondence  of  the  Count  with  Montmorin 
at  Madrid,  and  Gerard  and  Luzerne  at  Philadelphia,  showing 
his  persistent  attempts  in  the  interest  of  Spain,  and  in  return 
for  her  joining  in  the  war,  to  postpone  the  recognition  of 
American  independence  until  the  general  peace :  to  exclude 
the  Americans  from  the  Mississippi  and  the  Gulf,  to  deprive 
them  of  the  Newfoundland  fisheries  and  the  northwestern 
territory,  and  to  subject  them  to  the  control  of  Spain  and 
England,  affords  an  interesting  illustration  of  the  Count's 
assurance,  that  the  King's  efforts  to  influence  the  negotiations 
were  compelled  by  the  necessities  of  his  friends. 

France,  as  Mr.  Lecky  remarks,*  was  endeavoring  as  the 
principal  member  of  a  great  coalition  to  make  peace,  and 
"  she  desired  that  America  should  make  a  serious  sacrifice  of 
her  prospects  for  the  benefit  of  the  other  belligerents,  and 
especially  Spain."  Occasional  expressions  in  the  Count's 
letters  indicate  that  his  early  appreciation  of  the  Americans 
had  not  been  increased  by  some  of  his  dealings  with  them. 
Such  an  impression  might  well  attend  his  practice,  continued 
from  one  minister  to  another,  in  the  use  of  donations,  and  by 
his  remarkable  success  in  forcing  upon  Congress,  step  by  step, 
the  instructions  to  their  Commissioners,  which  as  Marbois 
correctly  described  them  made  the  King  master  of  the  terms 
of  peace.  And  it  would  seem  that  he  was  not  himself  averse 
to  curbing  their  ambition,  restricting  their  limits,  and  con 
forming  their  progress  to  the  ideas  of  Europe.  But  what 
ever  apology  Vergennes  might  find  in  the  necessities  of  the 
King's  friends,  for  the  efforts  of  France  to  influence  our  ne 
gotiations,  whether  in  the  attempt  to  induce  us  to  treat  as 
English  colonists,  or  to  persuade  us  to  relinquish  our  west 
ern  boundaries  by  the  conciliatory  line  urged  in  what  pur 
ported  to  be  a  personal  note  of  Rayneval,  or  to  persuade 
Shelburne  to  reject  our  claims,  those  efforts,  whether  in  the 

*  Lecky,  iv.,  283. 


76  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

interest  of  the  King  or  the  King's  friends,  gravely  threatened 
the  welfare  of  America,  and  demanded  of  our  Commissioners 
that  they  should  see  that  no  harm  came  to  the  Republic. 
The  skill  with  which  those  dangers  had  been  avoided  and 
the  future  greatness  of  the  Republic  secured  was  warmly  ap 
preciated  by  the  great  diplomatists  of  Europe.  The  day 
after  the  signing  of  the  Provisional  Articles  Jay  received  the 
congratulations  of  the  Count  d'Aranda,  whose  personal  friend 
ship  with  mutual  regard  was  unhindered  by  their  diplomatic 
opposition  ;  and  later  of  the  Count  de  Montmorin,  the  French 
Ambassador  at  Madrid,  whose  part  in  the  joint  schemes  of 
France  and  Spain  appears  by  the  secret  correspondence. 
The  complaint  addressed  by  Vergennes  to  Franklin  on  the 
conclusion  of  the  preliminary  articles,  in  disregarding  the 
instructions  of  Congress,  and  without  the  participation  of 
the  King,  was  diplomatically  met  by  the  courtly  response  of 
Franklin  admitting  that  "in  not  consulting  you  before  they 
were  signed  we  have  been  guilty  of  neglecting  a  point  of 
bienseance"  And  Franklin  afterward  wrote  to  Livingston,* 
touching  the  Court  and  the  Provisional  Articles':  "  I  do  not 
see,  however,  that  they  have  any  right  to  complain  of  that 
transaction.  Nothing  was  done  to  their  prejudice,  and  none 
of  the  stipulations  were  to  have  force  but  by  a  subsequent 
act  of  their  own.  ...  I  long  since  satisfied  Count  de 
Vergennes  about  it." 

Two  days  after  Vergennes  had  written  to  Luzerne — 
on  December  2ist — to  complain  of  the  signing,  he  wrote 
again  to  that  minister  that  the  King  would  make  a  loan  to 
the  United  States  of  six  millions  of  livres  ($i  ,i  1 1,1 1 1)  for 
the  year  1783.  This  last  fact  has  a  significance  beyond  the 
amount  of  the  loan,  which,  small  as  it  was,  France,  impover 
ished  by  the  war,  could  ill  afford  to  spare.  It  reminds  us  that 
the  American  Commissioners,  while  violating  the  instructions 
of  Congress  when  they  found  that  adherence  to  those  in 
structions  would  impair  the  honor,  independence,  and  perma 
nent  prosperity  of  the  Republic,  and  while  thwarting  by 
legitimate  means  the  secret  and  hostile  policy  of  France  and 

*  Franklin  to  Livingston,  July  22,  1783  :   Franklin's  Works,  xi.,  533. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  77 

Spain,  preserved  inviolate  the  national  faith  plighted  to  France 
by  the  treaty  of  alliance,  maintained  the  respect  and  friend 
ship  of  that  Court,  and  placed  the  Republic  in  a  position  of 
national  dignity  and  national  strength  where  it  was  more 
than  ever  the  interest  of  France  to  cherish  the  cordiality  of 
their  relations. 


THE  EFFECT  OF  THE  ARTICLES  IN  DEFEATING  THE  HOPES 

OF  SPAIN. 

To  no  court  of  Europe  could  the  Provisional  Articles  have 
been  less  acceptable  than  to  the  Court  of  Spain.  They  came 
as  an  unexpected  blow  from  a  power  which  Spain  had  treated 
with  rudeness  and  contempt.  They  involved  not  simply  the 
overthrow  of  her  schemes  against  the  Republic  and  her  plans 
for  her  own  advancement  in  America,  but  by  a  curious  and 
unexpected  contingency  they  destroyed  her  hopes,  which 
seemed  on  the  very  point  of  being  realized,  for  the  recovery 
of  Gibraltar. 

Nor  coulcf  it  have  soothed  the  disappointment  they  awak 
ened  in  Spain  to  remember  that  the  American  Minister, 
whom  they  had  refused  to  receive,  had  been  the  chief  of  the 
negotiations  in  which  they  were  vanquished,  and  that  the 
treatment  accorded  him  at  Madrid  had  probably  enabled  htm 
to  divine  and  defeat  the  secret  and  unfriendly  policy  of 
France  and  Spain. 

We  have  long  been  familiar  with  Spain's  ungracious  treat 
ment  of  the  United  States  during  their  revolutionary  struggle, 
with  her  excuses,  delays,  and  delusive  assurances  ;  and  notably 
her  unfriendly  and  shabby  behavior  in  allowing  the  bills 
drawn  by  Congress  upon  Jay  in  reliance  upon  her  friendship 
to  be  protested  ;  dishonoring  the  credit  of  the  Republic  for 
want  of  a  paltry  sum — less  than  twenty-five  thousand  pounds 
sterling.*  This  was  permitted  by  her  after  she  had  given 

*  See  Jay's  carefully  drawn  protest  and  statement  of  facts  in  his  letter  to  Livings 
ton,  April  28,  1782  :  Dip.  Corresp.,  viii.,  p.  83  et  seq.,  and  the  remarks  on  this 
transaction  of  the  French  Ambassador,  the  Count  de  Montmorin,  in  his  letter  to 
the  Count  de  Vergennes,  dated  Madrid,  March  30,  1782  :  de  Circourt,  iii.,  326-7. 


78  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

the  American  Minister  reason  to  believe  that  the  necessary 
moneys  would  be  advanced,  and  when,  under  the  circum 
stances,  it  was  a  discourtesy  to  France  almost  as  great  as 
to  ourselves. 

Jay  wrote  from  Spain  :  "  The  conduct  of  this  Court  bears 
few  marks  of  wisdom.  They  have  little  money,  less  credit, 
and  very  moderate  talents." 

Cumberland,  British  Agent  at  Madrid,  in  1781,  suggested 
that  other  than  political  motives  inspired  the  policy  of  King 
Charles,  when  he  wrote  that  "  there  was  a  gloomy  being,  out 
of  sight  and  inaccessible,  whose  command  as  confessor  over 
the  royal  mind  was  absolute,  and  whose  bigotry  was  disposed 
to  represent  everything  in  the  darkest  colors  against  a  nation 
of  heretics."  f  But  without  the  secret  correspondence  of  Ver- 
gennes  and  Montmorin  we  could  hardly  appreciate  the  ex 
tent  to  which  Spain  was  set  against  the  independence  of 
America  from  her  dislike  of  our  principles,  her  jealousy  of 
our  growing  power  and  influence,  and,  in  reference  to  her 
own  colonies,  from  her  dread  of  our  ambition  and  our  ex 
ample.  Nor  could  we,  without  these  letters  as  quoted  by 
Bancroft,  or  given  more  fully  by  de  Circourt,  at  all  appreciate 
the  character  and  extent  of  the  agreement  by  which  France 
had  secured  the  alliance  of  Spain  in  the  pending  war.  We 
now  read  aright  the  efforts  of  Vergennes,  Rayneval,  and  Lu- 
zerne  to  moderate  the  demands  and  expectations  of  Congress 
concerning  the  terms  of  the  peace,  and  to  induce  them  con 
fidingly  to  leave  to  his  Catholic  Majesty  the  adjustment  of 
the  Mississippi  and  the  western  territory. 

On  one  occasion,  after  the  scheme  for  depriving  us  of  the 
boundaries,  the  Mississippi,  and  the  fisheries  had  been  agreed 
upon,  the  French  Minister  assured  Congress  that  "  the  King 

*  Jay  to  Franklin,  February  n,  1782  :    Dip.  Corresp.,  viii.,  64. 
f  Cumberland  the  dramatist,  whom   Goldsmith   describes  in  his   poem  "Re 
taliation  "  as 

"  The  Terence  of  England,  the  mender  of  hearts," 

was  sent  by  the  British  Ministry  in  1780-81  to  sound  the  Spanish  Court  with  a 
view  to  negotiations. — Flanders'  Chief  Justices,  i.,  297.  Cumberland's  Memoirs, 
193- 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  79 

accepted  with  pleasure  the  proofs  which  Congress  have  given 
him  of  their  confidence  when  they  entrusted  to  his  care  the 
interests  of  the  United  States  ;  that  he  would  use  his  influ 
ence  and  credit  for  the  advantage  of  his  allies  whenever  a 
negotiation  should  render  their  interests  a  subject  of  discus 
sion  ;  that  if  he  did  not  obtain  for  every  State  all  they  wished, 
they  must  attribute  the  sacrifice  he  might  be  compelled  to 
make  of  his  inclination  to  the  tyrannic  rule  of  necessity."  * 
That  these  tland  assurances  with  their  semblance  of  good  faith 
carried  some  weight  with  members  of  Congress  is  clear  from 
the  remark  of  Mr.  Madison,  in  speaking  of  the  debate  on  the 
Provisional  Articles  in  March,  1783, t. that  "  upon  the  whole 
it  was  thought  and  observed  by  many  that  our  Ministers, 
particularly  Mr.  Jay,  instead  of  making  allowances  and  af 
fording  facilities  to  France  in  her  delicate  situation  between 
Spain  and  the  United  States,  had  joined  with  the  enemy  in 
taking  advantage  of  it  to  increase  her  perplexity."  u  The 
delicate  situation  "  of  France,  for  which  Jay  and  his  associ 
ates  were  to  make  allowances  and  afford  facilities,  is  made 
clear  by  the,  terms  of  the  bargain  in  which  she  secured  the 
Spanish  alliance.  Vergennes  had  offered  the  King  of  Spain 
carte  blanche  to  frame  a  treaty  which  the  Ambassador  of 
France  should  sign,^:  and  Florida  Blanca  regarded  the  suc 
cess  .of  his  schemes  as  certain,  and  expected  to  gain  for  him 
self  a  reputation  that  should  never  die.§ 

His  joy  at  being  able  to  exercise  power  over  France  and 
make  Vergennes  adopt  and  execute  his  plans  for  the  ad 
vancement  of  Spain,  and  his  vindictive  policy  toward  Amer 
ica,  was  blended  with  a  confidence  that  France  in  her  turn 
would  bend  the  Republic  to  her  will,  restrict  its  boundaries 
and  arrest  its  growth  :  and  these  anticipations  may  have  en 
couraged  the  contemptuous  refusal  of  Spain  to  recognize  the 
independence  of  the  United  States  and  her  willingness  to 
destroy  its  credit,  and  her  small  exhibition  of  international 

*  November  23,  1781  :  Jay's  Life,  i.,  134. 

f  Quoted  in  Rives'  Madison,  i.,  p. ^354. 

\  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  December  24,  1778  :  Bancroft,  x. ,  185,  186. 

§  Bancroft,  x.,  185. 


8o  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

courtesy  toward  a  nation  whom  the  joint  counsels  of  the 
Houses  of  Bourbon  had  destined  to  a  position  of  dependency 
where  it  would  be  both  helpless  and  harmless.  Certain  it  is 
that  Jay,  during  the  two  years  he  passed  in  Spain,*  had  an 
opportunity  of  observing  the  policy  toward  America  of  the 
Courts  of  Paris  and  Madrid.  One  of  his  biographers  has  said 
"  his  mind  was  vigorous,  exact,  logical.  .  .  .  Judgment 
discriminative,  penetrating,  was  the  characteristic  of  his  un 
derstanding,"  t  and  he  learned,  perhaps  unconsciously,  to 
read  aright  the  traits  and  methods  of  Bourbon  diplomacy, 
however  veiled  by  the  blandishments  of  Courts  or  marked  by 
the  secrecy  and  dexterity  of  French  finesse.  His  letters  from 
Spain  show  that  he  had  already  detected  some  features  of 
that  policy  which  he  so  accurately  analyzed  at  Paris. 

He  had  written  from  Spain  :  "There  are  many  things  that 
induce  me  to  think  that  France  does  not,  in  fact,  wish  to  see 
us  treated  as  independent  by  other  nations  until  after  a  peace, 
lest  we  should  become  less  manageable  in  proportion  as  our 
dependence  upon  her  shall  diminish."  \  That  idea  became  a 
conviction  when  Vergennes  not  only  advised  them  to  treat 
under  Oswald's  full  Commission,  which  described  them  as 
colonies,  but  advised  Fitzherbert  that  that  Commission  would 
answer  :  an  advice  intended  to  influence  against  us  the  British 
Government.  Then  Jay  quietly  told  the  Minister  that  "  we 
neither  could  nor  would  treat  with  any  nation  in  the  world 
on  any  other  than  an  equal  footing."  § 

Then  came  Jay's  direct  and  most  successful  appeal  to 
Shelburne  through  Vaughan  :  the  new  Commission  to  treat 
with  "the  United  States  of  America :  "  the  united  resolve  of  the 
American  Commissioners  to  proceed  without  consulting  the 
French  Court,  as  a  power  of  equal  dignity  and  independence  : 
inspiring  the  British  Cabinet  with  confidence  and  respect, 
and  so  convincing  their  judgment  as  to  the  true  policy  to 
be  pursued  toward  America,  that  the  plans  of  France  and 

*  From  January  22,  1780,  to  June,  1782. 

f  Mr.  Henry  Flanders  :  Lives  of  the  Chief  Justices,  i.,  429. 

JJay  to  Livingston,  Madrid,  April  28,  1782:    Dip.  Corr.,  viii.,  69. 

§  Jay  to  Governeur  Morris:  Jay's  Life,  ii. ,  106. 


((U  :ES 

nd  1781.  81 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783 

Spain    for   arresting   its   progress    were   quietly  swept  awa 
forever. 

When  Rayneval  in  London  spoke  to  Lord  Shelburne,  as 
he  admits  somewhat  reproachfully,  of  the  precipitancy  of  their 
dealings  with  the  Americans,  and  attempted  to  take  advan 
tage  of  the  opportunity  to  express  some  remarks  on  the  em 
barrassments  to  Spain  from  the  article  which  gave  the 
Americans  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  Lord  Shel 
burne  replied  in  a  lively  tone,  that  "  all  that  concerned 
Spain  mattered  little  to  him  ;  that  this  power  deserved  cour 
tesy  only  as  being  his  Majesty's  ally,  but  that  he  would  take 
no  step  in  its  favor." 

But  Spain,  in  making  (the  Spanish  alliance,  had  had  one 
other  object  apart  from  the  permanent  reduction  and  humilia 
tion  of  the  Americans,  and  that  was  the  recovery  of  Gibral 
tar,  to  which  France  had  been  compelled  to  pledge  herself, 
and  Florida  Blanca  wrote  to  Montmorin,  "without  Gibraltar 
I  will  never  consent  to  a  peace."  f 

Gibraltar  would  have  been  won  by  Spain  in  the  peace  ne 
gotiations  but  for  the  signing,  in  advance,  of  the  Provisional 
Articles.  The  wise  and  watchful  diplomacy  of  the  American 
Commissioners  secured  their  signature  at  the  auspicious  and 
essential  moment.  /'We  must  have  signed,"  said  Adams,  J 
"  or  lost  the  peace.  The  peace  depended  on  a  day.  If  we 
had  not  signed  the  Ministry  wbuld  have  changed,"  and  no 
such  terms  could  have  been  had  from  their  successors. 

Mr.  Lecky  says  :  "  The  separate  signature  appears  to  have 
had  one  important  effect  upon  European  affairs.  The  cession 
of  Gibraltar  to  the  Spaniards  had  for  some  time  been  seri 
ously  considered  in  the  Cabinet,  and  Shelburne  himself  was 
disposed  to  agree  to  it.  After  a  long  deliberation  the  Cab 
inet  had  actually  resolved  to  exchange  Gibraltar  for  Gauda- 

*  M.  Gerard  de  Rayneval  a  M.  le  Comte  de  Vergennes,  Londres,  25  Decem- 
bre,  1782  :  "  Mais  mylord  Shelburne  m'a  repondu  avec  vivacite  que  cela  lui  etait 
indifferent;  que  peu  lui  importait  tout  ce  qui  pouvait  concerner  1'Espagne,"  etc. 
De  Circourt,  iii.,  52. 

f  Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  January  12,- 1779  :  Bancroft,  x.,  186. 

\  Adams,  viii. ,  88. 

6 


82  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

loupe,  when  the  news  of  the  accomplished  peace  with  Amer 
ica  (meaning  the  Provisional  Articles),  induced  them  to 
reconsider  their  determination."  * 


EFFECT  OF  THE  ARTICLES  IN  ENGLAND. 

On  December  5th  Parliament  met,  and  instead  of  a  gen 
eral  peace  but  one  provisional  pacification  could  be  an 
nounced.  The  King  said  in  his  message  that  he  had  found 
it  indispensable  to  an  entire  and  cordial  reconciliation  with 
the  colonies  to  declare  them  free  and  independent  States, 
and  alluded  to  the  Articles  agreed  upon  to  take  effect,  when 
ever  terms  of  peace  should  be  finally  settled  with  the  Court 
of  France.  He  added  :  "In  thus  admitting  their  separation 
from  the  Crown  of  these  kingdoms,  I  have  sacrificed  every 
consideration  of  my  own  to  the  wishes  and  opinions  of  my 
people.  I  make  it  my  humble  and  earnest  prayer  to  Al 
mighty  God  that  Great  Britain  may  not  feel  the  evils  which 
might  result  from  so  great  a  dismemberment  of  the  empire  ; 
and  that  America  may  be  free  from  those  calamities,  which 
have  formerly  proved  in  the  mother  country  how  essential 
the  monarchy  is  to  the  enjoyment  of  constitutional  lib 
erty.  Religion,  language,  interest,  affection,  may,  and  I  hope 
will  yet  prove  a  bond  of  permanent  union  between  the  two 
countries  ;  to  this  end  neither  attention  nor  disposition  on  my 
part  shall  be  wanting." 

Attacks  upon  the  recognition  of  American  independence 
came  from  the  two  sections  of  the  opposition  which  after 
ward  coalesced  ;  with  bitter  speeches  from  Lord  Stormont, 
Burke,  and  Fox  ;  and  Pitt  and  Shelburne  rather  weakened 

*  Lecky's  History,  iv.,  284;  Shelburne's  Life,  iii.,  305,  306.  M.  de  Rayne- 
val,  writing  to  the  Count  de  Vergennes,  December  25,  1782,  says  :  "  Vous  ne  de- 
manderez  peut-etre,  Monseigneur  comment  il  est  possible  de  combiner  avec  ce  que  je 
viens  de  dire  la  conduite  de  mylord  Shelburne,  relativement  aux  equivalents.  Je  vous 
ai  donne  plus  haut,  et  dans  plusieurs  de  mes  depeches,  la  clef  de  cette  conduite. 
Celle  des  plenipotentiaires  Americains  y  a  contribue  essentiellement,  et  mylord 
Grantham,  comme  mylord  Shelburne,  en  a  prevu  les  effets.  La  malheureuse 
nouvelle  de  la  signature  qu'  ils  ont  faite  a  notre  insu  a  donne  lieu  a  1'extension  des 
-equivalents  demandes  pour  Gibraltar." 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  83 

their  position  by  a  difference  of  view,  Pitt  stating  that  the 
article  of  independence  was  irrevocable  though  the  treaty 
should  be  abortive,  and  Shelburne  holding  that  this  was  un 
doubtedly  a  mistake,  for  that  independence  was  alone  granted 
for  the  sake  of  peace.  With  better  success  than  has  always 
attended  our  senatorial  rule  of  secrecy,  all  attempts  to  obtain 
a  copy  of  the  Provisional  Articles  were  defeated. 

Rayneval  and  a  son  of  Vergennes  remained  in  England  as 
the  guests  of  Shelburne,  and  during  their  stay  made  the  ac 
quaintance  of  Jeremy  Bentham,  "  who  criticised  them  both 
severely."  *  Mr.  Fitzherbert  continued  in  Paris  his  negotia 
tions  with  the  Count  de  Vergennes. 

On  January  20,  1783,  the  preliminary  articles  of  peace  were 
signed  at  Paris  between  Great  Britain  and  France  and  Great 
Britain  and  Spain,  and  were  followed  by  a  proclamation  of 
the  cessation  of  arms  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States.  Adams  and  Franklin  were  present,  and  with  Fitzher 
bert  signed  the  declaration.  From  that  day  the  Provisional 
Articles  took  effect. f 

Apart  from  the  difficulties  of  his  foreign  policy,  Shelburne 
had  raised  up  many  enemies  by  his  view  of  parliamentary  re 
form,  and  his  measures  for  correcting  abuses  in  the  civil  ser 
vice  ;  and  when  on  February  nth  Pitt,  with  the  permission 
of  the  King,  invited  Fox  to  join  the  ministry  of  Shelburne, 
Fox  coldly  declined,  choosing,  as  Bancroft  remarks,  a  des 
perate  alliance  with  those  whose  conduct  he  had  pretended 
to  detest,  and  whose  principles  it  was  in  later  years  his  re 
deeming  glory  to  have  opposed.;): 

The  debate  on  the  address  upon  the  peace  took  place 
February  17,  1783,  Lord  Pembroke  and  Lord  Carmarthen 
being  the  proposer  and  seconder  in  the  Lords,  and  Mr. 
Thomas  Pitt  and  Mr.  Wilberforce  in  the  Commons.  The 
amendment  was  cleverly  drawn,  engaging  Parliament  to  con 
firm  the  peace,  but  asking  time  to  consider  and  virtually  de- 

*  Shelburne's  Life,  iii.,  306,  307,  referring  to  Vergennes  to  Shelburne,  Decem 
ber,  1782,  January,  1783,  and  Bentham,  x.,  125,  126. 

fDip.  Corr.,  x.,  122,  123  ;  Bancroft's  Const.  Hist.,  i.,  48. 
{Bancroft's  Const.  Hist.,  i.,  49,  50. 


84  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

dining  to  approve.  The  supporters  of  the  amendment  were 
Lords  Townsend,  Stormont,  Sackville,  Walsingham,  Keppel, 
and  Loughborough.  Against  them  were  the  Duke  of  Graf- 
ton,  Lords  Grantham,  Howe,  Shelburne,  and  the  Chancellor. 
After  a  debate  which  extended  to  an  early  hour  in  the  morn 
ing,  and  an  able  speech  from  Shelburne,  the  Government  tri 
umphed  by  a  vote  of  72  to  59,  a  majority  of  13.* 

In  the  House  of  Commons  the  amendment  was  carried  by 
224  to  208,  and  the  coalition  triumphed.  Pitt,  in  the  course 
of  a  remarkable  speech,  said  :  "  I  repeat  then  that  it  is  not 
the  treaty,  it  is  the  Earl  of  Shelburne  alone  whom  the  mov 
ers  of  the  question  are  desirous  to  wound.  This  is  the  object 
which  has  raised  this  storm  of  factions  ;  this  is  the  aim  of  the 
unnatural  coalition  to  which  I  have  alluded."  f 

On  February  22d  a  vote  censuring  the  terms  of  peace 
was  passed  by  207  to  190,  and  on  the  24th  Shelburne  re 
signed.  While  the  King  was  looking  for  a  minister,  Pitt 
with  the  concurrence  of  Shelburne,  decided  to  push  on  the 
bill  which  proposed  to  regulate  the  commercial  intercourse 
with  the  United  States.  "  The  measure,"  says  Lord  Edmond 
Fitzmaurice,!J;  "was  one  of  obvious  urgency,  and  was  framed 
with  the  liberal  principles  which  had  actuated  Jay  and  Os 
wald  in  their  conversation  on  the  subject  at  Paris.  It  re 
lieved  the  commerce  between  the  United  States  and  England 
of  the  burden  of  the  navigation  acts.  The  introduction  of  it, 
however,  was  the  signal  of  an  opposition  from  the  Whigs,  nor 
was  it  able  to  make  any  material  progress."  On  April  2d, 
Pitt  "with  his  usual  great  discretion"  having  declined  the 
premiership,  there  was  formed  the  coalition  ministry,  with 
the  Duke  of  Portland  as  First  Lord  of  the  Treasury  and  the 
old  opponents,  Lord  North  and  Mr.  Fox,  Secretaries  of 
State.  Mr.  Green,  in  his  admirable  history,  pronounced  this 
the  most  unscrupulous  coalition  known  in  English  history.§ 
Lord  Mahon,  with  equal  contempt,  said  that  "  from  a  new 

*  Shelburne's  Life,  iii.,  346. 

f  Ibid.,  367  ;  and  Mr.  Lecky's  History  of  England,  iv.,  says  that  in  this  state 
ment  Pitt  was  felt  to  have  expressed  the  truth. 

370.  §  Green's  History  of  England,  p.  760. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  85 

and  strange  coalition  an  ill-formed  and  rickety  government 
struggled  into  life."  Wilberforce  described  the  coalition  as 
partaking  of  the  vices  of  both  its  parents,  the  corruption  of 
the  one  and  the  violence  of  the  other,  f 

Under  the  coalition  ministry  the  efforts  of  the  American 
Commissioners  to  place  the  further  commercial  intercourse 
of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  on  a  safer  and  per 
manent  footing  by  definitive  treaty,  were  rendered  fruitless  by 
the  dilatory  and  fluctuating  councils  of  the  coalition  Cabinet, 
which  on  December  I9th  was  superseded  by  the  cabinet  of 
Pi«4 

Mr.  Oswald  was  recalled  soon  after  the  Provisional  Ar 
ticles  were  signed.  In  the  spring  Mr.  David  Hartley  was 
appointed  to  succeed  him  ;  and  the  negotiation  between 
the  American  Commissioners  and  this  gentleman  terminated 
in  August,  1783,  in  an  agreement  to  adopt,  as  they  stood,  the 
Preliminary.  Articles. 

THE  DEFINITIVE  TREATY. 

The  preliminary  articles  were  embodied  in  a  definite 
treaty,  and  signed  by  Adams,  Franklin,  and  Jay  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States,  and  David  Hartley  on  behalf  of  Great 
Britain,  on  September  3,  1783.  They  were  signed  at  Paris, 
and  not  at  Versailles,  as  first  proposed,  Mr.  Hartley's  in 
structions  confining  him  to  Paris,  and  they  were  ratified  by 
Great  Britain  on  April  9,  1786. 

We  have  traced  to  their  successful  conclusion  the  prog 
ress  of  the  peace  negotiations  which  secured  to  the  United 
States  their  independence,  with  the  boundaries  and  fisheries, 
a  vast  extent  of  territories,  and  large  commercial  advantages. 
The  Americans  were  saved  from  all  danger  or  apprehension 
from  powerful  neighbors,  saved  from  the  necessity  of  seeking 
foreign  alliances  to  secure  their  safety,  left  free  to  reorganize 
and  perfect  the  national  government  by  the  formation  of  our 
national  constitution,  which  was  framed  with  a  wisdom  that 

*  Lord  Mahon's  History  of  England,  vii.,  207. 

f  Lecky,  iv.,  297.  \  Life  of  Jay,  i.,  170. 


86  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

commanded  the  admiration  of  the  world,  and  to  exercise  in  the 
coming  European  contests  the  strict  and  impartial  neutrality 
which  reflected  so  great  honor  on  the  government  of  Wash 
ington.  The  influence  of  the  treaty  was  at  once  felt  in 
Europe,  and  as  Mr.  Trescott  remarks  in  his  admirable  study 
of  the  Diplomacy  of  the  Constitution,  the  spirit,  the  firmness, 
and  judgment  with  which  the  negotiations  were  conducted, 
and  the  character  of  the  treaty  itself,  were  unquestionable  ad 
vantages  of  the  new  government. 

The  Americans  became  independent  not  only  of  England 
but  of  the  world :  they  were  not  entangled  with  the  policy  of 
France,  they  were  not  forced  to  compromise  their  western  in 
terests  to  conciliate  Spain. 

This  success  was  achieved  by  the  united  action  of  the 
Commissioners,  and  that  was  due  to  a  common  devotion  to 
the  interests  of  their  country. 

Jay  wrote  to  Secretary  Livingston  from  Paris,  December 
12,  1782:  "  It  gives  me  pleasure  to  inform  you  that  perfect 
unanimity  has  hitherto  prevailed  among  your  Commissioners 
here  ;  and  I  do  not  recollect  that  since  we  began  to  negotiate 
with  Mr.  Oswald  there  has  been  the  least  division  or  opposi 
tion  between  us.  Mr.  Adams  was  particularly  useful  respect 
ing  the  eastern  boundary,  and  Doctor  Franklin's  firmness  and 
exertions  on  the  subject  of  the  Tories  did  us  much  service. 

"  I  enclose  herewith  a  copy  of  a  letter  he  wrote  about 
that  matter  to  Mr.  Oswald.  It  had  much  weight,  and  is  writ 
ten  with  a  degree  of  acuteness  and  spirit  seldom  to  be  met 
with  in  persons  of  his  age."  * 

The  unity  of  action  thus  obtained,  as  Mr.  C.  F.  Adams 
remarks,  did  not  fail  of  its  effect  upon  the  British  agents,  and 
he  adds,  that  upon  every  point  on  which  there  was  a  proba 
bility  of  dispute,  the  American  Commissioners  were  prepared 
to  reason  far  more  vigorously  than  their  opponents,  and  in 
no  case  did  they  manifest  more  of  tact  and  talent  than  in 
maintaining  their  own  independence  without  furnishing  the 
least  opening  for  complaint  of  want  of  faith  to  their  ally. 

*  Dip.  Cor.,  viii.,  pp.  214,  215. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  87 


THE  POLICY  OF  VERGENNES. 

The  object  of  this  review  of  the  peace  negotiations,  by  the 
light  newly  afforded  by  the  secret  correspondence  disclosing 
the  character  and  extent  of  the  plot  for  the  spoliation  of 
America  by  France  and  Spain,  has  been  rather  to  recall 
the  historic  facts  now  established  beyond  a  doubt,  and  to  do 
justice  to  the  American  Commissioners,  who  have  been  un 
justly  treated  through  a  misrepresentation  of  the  truth,  than 
to  discuss  the  policy  or  the  faith  of  the  eminent  chief  of  the 
French  Government,  whose  conduct  during  the  war  had 
earned  for  him  the  regard  and  gratitude  of  the  American  peo 
ple.  To  many,  despite  the  proofs  which  have  been  accumulat 
ing  during  the  last  half  century  to  the  correctness  of  the  views 
entertained  by  Jay  and  Adams  of  the  policy  of  France,  the 
disclosure  by  the  letters  of  Vergennes  and  his  agents,  of  the 
secret  conspiracy  of  the  two  great  powers  who  fought  in  our 
war  of  independence  to  deprive  us  of  its  just  fruits,  will  come 
like  a  revelation.  Whatever  bears  upon  it  will  be  carefully  con 
sidered.  The  publication  by  our  Government  will  be  demanded 
of  all  the  documents  gathered  or  to  be  gathered  from  the 
archives  of  Europe.  Students  of  history  here  and  abroad 
will  subject  the  correspondence  to  severe  analysis,  and  it 
may  be  that  Vergennes  will  find  apologists  and  defenders  in 
the  future  as  in  the  past :  and  this  time  on  the  ground  which 
he  himself  assumed — that  he  had  never  abandoned  the  virtual 
independence  of  the  United  States  to  which  he  was  pledged, 
however  strongly  urged  by  Spain,  and  that,  as  he  insisted, 
nothing  in  the  treaty  of  alliance  with  us  compelled  him  to 
recognize  or  assist  our  claims  to  the  fisheries  or  the  bounda 
ries.  But  ther^j^ljj^main  the  fact  that  in  seeking  to  defeat 
those  claims  he  exhibited  toward  the  United  States  a  want  of 
frankness  and  a  diplomatic  finesse  which,  had  it  deceived  our 
Commissioners  to  the  extent  that  it  deceived  Congress,  or  to 
the  extent  that  it  has  imposed  on  the  credulity  of  even 
American  historians  during  the  past  century,  would  have 
involved  a  loss  of  national  dignity,  territory,  and  power,  and 


$8  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

would  have  reduced  us  to  a  pitiable  condition  of  weakness 
and  humiliation.  The  letters  both  of  Vergennes  and  of  his 
agents  show  their  constant  care  to  keep  the  Americans  in  the 
dark  as  to  their  real  designs,  and  a  consciousness  that  their 
relations  would  be  strained  should  those  designs  be  dis 
covered,  and  that  they  would  never  be  forgiven. 

The  first  appearance  of  Vergennes  in  the  difficulties  be 
tween  England  and  her  American  colonies,  as  the  story  is 
told  by  the  historian  Lecky,*  was  early  in  1776,  some  months 
before  our  Declaration  of  Independence.  In  the  beginning  of 
that  year  Vergennes  prepared  a  memorial  on  American  affairs 
which  was  laid  before  the  King,  and  by  the  King  submitted  to 
Turgot,  who  in  April,  1776,  presented  his  own  views  of  the 
question.  Vergennes'  memorial  while  deprecating  a  war, 
tended  to  urge  upon  the  Government  a  more  directly  aggres 
sive  policy.  He  held  the  civil  war  beginning  in  America  ad 
vantageous  to  both  France  and  Spain  as  likely  to  exhaust  both 
the  victors  and  the  vanquished;  that  "  the  continuance  of  the 
war  for  at  least  one  year  was  desirable  for  the  two  crowns,"  and 
"  to  that  end  the  British  Ministry  should  be  maintained  in  the 
persuasion  that  France  and  Spain  were  pacific,  so  that  it  may 
not  fear  to  embark  in  an  active  costly  campaign,  while  on  the 
other  hand  the  courage  of  the  Americans  should  be  kept  up 
by  secret  favors  and  vague  hopes  which  will  prevent  accom 
modation."  To  carry  out  this  policy  the  Ministers  must  "  dex 
terously  tranquillize  the  English  Ministry  as  to  the  intentions 
of  France  and  Spain,"  while  secretly  assisting  the  insurgents 
with  military  stores  and  money, t  and  they  must  at  the  same 
time  strengthen  their  own  forces  with  a  view  to  war.  Mr. 
Lecky  remarks  that  to  judge  the  real  character  of  this  advice 
it  should  be  remembered  that  England  was  then  at  perfect 
peace  with  France,  and  had  given  no  provocation  or  pretext 
for  hostility  ;  that  the  American  colonies  had  not  yet  declared 

*  Lecky,  iv.,  pp.  42,  43,  44. 

f  Turgot,  supported  by  Maurepas  and  Malesherbes,  recommended  a  different 
and  more  pacific  policy,  but  that  of  Vergennes  prevailed,  and  assistance  was 
given  in  arms,  clothes,  cannon,  and  stores  in  1776,  besides  the  money  sent  by 
Beaumarchais,  the  author  of  "The  Barber  of  Seville"  and  a  confidential  agent 
of  Vergennes.  Dip.  Corres.,  i.,  p.  131. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  89 

their  independence  ;  that  the  quarrel  was  purely  domestic, 
and  that  no  regard  for  their  principles  or  their  interests  en 
tered  into  the  motion  of  action  declared  by  Vergennes. 

The  policy  recommended  in  this  memorial  closely  re 
sembles  that  developed  in  the  secret  correspondence  now 
brought  to  light,  where  the  policy  was  so  closely  identical  that 
the  same  phrase  might  have  been  used,  that  to  carry  it  out 
the  Ministers  must  "  dexterously  tranquillize  the  American 
Congress  as  to  the  intentions  of  France  and  Spain." 

Mr.  C.  F.  Adams,  speaking  of  the  disingenuousness  and 
unscrupulous  deception  of  the  French  system,  and  methods  of 
French  diplomacy  during  the  latter  years  of  Louis  XV.,  re 
marks  that  "  the  effect  of  such  a  system  upon  the  ambassadors 
of  France  at  Foreign  Courts  could  only  be  to  school  them  in 
the  practice  of  compounding  duplicity.  ...  It  was  to 
confirm  deception  as  the  rule  and  to  uphold  truth  only  as  the 
exception  required  for  the  exclusive  benefit  of  the  monarch 
himself.  .  .  .  Thirty  years  of  experience  in  a  school  of 
policy  thus  purely  French  had  resulted  in  making  'de  Ver 
gennes  one  of  the  most  skilful  of  her  diplomatists."  * 

The  American  Commissioners  seem  to  have  viewed  the 
policy  of  France  with  a  judicial  fairness  softened  by  a  remem 
brance  of  her  efficient  and  friendly  services  in  the  past,  but 
with  a  due  sense  of  what  was  due  to  their  own  country,  and 
their  language  in  reference  to  the  unfriendly  policy  of  France 
is  singularly  gentle  in  view  of  her  actual  designs  against  the 
dignity  and  power  of  the  Republic.  They  said  in  their  letter 
of  July  18,  1783, t  in  response  to  Livingston's  remarks  dis 
approving  of  their  course  :  "It  would  give  us  great  pain  if 
anything  we  have  written  or  now  write  respecting  this  Court 
should  be  construed  to  impeach  the  friendship  of  the  King 
and  nation  for  us;  we  also  believe  that  the  minister  is  our 
friend,  and  is  disposed  so  far  to  do  us  good  offices  as  may 
correspond  with,  and  be  dictated  by  his  system  of  policy  for 
promoting  the  power,  riches,  and  glory  of  France.  God  for 
bid  that  we  should  ever  sacrifice  our  faith,  our  gratitude,  and 
our  honor  to  any  considerations  of  convenience  ;  and  may 

*  Adams,  i.,  299,  309.  f  Dip.  Corres.,  x.,  191. 


9O  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

He  also  forbid  that  we  should  ever  be  unmindful  of  the  dig 
nity  and  independent  spirit  which  should  always  characterize 
a  free  and  generous  people." 

EUROPEAN  ESTIMATE  OF  AMERICA. 

The  papers  and  correspondence  relating  to  America,  in 
the  French  Archives,  so  far  as  France  and  Spain  were  con 
cerned,  do  not  confirm  the  view  which  has  been  sometimes 
entertained,  even  to  our  own  day,  of  an  extreme  indifference 
on  the  part  of  European  statesmen  of  the  last  century  to  the 
rise  and  growth  of  the  American  Republic.  In  1788  Patrick 
Henry  said,  in  reply  to  an  opponent,  in  the  Virginia  Con 
vention,  when  the  ratification  of  the  National  Constitution 
was  being  debated  :  "  Give  me  leave  to  say  that  Europe  is 
too  much  engaged  about  subjects  of  greater  magnitude  to  at 
tend  to  us.  On  that  great  theatre  of  the  world,  the  little  Amer 
ican  matters  vanish."  But  Marshall  mentions  in  his  life  of 
Washington,  that  when  Genet  came  to  us  as  Minister  from 
the  French  Republic,  he  submitted  to  our  Government 
official  documents,  disclosing  the  unfriendly  views  which  had 
been  entertained  by  Vergennes  and  Montmorin  toward  the 
United  States,  manifesting  in  plain  terms  the  solicitude  of 
France  and  Spain  to  exclude  the  United  States  from  the 
Mississippi,  their  jealousy  of  the  growing  power  of  our 
country,  and  the  wish  of  France,  expressed  while  the  question 
was  pending,  that  the  Constitution  might  not  be  adopted,  as 
it  suited  France  that  the  United  States  should  remain  in  their 
present  state  ;  because  if  they  should  acquire  the  consistency 
of  which  they  were  susceptible,  they  would  soon  acquire  a 
force  or  a  power  which  they  would  be  very  ready  to  abuse." 

Mr.  Charles  Francis  Adams,  in  speaking  of  John  Adams' 
estimate  at  an  earlier  date  of  Vergennes'  policy,  and  the  fact 
that  the  American  cause  was  everywhere  made  subordinate 
to  continental  politics,  remarked  that  perhaps  his  impres 
sions  at  some  moments  carried  him  even  farther,  and  led 
him  to  suspect  in  the  Count  a  positive  desire  to  check  and 
depress  America.  "  In  this,"  remarks  Mr.  Charles  Francis 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  91 

Adams,  "  he  fell  into  the  natural  mistake  of  exaggerating  the 
importance  of  his  own  country.  In  the  great  game  of  Na 
tions  which  was  now  playing  at  Paris,  under  the  practised 
eye  of  France's  chief,  the  United  States  probably  held  a  rela 
tive  position  in  his  mind  not  higher  than  that  of  a  pawn  or 
probably  a  knight  on  a  chess-table." 

While  admitting  the  partial  correctness  of  this  view,  we 
cannot  forget  that  the  colonies  of  differing  nationalities  from 
Canada  to  the  Gulf,  with  their  local  rivalries  and  disputes,  and 
their  forced  participation  in  the  constant  wars  of  the  Euro 
pean  powers  to  which  they  respectively  belonged,  had  made 
the  boundaries,  the  character  and  the  resources  of  the  colo 
nies  a  matter  of  constant  interest  to  the  home  Governments. 
From  the  secret  correspondence  now  brought  to  light,  as 
well  as  from  our  own  records,  it  would  seem  clear  that  the 
ablest  statesmen  of  France  and  Spain,  if  of  no  other  countries, 
had  studied  the  probable  future  of  America  with  a  singular 
intentness  and  far-reaching  intelligence.  If  they  looked  upon 
her  as  a  pawn,  it  was  as  a  pawn  which,  unless  carefully 
watched  and  checked,  was  all  but  certain  to  become  a  queen. 

The  Count  de  Vergennes,  in  a  letter  dated  October  14, 
1782,  to  the  Chevalier  de  la  Luzerne  at  Philadelphia,  ex 
pressed  with  cynical  frankness  his  contempt  for  American 
views  as  measured  by  the  European  standard  of  opinion.  He 
said  :  "  But  the  American  agents  do  not  shine  by 'the  sound 
ness  of  their  views,  or  the  adaptation  thereof  to  the  political 
condition  of  Europe;  they  have  all  the  presumption  of 


MEMOIR  ON  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  FROM  THE  FRENCH 

ARCHIVES. 

Some  extracts  from  a  memoir  in  the  Circourt  papers,  taken 
from  the  French  archives,  and  which  Mr.  Bancroft  writes  me  * 

*  From  Mr.  Bancroft's  note,  signed  "  Geo.  Bancroft,  n  Dec.,  1882,  set. 
82  y.  2m.  8  d."  "  The  papers  referred  to  by  Mr.  Jay  in  his  letter  of  December  18, 
1882,  were  both  selected  from  the  French  archives,  by  myself.  They  are  classi 
fied  among  those  papers  relating  to  Angleterre.  They  were  both  certainly  pre 
pared  in  the  French  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs.  The  kings  of  France  and 


92  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

was  certainly  prepared  in  the  French  Department  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  are  interesting  and  instructive  as  illustrating  the 
policy  of  restricting  the  limits,  resources,  and  actual  inde 
pendence  of  the  United  States  disclosed  in  the  secret  corre 
spondence  of  France,  as  coinciding  with  the  desire  of  Spain, 
expressed  to  England  when  she  proffered  mediation,  that  the 
ambition  of  the  Colonies  "  should  be  checked,  and  tied  down 
to  fixed  limits  through  the  union  of  the  three  nations."  * 

It  may  also  recall  the  remark  of  Jay  to  Washington  :  "It 
is  very  evident  to  me  that  the  increasing  power  of  America 
is  a  serious  object  of  jealousy  to  France  and  Spain  as  well  as 
Britain.  "  f 

Mr.  Bancroft,  in  quoting  the  remark,  adds  in  a  note  :  "  Mr. 
Sparks  has  written  on  the  margin  in  pencil,  '  Mr.  Jay  is  a 
man  of  suspicions.'  ' 

This  remark,  not  apparently  intended  for  publication, 
would  seem  to  indicate  that  Mr.  Sparks  knew  nothing  of  the 
secret  correspondence  of  Vergennes  disclosing  his  policy  and 
designs  in  regard  to  the  boundaries,  the  fisheries,  and  the 
Mississippi.  And  the  question  becomes  the  more  interesting 
how  he  was  deceived  into  the  belief  that  the  letters  shown 

Spain  being  of  the  same  family,  and  being  engaged  in  the  same  war,  needed  to 
respect  each  other ;  these  documents  show  the  interest  taken  by  France  in  the 
wishes  of  Spain.  The  one  without  date,  but  supposed  to  belong  to  the  middle  of 
1782,  relates  especially  to  the  need  of  restraining  the  United  States  boundaries, 
a  subject  on  which  Spain  was  keenly  alive.  You  can  judge  as  well  as  I  whether 
the  paper  was  not  so  planned  as  to  be  able  to  be  submitted  to  the  perusal  of  the 
Spanish  Ambassador  at  the  Court  of  Louis  XVI." 

Before  receiving  this  note  from  Mr.  Bancroft  I  was  inclined  to  think  that  the 
memoir  might  more  probably  have  come  from  the  Spanish  Ambassador,  as  the 
French  Court  would  hardly  call  the  Americans  "insurgents ;  "  and  M.  de  Circourt 
in  a  note  (Circourt,  iii.,  p.  38)  suggests  that  the  memoir,  written  by  one  not  an 
expert  in  the  French  language,  but  well  informed  as  to  the  interests  of  the  time 
when  he  lived,  reproduced  the  thoughts  of  the  Count  d'Aranda  ;  although  he  adds 
that  the  nature  of  the  thoughts  and  the  tenor  of  the  political  tendencies  are  the 
same  with  those  of  the  letters  of  the  Comte  de  Mercy.  Mr.  Bancroft's  opinion, 
however,  based  on  an  examination  of  the  original  document  and  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  the  French  policy  as  exhibited  in  the  Vergennes  correspondence,  is 
of  the  highest  authority. 

*  Bancroft's  Hist.,  x.,  p.  165. 

f  Dated  Paris,  April  6,  1783;  quoted  in  Bancroft's  Const.  Hist.,  i.,  307. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  93 

him  at  the  French  Office  of  Foreign  Affairs  were,  as  he  de 
clares,  "  the  entire  correspondence  of  the  Count  de  Vergennes 
during  the  whole  war  with  the  French  Minister  in  this  coun 
try,  developing  the  policy  and  designs  of  the  French  Court 
in  regard  to  the  war  and  the  objects  to  be  attained  by  the 
peace,"  if  all  the  significant  letters  quoted  by  Bancroft  and 
Circourt  had  been  carefully  eliminated. 

The  memoir  relates  to  the  principal  objects  to  be  consid 
ered  in  the  negotiations  for  peace,  of  a  date  between  May  30 
and  June  15,  1782,  and  presents  a  view  of  European  policy 
that  exhibits  with  great  clearness  the  care  with  which  the 
American  question  had  been  studied  by  European  diplomatists 
with  reference  to  European  views  and  interests  :  with  which 
they  were  anxious  to  convince  the  Court  of  St.  James  that  the 
interests  of  Great  Britain  were  in  this  case  identical.  After 
stating  that  they  are  to  witness  the  rise  in  the  midst  of  Europe, 
of  a  new  power  which  is  to  become  in  America  a  state  similar 
to  that  which  gave  it  birth,  and  that  the  future  treaty  of  peace 
would  make  it  a  rival  of  England,  independent  de  jure,  for 
"  such  was  of  necessity  the  will  of  France,  for  that  was  the 
most  fatal  blow  she  could  inflict  upon  her  ambitious  and 
troublesome  rival;"  the  question  was  asked  whether  France 
had  "foreseen  the  extent  of  the  power  which  the  United 
States  may  eventually  acquire,"  and -declared  that  "  what  at 
the  present  moment  appears  of  the  greatest  importance  is  to 
regulate  the  territorial  extent  which  must  be  given  to  this 
power  on  the  vast  continent  of  North  America,  and  what  its 
boundaries  shall  be.  .  .  .  The  interest  of  Europe  in  gen 
eral,  and  of  the  entire  world,  demands  that  the  power  of  the 
insurgents  should  have  well-known  and  clearly  defined  bound 
aries.  It  would  be  too  dangerous  to,  leave  to  this  power 
at  the  moment  of  its  birth  a  domain  of  undetermined  extent, 
in  a  new  land  very  thinly  peopled  as  yet,  but  which  can  be 
come  populous  in  a  very  short  time.'*  This  idea,  the  danger 
of  enabling  the  American  leaders  to  extend  their  revolutions 
from  America  beyond  their  continent,  the  migratory  spirit  of 
the  English  people,  stimulated  by  the  hope  of  more  assured 


94  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

liberties  in  the  new  state,  would  decide  numbers  of  English 
families  to  leave  their  homes  and  settle  amidst  the  insurgents, 

o 

and  this  new  wound  would  not  be  the  least  prejudicial  to 
England;  "the  rest  of  Europe,  also,  should  guard  against 
emigration."  The  excellence  of  the  American  soil,  which  the 
war  had  made  known,  was  made  to  present  an  argument  for 
forestalling  the  evil  of  emigration  against  which  each  power 
should  take  precautionary  measures,  by  not  leaving  too  much 
land  to  the  American  colonists.  "  To  neglect  this  important 
point,"  says  the  memoir,  "  were  a  capital  mistake,  for  which 
repentance  would  promptly  follow." 

The  unhappy  consequences  were  then  pointed  out,  which 
would  result  from  the  insurgents  being  allowed  to  spread  too 
far  to  the  eastward  and  seize  the  fisheries  on  the  eastern  shore, 
or  on  the  north  to  the  excellent  land  on  the  lakes  and  the  St. 
Lawrence,  where  they  might  seize  the  fur  trade :  or  to  ad 
vance  along  the  Ohio  and  the  Mississippi  to  the  silver  mines 
of  Mexico.  It  was  therefore  of  paramount  importance  to 
surround  the  new  power,  at  the  moment  when  it  was  to  be 
framed  and  consolidated,  with  nations  capable  of  mutually 
supporting  each  other  against  their  enterprises. 

It  was  held  to  be  clear  that  there  must  be  an  entire  ces 
sion  of  Florida  to  the  Spaniards,  and  that  Spain  must  not 
disturb  the  domains  of  England  :  and  the  treaty  of  peace  in 
recognizing  the  independence  of  the  colonies  should  first  of 
all  hold  them  to  their  original  limits,  "  so  that  the  new  Re 
public,"  in  the  language  of  the  memoir,  "  may  never  be  able 
to  extend  beyond  them,  neither  by  conquest,  nor  by  associa 
tion  between  the  American  Colonies.  The  boundaries  of 
their  continent  must  be  detailed  and  circumscribed  with  the 
greatest  exactness,  and  all  the  belligerent  powers  must  bind 
themselves  to  prevent  any  transgression  of  them.  It  is  as 
much  in  the  interest  of  England  as  in  that  of  Spain,  France, 
and  Holland  to  stop  them  by  force  at  the  first  infraction  of 
the  limits  and  the  first  attempt  toward  extending  beyond 
them."  The  extracts  given  by  De  Circourt,  after  further  elab 
orating  these  views,  close  with  the  suggestion  that  the  insur 
gents,  being  no  longer  Englishmen,  should  not  be  allowed  to 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  95 

aggrandize  themselves  by  the  fisheries  at  England's  expense, 
and  that  "it  is  therefore  obviously  in  England's  interest,  to 
have  the  French  as  partners  at  Newfoundland  in  preference  to 
the  insurgents." 

These  extracts  enable  us  to  understand  the  drift  of  M. 
Vergennes'  complaint,  that  the  views  entertained  by  Ameri- 
-can  statesmen  in  regard  to  the  proper  boundaries  and  re 
sources  of  the  new  Republic  were  ill  adapted*  to  suit  the  poli 
tical  views  of  Europe — views  which  were  based  on  a  jealousy 
of  our  future  power  and  a  fear  of  our  influence  and  example 
upon  dissatisfied  colonies. 

Mr.  Bancroft  refers  to  the  opposition  of  the  Prince  Mont- 
barey  to  the  alliance  of  France  with  the  insurgents,  as  fraught 
with  danger  in  sustaining  a  revolt  against  established  author 
ity :  and  to  the  doubts  of  the  first  Minister,  Maurepas,  and 
the  remonstrances  of  the  Minister  of  War  and  the  interior 
sentiment  of  the  King  himself,  when  the  traditional  antago 
nism  to  England  forced  the  French  into  an  alliance  with 
America.* 

Mr.  Bancroft  also  quotes  Raynal,  who  had  renounced  the 
Jesuit  cloister,  as  remarking  that  "  the  philosophers  like  the 
statesmen  of  France  would  not  have  the  United  States  be 
come  too  great ;  they  rather  desire  to  preserve  for  England 
so  much  strength  in  North  America  that  the  two  powers 
might  watch,  restrain,  and  balance  each  other." 

M.  Flassan  speaks  of  the  disapproval  at  Court  of  the  posi 
tion  of  the  King  as  the  encourager  of  rebels, f  and  a  despatch  to 
King  Frederic  II. ,  dated  April  25,  1782,  from  M.  de  Sandoz 
Rolling  relates  an  incident  at  a  sitting  at  Versailles,  presided 
over  by  the  King,  which  indicated  impatience  at  the  annual 
expenditures  for  America  and  Holland,  in  his  remark  : 
"  Very  dear  to  keep  people  from  whom  we  can  expect  neither 
fealty  nor  compensation  !  " 

*  Bancroft,  x.,  p.  42.  f  Flassan  :  Diplomatic  Franfoise,  vi.,  402. 

,     \  Circourt,  iii.,  p.  159. 


96  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 


THE  AMERICAN  BEARING  OF  THE  FRENCH  AND  SPANISH 

ALLIANCE. 

The  event  which  most  defined  the  policy  of  France  to 
ward  America  was  the  treaty  signed  at  Madrid,  April  12, 
1779,  by  which  the  King  of  France  entered  into  an  alli 
ance  offensive  and  defensive  with  his  uncle,  the  King  of 
Spain,  by  which  Spain  agreed  to  engage  in  the  war  against 
Great  Britain,  with  a  stipulation  that  no  peace  should  be 
concluded  until  Gibraltar  was  returned  to  Spain.  An  inter 
esting  sketch  of  the  negotiations  which  preceded  this  treaty, 
and  of  the  sacrifice  by  Vergennes  of  American  interests  in  order 
to  secure  the  alliance,  is  given  by  Bancroft,  with  references  to 
original  authorities.*  About  a  month  before  the  signing,  Ver 
gennes  wrote  to  Montmorin  in  a  tone  which  showed  at  once 
his  distrust  of  Spain  and  his  indifference  to  the  interests  of 
his  American  allies.  M  How  can  he  ask  us  to  bind  ourselves 
to  everything  that  flatters  the  ambition  of  Spain,  while  he 
may  make  the  secret  reserve  never  to  take  part  in  the  war, 
but  in  so  far  as  the  dangers  are  remote  and  the  advantages 
certain  ?  In  one  word,  to  reap  without  having  sown  ?  .  .  . 
I  cry  out  less  at  his  repugnance  to  guarantee  American  inde 
pendence.  Nothing  is  gratuitous  on  the  part  of  Spain  ;  we 
knew  from  herself  that  she  wants  suitable  concessions  from 
the  Americans;  to  this  we  assuredly  make  no  opposition."  f 

In  two  points  it  threatened  the  interests  of  the  United 
States. 

1.  As    regards  the    fisheries,    France   agreed  that    if  she 
could  drive  the  British  from  Newfoundland,  its  fisheries  were 
to  be  shared  only  with  Spain. 

2.  From  the   United  States,  Spain  was  left  free  to   exact 
as  the  price  of  her  friendship,  a  renunciation  of  every  part  of 
the  basin  of  the  St.  Lawrence  and  the  Lakes,  of  the  naviga- 

*  Bancroft's  History,  x.,  chapter  viii.,  p.  181. 

f  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  March  19,  1779,  quoted  in  Bancroft,  x.,  190.   This 
letter  is  not  included  among  those  given  by  De  Circourt. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  97 

tion  of  the  Mississippi,  and  of  all  the  land  between  that  river 
and  the  Alleghanies.* 

Here  again  we  see  that  all  that  would  have  been  left  to 
the  United  States,  would  have  been  the  narrow  strip  along  the 
Atlantic. 

Mr.  Bancroft  makes  one  suggestion  of  no  slight  interest 
when  he  says  :  "  This  convention  of  France  with  Spain  modi 
fied  the  treaty  between  France  and  the  United  States.  The 
latter  were  not  bound  to  continue  the  war  till  Gibraltar  should 
be  taken  ;  still  less  till  Spain  should  have  carried  out  her  views 
hostile  to  their  interests.  They  gained  the  right  to  make  peace 
whenever  Great  Britain  would  recognize  their  independence. "f 

The  original  correspondence  quoted  and  referred  to  by 
Bancroft,  and  in  part  printed  by  De  Circourt,  is  of  great  im 
portance  as  showing  that  the  boundaries  and  the  fisheries 
claimed  by  America,  and  which  they  confidently  hoped  would 
be  secured  for  them  by  the  Court  of  France,  were  a  part  of 
the  price  claimed  by  Spain  and  acceded  to  by  Vergennes  for 
the  Spanish  alliance  in  the  war  ;  and  as  showing,  further,  that 
after  he  had  thus  secured  the  treaty  with  Spain,  he  held  him 
self  bound  by  his  engagements  with  that  power  to  acquiesce  in 
and  assist  her  hostile  policy  toward  America  in  every  point, 
save  that  of  the  actual  independence  which  France  had  guar 
anteed,  and  which  Vergennes  held  it  was  not  essential  that 
England  should  acknowledge.  This  disclosure  of  his  bar 
gaining  with  Spain  assists  us  to  understand  the  instructions  to 
his  diplomatic  agents  at  Philadelphia,  explaining  and  enforc 
ing  the  inimical  policy  of  France. 

When  in  1779  Gerry  asked  Congress  to  declare  the  com 
mon  right  to  the  fisheries,  the  resolution  was  opposed  by  the 
friends  of  France  as  sure  to  alienate  Spain,  and  M.  Gerard 
remarked  :  "  There  would  seem  to  be  a  wish  to  break  the  con 
nection  of  France  with  Spain  ;  but  I  think  I  can  say  that  if 
the  Americans  should  have  the  audacity  to  force  the  King  of 
France  to  choose  between  the  two  alliances,  his  decision 
would  not  be  in  favor  of  the  United  States."  J 

*  Bancroft,  x.,  p.  191.  f  Ibid.,  191,  192. 

\  Gerard  to  Vergennes,  July  14,  1779,  quoted  by  Bancroft,  x. ,  219. 


98  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

The  correspondence  of  M.  Vergennes  with  his  agents 
shows  that  the  policy  announced  to  them  did  not  always  cor 
respond  with  the  assurances  given  by  him  to  Congress. 

On  September  16,  1779,  Washington  admitted  to  a  con 
ference  at  the  headquarters  at  West  Point,  M.  de  la  Luzerne, 
the  Minister  of  France,  who  had  arrived  at  Boston  August 
2d,  and  had  not  yet  been  publicly  introduced  to  Congress. 
General  Hamilton  acted  as  interpreter  and  made  report  of  the 
conference  on  September  i8th.*  From  the  report  it  appeared 
that  "  he  concluded  the  conference  with  stating  that  in  Boston 
several  gentlemen  of  influence,  some  of  them  members  of  Con 
gress,  had  conversed  with  him  on  the  subject  of  an  expedition 
against  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia  ;  that  his  Christian  Majesty 
had  a  sincere  and  disinterested  desire  to  see  those  two  prov 
inces  annexed  to  the  American  Confederacy,  and  would  be 
disposed  to  promote  a  plan  for  this  purpose,  but  that  he  would 
undertake  nothing  of  the  kind  unless  the  plan  was  previously 
approved  by  the  general." 

The  following  passages,  taken  from  the  French  letters  in 
M.  de  Circourt's  volume,  show  that  his  Christian  Majesty  had 
for  a  year  or  more  been  under  an  engagement  to  Spain  to 
retain  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia  in  the  hands  of  England,  for 
the  purpose  of  making  the  Americans  "  feel  the  need  of 
sureties,  allies,  and  protectors." 

Vergennes,  while  assuring  Montmorin,  October  17,  1778, f 
that  France  could  not  consent  to  the  English  retaining  New 
York  or  any  part  of  the  thirteen  provinces  without  violating 
his  engagements  that  they  should  be  independent,  expressed 
a  readiness  to  guarantee  to  England  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia. 

On  October  30,  1778,  Vergennes  wrote  J  that  France  de 
manded  independence  only  for  the  thirteen  States,  without 
comprising  among  them  any  of  the  other  English  possessions 
which  had  taken  no  part  in  the  insurrection. 

"  We  do  not  wish,"  he  said,  "  far  from  it,  that  the  new 
Republic  should  remain  the  only  mistress  of  all  that  immense 


*  Dip.  Corres.,  x.,  361.  \  Circourt,  iii.,  307. 

JIbid.,  310. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  99 

On  November  2,  1778,*  M.  Vergennes  suggested  to  Mont- 
morin  that  with  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia  guaranteed  to  Eng 
land,  and  with  Spain  in  possession  of  the  part  of  Western 
Florida  which  suits  her,  "  a  restraint  will  be  put  on  the  Am 
ericans  greater  than  is  needful  to  prevent  them  from  becoming 
enterprising  and  troublesome  neighbors,"  and  he  concluded 
with  an  expression  of  his  poor  opinion  of  their  firmness,  their 
talents,  views,  and  patriotism. 

October  14,  1782,  Vergennes  expressed  to  the  Count  de  la 
Luzerne,f  his  unchanged  view  against  the  conquest  of  Canada, 
and  added  "  that  this  our  way  of  thinking  must  be  an  impene 
trable  secret  to  the  Americans.  It  would  be  in  their  eyes  a 
crime  which  they  would  never  forgive  us.  It  behooves  us  to 
leave  them  to  their  illusions,  to  do  everything  that  we  can 
to  make  them  fancy  that  we  share  them,  and  unostentatiously  to 
defeat  any  attempts  to  which  these  illusions  might  carry  them, 
if  our  co-operation  is  required." 

After  these  instructive  extracts,  there  seems  a  certain  con 
sistency  in  the  instructions  to  the  French  Minister  at  Phila 
delphia,  to  impress  upon  the  United  States  what  they  owe 
to  the  King  for  graciously  surrendering  to  them  his  legitimate 
right  to  Canada,  with  "  the  single  view  of  favoring  the  United 
States  and  avoiding  everything  that  might  in  the  least  disa 
greeably  affect  them."  Such  disinterested  conduct,  continued 
the  chief  Minister  of  France,  should  serve  as  an  example  and 
incentive  to  the  United  States,  and  keep  them  from  displaying 
jealousy  toward  France  should  the  fortune  of  war  procure  for 
her  the  slight  advantages  of  extending  her  fisheries. 

So,  too,  with  the  advice  to  the  Americans  :  "  If  they  wish 
to  behave  wisely  or  even  decently,  to  trustingly  expose  their 
wishes  to  the  Catholic  King  without  touching  on  the  question 
of  right,  and  leave  the  rest  to  the  verdict  which  his  Majesty's 
magnanimity  may  dictate." 

The  Count's  own  idea  of  the  magnanimity  of  the  King  of 
Spain,  to  which  he  urged  the  Americans  trustingly  to  submit 
their  western  boundary,  is  frankly  expressed  in  other  places, 
and  on  January  22,  1781,  he  writes  to  Montmorin  : 

*  Circourt,  iii.,  311.  f  Ibid.,  288. 


ioo  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

"  We  never  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  Spain  will  strive  to 
set  her  own  interests  before  everything  else  ;  that  she  will 
want  to  make  all  the  other  conditions  of  peace  subordinate  to 
them  ;  and  that  she  will  the  less  give  any  attention  to  those 
of  the  Americans  :  that  she  also  sees  their  independence 
with  deep  reluctance  (avec  douleur)." 

Some  of  the  instructions  of  Vergennes  to  his  agents  at 
Philadelphia  published  by  Circourt*  are  elaborate  discus 
sions  against  the  American  claims,  and  exhibit  in  their  rea 
soning  more  ingenuity  than  good  faith. 

One,  for  instance,  addressed  to  M.  de  la  Luzerne,  says  : 
"  With  regard  to  the  navigation  on  the  Mississippi,  it  is 
pretty  nearly  proved  that  the  Americans  have  no  claim  to  it, 
since  at  the  moment  when  the  revolution  broke  out  the  limits 
of  the  thirteen  States  did  not  reach  to  the  river,  and  it  would 
be  absurd  for  them  to  claim  the  rights  of  England,  of  a 
power  whose  rule  they  have  abjured." 

Again,  writing  to  de  la  Luzerne,  he  remarked  in  trans 
mitting  the  king's  views  and  that  of  his  council  :f  "It  results 
from  this  that  the  fishing  along  the  coast  of  Newfoundland, 
New  Scotland  and  its  dependencies,  Canada,  etc.,  belongs  ex 
clusively  to  the  English,  and  that  the  Americans  have  abso 
lutely  no  claim  thereto. "J 

This  position  was  sustained  by  the  argument,  first  that 
the  fisheries  belonged  to  Great  Britain,  and  that  it  was  as 
subjects  of  that  crown  that  the  Americans  enjoyed  it,  and 
that  in  breaking  the  community  between  them,  they  and 
England  relinquished  all  advantages  they  derived  from  the 
union  ;  but  secondly,  that  if  they  had  a  previous  right  to  the 
fisheries,  they  had  virtually  renounced  it  by  the  ninth  article 
of  their  commercial  treaty  between  France  and  the  United 
States.  § 

*  De  Circourt,  iii.,  275.  f  Versailles,  July  13,  1779,  Circ.,  iii.,  266. 

\  "  II  resulte  de  la  que  la  peche  sur  les  cotes  de  Terre-Neuve,  de  la  nouvelle 
Ecosse  et  ses  dependances,  du  Canada,  etc.,  appartient  exclusivement  aux  Anglais  ; 
que  les  Americains  n'  ont  absolument  rien  a  y  pretendre,"  etc.  Vergennes  to 
Luzerne,  September  25,  1779.  De  Circourt,  iii.,  276. 

§  M.  de  Vergennes'  language  on  this  point  is  as  follows  :  "  L' Article  9  dit  qu' 
ils  ne  pecheront  point  les  havres.  baies,  criques,  rades,  cotes  et  places  que  le 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  101 

Of  the  lands  north  of  the  Ohio,  Vergennes  wrote  to 
Luzerne  on  October  14,  1782,  pending  the  peace  negotiations: 
"These  lands,"  those  bordering  on  Lake  Ontario,  "  either 
belong  to  the  savages  or  are  a  dependence  of  Canada.  In 
neither  case  have  the  United  States  a  right  to  them.  But  I 
am  aware  of  the  extravagant  pretensions  current  in  America. 
According  to  the  Congress,  the  Charters  emanating  from  the 
British  Crown  extend  the  dominions  of  America  from  the 
Atlantic  to  the  Pacific.  Such  is  the  system  proposed  by 
Mr.  Jay  on  the  basis  of  his  negotiations  with  Spain.  Such 
an  insane  illusion  (iin  pareil  delire)  is  undeserving  of  serious 
refutation.  Yet  a  confidential  note  has  been  placed  in  Mr. 
Jay's  hands,  in  which  note  it  is  pretty  well  demonstrated  that 
the  boundaries  of  the  United  States  south  of  the  Ohio  stop 
at  the  mountains  following  the  water-shed,  and  that  all  that 
skirts  that  mountain,  and  particularly  the  lakes,  has  formerly 
been  a  part  of  Canada.  All  this,  however,  is  meant  for  your 
eye  alone."  * 

The  note  here  referred  to  is  that  of  Mr.  Rayneval,  dated 
September  6,  1782, f  professing  to  give  only  his  "personal 
ideas,"  but  which  Jay  rightly  regarded  as  the  official  views 
of  Vergennes.  It  was  addressed  to  Jay  as  the  Minister  au 
thorized  to  treat  with  Spain,  urging  him  not  to  offend  the 
Spanish  Minister  by  declining  to  treat  with  him  till  he  pro 
duced  his  power,  and  sending  a  memoir  on  the  claims  of 
Spain,  and  the  right  of  the  States,  which  would  have  reduced 
our  national  territory  to  a  narrow  strip  along  the  Atlantic, 
cutting  off  nearly  the  whole  of  the  States  of  Alabama,  Mis 
sissippi,  parts  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  and  the  whole  of 
the  northwestern  territory  north  of  the  Ohio,  including  the 
States  of  Ohio  and  Michigan,  Indiana  and  Illinois,  and  Wis 
consin,  up  to  the  eastern  borders  of  Iowa  and  Minnesota. 
This  line,  reducing  thus  our  territory  to  one-half  of  what  we 
claimed,  M.  Rayneval  tendered  as  a  reasonable  conciliation. 

roi  possede  ou  possedera  a  1'avenir.  Or  il  est  possible  que  sa  Majeste  fasse  la 
conquete  de  Terre-Neuve  et  de  Cap-Breton  ;  dont  les  Americains  ne  pourraient 
point  pecher  sur  les  cotes  de  ces  deux  iles,"  etc.  Circourt,  iii.,  278. 

*  Circourt,  iii.,  288.  f  Dip.  Cor.,  viii.,  155. 


IO2  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

Of  this  note  Jay  said  in  his  letter  to  Livingston  :  "  The 
perusal  of  this  memoir  convinced  me  :  First,  that  this  Court 
would,  at  a  peace,  oppose  our  extension  to  the  Mississippi  ; 
second,  that  they  would  oppose  our  claims  to  the  free  naviga 
tion  of  that  river  ;  third,  that  they  would  probably  support 
the  British  claims  to  all  the  country  above  the  thirty-first  de 
gree  of  latitude,  and  certainly  to  all  the  country  north  of  the 
Ohio  ;  fourth,  that  in  case  we  should  not  agree  to  divide  with 
Spain  in  the  manner  proposed,  that  then  this  Court  would  aid 
Spain  in  negotiating  with  Britain  for  the  territory  she  wanted, 
and  would  agree  that  the  residue  should  remain  to  Britain. 

"  In  my  opinion  it  was  not  to  be  believed  that  the  first 
and  confidential  secretary  of  the  Count  de  Vergennes  would, 
without  his  knowledge  and  consent,  declare  such  sentiments 
and  offer  such  propositions,  and  that  too  in  writing.  I  there 
fore  considered  M.  Rayneval  as  speaking  the  sentiments  of 
the  Minister,  and  I  confess  they  alarmed  me,  especially  as 
they  seemed  naturally  to  make  a  part  of  that  system  of  pol 
icy  which  I  believed  induced  him  rather  to  postpone  the 
acknowledgment  of  our  independence  by  Britain  to  the  con 
clusions  of  a  general  peace,  than  aid  us  in  procuring  it  at 
present."  * 

The  letters  of  M.  de  Vergennes  show  an  instruction  to 
Luzerne  to  depict  to  the  Americans  "  the  priceless  advan 
tages  which  their  close  alliance  with  France  has  already  pro 
cured  and  will  further  insure  them,  and  in  the  enjoyment  of 
which  France  alone  can  maintain  them." 


VERGENNES'  DONATIONS  TO  AMERICAN  AUTHORS. 

This  sort  of  teaching,  and  the  idea  that  whatever  con 
cessions  might  be  granted  them  by  England  could  only  be 
secured  through  the  influence  of  France,  served  as  a  basis  for 
a  suggestion  on  the  part  of  the  Minister  of  France  that  the 
Commissioners  of  Peace  should  be  instructed  by  Congress  to 
be  guided  absolutely  by  the  Minister  of  France.  To  impress 

*  Dip.  Cor.,  viii.,  160,  161. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  103 

this  view  upon  Congress  and  the  people,  the  Government  of 
France  deemed  it  proper  to  supply  their  agent  at  Philadel 
phia  with  money  with  which  to  influence  the  American 
press. 

Vergennes  in  the  same  letter  to  Luzerne  *  says:  "His 
Majesty  further  empowers  you  to  continue  the  donations  (les 
donatifs]  which  M.  Gerard  has  given  or  promised  to  various 
American  authors,  and  of  which  he  will  surely  have  handed 
you  a  list."t 

A  note  by  M.  de  Circourt  to  this  passage  says  :  "  '  Tem 
porary  pecuniary  assistance.'  This  delicate  subject  has  been 
even  in  my  time  the  subject  of  criticisms  and  controversies 
into  which  we  need  not  enter." 

The  list  of  American  authors  thus  assisted  by  Messrs. 
Gerard  and  de  la  Luzerne  by  "  donatifs,"  and  "  Secours  tem- 
poraires  en  argent,"  if  preserved  among  the  once  confidential 
papers  now  open  to  inspection,  should  not  be  overlooked  by 
the  agents  of  our  National  Government  in  Paris,  who  may  be 
charged  to  gather  all  useful  materials  for  a  national  history 
that  are  to  be  found  in  the  archives  of  France. 

THE  INSTRUCTION  OF  CONGRESS. 

The  history  of  the  scheme  to  induce  Congress  to  give  to 
its  Commissioners  an  instruction  which  made  the  King  of 
France  the  arbiter  of  our  destiny,  combined  with  that  of  the 
unsuccessful  efforts  in  Congress  to  retreat  from  that  humiliat 
ing  position,  is  one  which  no  American  can  read  with  pride. 

That  error  of  Congress  occurred  when,  as  Mr.  C.  F.  Adams 
has  remarked,  the  tone  of  Congress  had  declined,;):  and  when, 

*  September  25,  1.779:   Circourt,  iii.,  275. 

\  Perhaps  a  fact  of  this  significance  should  be  given  in  the  original  text,  which 
reads  as  follows  :  "  Sa  Majeste  vous  authorise  en  outre  a  continner  les  donatifs  que 
M.  Gerard  a  clonnes  on  promis  a  differents  auteurs  Americains,  et  dont  ce  der 
nier  vous  aura  surement  remis  la  note."  Circourt,  iii.,  283. 

\  uThe  tone  of  Congress,"  says  Mr.  C.  F.  Adams,  "had  gradually  become 
lowered.  The  people  were  suffering  from  exhaustion  by  the  war,  especially  in  the 
Southern  States.  ...  At  the  instigation  of  M.  de  la  Luzerne,  the  words 
directing  their  Ministers  'to  use  their  own  judgment  and  prudence  in  securing 


104  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

according  to  Bancroft, t  one  of  the  members,  Sullivan,  was  in 
the  pay  of  France.  That  error  was  redeemed  by  Commis 
sioners  who  saw  clearly  the  perils  to  which  Congress  was  blind, 
and  who  broke  their  instructions  as  unsuited  to  the  situation 
and  dangerous  to  the  honor  and  interests  of  the  country. 

But  the  question  remains,  How  came  Congress  to  yield  to 
the  blandishments  of  the  French  Minister,  and  to  intrust  the 
future  strength  and  glory  of  the  United  States,  the  just  fruits 
of  their  war  with  Great  Britain,  to  the  will  of  the  King  of 
France,  knowing  as  they  did  his  close  relations  and  family 
alliance  with  his  uncle  of  Spain — a  power  persistently  and 
bitterly  opposed  to  us  ? 

Why  did  not  Congress  see  that  the  instruction  which  sub 
jected  the  Commissioners  to  French  control,  and  made  the 
King  the  master  of  the  terms  of  peace,  was  an  abdication  of 
national  sovereignty,  stripping  them  of  all  power  and  dignity 
as  the  representatives  of  an  independent  nation,  and  a  breach 
of  faith  to  the  American  people  ? 

Bancroft  in  part  only  explains  the  mystery  when  he  says  : 
''  The  necessity  of  appeals  to  France  for  aid  promoted  obse 
quiousness  to  its  wishes.  He  that  accepts  subsidies  binds 
his  own  hands  and  consents  to  play  a  secondary  part.";}: 

There  were  men  in  Congress  and  in  the  army  perfectly 
ready  to  accept  aid  from  France  as  our  ally  in  the  war,  but 
not  to  surrender  to  her  in  return  the  right  to  protect  the 
national  honor.  Another  explanation  is  attempted  by  Mr. 
Madison,  in  his  account  of  the  adoption  of  the  instructions  by 

the  interests  of  the  United  States,'  were  erased,  and  the  words  '  ultimately  to 
govern  themselves  by  the  advice  and  opinion  of  the  French  minister,'  were  intro 
duced  as  amendments.  The  decision  showed  the  influence  of  Massachusetts  to  be 
on  the  wane.  Even  New  Hampshire,  under  the  guidance  of  John  Sullivan,  de 
serted  her.  .  .  .  The  attitude  of  Virginia  was  no  longer  what  it  had  been. 

.  .  The  pressure  of  the  war  was  upon  her,  and  she  consented  to  the  greatest 
humiliation  of  the  national  pride  recorded  in  the  nation's  annals.  Even  those 
members  who  voted  for  it  felt  ashamed,  and  repeatedly  attempted  to  expunge  it 
afterward ;  but  the  record,  because  once  made,  was  permitted  to  remain  by  those 
who  offered  nothing  to  excuse  it."  * 

f  Bancroft's  Hist.,  x.,  452.  \  Ibid.,  212. 

*  Adam's  Works,  i.,  p.  341. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  105 

which  the    negotiations   were    submitted    to    the    counsel   of 
France,*  when  he  said  : 

"  It  was  added  that,  as  it  was  expected  nothing  would  be 
yielded  by  Great  Britain  which  was  not  extorted  by  the  ad 
dress  of  France  in  managing  the  mediation,  and  as  it  was 
the  intention  of  Congress  that  their  Minister  should  not  op 
pose  a  peace  recommended  by  them  and  approved  by 
France,  it  would  be  good  policy  to  make  the  declaration  to 
France,  and  by  such  a  mark  of  confidence  to  render  her 
friendship  the  more  responsible  for  the  issue." 

It  appears  from  the  journal  of  Congress,  that  Luzerne  ad 
vised  the  committee  of  Congress  that  when  negotiations  were 
entered  into,  "the  King  would  most  readily  employ  his 
good  offices  in  support  of  the  United  States  in  all  points  re 
lating  to  their  prosperity ,"  and  a  committee  repeating  these 
words  reported  that  "  Congress  placed  the  utmost  confidence 
in  his  Majesty's  assurances." 

The  adoption  by  Congress  of  the  instructions  to  their 
Commissioners  persistently  dictated  by  the  Minister  of 
France  was  not  simply,  as  Mr.  Madison  admitted, t  a  national 
humiliation — a  sacrifice  of  the  national  dignity,  as  was  said, 
to  national  policy — but  it  was,  in  fact,  a  sacrifice  of  the  na 
tional  interests  as  well  as  of  the  national  dignity.  Whatever 
temporary  identity  of  national  interest  there  might  have  been 
between  the  United  States  and  France  during  the  war,  upon 
the  single  point  of  American  independence  from  the  English 
crown — the  Americans  desiring  it  for  one  reason  and  France 
for  another — there  could  be  no  permanent  identity  of  interest 
between  them  in  regard  to  the  future  of  America  as  an  inde 
pendent  power,  but  rather  that  decided  and  permanent  dif 
ference,  which  would  naturally  result  from  the  antagonism  of 
their  principles,  and  the  variance  of  their  conditions  and  gen 
eral  policy. 

When  Vergennes  said  it  was  far  from  their  desire  that 
the  Republic  should  be  the  sole  mistress  of  this  vast  conti- 

*  Rives'  Madison,  i.,  334,  quoting  Madison's  Debates,  i.,  240,  243. 
f  The  Thompson  papers,  Collections  of  the  N.  Y.  Hist.  Soc.  for  1878,  pp.  96 
and  97. 


106  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

ne.nt,  he  spoke  the  truth  ;  and  when,  to  secure  the  aid  of 
Spain,  he  agreed  to  acquiesce  in  her  schemes  for  abridging 
the  territory  and  resources  which  would  give  us  national 
dignity  and  national  strength,  and  to  surround  us  with  an 
tagonistic  powers  combined  to  prevent  our  extension  and  to 
subject  us  to  their  control,  he  adopted  a  course  not  at  all  in 
disaccord  with  the  dynastic  interests,  the  family  compacts, 
and  the  balance  of  power  system  which  made  part  of  the 
policy  of  France. 

Congress  made  the  further  mistake  of  believing  the  assur 
ances  of  Luzerne,  that  France  was  not  only  ready  to  do  all  in 
her  power  to  secure  and  advance  the  prosperity  of  America, 
but  that  she  alone  could  induce  England  to  grant  us  the 
terms  we  desired,  and  that  without  her  great  assistance  in  the 
negotiation  we  would  be  helpless. 

France,  on  the  contrary,  occupied  a  position  toward  Eng 
land,  in  reference  to  the  colonial  dispute,  which  made  it  a 
matter  of  pride  and  self-respect  with  high-spirited  English 
men,  to  repel  the  smallest  interference  on  the  part  of  France 
in  the  final  negotiations  with  America. 

When  Austria  and  Russia  proffered  their  mediation,*  in 
1781,  the  Court  of  London  declined  it  with  the  remark: 
"  On  every  occasion  in  which  there  has  been  a  question  of 
negotiation  since  the  commencement  of  the  war  with  France, 
the  King  has  constantly  declared  that  he  could  never  admit 
in  any  manner  whatsoever,  nor  under  any  form,  that  there 
should  be  any  interference  between  foreign  powers  and  his 
rebellious  subjects."  It  was  the  "  scornful  refusal  by  England 
of  any  mediation  in  which  the  revolted  colonies  should  be 
included,  which,"  in  the  words  of  Shelburne's  biographer, 
"had  finally  alienated  her  from  the  Continental  powers  and 
left  her  bereft  of  every  friend  and  ally."  t 

If  that  was  the  feeling  toward  powers  which  had  been 
neutral,  why  should  it  not  have  been  still  stronger  against  all 
dictation  or  interference  touching  the  terms  of  peace,  by  the 

*Dip.  Corr.,  xi.,  p.  42.  f  Shelburne's  Life,  Hi.,  166. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.          107 

power  which  had  espoused   the   cause  of  the  Colonies,  and 
assisted  in  the  establishment  of  their  independence. 

This  fact  Vergennes  seemed,  in  part  at  least,  to  recognize 
and  accept,  when  he  disclaimed  all  intention  to  interfere  with 
the  separate  character  of  the  American  negotiation,  and  when 
he  instructed  Rayneval  to  declare  that  he  had  no  authority  to 
treat  of  American  questions,  unless  indeed  in  the  suggestion 
to  postpone  the  discussion  of  the  boundaries,  and  that  was 
suggested  simply  on  the  plea  of  avoiding  delay.* 


VERGENNES  AND  LECKY  ON  THE  AMERICAN  ARTICLES. 

The  surprise  of  Vergennes  at  the  terms  obtained  by  our 
Commissioners  by  rejecting  his  counsel  and  acting  as  the 
representatives  of  an  independent  people,  vyas  shown  by  the 
letter  to  Rayneval,  already  alluded  to,  that  the  English  had 
bought  a  peace  rather  than  made  one  :  that  indeed,  the  con 
cessions  as  well  in  regard  to  the  boundaries,  the  fisheries,  and 
the  loyalists,  exceeded  all  that  he  could  have  believed  pos 
sible."  t 

While  the  great  diplomatist  of  France  placed  on  record  a 
hundred  years  ago  that  involuntary  tribute  to  the  sound  policy, 
the  masterly  management  and  the  marvellous  success  of  the 
American  negotiators,  the  latest  of  the  English  historians, 
who  has  studied  the  subject  of  the  general  peace  by  all  the 
light  afforded  by  the  secret  correspondence  published  by  Ban 
croft  and  Circourt,  thus  pronounces  his  impartial  judgment. 

Speaking  of  the  policy  of  France,  Mr.  Lecky  says  :   "If 

*  The  Instruction  pour  le  Sieur  Gerard  de  Rayneval,  signed  "Louis,  par  le 
roi,  Xavierde  Vergennes,"  dated  November  15,  1782,  said  :  ';  II  tachera  d'engager 
le  ministere  britannique  a  renvoyer  au  traite  definitif  ou  a  des  commissaires  les 
discussions  des  limites  qui  arretent  la  negociation  entre  les  commissaires  anglais  et 
americains"  (De  Circourt,  iii.,  41,  42). 

f  Vergennes  to  Rayneval,  Versailles,  December  4,  1782:  "  Vous  y  remar- 
querez  que  les  Anglais  achetent  la  paix  plutot  qu'ils  ne  la  font.  Leurs  concessions, 
en  effet,  tant  pour  les  limites  que  pour  les  pecheries  et  les  loyalistes,  excedent  tout 
ce  que  j'avais  cru  possible.  Quel  est  le  motif  qui  a  pu  amener  une  facilite  que 
Ton  pourrait  interpreter  par  une  espece  d'abandon?"  M.  de  Vergennes  a  M. 
de  Rayneval,  Versailles,  4  Decembre  1782.  De  Circourt,  iii.,  p.  5°- 


io8  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

Vergennes'  policy  had  been  carried  out  it  seems  clear  that  he 
would  have  established  a  claim  for  concessions  from  England 
by  supporting  her  against  America  on  the  questions  of  Canada 
and  the  Canadian  border  and  the  Newfoundland  fishery,  and 
that  he  would  have  partially  compensated  Spain  for  her  fail 
ure  before  Gibraltar  by  obtaining  for  her  a  complete  ascen 
dancy  on  the  Mississippi.  The  success  of  such  a  policy  would 
have  been  extremely  displeasing  to  the  Congress,  and  Jay 
and  Adams  defeated  it.  Franklin  very  reluctantly  acquiesced 
in  the  secret  signature.  Livingston,  writing  from  America, 
strongly  blamed  it,  and  expressed  his  conviction  that  the  sus 
picions  were  unfounded.  But  the  act  was  done.  And  if  it 
can  be  justified  by  success,  that  justification  at  least  is  not 
wanting.  .  .  .  It  is  impossible,"  continues  Lecky,  "not 
to  be  struck  with  the  skill,  hardihood,  and  good  fortune  that 
marked  the  American  negotiation.  Everything  the  United 
States  could,  with  any  shadow  of  plausibility  demand  from 
England  they  obtained,  and  much  of  what  they  obtained  was 
granted  them  in  opposition  of  the  two  great  powers  by  whose 
assistance  they  had  triumphed.  The  conquests  of  France  were 
much  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  financial  ruin  which 
impelled  her  with  giant  steps  to  revolution.  The  acquisition 
of  Minorca  and  Florida  by  Spain  was  dearly  purchased  by 
the  establishment  of  an  example  which  before  long  deprived 
her  of  her  own  colonies.  Holland  received  an  almost  fatal 
blow  by  the  losses  she  incurred  during  the  war.  England 
emerged  from  the  struggle  with  a  diminished  empire  and  a 
vastly  augmented  debt,  and  her  ablest  statesmen  believed 
and  said  that  the  days  of  her  greatness  were  over.  But 
America,  though  she  had  been  reduced  by  the  war  to  almost 
the  lowest  stage  of  impoverishment  and  impotence,  gained  at 
the  peace  almost  everything  that  she  desired,  and  started  with 
every  promise  of  future  greatness  upon  the  mighty  career  that 
was  before  her."  * 

*  History  of  England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  by  William  Edward  Hart- 
pole  Lecky,  vol.  iv.,  p.  284.  New  York,  D.  Appleton  &  Co.  1883.  A  volume 
whose  admirable  history,  both  of  the  war  and  the  peace  negotiations,  especially 
commend  it  to  American  readers. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.          109 


THE  SCHEME  OF  THE  AMERICAN  GOVERNMENT  FOR  GATH 
ERING  MATERIAL  FOR  THE  NATIONAL  HISTORY. 

The  injustice  so  long  done  to  the  American  Commission 
ers,  the  fictions  asserted  and  believed  through  the  adop 
tion  as  historic  facts  of  assertions  and  theories,  have  taught 
us,  by  a  sharp  lesson  never  to  be  forgotten,  the  necessity  of 
supplementing  our  own  records  of  the  times  of  the  Revo 
lution  with  the  confidential  records  of  European  diplomacy. 
Among  the  memorable  acts  of  President  Hayes'  administra 
tion  was  the  scheme  inaugurated  by  Mr.  Evarts,  as  Secretary 
of  State,  for  securing  from  the  archives  of  every  State  in 
Europe,  whatever  they  might  contain  deserving  a  place  among 
the  materials  for  our  national  history. 

The  work  which  this  State,  under  the  auspicious  influence 
of  this  Society,  has  done  for  New  York  by  the  able  hands  of 
Brodhead  and  O'Callaghan,  in  gathering  our  colonial  records 
from  England,  France,  and  Holland,  President  Hayes  and 
his  Cabinet  proposed  to  do  for  the  nation  in  regard  to  the 
peace  negotiations.  Under  President  Garfield  and  Secre 
tary  Blaine,  it  made  satisfactory  progress  in  the  obtaining  of 
the  ready  and  courteous  consent  of  European  governments. 
Let  us  hope  that  under  President  Arthur  and  Secretary  Fre- 
linghuysen  it  will  be  brought  with  all  the  aid  that  may  be 
required  from  Congress,  to  a  successful  completion.  No 
work  could  be  regarded  with  more  of  interest  and  respect, 
not  simply  by  the  intelligent  people  of  America,  but  by  his 
toric  students  of  other  lands. 

If  there  is  no  special  objection  to  such  a  step,  might  not  oc 
casional  reports  from  the  State  Department  of  the  progress  of 
the  work  at  the  various  Courts  which  have  consented  to  the 
plan,  apart  from  their  interest  for  the  American  people,  have 
a  certain  advantage  in  bringing  to  the  Government  the  ad 
vice  and  assistance  of  historical  students  ?  And  is  it  not 
possible  that  a  large  share  of  the  labor  of  such  a  Quest  in 
Europe  may  be  spared  by  an  inquiry  as  to  the  wealth  in  MSS. 
copied  from  European  archives  in  our  own  libraries  ?  That 


no  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

of  Mr.  Bancroft,  for  instance,  would  furnish  a  mass  of  his 
toric  papers  selected  and  copied  under  his  own  supervision, 
the  regathering  of  which  abroad  might  cost  months,  if  not 
years  of  the  labor  of  experts,  and  possibly,  since  the  discus 
sion  of  the  unfriendly  policy  of  France  and  Spain  disclosed 
by  the  secret  correspondence,  the  copying  of  important  docu 
ments  may  be  occasionally  restricted. 

The  national  importance  of  the  confidential  correspond 
ence  already  published  can  hardly  be  overrated.  If  Jay, 
when  Oswald's  first  commission  was  approved  by  Vergennes, 
had  assented  to  the  view  of  his  venerable  and  cautious  col 
league — that  they  were  bound  by  the  instruction  of  Con 
gress,  an  instruction  which  declared,  "  You  are  to  make  the 
most  candid  and  confidential  communication  upon  all  sub 
jects  to  the  Minister  of  our  generous  ally  the  King  of  France  ; 
to  undertake  nothing  in  the  negotiation  for  peace  or  truce 
without  their  knowledge  and  concurrence  ;  and  ultimately, 
to  govern  yourselves  by  their  advice  and  opinion"* — it  is 
now  clear,  from  the  development  of  the  French  policy,  and 
the  obligations  of  the  King  to  Spain  to  do  what  he  could 
to  enforce  that  policy,  that  the  consequences  to  the  United 
States  would  have  been  most  humiliating  and  disastrous. 

After  the  lapse  of  a  century  we  can  review  with  the  im 
partial  eye  of  history  the  whole  transaction,  where  the  Amer 
ican  Commissioners^  occupying  their  modest  apartments 
amid  the  splendors  of  the  French  capital,  encountered  the  most 
accomplished  of  the  trained  diplomatists  of  Europe  ;  discov 
ered  by  their  intelligence  and  defeated  by  their  courage  and 
wisdom,  the  plans  which  had  been  so  long  and  so  carefully 
elaborated  for  the  reduction  of  America  to  narrow  limits  and 
a  subordinate  position,  hemmed  in  and  controlled  by  a  com 
bination  of  the  powers  of  Europe.  We  can  compare  even 
without  the  aid  of  a  map  the  magnificent  territory  secured  to 
us  by  the  peace,  and  that  allotted  to  us  by  the  "  conciliation 

*  Dip.  Cor.,  x.,  p.  76. 

f  Mr.  Laurens  joined  them  only  on  the  last  day  before  the  signing  of  the 
Provisional  Articles. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1/83.          m 

line,"  proffered  by  Vergennes  through  Rayneval,  and  enforced 
by  Vergennes  in  his  secret  correspondence,  a  line  which  would 
have  cut  off  our  great  Northwest  Territory,  with  part  of  Ken 
tucky  and  Tennessee,  and  nearly  the  whole  of  Alabama  and 
Mississippi,  excluding  us  alike  from  the  Lakes,  the  Gulf,  and 
the  Mississippi.  The  narrow  limits  assigned  for  us  were  to  be 
"  detailed  and  circumscribed,"  so  reads  the  French  memoir, 
"  with  the  greatest  exactness,  and  all  the  belligerent  powers 
must  bind  themselves  to  prevent  any  transgression  of  them." 
England,  Spain,  France,  and  Holland  were  to  unite  "  to  stop 
us  by  force  at  the  first  infraction  of  these  limits,  and  the  first 
attempt  toward  extending  beyond  them." 

The  historic  facts  now  disclosed  show  the  completeness 
of  the  success  of  the  American  Commissioners  in  suddenly 
reversing  the  position  of  subserviency,  in  which  they  were 
placed  by  their  instructions — in  declining  to  treat  as  colonies 
or  plantations,  assuming  a  position  of  sovereign  dignity  and  in 
dependence,  and  compelling  its  recognition — quietly  separat 
ing  their  counsels  from  the  unfriendly  and  disingenuous  policy 
of  France,  appealing  directly  and  successfully  to  the  better 
judgment  and  truest  interest  of  England,  and  thus  overthrow 
ing  the  hostile  schemes  so  carefully  elaborated  at  Madrid,  at 
Paris,  at  Philadelphia,  to  make  the  United  States  a  feeble 
power,  easily  controlled  by  the  European  States,  and  sud 
denly  startling  the  world  by  the  Provisional  Articles  which 
were  to  secure  its  dignity  and  its  greatness  at  once  and  for 
ever. 

It  was  natural  that  Vergennes,  that  famous  master  of 
European  diplomacy,  who  had  pronounced  the  American 
views  an  insane  delusion,  on  seeing  those  views  recognized 
by  England  and  reduced  to  practice,  should  declare  to  his 
confidential  secretary  his  amazement,  with  the  frank  declara 
tion  that  the  terms  exceeded  anything  he  could  have  believed 
possible. 

The  later  tribute  of  Mr.  Lecky,  so  striking  in  its  expres 
sions,  has  been  paid  after  the  learned  author  had  read  the 
grave  disclosures  of  the  French  correspondence.  But  some 
of  the  ablest  diplomatic  writers  of  America,  before  those 


112  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

proofs  had  been  disclosed  of  the  correct  judgment  of  the  com 
missioners,  and  when  still  influenced,  perhaps  insensibly,  by 
the  common  belief  that  Jay  and  Adams  had  been  unduly 
suspicious  and  had  perhaps  exaggerated  a  little  the  unfriend 
liness  of  the  French  policy,  have  nevertheless  been  profoundly 
struck  with  the  "  uncommon  address"  and  extraordinary  skill 
with  which  the  negotiation  was  managed  from  the  first  day  to 
the  last,  evolving  from  individual  differences  the  highest  wis 
dom  and  united  action,  and  accomplishing  results  which  Ver- 
gennes  had  deemed  impossible,  with  the  quiet  tact,  the  calm 
courage,  and  the  lofty  faith,  which  fitly  mark  the  concluding 
act  of  the  War  of  the  Revolution. 


Touching  the  work  thus  accomplished,  unitedly  and  with 
perfect  harmony,  it  has  been  attempted  to  fix  upon  the  Com 
missioner,  on  whom  rested  the  chief  responsibility,  charges 
of  groundless  suspicion,  of  blundering  disobedience  to  instruc 
tions,  of  national  discourtesy,  and  even  bad  faith.  Such  have 
been  the  allegations  or  insinuations  against  Jay  from  the  publi 
cation  of  Dr.  Sparks'  note  *  in  the  official  volumes  of  the  "  Dip- 

*  While  the  refutation  of  Dr.  Sparks'  statement  touching  the  character  of  the 
correspondence  of  Vergennes  and  his  agents  is  complete,  and  the  correspondence 
shows  that  the  mind  of  Jay  in  its  reading  of  their  policy  was  not  weak  and  sus 
picious,  but  rather,  as  Prescott  says,  "eminently  calm  and  judicious,"  *  there 
would  seem  to  be  room  for  the  personal  friends  and  representatives  of  Dr.  Sparks 
to  explain,  should  his  papers  throw  light  upon  the  subject,  how  he  came  to  be 
deceived,  and  by  whom  he  was  persuaded  that  the  papers  shown  him  as  the 
complete  correspondence  of  Vergennes  with  his  agents,  contained  none  of  the 
numerous  letters  now  published,  which  exhibit  their  hostility  to  the  American 
claims  and  the  methods  resorted  to  to  defeat  them. 

It  is  true  that  Mr.  Sparks,  in  editing  his  "  Life  and  Writings  of  Washington," 
seemed  to  exhibit  an  uncommon  and  rather  extravagant  idea  of  the  rightful 
powers  of  an  editor,  when  he  assumed  to  make  in  the  text  of  "  Washington's 
Writings,"  without  notice  to  the  reader,  alterations  which  he  claimed  to  be 
"verbal  or  grammatical,"  but  which  by  others  were  regarded  as  "an  unwar 
rantable  liberty  with  the  text,  altering,  omitting,  and  adding,  as  might  suit  his 
caprice,  and  that  for  the  purpose  of  conforming  the  work  to  his  own  standard 
of  taste."  These  were  liberties  which  induced  Lord  Mahon  to  remark,  although 
Dr.  Sparks  denied  the  justice  of  the  criticism,  that  he  had  ' '  tampered  with  the 

*  1>rescott's  Diplomacy  of  the  Constitution  :  An  Historical  Study,  pp.  122,  123. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.          113 

lomatic  Correspondence  "  to  the  present  year,  and  in  obedience 
to  the  request  of  this  venerable  Society,  when  they  said, 
"  We  trust  you  will  not  be  reluctant  to  render  this  service  to 
history  in  setting  forth  the  fair  record  of  so  great  a  son  of 
New  York  in  connection  with  so  great  an  event,"  I  have 
presented  this  narrative  of  historic  facts,  including  some  of 
profound  importance,  from  the  confidential  records  from 
London  and  Paris. 

After  the  publication  of  these  records,  of  which  occasion 
ally  we  have  only  extracts,  and  also  of  those  which  the  other 
governments  of  Europe  consented  to  furnish  from  their  ar 
chives  at  the  request  of  Garfield — and  their  publication  with 
translations  should  not  be  delayed  lest  the  favorable  oppor 
tunity  be  lost — the  history  of  the  peace  negotiations  will  be 
expanded,  in  volume  and  in  interest  ;  but  we  may  rest  as 
sured  that  nothing  will  appear  to  throw  doubt  upon  the  cor 
respondence  of  Vergennes,  for  whose  authenticity  we  have 
the  voucher  of  Mr.  Bancroft,  and  which  discloses  the  charac 
ter  and  reasons  of  the  policy  of  France. 

There  may,  perhaps,  be  properly  recalled  here  the  testi 
mony  of  Franklin  to  the  advantage  brought  to  the  negotia 
tion  by  Adams  and  Jay,  and  the  generous  tribute  borne  by 
Adams  in  his  diary  to  the  youngest  of  the  negotiators — for 
the  age  of  Jay  at  this  time  was  thirty-seven,  that  of  Adams 
forty-seven,  and  that  of  Franklin  seventy-six. 

"  I  have  not,"  said  Adams,  "  attempted  in  these  notes  to 
do  justice  to  the  arguments  of  my  colleagues,  all  of  whom 
were  throughout  the  whole  business  very  attentive  and  very 

truth  of  history."  *    But  in  this  case  the  question  has  become  one  not  of  opinion, 
but  of  simple  fact.f 

*  Dr.  Sparks'  reply  to  Lord  Mahon,  pages's,  6. 

t  The  statement  of  Dr.  Sparks,  in  his  Life  of  Franklin  (vol.  i.,  p.  456),"  was  as  follows.: 
"  The  violation  of  the  instructions  by  the  American  Commissioners  in  concluding  and  signing  their 
treaty  without  the  concurrence  of  the  French  Government  was  the  morejjunjustifiable  |on  account 
of  the  fidelity  with  which  the  French  Minister  adhered  to  the  spirit  of  those  instructions  with 
reference  to  the  United  States,  in  negotiating  their  treaty  with  England." 

In  a  note  to  page  452  Mr.  Sparks  said  :  "  Indeed,  there  is  no  fact  in  history  which  is  now 
more  susceptible  of  complete  demonstration  than  that  the  suspicions  of  the  American  Commis 
sioners  on  this  occasion  were  utterly  without  foundation  ;  that  the  French  Ministry,  so  far  from 
interfering  or  meddling  with  the  negotiation,  kept  wholly  aloof  from  it.  ...  The  direct  proofs 
of  these  facts  are  abundant ;  whereas  the  suspicions  of  the  Commissioners  are  sustained  by  no 
other  evidence  than  that  of  circumstances,  inferences,  conjectures,  and  deceptive  appearances." 

8 


H4  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

able,  especially  Mr.  Jay,  to  whom  the  French,  if  they  knew 
as  much  of  his  negotiations  as  they  do  of  mine,  would  very 
justly  give  the  title  with  which  they  have  inconsiderately 
decorated  me,  that  of  '  Le  Washington  de  la  Negociation,' 
a  very  flattering  compliment  indeed,  to  which  I  have  not  a 
right,  but  sincerely  think  it  belongs  to  Mr.  Jay." 

Not  less  pronounced  was  the  testimony  of  Lord  St.  Hel 
ens,  the  Mr.  Fitzherbert  of  the  negotiations,  who  was  made  by 
his  Government  the  adviser  of  Mr.  Oswald,*  and  who  knew 
from  first  to  last  its  secret  history,  both  at  Paris  and  in  Lon 
don.  This  gentleman  wrote  to  Sir  George  Rose,  in  1838,  in  re 
turning  the  two  volumes  of  "Jay's  Life  and  Writings :  "  "These 
memoirs  are  indeed  highly  deserving  of  further  attention  on 
both  sides  of  the  Atlantic,  and  as  you  justly  foresaw,  particu 
larly  interesting  to  myself  from  my  intimate  acquaintance 
and  political  intercourse  with  Mr.  Jay  when  we  were  respect 
ively  employed  at  Paris  in  1782;  and  I  can  safely  add  my 
testimony  to  the  numerous  proofs  afforded  by  these  memoirs 
that  it  was  not  only  chiefly,  but  solely  through  his  means 
that  the  negotiations  of  that  period  between  England  and 
America  were  brought  to  a  successful  conclusion."  f  A  mar- 

*  Fitzherbert  to  Shelburne,  August  17,  1782,  speaking  of  Oswald :  "Our  de 
partments,  though  nominally  distinct  and  separate,  are  in  fact  most  connected 
and  interwoven  with  each  other.  .  .  .  The  extensive  and  almost  universal 
knowledge  he  is  possessed  of,"  etc. 

f  Mr.  Henry  Flanders,  by  whom  this  passage  is  given  (Flanders'  Chief  Jus 
tices,  i.,  p.  351)  from  MS.  furnished  him  by  my  father,  remarks  in  a  note :  "  Lord 
St.  Helens  doubtless  attributed  the  favorable  conclusion  of  the  treaty  to  Jay's 
inflexible  determination  to  proceed  separately  in  the  negotiation,  and  not  con 
jointly  with  the  French." 

Mr.  Madison,  who  had  voted  for  the  Congressional  instructions  to  the  Com 
missioners  and  who  warmly  disapproved  of  their  violation,  in  writing  to  Secretary 
Edmund  Randolph,  thus  sententiously,  in  the  words  of  his  biographer,  "summed 
up  the  parts  of  the  different  actors  "  (March  18,  1783  :  Madison's  Debates,  i.,  518  ; 
Rives'  Madison,  i.,  362) :  "  In  this  business  Jay  has  taken  the  lead  and  proceeded 
to  a  length  of  which  you  can  form  little  idea.  Adams  has  followed  with  cordial 
ity.  Franklin  has  been  dragged  into  it.  Laurens  in  a  separate  letter  professes  a 
violent  suspicion  of  Great  Britain  and  good-will  and  confidence  toward  France." 

Mr.  Parton,  in  his  Life  of  Franklin  (ii.,  p.  488),  says:  "In  truth,  Mr.  Jay's 
determination  was  such  that  there  was  no  choice  left  to  Franklin  but  to  with- 
.draw  from  the  Commission  or  let  him  have  his  way.  '  Would  you  break  your 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.  115 

ginal  note  of  Lord  St.  Helens  on  the  French  question  and 
the  Marbois  letter  said:  "The  sequel  of  this  narrative,  which 
is  perfectly  true  throughout,  will  show  that  this  important 
disclosure  of  the  machinations  of  France  led  to  the  immediate 
conclusion  of  the  Provisional  Treaty,"  etc.  Another  marginal 
note  *  on  the  propositions  of  France,  by  Rayneval,  for  enlarg 
ing  the  limits  of  the  French  fisheries,  remarks  that  "in  the 
course  of  their  discussion  M.  de  Vergennes  never  failed  to 
insist  on  the  expediency  of  a  concert  of  measures  between 
France  and  England  for  the  purpose  of  excluding  the  Ameri 
can  States  from  these  fisheries  lest  they  should  become  a  nur 
sery  for  seamen,  "t  What  Vergennes  and  Rayneval  thought 
of  the  Provisional  Articles,  which  so  completely  overthrew  the 
plans  they  had  pursued  with  such  secrecy,  dexterity,  and 
confidence,  we  already  know  from  their  remarkable  letters; 
and  there  is  a  remark  about  Jay  in  a  letter  to  Luzerne  \ 
which,  following  as  it  does  the  secret  correspondence  dis 
closing  the  combination  and  the  schemes  of  the  two  great 
powers  which  Jay,  while  acting  singly  and  alone,  had  de 
tected  and  defeated,  is  a  tribute  not  to  be  overlooked.  Allud 
ing  to  a  report  that  Doctor  Franklin  had  asked  to  be  recalled, 
M.  de  Vergennes  wishes  Congress  may  reject  the  demand,  at 
least  for  the  present,  "  for  it  would  be  impossible  to  give  Mr. 
Franklin  a  successor  so  wise  and  so  conciliating  as  himself. 
Besides,  I  should  be  afraid  lest  they -should  leave  us  Mr.  Jay  ; 
and  this  is  the  man  with  whom  I  should  like  least  to  treat  of 
affairs." 

Mr.  Trescott,   in  his  thoughtful  and  philosophical  paper 
on  the  subject,  remarked  that  in  the  proud  circle  of  famous 

instructions?'  Franklin  asked  him  one  day.  'Yes,'  replied  Jay,  taking  his  pipe 
from  his  mouth,  *  as  I  break  this  pipe ; '  and  so  saying  threw  the  fragments  into 
the  fire."  Mr.  Parton  quotes  as  authority  for  this  anecdote,  Diplomacy  of  the 
United  States,  i.,  121. 

*  To  Jay's  Life,  i.,  149. 

|  The  New  York  Review  for  October,  1841,  p.  307,  says  that  "  to  Jay  in  chief 
belonged  the  merit  of  saving  the  fisheries  is  clear,"  and  quotes  John  Adams  as 
writing  to  Jay  from  the  Hague,  April  2,  1786:  "  You  have  erected  a  monument 
to  your  memory  in  every  New  England  heart ;  "  and  Hamilton  to  Jay,  July  25, 
1783:  "  The  New  England  people  talk  of  making  you  an  annual  fish  offering." 

\  Vergennes  to  Luzerne,  July  21,  1783. 


Il6  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

warriors  and  great  civilians  which  illustrates  the  history  of  the 
United  States,  none  should  stand  in  brighter  light  than  the  di 
plomatists  of  the  Revolution,  and  in  a  single  paragraph  he  allud 
ed  in  turn  to  each  of  the  negotiators  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace. 

"  The  very  variety  of  their  characters  adapted  itself  to 
their  necessities,  and  if  the  deferential  wisdom  of  Franklin 
smoothed  the  difficulties  of  the  French  treaty,  the  energetic 
activity  of  Adams  conquered  the  obstacles  to  the  alliance  with 
Holland,  and  the  conduct  of  the  negotiation  with  England 
was  guided  by  the  inflexible  firmness  of  Jay." 

The  comparison  drawn  by  Lecky  of  the  results  of  the 
general  pacification  to  France,  Spain,  and  the  United  States 
enforces  the  remark  of  Segtir,  applicable  alike  to  politics  and 
diplomacy,  that  "  the  true  dexterity  is  a  courageous  good 
faith,  and  character  saves  men  from  the  dangers  on  which 
subtlety  makes  shipwreck.".  Never  was  diplomacy  more 
subtle  than  that  of  France  and  Spain  toward  America  and 
her  too  trustful  Congress  ;  never  was  true  dexterity  and 
courageous  good  faith  more  marked  than  in  the  breaking  of 
the  Congressional  instructions,  and  the  refusal  to  negotiate  ex 
cepting  on  an  equal  footing  as  a  free  and  independent  power. 
Nor  is  it  without  significance  that  the  signing  of  the  articles 
which  gave  us  all  of  which  Spain  sought  to  deprive  us,  lost 
to  Spain  her  coveted  Gibraltar. 

Looking  at  the  restricted  role  which  France  and  Spain 
proposed  that  we  should  play,  and  then  at  the  boundaries 
which  the  confidence  reposed  in  us  by  Shelburne  and  his 
cabinet  assisted  us  to  secure,  perhaps  no  finer  illustration  can 
be  found  in  history  of  the  truth  of  the  saying  of  the  late  Lord 
Clarendon,  that  "  the  one  special  art  required  in  diplomacy 
is  to  be  perfectly  honest,  truthful,  and  straightforward." 

THE  PART  BORNE  BY  SHELBURNE. 

As  the  concluding  act  in  the  long  connection  between 
England  and  the  thirteen  colonies,  and  one  looking  not 
simply  to  an  end  of  strife,  but  to  mutual  interests  and  a  well- 
founded  and  permanent  friendship,  it  was  a  treaty  worthy  of 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.          117 

both  countries,  and  entitles  the  name  of  SHELBURNE  to  the 
lasting  regard  of  the  two  peoples. 

Shelburne,  happily,  escaped  the  treatment  awarded  to 
Jay  and  Adams  by  some  of  the  writers  who  perhaps  uncon 
sciously  have  misrepresented  facts,  caricaturing  the  peace 
negotiations  :  with  a  jumble  of  the  characters,  a  reversal  of 
the  parts,  and  so  complete  an  ignoring  of  all  duty  to  the 
honor  and  interests  of  America,  that  Jay  has  been  reproached 
with  having  disregarded  the  advice  and  wishes  of  France,  and 
having  declined  to  concede  the  demands  of  Spain,  while 
Adams  has  been  accused  "  of  aiding  and  abetting  "  Jay  in 
disappointing  the  plans  of  these  powers.  Still  but  moderate 
justice  was  awarded  to  Shelburne  in  the  Parliamentary  de 
bates  on  the  Provisional  Articles,  by  the  captious  orators  of 
the  coalition,  including  men  as  notable  as  Burke  and  Sheri 
dan.  Burke,  in  a  tone  little  in  accord  with  that  which  marked 
his  immortal  speech  on  "  Conciliation  with  America,"  de 
clared  that  the  Articles  were  so  degrading  as  to  merit  obliter 
ation,  if  it  were  possible  to  effect  it,  out  of  the  history  of 
England  ;  while  Sheridan  declared  that  the  treaty  relinquished 
everything  that  was  glorious  and  great  in  the  country. 

The  chief  charge  against  Shelburne,  that  of  abandoning 
the  American  loyalists,  was  unjust;  as  he  pressed  their  claim 
to  the  utmost,  threatening  to  continue  the  war  if  it  was  not 
yielded,  until  he  found  that  neither  the  Commissioners  nor  Con 
gress  had  the  power  to  guarantee  it.  The  further  charge  of 
sacrificing  the  interests  of  England  by  conceding  too  exten 
sive  boundaries  is  unsustained  by  the  verdict  of  impartial  his 
tory.  The  world  recognizes  at  last  the  far-sighted  and  en 
lightened  statesmanship  that  attempted  at  the  peace  to  atone 
in  part  for  the  mistaken  policy  of  the  war ;  that  declined  to  listen 
to  the  narrow  policy  of  France  and  Spain  for  keeping  our 
Republic  in  a  condition  of  dependency  on  Europe,  and,  stimu 
lated  perhaps  by  the  clear  motive  of  that  policy,  granted  the 
boundaries  and  the  fisheries  with  a  generosity  which  puz 
zled  Vergennes  and  seemed  like  a  dream  to  Rayneval,  but 
which  was  wisely  exercised  to  increase  the  stability  and  pros 
perity  of  the  Republic,  to  make  it  thoroughly  independent 


n8  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

of  the  powers  of  Europe,  and  to  promote  a  lasting  recon 
ciliation  and  friendship  between  America  and  England. 

It  has  been  said  by  the  late  historian,  Mr.  Green  :  "  Eng 
land  is  only  a  small  part  of  the  outcome  of  English  history. 
Its  greater  issues  lie  not  within  the  narrow  limits  of  the 
mother  island,  but  in  the  destinies  of  nations  yet  to  be.  The 
struggles  of  her  patriots,  the  wisdom  of  her  statesmen,  the 
steady  love  of  liberty  and  law  in  her  people  at  large,  were 
shaping  in  the  past  of  our  little  island  the  future  of  mankind. 
At  the  time,  however,  this  work  first  became  visible  in  the 
severance  of  America,  the  wisdom  of  English  statesmen 
seemed  at  the  lowest  ebb." 

Few  of  them,  while  mourning  the  independence  of  the 
thirteen  colonies  with  their  familiar  names  and  historic  mem 
ories  as  an  irreparable  loss,  and  declaring,  as  did  some  of  their 
greatest  men,  that  the  glory  of  England  was  extinguished 
forever — few  of  them  remembered  that  England  had  been 
conquered  by  the  love  of  liberty  and  constitutional  right  which 
her  American  children  had  inherited  from  herself,  and  that 
with  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  the  American 
Republic  began  the  proud  career  of  England  as  the  Mother 
of  States. 

The  policy  of  Shelburne  in  rejecting  the  overtures  of 
France  and  Spain  and  looking  to  the  friendship  of  America 
was  a  policy  worthy  of  the  minister  on  whom  it  devolved  to 
end  the  war  of  the  Revolution  :  a  policy  which  recalls  the  ad 
vice  given  long  before  by  Tucker  the  Dean  of  Gloucester, 
and  Adam  Smith,  to  let  the  colonies  depart  to  form  their 
own  destinies,  England  retaining  only  the  right,  like  other 
nations,  of  connecting  herself  with  them  by  treaties  of  com 
merce  or  of  alliance.* 

Americans  may  well  remember  with  honor  Shelburne, 
Oswald,  and  Fitzherbert:  Townsend,  Pitt,  and  Grantham  :  and 
Englishmen,  as  they  read  the  history  of  the  Peace,  may  thank 
God  that  the  British  Cabinet  rejected  the  advice  of  France 
and  Spain,  and  gave  a  fair  hearing  and  a  just  confidence  to 
the  American  Commissioners. 

*  Tucker's  Political  Tracts,  quoted  by  Lecky,  i.,  423. 


The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783.          119 

I  need  scarcely  remind  you  that  the  Marquis  of  Lansdowne, 
our  new  neighbor  in  Canada,  the  successor  of  Lord  Lome  as 
Governor-General,  is  the  grandson  of  the  Shelburne  who  re 
posed  so  just  a  confidence  in  the  American  Commissioners  ; 
and  when  his  Excellency  shall  favor  us  with  a  visit,  he  will 
find  that  Americans  have  not  forgotten  the  honorable  part 
borne  by  his  illustrious  ancestor  in  the  peace  negotiations. 

Looking  to  the  colonial  union  of  England  and  America  in 
the  past,  and  to  their  international  relations  in  the  future, 
it  may  be  a  matter  of  common  pride  that  no  disappointment 
or  humiliation  marred  the  dignity  with  which  the  United 
States  took  their  place  in  the  old  and  venerable  circle  of 
nations.  The  Republic  entered,  in  the  words  of  Trescott, 
"  Calmly  as  conscious  of  right,  resolutely  as  conscious  of 
strength,  gravely  as  conscious  of  duty." 

It  may  not  be  amiss  to  allude  in  closing  to  the  fact  that 
Jay  bore  explicit  testimony*  to  Franklin's  fidelity  to  the 
American  claims  to  the  fisheries  and  the  boundaries  ;  that 
their  friendship  was  not  disturbed  by  their  difference  of  view 
touching  the  designs  of  France  or  their  own  duties  as  Com 
missioners,  and  that  Jay  was  appointed  by  Franklin  one  of  the 
executors  of  his  will. 

The  friendship  also  of  Jay  and  Adams  continued  to  the 
close  of  their  lives ;  and  their  occasional  correspondence, 
sometimes  evoked  by  historical  misstatements  touching  the 
events  in  which  they  had  been  engaged,  was  marked  by  the 
warmest  feeling  of  regard.  "  The  sight  of  your  handwriting 
and  your  name,"  wrote  Adams  to  Jay,  from  Quincy,  March 
6,  1821,  "  is  to  me  a  cordial  for  low  spirits." 

To  us  who,  looking  back  over  the  century,  have  traced  the 

*  Jay  to  Franklin,  Passy,  September  n,  1783:  Jay's  Life  and  Writings, 
ii.,  126.  Mr.  Benjamin  Vaughan,  in  a  letter  to  the  late  Peter  Augustus  Jay,  dated 
January  7,  1830,  said  :  "  When  at  your  father's,  about  twelve  years  ago,  I  asked 
him  in  the  presence  of  President  Kirkland,  my  cousin  Mr.  Robert  Hallowell  Gardi 
ner,  of  Maine,  and  my  son  Petty,  whether  Doctor  Franklin  had  ever  given  him  reason 
to  doubt  of  his  sincerity  in  the  negotiation,  and  he  answered  with  almost  a  con 
vulsive  promptness,  «  Oh,  no  ! '  This,  I  think,  proves  that  they  finally  thought 
pretty  much  alike." — MS.  belonging  to  Miss  E.  C.  Jay. 


I2O  The  Peace  Negotiations  of  1782  and  1783. 

outline  of  the  peace  negotiations  and  marked  the  dangers 
that  were  discovered  and  avoided,  those  negotiations,  as  read 
by  the  light  of  the  records  of  all  the  players  in  that  game  of 
nations,  will  more  than  ever  occupy  a  chief  place  among  the 
picturesque  and  heroic  incidents  of  the  Revolution  which  for 
seven  years  have  been  rehearsed  before  us. 

As  illuminated  by  the  skilful  pens  of  Vergennes  and 
Montmorin,  Gerard,  Luzerne,  and'Rayneval,  the  story  grows 
in  interest  as  it  exhibits  on  the  one  hand,  in  this  chapter 
of  diplomacy,  the  subtle  finesse  of  European  Courts,  and  on 
the  other  that  early  American  spirit,  with  its  cool  courage, 
its  self-reliance,  its  fearless  reflection,  its  sturdy  faith,  and 
practical  energy  which  in  our  centennial  year  was  so  ad 
mirably  developed  before  this  Society. 

While  the  generations  of  that  day  have  passed  with  children 
and  grandchildren  into  the  spirit-land,  that  early  American 
spirit,  thank  God,  still  lives.  It  lives  to  remind  us  that  the 
imperial  Republic  which  they  founded  is  in  our  keeping  to 
day,  and  that  we  may  gather  from  their  example  courage, 
firmness,  and  faith  for  the  solution  of  every  problem  at  home 
or  abroad  that  shall  threaten  the  honor  or  the  welfare  of  our 
country. 

NOTE. 

THE  length  of  the  Address  compelled  some  omissions  in  its  delivery.  The 
map  opposite,  "  showing  the  boundaries  of  the  United  States,  Canada,  and  the 
Spanish  Possessions  according  to  the  proposals  of  the  Court  of  France,"  is  copied 
from  one  given  by  Lord  Edmond  Fitzmaurice  in  his  "  Life  of  William,  Earl  of 
Shelburne,  afterward  first  Marquis  of  Lansdowne,  with  Extracts  from  his  Papers 
and  Correspondence  "  (Vol.  III.,  pp.  170.  London:  Macmillan  &  Co.  1876). 
The  boundary  line  fixed  by  the  Provisional  Articles  and  the  Definitive  Treaty 
has  been  added  in  the  copy.  It  shows  the  additional  territory  obtained  beyond 
that  awarded  us  by  the  French  proposals,  which  shut  us  out  from  the  Mississippi 
and  the  ..Gulf:  including  nearly  the  whole  of  the  States  of  Alabama  and  Missis 
sippi,  the  greater  parts  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  and  the  whole  of  what  was 
known  as  the  "  Northwestern  Territory,"  north  of  the  Ohio,  embracing  the 
States  of  Ohio,  Michigan,  ^Indiana,  Illinois,  Wisconsin,  and  part  of  Minnesota, 
together  with  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi.  Spain,  disappointed  in  her  plans, 
re-ceded  to  France,  in  1800,  the  vast  territory  of  Louisiana,  which  in  1803  we 
purchased  from  Napoleon  for  fifteen  millions  of  dollars. 


8O  7O  6O 


NORTH  AMERICA 

showing  the  Boundaries  of 
THE    UNITED    STATES,   CANADA, AND      __J|30 

THE   SPANISH  POSSESSIONS 
-  according io  the  proposals  of  the  Court  of  France 


n  territory 
mder  Spanish  o>- American  proiec- 
'on,  according  as  U  lies  West  or 
of  the  tinted  inirnedinq  lint 


t^^t^! 

r     OP  TFTF5         N£^ 

'UNIVERSITY' 


APPENDIX  A. 


DEFINITIVE  TREATY  OF  PEACE 
Between  the  United  States  of  America  and  his  Britannic  Majesty. 

IN  the  name  of  the  Most  Holy  and  Undivided  Trinity. 

It  having  pleased  the  Divine  Providence  to  dispose  the  hearts  of 
the  most  serene  and  most  potent  Prince  GEORGE  the  Third,  by  the 
Grace  of  God  King  of  Great-Britain,  France  and  Ireland,  Defender 
of  the  Faith,  Duke  of  Brunswick  and  Lunebourg,  Arch-Treasurer 
and  Prince  Elector  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  &c.,  and  of  the 
UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA,  to  forget  all  past  misunderstandings 
and  differences  that  have  unhappily  interrupted  the  good  correspond 
ence  and  friendship  which  they  mutually  wish  to  restore  ;  and  to  es 
tablish  such  a  beneficial  and  satisfactory  intercourse  between  the 
two  countries,  upon  the  ground  of  reciprocal  advantages  and  mutual 
convenience,  as  may  promote  and  secure  to  both  perpetual  peace 
and  harmony  :  And  having  for  this  desirable  end,  already  laid  the 
foundation  of  peace  and  reconciliation,  by  the  provisional  articles, 
signed  at  Paris,  on  the  thirtieth  of  November,  one  thousand  seven 
hundred  and  eighty-two,  by  the  commissioners  empowered  on  each 
part,  which  articles  were  agreed  to  be  inserted  in,  and  to  constitute 
the  treaty  of  peace  proposed  to  be  concluded  between  the  crown  of 
Great-Britain  and  the  said  United  States,  but  which  treaty  was  not 
to  be  concluded  until  terms  of  peace  should  be  agreed  upon  between 
Great-Britain  and  France,  and  his  Britannic  Majesty  should  be  ready 
to  conclude  such  treaty  accordingly ;  and  the  treaty  between  Great- 
Britain  and  France,  having  since  been  concluded,  his  Britannic  Maj 
esty  and  the  United  States  of  America,  in  order  to  carry  into  full  ef 
fect  the  provisional  articles  abovementioned,  according  to  the  tenor 
thereof,  have  constituted  and  appointed,  that  is  to  say,  His  Britan 
nic  Majesty  on  his  part,  David  Hartley,  Esquire,  Member  of  the 
Parliament  of  Great-Britain  ;  and  the  said  United  States  on  their 


122  Appendix. 

part,  John  Adams,  Esquire,  late  a  Commissioner  of  the  United  States 
of  America  at  the  Court  of  Versailles,  late  Delegate  in  Congress  from 
the  state  of  Massachusetts,  and  Chief  Justice  of  the  said  state,  and 
Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  the  said  United  States  to  their  High 
Mightinesses  the  States  General  of  the  United  Netherlands ;  Ben 
jamin  Franklin,  Esquire,  late  Delegate  in  Congress  from  the 
state  of  Pennsylvania,  President  of  the  Convention  of  the  said  state, 
and  Minister  Plenipotentiary  from  the  United  States  of  America  at 
the  Court  of  Versailles  ;  John  Jay,  Esquire,  late  President  of  Con 
gress,  and  Chief  Justice  of  the  state  of  New  York,  and  Minister 
Plenipotentiary  from  the  said  United  States  at  the  Court  of  Madrid, 
to  be  the  Plenipotentiaries  for  the  concluding  and  signing  the  pres 
ent  definitive  treaty  ;  who  after  having  reciprocally  communicated 
their  respective  full  powers,  have  agreed  upon  and  confirmed  the  fol 
lowing  articles. 

ARTICLE   I. 

His  Britannic  Majesty  acknowledges  the  said  United  States,  viz. 
New-Hampshire,  Massachusetts-Bay,  Rhode-Island  and  Providence 
Plantations,  Connecticut,  New-York,  New-Jersey,  Pennsylvania, 
Delaware,  Maryland,  Virginia,  North-Carolina^  South-Carolina,  and 
Georgia,  to  be  free,  sovereign  and  independent  States  ;  that  he  treats 
with  them  as  such  ;  and  for  himself,  his  heirs  and  successors,  relin 
quishes  all  claims  to  the  government,  propriety  and  territorial  rights 
of  the  same,  and  every  part  thereof. 

ARTICLE  II. 

And  that  all  disputes  which  might  arise  in  future,  on  the  subject 
of  the  boundaries  of  the  said  United  States,  may  be  prevented,  it  is 
hereby  agreed  and  declared,  that  the  following  are,  and  shall  be  their 
boundaries,  viz.  From  the  north-west  angle  of  Nova-Scotia,  viz.  that 
angle  which  is  formed  by  a  line,  drawn,  due  north  from  the  source  of 
St.  Croix  river  to  the  Highlands ;  along  the  said  Highlands  which 
divide  those  rivers,  that  empty  themselves  into  the  river  St.  Lawrence, 
from  those  which  fall  into  the  Atlantic  ocean,  to  the  northwestern- 
most  head  of  Connecticut  river,  thence  down  along  the  middle  of 
that  river  to  the  forty-fifth  degree  of  north  latitude  ;  from  thence, 
by  a  line  due  west  on  said  latitude,  until  it  strikes  the  river  Iro- 
quois  or  Cataraquy ;  thence  along  the  middle  of  said  river  into 


Appendix.  123 

lake  Ontario,  through  the  middle  of  said  lake  until  it  strikes  the 
communication  by  water  between  that  lake  and  lake  Erie ; 
thence  along  the  middle  of  said  communication  into  lake  Erie, 
through  the  middle  of  said  lake  until  it  arrives  at  the  water-commu 
nication  between  that  lake  and  lake  Huron  ;  thence  along  the  mid 
dle  of  said  water-communication  into  the  lake  Huron ;  thence 
through  the  middle  of  said  lake  to  the  water-communication  between 
that  lake  and  lake  Superior ;  thence  through  lake  Superior  north 
ward  of  the  isles  Royal  and  Phelipeaux,  to  the  Long  Lake  ;  thence 
through  the  middle  of  said  Long  Lake,  and  the  water-communication 
between  it  and  the  Lake  of  the  Woods,  to  the  said  Lake  of  the 
Woods  ;  thence  through  the  said  lake  to  the  most  northwestern  point 
thereof,  and  from  thence  on  a  due  west  course  to  the  river  Missis- 
ippi ;  thence  by  a  line  to  be  drawn  along  the  middle  of  the  said  river 
Missisippi  until  it  shall  intersect  the  northernmost  part  of  the  thirty- 
first  degree  of  north  latitude.  South  by  a  line  to  be  drawn  due  east 
from  the  determination  of  the  line  last  mentioned,  in  the  latitude  of 
thirty-one  degrees  north  of  the  Equator,  to  the  middle  of  the  river 
Apalachicola  or  Catahouche  ;  thence  along  the  middle  thereof  to  its 
junction  with  the  Flint  river ;  thence  straight  to  the  head  of  St.  Mary's 
river  ;  and  thence  down  along  the  middle  of  St.  Mary's  river  to 
the  Atlantic  ocean.  East  by  a  line  to  be  drawn  along  the  mid 
dle  of  the  river  St.  Croix,  from  its  mouth  in  the  Bay  of  Fundy  to 
its  source,  and  from  its  source  directly  north,  to  the  aforesaid  High 
lands  which  divide  the  rivers  that  fall  into  the  Atlantic  ocean,  from 
those  which  fall  into  the  river  St.  Lawrence  ;  comprehending  all  isl 
ands  within  twenty  leagues  of  any  part  of  the  shores  of  the  United 
States,  and  lying  between  lines  to  be  drawn  due  east  from  the  points 
where  the  aforesaid  boundaries  between  Nova-Scotia  on  the  one 
part,  and  East-Florida  on  the  other,  shall  respectively  touch  the  Bay 
of  Fundy  and  the  Atlantic  ocean ;  excepting  such  islands  as  now 
are,  or  heretofore  have  been  within  the  limits  of  the  said  province  of 
Nova-Scotia. 

ARTICLE    III. 

It  is  agreed  that  the  people  of  the  United  States  shall  continue 
to  enjoy  unmolested  the  right  to  take  fish  of  every  kind  on  the  Grand 
Bank,  and  on  all  the  other  banks  of  Newfoundland ;  also  in  the 
gulph  of  St.  Lawrence,  and  at  all  other  places  in  the  sea,  where  the 


124  Appendix. 

inhabitants  of  both  countries  used  at  any  time  heretofore  to  fish ;  and 
also  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  United  States  shall  have  liberty  to 
take  fish  of  every  kind  on  such  part  of  the  coast  of  Newfoundland  as 
British  fishermen  shall  use  (but  not  to  dry  or  cure  the  same  on  that 
island)  ;  and  also  on  the  coasts,  bays  and  creeks  of  all  other  of  his 
Britannic  Majesty's  dominions  in  America;  and  that  the  American 
fishermen  shall  have  liberty  to  dry  and  cure  fish  in  any  of  the  unset 
tled  bays,  harbours  and  creeks  of  Nova-Scotia,  Magdalen  islands, 
and  Labrador,  so  long  as  the  same  shall  remain  unsettled  ;  but  so 
soon  as  the  same  or  either  of  them  shall  be  settled,  it  shall  not  be 
lawful  for  the  said  fishermen  to  dry  or  cure  fish  at  such  settlement, 
without  a  previous  agreement  for  that  purpose  with  the  inhabitants, 
proprietors  or  possessors  of  the  ground. 

ARTICLE  IV. 

It  is  agreed  that  creditors  on  either  side,  shall  meet  with  no  law 
ful  impediment  to  the  recovery  of  the  full  value  in  sterling  money,  of 
all  bona  fide  debts  heretofore  contracted. 

ARTICLE    V. 

It  is  agreed  that  the  Congress  shall  earnestly  recommend  it  to 
the  legislatures  of  the  respective  states,  to  provide  for  the  restitution 
of  all  estates,  rights  and  properties,  which  have  been  confiscated,  be 
longing  to  real  British  subjects,  and  also  of  the  estates,  rights  and 
properties  of  persons  resident  in  districts  in  the  possession  of  his 
Majesty's  arms,  and  who  have  not  borne  arms  against  the  said 
United  States.  And  that  persons  of  any  other  description  shall  have 
free  liberty  to  go  to  any  part  or  parts  of  any  of  the  thirteen  United 
States,  and  therein  to  remain  twelve  months,  unmolested  in  their  en 
deavours  to  obtain  the  restitution  of  such  of  their  estates,  rights  and 
properties,  as  may  have  been  confiscated ;  and  that  Congress  shall 
also  earnestly  recommend  to  the  several  states  a  reconsideration  and 
revision  of  all  acts  or  laws  regarding  the  premises,  so  as  to  render 
the  said  laws  Or  acts  perfectly  consistent,  not  only  with  justice  and 
equity,  but  with  that  spirit  of  conciliation,  which  on  the  return  of 
the  blessings  of  peace  should  universally  prevail.  And  that  Con 
gress  shall  also  earnestly  recommend  to  the  several  states,  that  the 
estates,  rights  and  properties  of  such  last  mentioned  persons,  shall 
be  restored  to  them,  they  refunding  to  any  persons  who  may  be  now 


Appendix.  125 

in  possession,  the  bona  fide  price  (where  any  has  been  given)  which 
such  persons  may  have  paid  on  purchasing  any  of  the  said  lands, 
rights,  or  properties,  since  the  confiscation.  And  it  is  agreed,  that 
all  persons  who  have  any  interest  in  confiscated  lands,  either  by 
debts,  marriage  settlements,  or  otherwise,  shall  meet  with  no  lawful 
impediment  in  the  prosecution  of  their  just  rights. 

ARTICLE  VI. 

That  there  shall  be  no  future  confiscations  made,  nor  any  prose 
cutions  commenced  against  any  person  or  persons  for,  or  by  reason 
of  the  part  which  he  or  they  may  have  taken  in  the  present  war  ;  and 
that  no  person  shall,  on  that  account,  suffer  any  future  loss  or  dam 
age,  either  in  his  person,  liberty  or  property ;  and  that  those  who 
may  be  in  confinement  on  such  charges,  at  the  time  of  the  ratifica 
tion  of  the  treaty  in  America,  shall  be  immediately  set  at  liberty,  and 
the  prosecutions  so  commenced  be  discontinued. 

ARTICLE  VII. 

There  shall  be  a  firm  and  perpetual  peace  between  his  Britannic 
Majesty  and  the  said  States,  and  between  the  subjects  of  the  one  and 
the  citizens  of  the  other,  wherefore  all  hostilities,  both  by  sea  and 
land,  shall  from  henceforth  cease  :  all  prisoners  on  both  sides  shall 
be  set  at  liberty,  and  his  Britannic  Majesty  shall,  with  all  convenient 
speed,  and  without  causing  any  destruction,  or  carrying  away  any  ne 
groes  or  other  property  of  the  American  inhabitants,  withdraw  all  his 
armies,  garrisons  and  fleets  from  the  said  United  States,  and  from 
every  post,  place  and  harbour  within  the  same  ;  leaving  in  all  fortifi 
cations  the  American  artillery  that  may  be  therein  ;  and  shall  also 
order  and  cause  all  archives,  records,  deeds  and  papers,  belonging 
to  any  of  the  said  states,  or  their  citizens,  which  in  the  course  of  the 
war  may  have  fallen  into  the  hands  of  his  officers,  to  be  forthwith  re 
stored  and  delivered  to  the  proper  states  and  persons  to  whom  they 
belong. 

ARTICLE  VIII. 

The  navigation  of  the  river  Missisippi,  from  its  source  to  the  ocean, 
shall  for  ever  remain  free  and  open  to  the  subjects  of  Great-Britain, 
and  the  citizens  of  the  United  States. 


1 26  Appendix. 

ARTICLE  IX. 

In  case  it  should  so  happen  that  any  place  or  territory  belonging 
to  Great-Britain  or  to  the  United  States,  should  have  been  conquered 
by  the  arms  of  either  from  the  other,  before  the  arrival  of  the  said  pro 
visional  articles  in  America,  it  is  agreed,  that  the  same  shall  be  re 
stored  without  difficulty,  and  without  requiring  any  compensation. 

ARTICLE   X. 

The  solemn  ratifications  of  the  present  treaty,  expedited  in  good 
and  due  form,  shall  be  exchanged  between  the  contracting  parties, 
in  the  space  of  six  months,  or  sooner  if  possible,  to  be  computed 
from  the  day  of  the  signature  of  the  present  treaty.  In  witness 
whereof,  we  the  undersigned,  their  Ministers  Plenipotentiary,  have 
in  their  name  and  in  virtue  of  our  full  powers,  signed  with  our  hands 
the  present  definitive  treaty,  and  caused  the  seals  of  our  arms  to  be 
affixed  thereto. 

Done  at  Paris,  this  third  day  of  September,  in  the  year  of  our 
Lord  one  thousand  seven  hundred  and  eighty-three. 

D.  HARTLEY,  (L.S.) 
JOHN  ADAMS,  (L.S.) 
B.  FRANKLIN,  (L.S.) 
JOHN  JAY,  (L.S.) 


APPENDIX   B. 


THE  VIEWS  OF  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  CAB 
INET  ON  THE  POLICY  OF  FRANCE  IN  THE 
PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS. 

AMONG  the  notable  incidents  that  marked  the  administration  and 
tested  the  temper  and  tact  of  Washington  were  the  exhibitions  of 
what  Mr.  Gibbs  described  as  "  the  audacious  insolence  of  Genet  and 
the  studied  impertinence  of  his  successor."  The  almost  incredible 
note  of  M.  Adet,  the  French  Minister,  which  compelled  on  our 
part  a  frank  review  of  the  policy  of  France  toward  America,  ap 
peared  during  the  Presidential  canvass,  and  John  Adams  wrote 
(December  12,  1796)  :  "  Adet's  note  has  had  some  effect  in  Penn 
sylvania  and  proved  a  terror  to  some  Quakers,  and  that  is  all  the  ill 
effect  it  has  had.  Even  the  Southern  States  appear  to  resent  it."  * 

It  threatened  the  wrath  of  the  French  Directory  if  the  American 
people  did  not  pursue  a  course  in  accord  with  the  wishes  of 
France,f  and  some  idea  of  its  tone  and  charges,  which  could  not 
be  allowed  to  pass  unnoticed,  may  be  obtained  from  the  note  of  its 
contents  given  in  the  index  to  the  first  volume  of  our  "  State  Papers 
on  Foreign  Relations,"  which  reads  :  "  Reproaches,  allegations  against 
the  United  States  of  duplicity,  weakness,  partiality,  insensibility  to 
the  claims  of  justice  and  honor,  in  the  disregarding  of  their  neutral 
obligations,  .  .  .  violating  treaty  stipulations,"  etc. 

Hamilton's  advice  was  explicit.  He  wrote  to  Washington  :J 
"  Let  a  full  reply  to  M.  Adet's  last  communication  be  made,  con 
taining  a  particular  review  of  our  conduct  and  motives  from  the 
commencement  of  the  Revolution.  Let  this  be  sent  to  Mr.  Pinckney 
to  be  imparted  to  the  Directory,  and  let  a  copy  of  it,  with  other 
auxiliary  statements  of  fact  if  necessary,  be  sent  to  the  House  of 

*  Adams'  Works,  i.,  495. 

f  Gibbs'  Memories  of  the  Federal  Administration,  etc.,  380. 

\  Hamilton  to  Washington,  November  19,  1796  :   Hamilton's  Works,  i.,  177. 


128  Appendix. 

Representatives.  .  .  .  The  crisis  is  immensely  important  to 
the  glory  of  the  President  and  the  interests  of  the  country." 

Washington  said  :  *  "  .  .  .  The  French  Government  are  dis 
posed  to  play  a  high  game.  If  other  proof  were  wanting,  the  time 
and  indelicate  mode  and  style  of  the  present  attack  on  the  execu 
tion  exhibited  in  this  labored  performance,  which  is  as  unjust  as  it  is 
voluminous,  would  leave  no  doubt  as  to  the  primary  object  it  had  in 
view." 

Hamilton  wrote  to  Wolcott :  f  "I  thank  you  for  the  note  sending 
me  Adet's  letter.  The  present  is,  in  my  opinion,  as  critical  a  situation 
as  our  Government  has  been  in,  requiring  all  its  prudence,  all  its 
wisdom,  all  its  moderation,  all  its  firmness." 

Washington's  letter  to  Pinckney  (January  4,  1797),  while  the  des 
patch  was  in  progress,  exhibits  the  strongest  anxiety  that  it  should  be 
unexceptionable  and  unanswerable,  for  the  reason  that  "  if  there  be 
the  least  ground  for  it,  we  shall  be  charged  with  unfairness  and  an  in 
tention  to  impose  on  or  to  mislead  the  public  judgment.  Hence,  and 
from  a  desire  that  the  statement  may  be  full,  fair,  calm,  and  argu 
mentative,  without  asperity  or  anything  more  irritating  than  the  nar 
rative  of  facts  which  express  unbounded  charges  and  assertions  does 
itself  produce,  I  have  wished  that  the  letter  to  Mr.  Pinckney  may  be 
reviewed  over  and  over  again.  Much  depends  on  it  as  relates  to 
ourselves  and  in  the  eyes  of  the  world,  whatever  may  be  the  effect  as 
respects  the  governing  power  of  France." 

Among  the  charges,  which  were  not  only  theatrical  and  untrue, 
but  which  were  presented  with  an  uncommon  disregard  of  diplomatic 
propriety,  was  one  of  ingratitude.  It  complained  that  while  "  tender 
tears  had  trickled  from  every  eye  "  when  the  American  flag  was  un 
furled  in  the  French  Senate,  the  American  Government  had  "  for 
gotten  the  services  France  had  rendered  "  and  had  "  thrown  aside 
the  duty  of  gratitude,  as  if  ingratitude  was  a  fundamental  duty." 

Of  the  letter  of  Pickering,  Hamilton  wrote  to  Washington  J  ap 
proving  the  matter  but  criticising  the  style  :  "  I  have  read  with  at 
tention  Mr.  Pickering's  letter.  It  is  in  the  main  a  substantial  and 
satisfactory  paper.  It  will  in  all  probability  do  considerable  good 
in  enlightening  public  opinion  at  home.  It  wants,  however,  that 
management  of  expression  and  suavity  in  mode  which  a  man  more 

*  Washington  to  Hamilton,  Philadelphia,  November  21,  1796. 
f  November  22,  1796. 
i  January  22,  1797. 


Appendix.  \  29 

used  to  diplomatic  communication  could  have  given  it,  and  which 
would  have  been  happy  if  united  with  other  merits." 

Before  the  letter  reached  Mr.  Pinckney  that  minister  had  been 
ordered  by  the  Directory  to  leave  Paris,*  and  Mr.  Pinckney  wrote 
to  the  Secretary  from  the  Hague,  June  28,  1797:  "  Your  letter  to 
me  of  January  i6th  has  been  read  not  only  by  the  members  of  the 
Legislature  in  France,  but  also  by  most  of  the  officers  of  the  Gov 
ernment.  M.  Segur,  who  writes  sometimes  in  our  favor,  wishes  the 
case  of  gratitude  had  been  treated  more  moderately ;  but  it  was  ab 
solutely  necessary  to  answer  the  continual  charges  of  ingratitude  and 
perfidy,  nor  do  I  conceive  it  could  have  been  done  with  greater 
mildness.  To  the  thousand  copies  I  directed  originally  to  be  dis 
tributed  I  have  added  five  hundred  more,  as  many  of  our  consuls  in 
the  ports  of  France  are  writing  for  them,  saying  they  have  had  a 
wonderful  effect  upon  the  minds  of  many  persons  both  in  and  out  of 
office  who  neither  knew  the  facts  nor  were  aware  of  the  arguments 
used."  f 


WASHINGTON'S   REVIEW  OF  THE  FRENCH   POL 
ICY  IN  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS. 

(American  State  Papers,  vol.  i.,  pp.  559,  576.) 
Fourth  Congress.  No.    118.  Second  Session. 

FRANCE. 
COMMUNICATED  TO  CONGRESS  JANUARY  19,    1797. 

UNITED  STATES,  January  19,  1797. 
Gentlemen  of  the  Senate  and  of  the  House  of  Representatives  : 

At  the  opening  of  the  present  session  of  Congress  I  mentioned 
that  some  circumstances  of  an  unwelcome  nature  had  lately  occurred 
in  relation  to  France  ;  that  our  trade  had  suffered  and  was  suffering 
extensive  injuries  in  the  West  Indies  from  the  cruisers  and  agents  of 
the  French  Republic ;  and  that  communications  had  been  received 
from  its  minister  here  which  indicated  danger  of  a  further  disturbance 
of  our  commerce  by  its  authority,  and  that  were,  in  other  respects, 
far  from  agreeable  ;  but  that  I  reserved  for  a  special  message  a  more 

*  On  December  28,  1796  :  King  to  Hamilton,  February  6,  1797. 
f  Trescott's  American  Diplomatic  History,  180. 

9 


1 30  Appendix. 

particular  communication  on  this  interesting   subject.     This   com 
munication  I  now  make. 

The  complaints  of  the  French  Minister  embraced  most  of  the 
transactions  of  our  Government  in  relation  to  France  from  an  early 
period  of  the  present  war,  which,  therefore,  it  was  necessary  care 
fully  to  review.  A  collection  has  been  formed  of  letters  and  papers 
relating  to  those  transactions,  which  I  now  lay  before  you,  with  a 
letter  to  Mr.  Pinckney,  our  minister  at  Paris,  containing  an  exami 
nation  of  the  notes  of  the  French  Minister  and  such  information  as  I 
thought  might  be  useful  to  Mr.  Pinckney  in  any  further  representa 
tions  he  might  find  necessary  to  be  made  to  the  French  Govern 
ment.  The  immediate  object  of  his  mission  was  to  make  to  that 
Government  such  explanations  of  the  principles  and  conduct  of  our 
own  as  by  manifesting  our  good  faith  might  remove  all  jealousy  and 
discontent,  and  maintain  that  harmony  and  good  understanding  with 
the  French  Republic  which  it  has  been  my  constant  solicitude  to 
preserve.  A  government  which  required  only  a  knowledge  of  the 
truth  to  justify  its  measures  could  not  but  be  anxious  to  have  this 
fully  and  frankly  displayed.  G.  WASHINGTON. 


EXTRACTS  FROM  THE  LETTER  OF  SECRETARY 
PICKERING  TO  MR.  PINCKNEY,  MINISTER  AT 
PARIS,  DATED  JANUARY  19,  1797, 

In  Review  of  a  Letter  Addressed  to  Mr.  Pickering  by  M.  Adet,  the 
French  Minister  to  the  United  States. 

Will  the  ministers  of  the  French  Republic  never  cease  to  re 
proach  us  with  "  ingratitude  ?  "  If,  indeed,  "  France  wrought,"  as  well 
as  "guaranteed,"  the  independence  of  the  United  States,  as  M. 
Adet  asserts,  "at  a  time  when  she  might,  at  the  price  of  that  very 
independence,  have  granted  them  less  liberal  conditions,"  our  obli 
gations  are  greater  than  we  have  hitherto  imagined.  But  it  is  time 
that  these  claims  to  our  gratitude  were  investigated  and  their  extent 
ascertained.  We  have  citizens  yet  alive  who  were  actors  and  wit 
nesses  of  the  declaration  of  our  independence,  and  of  the  efforts  to 
maintain  it,  with  their  effects,  prior  to  our  treaty  with  France.  But 
laying  no  stress  on  our  own  recollection  or  consciousness,  we  will 
resort  to  the  testimony  of  France  herself. 

France,   by  her  minister,    Marquis  de   Noailles,   having,  in  the 


Appendix.  131 

declaration  of  March  13,  1778,  which  I  have  already  quoted,  an 
nounced  to  the  Court  of  London  the  treaty  of  friendship  and  com 
merce  she  had  formed  with  the  United  States,  and  that  to  maintain 
the  commerce  of  his  subjects  with  them,  which  was  the  object  of  that 
treaty,  his  Most  Christian  Majesty  had  "  taken  eventual  measures  in 
concert  with  the  United  States  of  North  America,"  that  Court  pub 
lished  a  justificative  memorial,  to  vindicate  to  the  world  the  war  she 
had  determined  to  wage  against  France.  In  the  "Observations"  of 
the  Court  of  France  on  this  British  memorial  we  find  the  following 
declarations  on  the  part  of  France  :  "  While  the  ambassador  of  Eng 
land  put  the  King's  patience  to  the  strongest  proofs,  and  while  the 
Court  of  London  was  constantly  repeating  denials  of  justice  to  his 
Majesty's  subjects,  at  the  same  time  that  the  British  officers  con 
tinued  to  desolate  them  on  the  sea,  an  event  came  to  pass  in  Amer 
ica  which  essentially  changed  the  face  of  things  in  that  quarter  of 
the  world.  This  event  was  the  defeat  of  the  army  under  General 
Burgoyne.  The  news  of  this  unexpected  disaster,  which  arrived  in 
Europe  in  November,  1777,  astonished  the  British  Ministers,  and 
must  have  more  sensibly  affected  them,  as  it  overthrew  the  plan  they 
had  made  for  the  reduction  of  the  colonies."  *  The  "  Observations" 
then  suggest  that  this  great  event  induced,  in  the  British  Cabinet,  the 
idea  of  conciliation  with  America,  and  of  a  coalition  against  the 
Crown  of  France  in  revenge  for  the  supposed  aid  rendered  by  her 
to  the  United  States,  and  to  gratify  "their  most  dear  and  constant 
wish — that  of  humbling  France."  "It  was  natural  for  the  British 
Ministry,  unable  to  subdue  her  colonies,  to  seek  to  be  reconciled  to 
them  and  to  engage  them  to  espouse  her  resentment.  They  might 
so  much  the  more  flatter  themselves  that  they  should  succeed  herein, 
as  the  proceedings  of  France  with  regard  to  American  privateers, 
and  especially  the  dislike  the  King  had  at  all  times  manifested  to 
any  engagement  with  the  Congress,  must  have  given  disgust  and  dis 
satisfaction  to  their  deputies,  and  induced  them,  notwithstanding 
their  well-known  aversion,  to  seek,  even  in  England,  the  safety  of 
their  country  when  they  failed  to  find  it  in  France."  f 

"  The  King,  well  informed  of  the  plan  of  the  Court  of  London, 
and  of  the  preparations  which  were  the  consequence  of  it,  perceived 
that  no  more  time  was  to  be  lost  if  he  would  prevent  the  designs  of 
his  enemies.  His  Majesty  determined,  therefore,  to  take  into  con 
sideration,  at  length,  the  overtures  of  the  Congress."  J 

*  Observations,  p.  60.  f  Ibid.,  p.  64.  JIbid.,  p.  66. 


132  Appendix. 

"  The  Commissioners  from  the  United  States  proposed  to  the 
King  a  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce,  and  an  alliance  offensive  and 
defensive  by  which  his  Majesty  should  engage  not  only  to  acknowl 
edge  simply  and  purely  the  independence  of  the  United  States,  but 
also  to  guarantee  and  defend  it  by  force  of  arms.  The  King  or 
dered  an  answer  to  be  given  that  he  could  indeed  look  upon  the  in 
dependence  of  the  United  States  as  existing,  but  that  it  did  not  be 
long  to  him  to  acknowledge  it,  because  he  had  not  any  right  to 
judge  of  it ;  neither  could  he  guarantee  it,  as  he  did  not  intend 
to  enter  into  a  war  for  its  support.  His  Majesty,  in  consequence, 
refused  an  offensive  alliance,  and  confined  himself  to  the  treaty  of 
amity  and  commerce.  But  as  it  was  more  than  probable  that  the 
Court  of  London  had  formed  the  design  of  attacking  France,  his 
Majesty  thought  he  ought  to  enter  into  an  alliance  with  the  United 
States  eventual  and  purely  defensive.  The  stipulations  contained  in 
this  second  treaty  are,  in  substance,  that  if  France  should  be  at 
tacked  by  the  Court  of  London  before  the  cessation  of  hostilities  be 
tween  that  Court  and  its  colonies,  then  the  King  and  the  United 
States  should  mutually  assist  each  other  against  the  common  enemy ; 
that  the  King  should  guarantee  the  independence  and  sovereignty  of 
the  United  States ;  and  that  he  should  not  lay  down  his  arms  till  it 
should  be  acknowledged  by  Great  Britain."* 

Thus  it  is  manifest  that  the  United  States  were  to  be  left  still  to 
fight  their  own  battles,  unless  Great  Britain  should  choose  to  in 
crease  the  number  of  her  enemies  by  attacking  France,  in  which  it 
would  be  as  truly  the  interest  of  France  as  of  the  United  States  to 
make  it  a  common  cause. 

"  This  last  treaty  remained  secret  because  it  was  not  in  force  at 
the  time  of  concluding  it ;  but  that  of  commerce  was  notified  at  the 
Court  of  London  March  13,  1778."  f  The  first  words  of  the  notifi 
cation  are  these  :  "The  United  States  of  North  America,  who  are  in 
full  possession  of  independence,"  etc.  The  whole  paragraph  has 
been  already  quoted.  The  notification  further  expressed  that 
"  the  King  being  determined  to  protect  effectually  the  lawful  com 
merce  of  his  subjects  and  to  maintain  the  dignity  of  his  flag,  his 
Majesty  has  in  consequence  taken  eventual  measures  in  concert 
with  the  United  States  of  North  America."  The  Court  of  London 
chose  to  consider  this  notification  as  a  declaration  of  war,  of  which 
they  accuse  the  King  as  being  the  author,  and  represent  him  as  the 
*  Observations,  p.  67.  f  Ibid.,  p.  82. 


Appendix.  133 

violator  of  laws  divine  and  human,  etc.,  etc.  "The  act,  however, 
which  has  drawn  upon  the  King  such  odious  imputations  has  for  its 
foundation  two  incontestable  truths  :  The  first,  that  at  the  period 
of  February  6,  1778,  the  Americans  had  the  public  possession  of 
their  independence ;  the  second,  that  the  King  had  the  right  to  look 
upon  this  independence  as  existing  without  being  obliged  to  exam 
ine  the  legality  of  it,  and  that  no  law  forbade  him  to  form  connec 
tions  with  the  Americans." 

The  "  Observations,"  then  reciting  that  the  fruitless  attempts  of 
the  colonies  to  obtain  redress  from  their  mother  country  in  the  mode 
of  supplication  had  induced  them  to  league  together  to  maintain  their 
privileges  sword  in  hand,  and  soon  after  to  publish  the  solemn  act 
whereby  they  declared  themselves  independent,  say:  ''This  act, 
which  is  of  July  4,  1776,  induced  the  Court  of  London  to  give 
way  to  her  resentment.  She  displayed  her  power  to  chastise  the 
Americans  and  to  reduce  them  by  conquest.  But  what  has  been 
the  fruit  of  these  efforts  ?  Have  they  not  served  to  demonstrate  to 
America,  to  all  Europe,  and  to  the  Court  of  London  herself,  her  im 
potence  and  the  impossibility  of  her  ever  hereafter  bringing  the 
Americans  again  under  her  yoke  ?"  *  That  she  had  given  this  dem 
onstration  to  America  is  evident  by  the  manner  in  which  Congress 
received  the  conciliatory  bills,  hastily  sent  from  the  Court  of  London 
to  America  and  communicated  by  Lord  and  General  Howe.  Con 
gress  were  then  uninformed  of  the  treaties  which  their  Commissioners 
had  lately  concluded  at  Paris.  Yet,  confident  in  the  strength  and 
spirit  of  their  country,  and  of  the  inability  of  Britain  to  subdue  it, 
they  resolved,  unanimously, f  to  reject  these  overtures  for  peace  and 
conciliation  and  to  hold  no  conference  or  treaty  with  any  Commis 
sioners  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  unless  as  a  preliminary  they 
withdrew  their  fleets  and  armies  or  in  positive  terms  acknowledged 
the  independence  of  these  States. 

Again  :  "It  is  sufficient  for  the  justification  of  his  Majesty  that 
the  colonies,  which  form  a  nation  considerable  as  well  for  the  num 
ber  of  their  inhabitants  as  for  the  extent  of  their  dominion,  have 
established  their  independence,  not  only  by  a  solemn  declaration  but 
also  in  fact,  and  that  they  have  supported  it  against  the  efforts  of 
their  mother  country.  Such  was  in  effect  the  situation  of  the 
United  States  when  the  King  began  to  negotiate  with  them.  His 
Majesty  had  full  liberty  of  considering  them  as  independent  or  as 

*  Observations,  p.  73.  f  Journals  of  Congress,  April  22,  1778. 


1 34  Appendix. 

the  subjects  of  Britain.  He  chose  the  first  part  because  his  safety, 
the  interest  of  his  people,  invariable  policy,  and  above  all  the  secret 
projects  of  the  Court  of  London  imperiously  laid  him  under  the  ne 
cessity."  * 

The  secret  projects  here  referred  to  were  those  of  reconciliation 
on  terms  which  might  satisfy  the  United  States  and  produce  a  re 
union  and  coalition  for  the  purpose  of  falling  upon  France.  To 
avoid  the  risk  of  this  combined  attack,  to  avoid  greater  danger  in 
future  by  preventing  the  possibility  of  uniting  again  the  great  por 
tions  of  the  British  Empire,  separated  in  fact,  and  thus  essentially  to 
dimmish  its  power,  were  the  avowed  inducements  with  the  Court 
of  France  to  consider  the  United  States  as  independent.  Having 
stated  these  things,  they  ask  "  if  there  is  a  sovereign  who,  in  the 
same  situation  with  his  Majesty,  would  not  have  imitated  his 
example  ?  "  f 

Again  :  "  He  [the  King  of  France]  had  the  right  to  con 
sider  as  independent  the  confederate  inhabitants  of  an  immense  con 
tinent  who  presented  themselves  to  him  with  this  character ;  es 
pecially  after  their  ancient  sovereign  had  demonstrated,  by  efforts  as 
continual  as  painful,  the  impossibility  of  bringing  them  back  to 
obedience."  J 

"  To  complete  the  justification  of  his  Majesty,  nothing  remains 
but  to  examine  whether  what  are  called  reasons  of  state  could  have 
determined  his  Majesty  to  connect  himself  with  the  Americans.  To 
treat  this  question  with  all  the  clearness  of  which  it  is  susceptible, 
the  political  interests  of  France  must  be  viewed  under  two  different 
relations  :  the  first  respects  the  other  powers  of  Europe  ;  the  second 
respects  Great  Britain."  § 

"  In  treating  with  the  Americans  after  they  became  independent, 
the  King  exercised  the  right  inherent  in  his  sovereignty,  with  no 
other  view  than  to  put  an  end  to  the  predominant  power  which 
England  abused  in  every  quarter  of  the  globe."  The  "  Observations  " 
then  suggest  that  by  this  conduct  the  King  has  essentially  watched 
over  the  interest  of  all  the  sovereigns  of  Europe,  "  by  contributing 
to  restrain  a  power  which  has  always  carried  to  excess  the  abuse  of 
her  resources."  || 

The  Court  of  London  having  charged  the  King  of  France  with 
ambition  and  the  project  of  demolishing  the  power  of  England  by 

*  Observations,  p.  77.  f  Ibid.,  p.  78.  \  Ibid.,  p.  82. 

§  Ibid.,  p.  88.  1  Ibid.,  p.  89. 


Appendix.  1 3  5 

his  engagements  with  the  Americans,  the  "Observations"  declare  that 
"  nothing  more  will  be  discovered  in  them  [his  engagements  with 
the  United  States],  on  the  most  accurate  scrutiny,  than  a  diminution 
of  this  power — a  diminution  which  England  has  herself  provoked  by 
a  conduct  the  most  unjust  and  most  irregular,  and  which  the  tran 
quillity  and  happiness  of  Europe  have  for  a  long  time  required."  * 

"The  most  vigilant  and  consummate  prudence  could  not  devise 
adequate  precautions  against  the  enterprises  of  such  a  power ;  so 
that  the  only  means  of  being  secured  from  it  was  to  seize  the  op 
portunity  of  diminishing  it."  f 

"  It  may  then  be  truly  said  that  on  examination  of  the  conduct 
of  the  King  it  was  not  only  just  and  lawful,  but  even  necessary,  as 
well  for  the  individual  interest  of  France  as  for  that  of  all  Europe."  J 

I  will  trouble  you  with  but  one  more  extract  from  the  justifica 
tory  "  Observations  "  of  the  Court  of  France.  "  To  deceive  the  other 
nations  with  regard  to  the  real  motives  which  have  directed  the  con 
duct  of  the  King,  the  British  Ministry  maintain  that  he  entered  into 
treaty  with  the  Americans  not  because  he  feared  the  secret  views 
of  Great  Britain,  but  because  he  foresaw  that  the  Americans,  de 
feated,  discouraged,  without  support,  and  without  resources,  were 
about  to  return  to  their  mother  country,  and  that  there  was  not  a 
moment  to  be  lost  in  reanimating  and  confirming  them  in  their  op 
position.  It  was,  without  doubt,  for  the  sake  of  this  assertion  that 
the  British  Ministry  have  thought  it  beneath  the  dignity  of  their 
sovereign  to  search  for  the  period  at  which  France  formed  connec 
tions  with  the  United  States.  It  might  with  greater  truth  be  said 
that  this  research  did  not  coincide  with  their  plan  of  defence.  The 
King  is  willing  to  spare  the  British  Ministry  a  task  so  disagreeable 
and  embarrassing  by  observing  for  them  that  the  conversations 
which  led  to  the  treaties  of  February  6,  1778,  were  considerably 
posterior  to  the  capitulation  of  General  Burgoyne.  Now,  it  is  no 
torious  that  this  event  elevated  the  courage  and  the  hopes  of  the 
Americans  as  much  as  it  dejected  the  British  nation,  and  principally 
the  Court  of  London.  If,  then,  the  King  has  listened  to  the  propo 
sitions  of  Congress  after  this  period,  so  disastrous  to  the  British,  it 
has  not  been,  and  could  not  have  been,  for  any  other  reason  but 
because  he  thought,  with  the  United  States,  that  their  independence 
was  thenceforward  irrevocable."  § 

In  these  extracts  from  the  "  Observations  "  of  the  Court  of  France 
*  Observations,  p.  90.        f  Ibid.,  p.  91.        \  Ibid.,  p.  92.        £  Ibid.,  pp.  95,  96. 


136  Appendix. 

we  see  an  open  avowal  of  her  motives  for  entering  into  treaties  with 
the  United  States  during  our  Revolution.  But  do  such  motives 
afford  any  strong  claims  to  our  gratitude  ?  She  rejoiced  at  the  pros 
pect  of  a  final  separation  of  the  thirteen  colonies  from  Great  Britain  ; 
she  saw  them  erected,  by  their  solemn  Declaration,  into  independent 
States  ;  but  during  near  three  years  of  our  contest  she  continued 
waiting  for  some  fortunate  event  that  should  insure  stability  and 
ultimate  success  to  our  enterprise.  This  event  took  place  in  the 
capture  of  a  whole  British  army.  Then  "  the  King  listened  to  the 
propositions  of  Congress  because  he  thought,  with  the  United  States, 
that  their  independence  was  irrevocable."  He  then  treated  with 
the  Americans,  "  with  no  other  view  than  to  put  an  end  to  the  pre 
dominant  power  which  England  exercised  in  every  quarter  of  the 
globe."  "  A  diminution  of  this  power  [says  the  King]  the  tran 
quillity  and  happiness  of  Europe  have  for  a  long  time  required." 
"The  only  means  of  being  secured  from  it  was  to  seize  the  oppor 
tunity  of  diminishing  it ;"  and  he  did  seize  it,  "becailsehis  safety, 
the  interest  of  his  people,  invariable  policy,  and,  above  all,  the 
secret  projects  of  the  Court  of  London,  imperiously  laid  him  under 
the  necessity." 

After  these  repeated  declarations  on  the  part  of  Erance  that  her 
only  view  in  contracting  engagements  with  the  United  States  was 
to  diminish  the  British  power,  and  thereby  promote  the  safety  and 
interest  of  her  own  people  and  the  tranquillity  of  Europe,  very  un 
expected,  indeed,  are  the  modern  claims  of  boundless  and  perpetual 
gratitude.  Nevertheless,  animated,  as  we  always  have  been,  with 
sincere  desires  to  maintain  those  useful  and  friendly  connections 
with  France  which  had  their  foundation  in  our  Revolution,  we 
should  have  remained  silent  on  these  claims  had  not  the  frequency 
and  manner  in  which  they  have  been  urged  compelled  their  discus 
sion.  We  are  not  now  disposed  to  question  the  importance  of  the 
aid  we  actually  derived  from  France  in  the  War  of  our  Revolution, 
nor  to  retract  the  grateful  acknowledgments  that  all  America  has, 
from  that  time,  offered  to  that  nation.  We  were  in  the  habit  of  ex 
pressing  our  gratitude  to  her  for  the  benefits  which  we  received, 
although  they  resulted  from  her  exertions  to  advance  her  own  inter 
est  and  secure  her  own  safety.  But  if  those  benefits  had  been  ren 
dered  from  pure  benevolence,  from  disinterested  good-will  to  us, 
and  we  had  been  remiss  in  acknowledging  them,  is  it  the  part  of 
generosity,  of  magnanimity,  constantly  to  upbraid  the  receivers  of 


Appendix.  137 

their  favors  with  ingratitude  ?  Do  not  such  reproaches  cancel  the 
obligation?  But  if  for  favors,  apparently  generous,  substantial  re 
turns  are  demanded,  the  supposed  liberal  act  degenerates  and  be 
comes  a  mercenary  bargain. 

If  such  only  are  the  motives  for  our  gratitude  toward  France,  at 
the  commencement  of  her  political  and  commercial  connections  with 
us,  in  the  midst  of  our  war  with  Great  Britain,  what  more  can  we 
discover  at  the  conclusion  of  that  war  ?  Let  us  examine. 

In  1781,  with  the  assistance  of  a  French  army  by  land  and  a 
powerful  fleet  by  sea,  a  second  British  army  was  captured.  This 
event  made  even  the  British  Government  despair  of  bringing  the 
United  States  again  under  her  subjection.  The  Ministry  was  changed, 
and  the  Parliament  passed  an  act  to  authorize  the  King  to  make 
peace.  In  the  summer  of  1782  an  agent  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain 
repaired  to  Paris  to  negotiate  with  the  Commissioners  of  the  United 
States.  For  some  time  Doctor  Franklin  and  Mr.  Jay  were  alone 
at  Paris.  The  commission  to  Mr.  Oswald  (the  British  negotiator) 
authorized  him  to  treat  of  and  conclude  a  peace  or  truce  with  any 
Commissioner  or  Commissioners  named  or  to  be  named  by  the  colo 
nies  or  plantations  of  New  Hampshire,  etc.  (naming  the  thirteen),  or 
with  any  of  them  separately,  with  parts  of  them,  or  with  any  persons 
whatsoever.  Mr.  Jay  was  not  satisfied  with  this  commission  to  Mr. 
Oswald ;  the  independence  of  the  thirteen  States  was  nowhere  in 
timated.  Agreeably  to  their  instructions  from  Congress  to  take  ad 
vice  of  the  Court  of  France,  the  Commissioners  communicated  Mr. 
Oswald's  commission  to  the  Prime  Minister,  the  Count  de  Vergennes. 
The  Count  expressed  his  opinion  that  the  commission  was  sufficient ; 
that  it  was  such  a  one  as  we  might  have  expected  it  would  be ;  that 
"an  acknowledgment  of  our  independence,  instead  of  preceding, 
must  in  the  natural  course  of  things  be  the  effect  of  the  treaty." 
This  opinion  the  Count  continued  from  time  to  time  to  repeat.  In 
short,  "  it  was  evident  the  Count  did  not  wish  to  see  our  indepen 
dence  acknowledged  by  Britain  until  they  had  made  all  their  uses  of 
us."  Mr.  Jay  still  continued  unmoved.  He  conferred  with  Mr.  Os 
wald,  and  "  urged,  in  the  strongest  terms,  the  great  impropriety  and 
consequently  the  utter  impossibility  of  our  ever  treating  with  Great 
Britain  on  any  other  than  an  equal  footing ;  and  told  him  plainly 
that  he  (Mr.  Jay)  would  have  no  concern  in  any  negotiation  in  which 
we  were  not  considered  as  an  independent  people." 

It  was  on  this  occasion   that   Mr.  Oswald  communicated  to  Mr. 


138  .  Appendix. 

Jay  this  article  of  his  instructions  :  "  In  case  you  find  the  American 
Commissioners  are  not  at  liberty  to  treat  on  any  terms  short  of  inde 
pendence,  you  are  to  declare  to  them  that  you  have  our  authority  to 
make  that  cession  ;  our  ardent  wish  for  peace  disposing  us  to  pur 
chase  it  at  the  price  of  acceding  to  the  complete  independence  of 
the  thirteen  colonies." 

The  British  Ministry  approved  of  this  communication,  but  still 
were  for  treating  with  us  as  colonies  and  making  an  acknowledgment 
of  our  independence  only  an  article  of  the  treaty.  Mr.  Jay's  discern 
ment  discovered  the  source  of  the  backwardness  at  this  time  in  the 
British  Court  to  admit  our  independence  previous  to  the  negotiating 
of  the  treaty,  and  mentioned  it,  with  his  reasons,  to  Mr.  Oswald  ; 
who,  far  from  contradicting  Mr.  Jay's  inference,  told  him  a  fact 
which  confirmed  his  opinion  that  it  originated  in  the  Court  of  France 
and  was  communicated  to  that  of  London  by  the  British  Commis 
sioner  then  in  Paris  to  treat  of  peace  between  France  and  Great 
Britain.  Mr.  Jay  then  explained  to  Mr.  Oswald  what  he  supposed 
to  be  the  natural  policy  of  the  French  Court,  and  showed  him  that 
"  it  was  the  interest  of  Britain  to  render  us  as  independent  on  France 
as  we  were  resolved  to  be  on  Britain."  Mr.  Oswald  was  convinced. 
Mr.  Jay  reminded  him  of  the  several  resolutions  of  Congress,  passed 
at  different  periods,  not  to  treat  with  British  Commissioners  on  any 
other  footing  than  that  of  absolute  independence  ;  and  proposed  to 
give  to  him  in  writing  what  he  had  before  expressed  in  conversation 
— his  determination  not  to  treat  but  on  the  footing  of  equality. 
Mr.  Oswald  preferred  having  it  in  writing.  Mr.  Jay  prepared  the 
draft  of  a  letter,  to  be  signed  by  him  and  Doctor  Franklin,  express 
ing  their  determination  not  to  treat  but  on  terms  of  equality  as  an 
independent  nation,  and  exhibiting  the  reasons  of  this  determina 
tion.  Doctor  Franklin  thought  the  letter  "  rather  too  positive, 
and  therefore  rather  imprudent ;  for  that  in  case  Britain  should 
remain  firm,  and  future  circumstances  should  compel  us  to  submit 
to  their  mode  of  treating,  we  should  do  it  with  an  ill  grace  after 
such  a  decided  and  peremptory  refusal.  Besides,  the  Doctor 
seemed  much  perplexed  and  fettered  by  the  instructions  from  Con 
gress  to  be  guided  by  the  advice  of  the  French  Court.  Neither 
of  these  considerations  affected  Mr.  Jay  :  for  as  to  the  first,  he  could 
not  conceive  of  any  event  which  would  render  it  proper,  and  there 
fore  possible  for  America  to  treat  in  any  other  character  than  as 
an  independent  nation ;  and  as  to  the  second,  he  could  not  believe 


Appendix.  1 39 

that  Congress  intended  they  should  follow  any  advice  which  might 
be  repugnant  to  their  dignity  and  interest;" 

Doctor  Franklin's  doubts  prevented  this  letter  being  signed. 
Mr.  Oswald  was  disappointed,  and  desired  to  see  the  draft.  He  saw 
it  and  requested  a  copy  of  it.  After  taking  time  for  consideration, 
Mr.  Jay  complied  with  the  request.  "For though  unsigned,  it  would 
convey  to  the  British  Ministry  the  sentiments  and  opinions  he  wished 
to  impress  ;  and  if,  finally,  they  should  not  be  content  to  treat  with 
us  as  independent,  they  were  not  yet  ripe  for  peace  or  treaty  with  us. 
Besides,  he  could  not  be  persuaded  that  Great  Britain,  after  what  the 
House  of  Commons  had  declared,  after  various  other  acts  of  that 
Government  manifesting  the  intention  to  acknowledge  it,  would 
persist  in  refusing  to  admit  our  independence,  provided  they  really 
believed  that  we  had  firmly  resolved  not  to  treat  on  more  humble 
terms." 

11  With  the  copy  of  this  draft  Mr.  Jay  gave  Mr.  Oswald  copies 
of  the  various  resolutions  of  Congress  which  evinced  their  adherence 
to  their  independence.  These  papers  Mr.  Oswald  sent  by  express 
to  London,  and  warmly  recommended  the  issuing  a  new  commis 
sion,  to  remove  all  further  delay." 

Mr.  Jay  having  afterward  ascertained  that  the  Count  de  Ver- 
gennes  had  sent  a  confidential  agent  to  London — but  whose  journey 
was  intended  to  have  been  a  secret — for  purposes  evidently  hostile 
to  the  interests  of  the  United  States,  determined  immediately  to 
counteract  the  project  by  an  agent  on  whom  he  could  rely,  to  make 
to  the  Court  of  London  such  representations  as  he  thought  the  oc 
casion  demanded.  He  succeeded,  and  in  about  two  weeks  Mr. 
Oswald  received  a  new  commission,  in  the  form  for  which  Mr.  Jay 
had  contended. 

Mr.  Jay  remarked  that  agreeably  to  the  Declaration  of  Indepen 
dence  the  United  States,  as  free  and  independent,  had  full  power  to 
levy  war,  conclude  peace,  contract  alliances,  etc.  ;  that  by  the  act 
of  confederation  the  style  of  the  confederacy  was  declared  to  be  the 
United  States  of  America,  and  by  that  act  Congress  were  vested 
with  the  sole  and  exclusive  right  and  power  of  determining  on  peace 
and  war,  and  of  entering  into  treaties  and  alliances  ;  that  being  of 
right  and  in  fact  free  and  independent  States,  their  representatives 
in  Congress  granted  a  commission  to  certain  gentlemen,  of  whom 
Doctor  Franklin  and  he  were  two,  in  their  name  to  confer,  treat,  and 
conclude  with  ambassadors  or  commissioners  vested  with  equal 


140  Appendix. 

powers  relating  to  the  re-establishing  of  peace,  etc.  But  the  first 
commission  to  Mr.  Oswald  was  not  equivalent ;  the  United  States 
were  not  named  in  it,  nor  their  Commissioners,  who  consequently 
were  not  the  persons  with  whom  Mr.  Oswald  was  authorized  to 
treat.  And  if  the  Commissioners  had  consented  to  treat  with  Mr. 
Oswald  under  such  a  commission,  what  would  have  been  the  condi 
tion  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  in  the  interval  between  the 
commencement  of  the  negotiation  and  the  conclusion  of  peace  ? 
They  would  have  been,  not  independent  citizens,  but,  by  our  ac 
knowledgment,  British  subjects !  Mr.  Jay  would  not  consent  to 
this  degradation  after  we  had  maintained  our  independence  six 
years,  after  we  had  established  it  in  fact,  and  after  Congress  had,  by 
firm  and  repeated  resolutions,  refused  to  treat  with  Great  Britain  un 
less  as  a  preliminary  she  withdrew  her  fleets  and  armies,  or  else  in 
positive  and  express  terms  acknowledged  the  independence  of  the 
United  States.  At  the  same  time  Congress  manifested  their  readi 
ness  to  assent  to  such  terms  of  peace  as  might  consist  with  the 
honor  of  independent  nations,  but  the  honor  of  an  independent 
nation  forbade  their  treating  in  a  subordinate  capacity.  Even  the 
dignity  of  France,  who  four  years  before  treated  with  us  as  an  in 
dependent  nation,  required  that  we  should  not  degrade  ourselves 
when  going  to  treat  with  her  enemy.  And  why,  then,  should  her 
ministers  desire  us  to  do  it  ?  especially  when  the  treaty  of  defensive 
alliance  declared  that  "  the  essential  and  direct  end  of  it  was  to  main 
tain  effectually  the  liberty,  sovereignty,  and  independence,  absolute 
and  unlimited,  of  the  United  States,  as  well  in  matters  of  govern 
ment  as  of  commerce."  There  were  several  reasons.  The  two 
parties,  France  and  the  United  States,  engaged  not  to  lay  down 
their  arms  until  the  independence  of  the  United  States  should  be 
attained.  The  explicit  acknowledgment  of  their  independence  by 
Great  Britain  would  show  that  for  the  essential  and  direct  object  of 
the  alliance  there  was  no  necessity  of  continuing  the  war.  But  since 
making  this  treaty  of  alliance  with  the  United  States,  France  had 
formed  other  connections  with  whose  views  we  had  no  concern,  and 
for  whose  sake  we  were  not  bound  to  postpone  the  offered  peace. 
We  have  seen  the  explicit  avowal  of  the  King  of  France  that  he 
entered  into  a  treaty  with  the  United  States  with  a  view  to  promote 
the  safety  and  interest  of  his  kingdom  and  subjects  by  diminishing  the 
power  of  England  ;  but  in  doing  this  and  eventually  facilitating  our  in 
dependence  of  Great  Britain,  it  became  apparent  that  there  would  be 


Appendix.  141 

no  objection  to  our  dependence  on  France,  particularly  in  "  leaving 
the  King  master  of  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  peace,"  and  to  keep  us 
thus  far  dependent  was  manifestly  the  object  of  certain  measures  of 
the  French  Court  calculated  to  deprive  the  United  States  of  an 
immense  western  territory,  of  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi, 
and  of  the  fisheries  except  on  our  own  coast. 

A  combination  of  facts  and  circumstances  leave  no  doubt  of  the 
intentions  of  the  French  Court  as  to  the  objects  above  mentioned. 
I  cannot  undertake  the  lengthy  detail,  and  will  only  just  mention,  in 
regard  to  territory,  what  was  proposed  and  urged  by  one  whose 
official  station  rendered  it  impossible  to  believe  that  he  was  express 
ing  only  his  own  sentiments,  or  that  he  was  not  acting  by  the  direction 
of  the  French  Court.  He  proposed  what  he  called  a  conciliatory 
line  between  the  United  States  and  Spain.  This  was  to  begin  at 
the  division  of  East  and  West  Florida,  and  run  thence  to  Fort 
Toulouse  on  the  River  Alabama,  thence  by  different  courses  to  the 
Cumberland  River  and  down  the  Cumberland  to  the  Ohio.  It  was 
insisted  that  the  United  States  could  have  no  pretensions  westward 
of  this  line  ;  that  "  as  to  the  course  and  navigation  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  they  followed  the  property,  and  would  belong,  therefore,  to  the 
nation  to  which  the  two  banks  belonged.  The  United  States  could 
have  no  pretensions,  not  being  masters  of  either  border  of  the  river ;" 
and  that  "  as  to  what  respects  the  lands  situated  to  the  northward 
of  the  Ohio,  there  was  reason  to  presume  that  Spain  could  form  no 
pretensions  thereto.  Their  fate  must  be  regulated  with  the  Court 
of  London."  It  is  certain  that,  originally,  Spain  made  no  preten 
sions  to  any  lands  eastward  of  the  Mississippi  to  the  northward  of 
the  Floridas  ;  and  it  is  clear  that  the  idea  of  her  finally  making  the 
claim  was  suggested  by  the  Court  of  France. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  understand  the  declarations  made  in 
the  instructions  to  citizen  Genet,  Minister  Plenipotentiary  from 
the  French  Republic  to  the  United  States.  These  instructions  are 
dated  January  4,  1793,  and  were  published  in  December  of  that 
year,  in  Philadelphia,  by  M.  Genet,  in  vindication  of  his  extraordi 
nary  measures  which  had  induced  our  Government  to  desire  his  recall. 
In  these  instructions  we  find  the  following  passages  :  "  The  Execu 
tive  Council  has  called  for  the  instructions  given  to  citizen  Genet's 
predecessors  in  America,  and  has  seen  in  them,  with  indignation,  that 
at  the  very  time  the  good  people  of  America  expressed  Jtheir  grati 
tude  to  us  in  the  most  feeling  manner,  and  gave  us  every  proof  of 


142  Appendix. 

their  friendship,  Vergennes  and  Montmorin  thought  that  it  was  right 
for  France  to  hinder  the  United  States  of  taking  that  political  sta 
bility  of  which  they  were  capable,  because  they  would  soon  acquire 
a  strength  which  it  was  probable  they  would  be  eager  to  abuse." 
"  The  same  Machiavelian  principle  influenced  the  operations  of  the 
war  for  independence  ;  the  same  duplicity  reigned  over  the  negotia 
tions  for  peace." 

We  see,  then,  that  in  forming  connection  with  us  in  1778,  the 
Court  of  France,  the  actual  organ  of  the  nation,  had  no  regard  to 
the  interest  of  the  United  States,  but  that  their  real  object  was,  by 
seizing  the  occasion  of  dismembering  the  British  Empire,  to  diminish 
the  power  of  a  formidable  rival,  and  that  when,  after  we  had  carried 
on  a  distressing  war  for  seven  years,  the  great  object  for  which  we 
had  contended — independence — was  within  our  reach,  that  Court 
endeavored  to  postpone  the  acknowledgment  of  it  by  Great  Britain, 
and  eventually  to  deprive  us  of  its  fairest  fruits — a  just  extent  of 
territory,  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  and  the  fishery. 

Such  being  the  motives  and  conduct  of  France,  what  inspired 
our  truly  grateful  sentiments  toward  that  nation  ?  The  ardent  affec 
tion,  the  sincere  friendship  of  Americans  for  Frenchmen  ?  We 
were  engaged  in  a  common  cause  against  Great  Britain.  We  re 
ceived  loans  of  money,  we  were  aided  by  troops  and  ships  in  attack 
ing  and  conquering  the  common  enemy  in  the  bosom  of  our  country  ; 
and  this  association  in  war  produced  acquaintances  and  personal 
friendships.  And  experiencing  these  benefits  we  gave  way  to  our 
feelings  without  inquiring  into  the  motives  from  which  they  were 
rendered. 

But  why  are  we  so  often  reminded  of  the  debt  of  gratitude  ?  Is 
it  really  because  more  than  gratitude — because  compensation  is  ex 
pected  to  cancel  it  ?  If  compensation  is  the  object,  the  treaty  of 
alliance  has  absolved  the  claim. 

"  The  contracting  parties  declare  that,  being  resolved  to  fulfil 
each  on  its  own  part  the  clauses  and  conditions  of  the  present  treaty 
of  alliance,  according  to  its  own  power  and  circumstances,  there 
shall  be  no  after-claim  of  compensation  on  one  side  or  the  other, 
whatever  may  be  the  event  of  the  war." 

I  am  here  naturally  led  to  notice  M.  Adet's  charge,  already 
mentioned,  that  we  have  not  offered  to  France  the  succors  which 
friendship  might  have  given  without  compromising  the  Govern 
ment. 


Appendix.  143 

If  M.  Adet  had  specified  the  kind  of  succors  which  might  thus 
have  been  offered,  we  could  better  judge  the  correctness  of  his  as 
sertion. 

But  is  it  true  that  we  have  rendered  no  succors  to  France? 
Read  the  following  passages  in  the  Secretary  of  State's  letter  of 
August  1 6,  1793,  to  Mr.  Morris:  "We  recollect  with  satisfaction 
that  in  the  course  of  two  years,  by  unceasing  exertions,  we  paid  up 
seven  years'  arrearages  and  instalments  of  our  debt  to  France,  which 
the  inefficacy  of  our  first  form  of  government  had  suffered  to  be  ac 
cumulating;  that  pressing  on  still  to  the  entire  fulfilment  of  our  en 
gagement,  we  have  facilitated  to  M.  Genet  the  effect  of  the  instal 
ments  of  the  present  year,  to  enable  him  to  send  relief  to  his 
fellow-citizens  in  France  threatened  with  famine ;  that  in  the  first 
moment  of  the  insurrection  which  threatened  the  colony  of  St. 
Domingo  we  stepped  forward  to  their  relief  with  arms  and  money, 
taking  freely  on  ourselves  the  risk  of  an  unauthorized  aid  when 
delay  would  have  been  denial ;  that  we  have  given  the  exclusive 
admission  to  sell  here  the  'prizes  made  by  France  on  her  enemies 
in  the  present  war,  though  unstipulated  in  our  treaties  and  unfounded 
in  her  own  practice  or  in  that  of  other  nations,  as  we  believe." 

To  this  detail  I  have  to  add  that  of  all  the  loans  and  supplies 
received  from  France  in  the  American  war,  amounting  to  nearly 
fifty-three  millions  of  livres,  the  United  States,  under  their  late  Gov 
ernment,  had  been  enabled  to  pay  not  two  millions  and  a  half  of 
livres  ;  that  the  present  Government,  after  paying  up  the  arrearages 
and  instalments  mentioned  by  Mr.  Jefferson,  has  been  continually 
anticipating  the  subsequent  instalments,  until,  in  the  year  1795,  the 
whole  of  our  debt  to  France  was  discharged  by  anticipating  the  pay 
ments  of  eleven  millions  and  a  half  of  livres,  no  part  of  which 
would  have  become  due  until  September  2,  1796,  and  then  only  one 
million  and  a  half;  the  residue  at  subsequent  periods,  the  last  not 
until  the  year  1802. 


APPENDIX  C. 


EXTRACTS  (TRANSLATED)  FROM  CONFIDENTIAL 
CORRESPONDENCE  AND  PAPERS  IN  THE 
FRENCH  ARCHIVES.* 

THE  COUNT  DE  VERGENNES  TO  COUNT  DE  MONTMORIN. 
;  (De  Circourt,  iii.,  310.) 

VERSAILLES,  October  30,  1778. 

WE  demand  independence  only  for  the  thirteen  States  of  Amer 
ica  which  have  formed  a  Union,  without  comprising  among  them 
any  of  the  other  English  possessions  which  have  taken  no  part  in 
the  insurrection. 

We  do  not  wish — far  from  it — that  the  new  Republic  should  re 
main  the  only  mistress  of  all  that  immense  continent.  As  it  would 
in  that  case  be  self-sufficient,  the  other  nations  would  soon  have  to 
yield  to  it,  because  being  able  to  do  without  them  it  would  most 
certainly  impose  on  them  very  hard  laws. 

The  predominating  spirit  of  this  Republic  is,  to  my  thinking,  a 
mercantile  one.  It  is  best  so,  for  that  will  make  it  the  less  danger 
ous  to  its  neighbors. 

According  to  M.  Gerard's  reports,  a  long  time,  ages  even,  will 
be  needed  before  this  new  Republic  can  attain  such  a  compactness 
as  may  enable  it  to  play  a  part  in  the  affairs  of  the  outer  world. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  important  that  the  English  should  remain  masters 
of  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia ;  they  will  keep  alive  the  jealousy  of 
this  nation,  which  might  otherwise  turn  somewhere  else,  and  will 
make  it  feel  the  need  of  sureties,  allies,  and  protectors. 

*  The  original  documents,  in  French  (pages  15  and  16),  from  which  these  ex 
tracts  are  translated  were  copied  for  Mr.  Bancroft  from  the  French  archives 
at  Paris,  and  given  by  Mr.  Bancroft  to  the  Count  Adolphe  de  Circourt,  by  whom 
they  were  published  in  the  third  volume  of  his  work,  entitled  "  Histoire  de 
1'action  commune  de  La  France  et  de  L'Amerique  pour  L'Independance  des 
Etats  Unis,"  etc.  Paris;  F.  Vieweg,  Rue  Richelieu,  67.  1876. 


Appendix.  145 

(Page  31 1.) 

VERSAILLES,  November  2,  1778. 

.  But  you  may  assure  him  [the  minister  of  the  King  of 
Spain]  that  it  is  not  on  our  part  he  will  meet  with  difficulties  with 
regard  to  the  preservation  and  guaranteeing  of  Canada  and  Nova 
Scotia  to  England. 

If  these  two  vast  provinces  remain  in  England's  power,  and 
Spain  gets  back  the  part  of  Western  Florida  which  suits  her,  a 
restraint  will  be  put  on  the  Americans  greater  than  is  needful  to 
prevent  them  from  becoming  enterprising  and  troublesome  neigh 
bors. 

I  begin  not  to  have  so  high  an  opinion  of  their  firmness,  because 
that  which  I  had  of  their  talents,  views,  and  patriotism  is  weakened 
as  I  become  better  informed. 

(Page  314.) 

VERSAILLES,  November  27,  1778. 

.  .  .  It  is  very  strange  that  people  persist  in  looking  on  the 
Americans  as  more  dangerous  neighbors  than  the  English. 

Their  Republic,  unless  they  correct  its  failings — a  thing  which  ap 
pears  to  me  very  difficult  on  account  of  the  diversity  and  even  con- 
tradictoriness  of  the  interests  concerned — will  never  be  anything  but 
a  feeble  body,  capable  of  very  little  exertion. 

Had  the  English  displayed  more  activity,  this  seeming  Colossus 
would  now  be  more  submissive  than  it  has  ever  been  before. 

Heaven  grant  such  may  not  be  the  end  still  !  I  confess  I  have 
but  little  confidence  in  the  energy  of  the  United  States. 

(Page  3 1 9.) 

VERSAILLES,  January  22,  1781. 

.  We  never  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  Spain  will  strive  to  set 
her  own  interests  before  everything  else  ;  that  she  will  want  to  make 
all  the  other  conditions  of  peace  subordinate  to  them  ;  and  that  she 
will  the  less  give  any  attention  to  those  of  the  Americans,  that  she 
sees  their  independence  with  deep  reluctance  ("  avec  douleur  "). 

(Page  320.) 

VERSAILLES,  April  12,  1781. 

I  have  long  had   the   conviction  that  Count  de  Florida  Blanca 
entertains  erroneous  principles  with  regard  to  America,  that  he  is 
secretly  hostile  to  the  independence  of  the  United  States,  and  that 
10 


146  Appendix. 

he  will  thwart  us  as  much  as  will  be  in  his  power  when  this  matter 
will  have  to  be  treated  of  with  Great  Britain.  .  .  . 

.  .  .  I  will  confide  to  you,  sir,  that  the  King,  moved  by  the 
extreme  distress  of  the  Americans,  has  just  granted  the  Congress  a 
gift  of  six  millions,  and  has  consented  to  the  surety  for  a  loan  of  ten 
millions  which  is  to  be  raised  on  their  behalf  in  Holland. 

I  leave  it  to  your  discretion  whether  you  will  or  will  not  tell 
M.  de  Florida  Blanca  of  this  resolve.  It  might  perhaps  have  the 
effect  of  making  him  less  parsimonious  in  his  dealings  with  Mr.  Jay. 

If  you  speak  of  it  to  him,  pray  make  him  feel  that  if  we  carry  on 
the  war  for  the  Americans  we  do  so  for  the  common  cause;  that 
consequently  it  is  for  the  interest  of  both  crowns  to  enable  them  to 
carry  it  on  effectually.  But  I  am  much  afraid  you  will  preach  in  the 
desert. 


EXTRACT  FROM  A  DESPATCH  OF  M.  GERARD  TO  COUNT 
DE  VERGENNES. 

(Page  260.) 

PHILADELPHIA,  December  22,  1778. 

.  A  few  days  ago  I  gave  a  dinner  to  the  President  *  for  his 
inauguration.  After  the  dinner  he  outstayed  the  other  guests,  with 
several  members  of  Congress  and  M.  de  Mirales.f  . 

.  .  .  I  have  abstained  from  speaking  about  the  exclusive  ac 
quisition  of  the  Mississippi  along  its  entire  course,  on  which  subject 
I  have  reported  already,  for  this  matter  must  be  handled  with  secrecy 
and  dexterity.  The  considerations  on  which  I  have  also  reported,  as 
well  as  the  extreme  need  in  which  the  Congress  stands  of  assistance 
to  pay  its  debts,  will  operate  powerfully  on  that  body,  more  particu 
larly  on  the  States  north  of  Virginia,  which  will  be  very  glad  to  prevent 
undertakings  of  which  they  would  share  only  the  burdens  ;  but  should 
the  project  come  to  light  prematurely,  the  owners  of  the  Illinois  lands 
and  of  two  immense  settlements  projected  and  begun  on  the  Ohio 
would  spare  nothing  to  put  obstacles  in  its  way,  and  they  would  have 
many  means  of  forming  a  powerful  party. 

.     .     .     In  all  my  talks  with  the  President  I  have  found  him  a 

*  Mr.  Jay,  President  pro  tempore  of  the  Congress,  elected  December  10,  1778  ; 
appointed  to  Spain  September  27,  1779  ;  sailed  October  20,  1779. 
f  Confidential  agent  of  Spain. 


Appen  dix.  1 47 

man  of  enlightened  mind,  exempt  from  prejudice  of  any  sort,  and 
capable  of  lofty  views.  He  shows  himself  sincerely  attached  to  the 
alliance  and  hostile  to  England. 

He  delights  in  the  idea  that  this  triumvirate,  as  he  calls  it,  be 
tween  France,  Spain,  and  America  will  defy  the  forces  of  the  entire 
world.  He  discusses  things  openly  and  honestly,  and  willingly  yields 
to  sound  argument.  I  am  much  mistaken,  or  we  shall  have  occa 
sion  to  regret  it  should  his  Presidency  prove  as  short-lived  as  it  ap 
pears  likely  to  be.  . 

EXTRACT  FROM  A  DESPATCH  OF  M.  GERARD  TO  COUNT 
DE  VERGENNES. 

(Page  264.) 

PHILADELPHIA,  January  28,  1779. 

.  With  regard  to  this  object,  Monseigneur,  I  must  tell 
you  that  my  insinuations  concerning  Florida  and  the  Mississippi 
have  produced  much  impression.  . 

.  .  .  The  greater  number  inclines  favorably  toward  my  in 
sinuations,  a  few  wished  to  find  a  middle  course,  and  others  think  the 
preservation  of  the  right  of  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  absolutely 
indispensable.  The  two  latter  classes  take  their  standing  on  the  in 
terests  of  the  population  settled  on  the  Ohio,  toward  the  Illinois 
River,  in  the  lands  of  the  Natchez,  in  Eastern  Florida.  They  say 
they  cannot  abandon  their  countrymen,  who  have  formed  themselves 
into  a  national  body  and  ask  to  be  admitted  into  the  American  Con 
federacy.  I  replied  that  in  a  matter  of  such  paramount  importance 
they  should  not  be  stopped  by  personal  considerations  and  mere 
questions  of  propriety  before  having  examined  whether  it  was  for  the 
general  interests  of  the  Republic. 


EXTRACT  FROM  THE  COUNT  DE  VERGENNES  TO  M.  DE 

LA    LUZERNE,   WHO    SUCCEEDED     M.    GERARD   AS    MIN 
ISTER  TO  THE  UNITED  STATES. 

(Page  266.) 

VERSAILLES,  July  18,  1779. 

.  .  .  It  is  nevertheless  possible  that  the  Congress  should  not 
have  roused  itself  from  its  habitual  torpor  and  should  have  made  no 
offensive  disposition  for  this  campaign.  The  King  charges  you  in 


148  Appendix. 

• 

this  case  to  lay  before  that  assembly  the  great  evils  which  must 
result  from  such  conduct.  . 

.  .  .  Spain  having  now  become  associated  in  our  war  and 
defending — at  least  indirectly — the  American  cause,  although  she  has 
not  entered  into  any  explanations  on  the  subject  nor  taken  any  en 
gagement  toward  the  United  States,  the  King  thinks  it  will  be  for 
the  interest  of  the  Congress,  as  well  as  a  matter  of  duty,  to  regulate 
at  once,  in  a  manner  satisfactory  to  that  power,  the  various  points 
which  concern  it.  I  know  of  three  such  : 

The  first  regards  the  boundaries  of  the  United  States  toward  the 
West ;  the  second  relates  to  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi ;  the 
third  to  the  two  Floridas.' 

.  .  .  With  regard  to  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  it  is 
pretty  nearly  proved  that  the  Americans  have  no  claim  to  it,  since 
at  the  moment  when  the  Revolution  broke  out  the  limits  of  the  thir 
teen  States  did  not  reach  to  the  river,  and  it  would  be  absurd  for 
them  to  claim  the  rights  of  England — i.e.,  of  a  power  whose  rule 
they  have  abjured. 

It  behooves  the  Congress,  therefore,  to  be  categorically  explicit 
on  this  point,  and  to  declare  that  the  United  States  put  forward  no 
pretensions  on  that  score — i.e.,  regarding  the  Mississippi — and  will 
be  content  to  request  the  gracious  countenance  of  the  King  of 
Spain  as  far  as  his  interest  will  permit  him  to  grant  to  them.  This 
matter  has  already  been  treated  by  M.  de  Rayneval,  and  I  judge 
from  his  reports  that  the  Congress  was  not  far  from  adopting  our 
views. 

.  .  .  As  to  the  Floridas,  they  do  not  belong  by  any  title  to 
the  United  States.  .  .  . 

.     .     Such,  sir,  is  our  view  of  the  three  points  which  concern 
the  Court  of  Madrid.     That  Court,  I  know,  shares  it.     ... 

.  .  .  You  will,  perhaps,  be  spoken  to  about  a  peace  subsidy. 
Such  assistance  would  assuredly  help  the  Congress  to  free  itself  from 
embarrassment,  and  an  excellent  impression  might  be  produced  by 
giving  even  now  a  promise  to  that  effect.  But  it  is  impossible  the 
King  should  take  such  an  engagement,  because  not  only  are  his  ex 
penses  excessive,  but  he  cannot  foretell  the  end  of  them,  nor,  conse 
quently,  the  extent  of  the  debts  which  the  war  will  have  forced  him 
to  incur.  Perhaps,  however,  it  would  be  imprudent  to  take  all  hope 
from  the  Americans,  nor  is  it  his  Majesty's  intention  to  do  so.  The 


,  Appendix.  149 

King  thinks,  on  the  contrary,  that  should  you  be  sounded  on  the 
subject  you  might,  as  though  speaking  for  yourself  only,  give  them 
a  glimpse  of  hope  that  he  may  grant  them  some  succor  should  the 
condition  of  his  own  affairs  allow  him  to  follow  the  impulse  of  his 
affection  toward  the  United  States.  You  will  feel  yourself  that  this 
disposition  of  the  King's  must  be  presented  with  as  much  circumspec 
tion  as  dexterity,  in  order  that  the  Americans  may  not  take  it  for  a 
formal  engagement  nor  complain  should  it  not  be  carried  into  ef 
fect.  .  .  . 

.  .  .  I  do  not  need  to  tell  you,  sir,  that  this  matter  [the  truce 
proposed  by  Spain]  should  be  presented  with  all  possible  caution,  so 
that  it  may  not  be  supposed  to  enter  at  present  our  views  or  our 
plans  for  pacification. 


COUNT  DE  VERGENNES  TO  M.  DE  LA  LUZERNE. 

(Page  275.) 

VERSAILLES,  September  25,  1779. 

.  .  According  to  M.  Gerard's  report,  no  member  of  that 
assembly  has  dared  openly  to  opine  in  favor  of  a  continuation  of  the 
war  ;  but  the  party  which  has  formed  itself  under  the  leadership  of 
Messrs.  Lee  and  Adams  seeks  to  prolong  it  in  an  indirect  way,  by 
raising  difficulties  regarding  the  conditions  of  peace.  This  party  has 
principally  laid  hold  of  two  items,  the  fisheries  and  the  territories 
situated  along  the  banks  of  the  Mississippi.  It  pretends,  first,  that 
the  right  of  fishing  belongs  to  the  Eastern  States  ;  that  England 
must  recognize  and  France  guarantee  it.  Second,  that  the  land 
lying  toward  the  Mississippi  belongs  to  the  United  States,  and  that 
their  right  to  free  navigation  along  that  river  cannot  be  contested.* 

As  it  is  important  to  elucidate  these  two  points  and  to  rectify  the 
ideas  of  a  great  number  of  delegates  concerning  them.  I  shall  not 
lose  an  instant,  sir,  in  transmitting  to  you  the  King's  view  of  the  sub 
ject  and  that  of  his  Council. 

.  .  .  There  can,  therefore,  be  no  question  of  disputing  the 
Americans'  right  of  fishing  out  in  the  open  sea,  and  it  would  be  idle 
to  discuss  this  position. 

*  Previous  to  the  peace  of  1763  France  considered  herself  the  sovereign  of  the 
entire  Mississippi  basin.  She  adjudged  to  Canada  the  north  of  that  immense  re 
gion  to  the  Ohio  and  the  south  to  Louisiana. 


150  Appendix. 

No  so  the  fishing  along  the  coast ;  it  belongs  by  right  to  the 
owner  ot  that  coast,  and  he  is  at  liberty  to  exclude  from  it  whomso 
ever  he  thinks  fit.  It  results  from  this  that  the  fishing  along  the 
coast  of  Newfoundland,  New  Scotland  and  its  dependencies,  Canada, 
etc.,  belongs  exclusively  to  the  English  ;  that  the  Americans  have 
absolutely  no  claim  thereto,  and  that,  if  we  do  enjoy  it  in  certain 
places,  it  is  not  in  virtue  of  a  common  right,  but  of  treaties  which 
have  expressly  reserved  us  the  privilege. 

.  .  .  It  is  essential  to  remark  that  the  fisheries  belong  and 
have  always  belonged  to  the  Crown  of  Great  Britain,  and  that  it  was 
as  subjects  of  that  Crown  the  Americans  enjoyed  it.  Consequently, 
from  the  moment  when  they  shook  off  the  English  yoke  and  declared 
themselves  independent,  they  broke  the  community  which  existed 
between  them  and  the  metropolis  and  voluntarily  relinquished  all  the 
advantages  which  they  derived  from  that  community,  just  as  they 
despoiled  England  of  all  the  advantages  she  derived  from  their  union 
with  her. 

It  should,  therefore,  be  well  established  that  from  the  moment 
when  the  colonies  published  their  Declaration  of  Independence,  they 
have  ceased  to  own  a  share  in  the  fisheries  because  they  have  for 
feited  by  their  own  act  the  qualification  which  entitled  them  to  such 
a  share  ;  that  consequently  they  can  oppose  to  the  Court  of  London 
neither  title  nor  actual  possession.  From  this  truth  another  results, 
viz.:  that  the  Americans  having  no  right  to  the  fishing,  we  can  give 
them  no  guarantee  on  that  head.  .  .  . 

.  .  .  From  all  that  I  have  just  said  result  the  following  posi 
tions  : 

1.  That  the  King's  guarantee  actually  bears  only  on  the  indepen 
dence  of  the  United  States. 

2.  That  this  guarantee  only  eventually  bears  on  their  possessions, 
whatever  these  may  be. 

3.  That  the  United  States  have  no  actual  right  to  the  fisheries. 

4.  That  the  King  has  not  contracted,  either  explicitly  or  impli 
citly,  the  obligation  of  letting  them  have  a  share  in  the  same. 

5.  That  they  can  claim  such  share  only  in   so  far  as   they  may 
secure  it  by  force  of  arms  and  by  the  future  truce  or  treaty  of  peace. 

The  second  point  on  which  the  enemies  of  peace  have  striven  to 
hamper  the  deliberations  of  the  Congress  is  the  land  that  lies  toward 
the  Mississippi,  and  which  we  have  ceded  to  the  English  by  our  last 
treaty  of  peace.  .  .  . 


Appendix.  151 

Referring  to  the  project  of  a  truce  which  had  been  proposed  by 
Spain  in  the  supposition  that  by  this  means  further  bloodshed  might 
be  avoided,  M.  de  Vergennes  said:  "  .  .  .  However  improbable 
it  may  appear,  it  would  be  infinitely  better,  both  for  America  and 
ourselves,  to  sign  a  truce  rather  than  continue  a  ruinous  war  with 
uncertain  success.  The  history  of  several  European  Republics  will 
supply  you  with  ample  means  for  convincing  unprejudiced  Ameri 
cans  that  by  virtually  \de  fait]  maintaining  their  independence,  it 
will  in  reality  be  as  firmly  established  as  though  England  had  recog 
nized  it  by  a  formal  and  definite  treaty,  thanks  to  the  guarantees  by 
which  it  would  be  supported."  * 

It  will  probably  be  objected  to  you,  sir,  that  by  procuring  only 
a  truce  for  America  France  would  not  fulfil  the  obligations  imposed 
on  it  by  the  alliance.  But  in  order  to  destroy  this  objection,  it  will 
doubtless  be  sufficient  for  you  to  recall  the  very  terms  of  the  treaty 
to  which  I  have  referred  in  the  beginning  of  the  present  despatch. 
By  Article  II.  the  King  binds  himself  to  guarantee  the  indepen 
dence  of  the  United  States.  In  what  way  is  not  expressed. 

It  is  not  said  that  the  independence  must  be  recognized  by  Eng 
land.  All  that  the  King  is  bound  to  do  is  to  insure  it  formally  or 
tacitly  by  the  treaty  which  will  put  an  end  to  the  war,  and  to  guaran 
tee  the  United  States  against  all  harm.  This  latter  point  is  foreseen 
by  the  treaty  itself,  and  is  the  object  of  the  war  which  his  Majesty  is 
carrying  on  against  England  ;  the  other  will  be  achieved  by  a  truce 
supported  by  such  measures  as  may  insure  and  perpetuate  its  effects, 
and  such  a  truce  would  fully  come  up  to  the  obligation  expressed  in 
Article  VIII.  of  the  treaty  of  alliance.  . 

.  .  .  If  provoked  to  speak,  you  will  abstain  from  official  dec 
larations.  You  will  present  your  view  as  personal  to  yourself,  lest, 
should  you  speak  in  the  King's  name,  they  might  suspect  us  of  an 
intention  to  stop  at  a  truce,  whence  would  result  new  debates  and 
distrust,  which  it  the  more  behooves  us  to  avoid  as  the  King's  pro 
ject,  as  well  as  that  of  the  King  of  Spain,  is  to  end  the  war  only  by 
a  definite  treaty.  .  . 

.     .     .     His  Majesty  further  empowers  you  to  continue  the  dona- 

*  M.  de  Vergennes  here  alludes  to  the  truce  concluded  in  1609  between  the 
United  Provinces  of  the  Netherlands  and  the  Archdukes  who  ruled  Belgium.  This 
truce,  which  recognized  the  provinces'  independence  de  facto,  preceded  by  thirty- 
nine  years  the  recognition  de  jure  by  the  Crown  of  Spain. — Editor's  note  in  Cir- 
court's  third  volume. 


152  Appendix. 

tions  which  M.  Gerard  has  given  or  promised  to  various  American 
authors,  and  of  which  he  will  surely  have  handed  you  a  list.* 

It  appears  that,  when  the  Americans  will  be  their  own  masters, 
the  general  confederacy  will  have  much  difficulty  in  maintaining 
itself,  and  that  it  may  very  possibly  be  superseded  by  separate  con 
federacies.  If  such  a  revolution  really  takes  place  it  will  weaken  the 
United  States,  which  has  not  nor  ever  will  have  anything  like  real 
respectable  strength  except  by  their  union.  But  it  is  entirely  their 
own  business  to  consider  these  things ;  we  have  neither  the  right 
nor  any  interest  to  draw  their  attention  thereunto.  I  say  "  no  in 
terest,"  because  it  is  no  profit  to  us  to  see  Northern  America  play 
the  part  of  a  power  and  be  able  to  cause  uneasiness  to  her  neigh 
bors.  All  that  we  wish  with  regard  to  the  United  States  is  that  they 
may  be  independent  and  peaceable ;  this  latter  point  might  become 
doubtful,  sooner  or  later,  should  their  political  condition  ever  allow 
them  to  become  ambitious.  .  .  . 

.  .  .  The  possibility  of  a  dissolution  of  the  general  confed 
eracy,  and  consequently  of  the  suppression  of  the  Congress,  makes  us 
think  that  nothing  could  be  more  in  conformity  to  our  political  in 
terest  than  that  each  State  should  ratify  the  treaties  concluded  with 
France  by  a  separate  act,  because  in  this  manner  each  State  will 
be  bound  to  us  separately,  whatever  may  be  the  fate  of  the  general 
confederacy.  So  you  will  please,  sir,  to  hold  the  Americans  to  this 
system  by  your  insinuations  and  induce  them  to  carry  it  out. 

Post-scriptum. — I  enclose  the  King's  answer  to  the  letter  in 
which  the  Congress  has  asked  his  Majesty  for  his  own  portrait  and 
that  of  the  Queen. 


EXTRACTS  FROM  AN  UNDATED  MEMOIR,  WRITTEN  BE 
TWEEN  MAY  30  AND  JUNE  15,  1782.1 

(Pages  30-34.) 

It  appears  we  are  to  witness  the  rise  out  of  the  midst  of  Europe 
of  a  new  power  which  is  to  become  in  America  a  State  similar  to 
those  which  gave  it  birth.  The  united  colonies  do  not  possess  any 
of  those  metals,  those  precious  wares  and  products  which  give  such 

*  Temporary  pecuniary  assistance.  This  delicate  subject  has  been  even  in  our 
time  the  subject  of  criticism  and  controversies  into  which  we  need  not  enter. — 
Editor's  note,  Circourt,  iii. 

f  See  Mr.  Bancroft's  views  on  the  origin  of  this  memoir,  note  pp.  91-92,  ante. 


Appendix.  153 

advantages  to  the  other  American  colonies.  It  is  not  through  gold 
or  silver  mines,  nor  through  those  products  which  the  Old  World  can 
yield  that  the  new  power  will  become  noteworthy.  By  these  pro 
ducts  it  is  placed  on  a  level  with  Europe.  It  is  to  the  cultivation  of 
land,  to  the  industry  of  the  inhabitants,  to  the  vigor  of  its  commerce 
it  will  owe  its  wealth. 

The  die  is  cast ;  England  must  regard  the  new  power  as  her 
equal — nay,  as  her  rival,  independent  de  facto  ;  the  future  treaty  of 
peace  will  make  it  independent  de  jure — such  is  the  will  of  France. 
Such  was  of  necessity  the  will  of  France,  for  that  was  the  most  fatal 
blow  she  could  inflict  on  her  ambitious  and  troublesome  rival.  But 
has  France  foreseen  the  extent  of  the  power  which  the  United  States 
may  eventually  acquire  ?  This  question,  though  doubtless  present 
to  Count  de  Vergennes'  mind,  is  not  what  must  occupy  it  just  now. 
What  at  the  present  moment  appears  of  greatest  importance  is  to 
regulate  the  territorial  extent  which  must  be  given  to  this  power  on 
the  vast  continent  of  North  America,  and  what  its  boundaries  shall 
be.  Nature  seems  to  have  drawn  them  to  the  north  and  south  by 
the  chain  of  the  Appalachian  Mountains*  and  the  sea.  It  remains 
to  determine  what  they  shall  be  to  the  east  and  west.  The  ques 
tion  is  a  very  important  one,  and  in  order  to  prove  this  we  will  take 
the  liberty  of  giving  our  ideas  some  development. 

The  interest  of  Europe  in  general  and  of  the  entire  world  de 
mands  that  the  power  of  the  insurgents  should  have  well-known  and 
clearly  denned  boundaries.  It  would  be  too  dangerous  to  leave  to 
this  power,  at  the  moment  of  its  birth,  a  domain  of  undetermined  ex 
tent  in  a  new  land,  very  thinly  peopled  as  yet,  but  which  can  become 
populous  in  a  very  short  time.  This  would  amount  to  enabling  its 
leaders  not  only  to  produce  the  greatest  revolutions  in  that  part  of 
the  globe,  but  to  extend  these  revolutions  beyond  their  continent.  It 
may  be  looked  on  as  certain  that  the  new  States'  population  will  in 
crease  quickly  and  considerably.  The  discontent  which  actually 
prevails  among  the  English  nation,  its  migratory  spirit,  the  hope  of 
finding  more  assured  liberties  in  a  new  State,  amidst  people  whom  a 
desire  to  enlarge  their  trade  has  urged  to  such  great  efforts,  the  cer 
tainty  of  peaceably  enjoying  there  the  fruits  of  labor  and  industry — 
all  these  things  will  decide  numbers  of  English  families  to  leave  their 
homes  and  settle  amidst  the  insurgents,  and  this  new  wound  will  not 
be  the  least  felt  or  least  prejudicial  to  England.  The  rest  of  Europe 
*  So  the  French  writers  of  that  day  called  the  Alleghanies. 


1 54  Appendix. 

should  also  guard  against  emigration.  Before  the  beginning  of  the 
present  war  people  hardly  knew  the  excellence  of  the  soil  of  North 
America  ;  but  now  everybody  is  informed  of  it. 

Each  power,  therefore,  should  take  precautionary  measures  against 
emigration.  In  order  as  much  as  possible  to  forestall  this  evil,  it 
behooves  not  to  leave  too  much  land  to  the  American  colonies,  so 
as  not  to  give  them  the  means  of  receiving  too  many  new  subjects. 
To  neglect  this  important  point  were  a  capital  mistake,  on  which 
repentance  would  promptly  follow. 

Moreover,  should  the  insurgents  be  suffered  to  spread  too  far 
eastward,  they  would  soon  be  enabled  to  seize  on  all  the  fisheries 
along  the  American  shore.  Should  they  be  allowed  to  push  too  far 
to  the  north  and  settle  the  excellent  land  which  lies  between  the 
Appalaches,  the  lakes,  and  the  St.  Lawrence  River,  they  would  soon 
become  sole  masters  of  the  fur  trade  in  America.  If  they  carried 
their  settlements  into  the  West,  along  the  Ohio  and  the  Mississippi, 
it  would  be  easy  for  them  to  advance  into  New  Mexico  and  the  land 
of  the  new  silver  mines,  and  occupy  them  before  the  Spaniards  could 
come  in  force  to  oppose  them. 

It  is  of  paramount  importance,  therefore,  at  the  moment  when 
the  new  power  is  to  be  framed  and  consolidated,  to  enclose  it  within 
such  boundaries  as  must,  at  least  for  a  long  time,  restrain  any  am 
bitious  projects,  and  the  following  are  the  means  which  we  think  best 
calculated  to  achieve  this  purpose  :  In  the  first  place,  to  surround 
the  possessions  of  the  insurgents  with  nations  capable  of  mutually 
supporting  each  other  against  their  enterprises,  and  whose  power 
should  be  sufficiently  great  to  oppose  all- projects  endangering  the 
tranquillity  of  this  part  of  the  world. 

Further,  it  appears  indispensable  that  England  should  sacrifice 
the  feeble  colony  of  Georgia,  and  that  the  western  boundaries  of  the 
united  colonies  should  be  drawn  in  that  country,  so  that  there  the 
Spanish  territory  should  end. 

It  is  clear  from  this  that  we  take  for  granted  the  entire  cession 
of  Florida  to  the  Spaniards.  This  sacrifice  will  be  shown  to  be  in 
dispensable.  To  insure  the  solidity  of  the  future  peace,  we  think 
the  entire  removal  of  the  English  from  this  part  of  the  continent 
absolutely  necessary.  The  ambitious  views  which  they  have  mani 
fested  in  wishing  to  have  the  Mississippi  River  for  their  boundary, 
the  extension  which  they  have  tried  to  give  to  their  commerce  in 
this  part  of  the  world,  the  communications  which  they  have  estab- 


Appendix.  155 

lished  with  New  Mexico — all  these  symptoms  are  a  leaven  of  dis 
cord  which  should  be  removed.  The  chief  object  of  the  future 
treaty  of  peace  must  be  to  insure  to  every  one  tranquillity  in  their 
domains  and  entire  liberty  of  commerce.  Spain  must  not  be  able 
to  invade  or  disturb  England  in  either  ;  but  there  must  be  complete 
reciprocity.  Only  by  removing  the  occasions  of  so  doing  will  this 
object  be  achieved. 


EXAMINATION  OF  THE  MOTIVES  AND  CONDITIONS  OF  THE 
TREATY  OF  PEACE  TO  BE  MADE  WITH  THE  INSUR 
GENTS,  WITH  THE  ENGLISH,  AND  WITH  OUR  ALLIES. 

(Fragment,  June  or  July,  1782.) 
(Pages  34-38.) 

The  treaty  of  peace  which  will  recognize  their  independence 
must,  first  of  all,  hold  them  to  their  original  limits,  so  that  the  new 
Republic  may  never  be  able  to  extend  beyond  them,  neither  by  con 
quest  nor  by  associations  between  the  American  colonies. 

The  boundaries  of  their  continent  must  be  detailed  and  circum 
scribed  with  the  greatest  exactness,  and  all  the  belligerent  powers 
must  bind  themselves  to  prevent  any  transgression  of  them.  It  is 
as  much  in  the  interest  of  England  as  in  that  of  Spain,  France,  and 
Holland  to  stop  them  by  force  at  the  first  infraction  of  the  limits  and 
the  first  attempt  toward  extending  beyond  them. 

The  example  of  England,  who  has  made  herself  ruler  of  the  seas 
and  of  the  vast  commerce  of  America,  notwithstanding  the  distance 
and  smallness  of  the  metropolis,  as  compared  to  those  European 
nations  who  hold  the  strongest  interest  in  the  colonies,  is  a  warning 
which  makes  the  greatest  caution  incumbent  on  all  concerned,  in 
order  not  to  exchange  one  bondage  for  another  and  not  to  become 
dependent  on  these  new-comers,  whom  their  numbers  may  raise  to 
the  first  rank  in  America. 

*  The  support  given  to  insurgents  against  their  masters  is  an  exam 
ple  which  must  strongly  impress  the  nations  of  those  countries  who 
think  themselves  ill-used  by  their  sovereign.  None  but  well-in 
formed  persons  know  that  France  has  assisted  the  insurgents  only 
long  after  they  had  taken  up  arms.  France  really  sent  over  help 
only  after  the  battle  of  Belle-Poule. 

It  may  be  said  with  some  probability  that  a  long  time  must 
elapse  before  the  new  republicans  are  in  a  condition  to  give  laws  to 


1 56  Appendix. 

America,  or  even  to  play  there  a  conspicuous  part,  all  the  more  that 
they  have  a  very  scanty  population,  very  little  cultivated  land,  very 
little  trade,  little  clothing,  no  money  and  many  debts,  and  it  will 
always  be  time  enough  to  act  against  them  and  take  measures  ac 
cording  to  circumstances. 

It  is  true  that  time  is  needed  to  make  a  conquering  or  even  an 
enterprising  people  ;  indeed,  that  it  is  more  difficult  to  implant  the 
spirit  of  conquest  into  a  republic  than  into  the  head  of  a  govern 
ment  entrusted  to  one  person.  This  fear,  in  fact,  seems  to  be  un 
founded,  as  proven  by  every  precedent  in  ancient  or  modern  history, 
or  at  least  to  be  removed  to  a  far-distant  future.  Still,  and  notwith 
standing  these  considerations  arising  from  the  common  course  of 
events  in  Europe,  it  appears  to  me  that  precautions  should  be  taken 
at  once  with  regard  to  North  America. 

America  is  to  Europe  as  another  world,  quite  as  much  as  India, 
Persia,  or  any  other  nation  of  the  remaining  three  parts  of  the  world. 
.  .  .  If  we  consider  that  a  handful  of  insurgents  have,  for  sev 
eral  years  and  unaided,  stood  their  ground  against  the  forces  of  Eng 
land,  who,  notwithstanding  her  immense  wealth  and  the  great  number 
of  troops  she  sent  over  to  North  America,  could  not  bring  this 
handful  of  men  to  terms,  although  they  had  neither  experience  in  the 
craft  of  war,  nor  money,  nor  protectors,  and  that  England  has  been 
unable  to  induce  them  even  to  accept  an  amicable  compromise,  we 
may  judge  how  difficult  they  will  be  to  manage  if  they  are  allowed 
to  extend  their  boundaries,  especially  if  they  increase  the  popula 
tion,  if  they  cultivate  the  land,  and  have  a  commerce  in  proportion 
to  the  area  they  cover.  We  have  to  do  here  emphatically  with  the 
welfare  of  the  State,  which  is  the  supreme  law  of  a  government,  and 
nothing  should  be  forgotten,  even  at  this  early  stage,  to  forestall  the 
consequences  of  the  new  country's  independence. 

All  these  considerations  lead  me  to  the  conclusion  that  it  is  most 
essential  to  guard  against  the  steps  which  the  insurgents  may  take  in 
America,  at  any  future  time,  with  a  view  either  to  extend  their  owYi 
dominion  or  to  assist  other  nations  in  that  part  of  the  world  who 
might  wish  to  follow  the  example  given  by  Americans  of  the  united 
provinces  and  shake  off  the  yoke  of  the  Europeans,  and  who,  blinded 
by  the  prosperity  of  the  united  provinces,  might  fancy  themselves  pos 
sessed  of  sufficient  strength  to  acknowledge  their  masters  no  longer. 
The  only  question,  then,  is  by  what  means  to  guard  against  this  dan 
ger.  As  England,  Spain,  and  Holland  are  interested  in  the  matter 


Appendix.  157 

equally  with  France,  the  necessity  of  taking  pecautionary  measures 
must  be  declared  by  the  minister  of  one  of  those  powers.  The  mat 
ter  is  considered  all  the  more  easy  as  it  is  doubted  whether  Spain 
will  acknowledge  the  independence  of  the  insurgents,  on  account 
of  the  bad  example  to  the  Peruvians,  the  Mexicans,  and  the  other 
inhabitants  of  her  different  colonies. 

It  is  believed  that  the  insurgents,  before  they  broke  with  the 
mother  country,  got  the  profits  of  the  greatest  part  of  the  free  fishing 
\feche  errante\  about  Newfoundland,  besides  the  sedentary  fisher 
ies,  which  are  the  most  abundant  and  the  most  lucrative.  But  as 
the  insurgents  are  no  longer  Englishmen,  and  Newfoundland  is  no 
dependence  of  their  thirteen  provinces,  England  has  as  much  inter 
est  as  France  to  exclude  them  from  at  least  the  right  of  free  fishing, 
which  would  give  them  the  promptest  and  surest  means  of  enriching, 
perhaps  even  of  aggrandizing  themselves  at  England's  expense 

It  is,  therefore,  obviously  in  England's  interest  to  have  the  French 
as  partners  at  Newfoundland  in  preference  to  the  insurgents. 


COUNT  DE  VERGENNES  TO  THE  CHEVALIER  DE  LA 
LUZERNE. 

(Page  298.) 

VERSAILLES,  October  14,  1782. 

.  .  .  If  we  are  fortunate  enough  to  achieve  a  peace  it  is  evi 
dent  that  the  King  must  then  cease  to  pay  the  American  army, 
which,  from  being  habitually  inactive,  will  then  have  become  en 
tirely  useless.  But  it  might  be  dangerous,  in  the  present  state  of 
things,  to  make  such  an  announcement  to  the  Congress.  Therefore 
if  they  talk  to  you  about  subsidies  for  next  year,  you  will  merely  say 
that  you  are  still  ignorant  of  the  King's  intentions  on  that  sub 
ject.  .  .  . 

.  You  know  our  system  regarding  Canada;  it  is  un 
changed,  so  that  everything  that  will  prevent  the  conquest  of  it  will 
essentially  meet  our  views.  But  you  will  yourself,  sir,  feel  that  this 
our  way  of  thinking  must  be  an  impenetrable  secret  to  the  Ameri 
cans  ;  it  would  be,  in  their  eyes,  a  crime  which  they  would  never 
forgive  us.  It  behooves  to  leave  them  to  their  illusions,  to  do  every 
thing  that  can  make  them  fancy  that  we  share  them,  and  unostenta 
tiously  to  defeat  any  attempts  to  which  these  illusions  might  carry 
t  hem  if  our  co  operation  is  required.  .  .  . 


158  Appendix. 

.  .  Besides,  I  do  not  see  on  what  grounds  the  Americans 
would  claim  the  lands  which  border  on  Lake  Ontario.  These  lands 
either  belong  to  the  savages  or  are  a  dependence  of  Canada.  In 
neither  case  have  the  United  States  any  right  to  them.  But  I  am 
aware  of  the  extravagant  pretensions  current  in  America.  According 
to  the  Congress,  the  charters  emanating  from  the  British  Crown  ex 
tend  the  domain  of  America  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific  Oceans. 
Such  is  the  system  proposed  by  Mr.  Jay  as  the  basis  of  his  negotia 
tion  with  Spain.  Such  an  aberration  \un  pareil delirt]  is  undeserving 
of  serious  refutation.  Yet  a  confidential  note  has  been  placed  in 
Mr.  Jay's  hands,  in  which  note  it  is  pretty  well  demonstrated  that 
the  boundaries  of  the  United  States  south  of  the  Ohio  stop  at  the 
mountains  following  the  water-shed,  and  that  all  that  skirts  those 
mountains,  and  particularly  the  lakes,  has  formerly  been  a  part  of 
Canada.  All  this,  however,  is  meant  for  your  own  eye  alone.  You 
will  in  no  way  show  that  you  have  any  knowledge  of  these  things, 
because  we  are  the  less  inclined  to  interfere,  at  least  at  the  present 
moment,  in  the  discussion  between  Count  Aranda  and  Mr.  Jay,  that 
both  parties  claim  land  to  which  neither  has  a  right,  and  that  it  will 
be  impossible  to  make  them  agree. 

.  .  .  But  the  American  agents  do  not  shine  by  the  soundness 
of  their  views  or  the  adaptation  thereof  to  the  political  condition  of 
Europe.  They  have  all  the  presumption  of  ignorance.  But  there 
is  reason  to  expect  that  experience  will  ere  long  enlighten  and  im 
prove  them. 

In  my  despatch  No.  39  I  informed  you  of  the  manner  in 
which  Messrs.  Franklin  and  Jay  were  situated  toward  Mr.  Oswald. 
The  objections  which  they  have  raised  against  the  form  of  the  Eng 
lish  agent's  powers,  together  with  the  observations  which  I,  on  my 
side,  had  made  to  Mr.  Eitzherbert,  have  been  taken  into  considera 
tion  by  the  Council  at  St.  James. 

New  powers  have  been  made  out,  in  which  the  colonies  are  en 
titled  "  United  States."  These  powers  have  been  exchanged  against 
those  of  the  American  plenipotentiaries.  Thus  that  matter  is  per 
fectly  regulated  according  to  the  wishes  and  to  the  satisfaction  of 
the  Congress.  I  have  been  assured  that  the  negotiations  on  the 
substance  of  the  question  had  begun,  and  that  the  English  plenipo 
tentiary  showed  himself  rather  manageable  \assez  coulant\.  But  I 
cannot  tell  you  anything  positive  on  the  subject,  as  Messrs.  Jay 
and  Franklin  observed  the  most  absolute  reserve  toward  me. 


Appendix.  159 

.  .  .  This  mission  [that  of  Rayneval  to  England]  had  no 
other  object  than  to  enlighten  us  on  the  real  intentions  of  the  Eng 
lish  Cabinet,  indicated  by  some  overtures  which  it  had  caused  to  be 
made  in  an  indirect  way.  The  first  subject  treated  in  the  confer 
ences  which  M.  de  Rayneval  had  there  was  the  independence  of 
America,  and  the  fact  of  new  powers  having  been  made  out  for  Mr. 
Oswald  sufficiently  shows  how  he  must  have  spoken  on  the  subject. 
I  enter  into  these  details  because  they  will  have  learned  in  America 
M.  de  Rayneval's  journey  to  England  from  the  newspapers,  and  it  is 
possible  that  evil-intentioned  persons  may  try  to  lend  a  false  color 
to  that  step. 


EXTRACTS  FROM   M.   DE   RAYNEVAL'S   REPORTS   ON  HIS 
CONFERENCES  WITH  THE  ENGLISH  MINISTERS. 

(October  13,   1782.) 
(Page  46.) 

America's  turn  came  at  last.  Lord  Shelburne  foresaw  that  they 
would  have  much  difficulty  with  America,  with  regard  as  well  to  the 
boundaries  as  to  the  fisheries  ;  but  he  hopes  the  King  will  not  sup 
port  them  in  their  claim.  I  have  answered  that  I  did  not  doubt  the 
King's  readiness  to  do  all  in  his  power  to  restrain  the  Americans 
within  the  bounds  of  justice  and  reason.  And  his  lordship  having  de 
sired  to  know  what  I  thought  of  their  pretensions,  I  replied  that  I  did 
not  know  what  they  were  concerning  the  fisheries,  but  that,  whatever 
they  might  be,  there  was,  to  my  thinking,  one  principle  safely  to  be 
followed  in  the  matter,  viz.  :  that  fishing  in  the  open  sea  is  res 
nullius,  and  that  fishing  along  the  coasts  belongs  of  right  to  the 
owners  of  those  coasts,  unless  there  exist  departures  from  the  prin 
ciple  founded  on  conventions.  As  to  the  boundaries,  I  supposed 
the  Americans  would  go  for  them  to  their  charters,  and  want  the 
whole  continent,  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific.  Lord  Shelburne 
said  the  charters  were  nonsense,  and  the  discussion  was  not  con 
tinued  because  I  would  neither  support  the  American  claim  nor 
demolish  it.  I  only  said  that  the  English  Cabinet  should  find,  in 
the  negotiations  of  1754  concerning  the  Ohio,  the  limits  which  Eng 
land,  then  the  sovereign  of  the  thirteen  united  provinces,  thought 
fit  to  assign  to  them. 


160  Appendix. 

(Page  51.) 

LONDON,  December  25,  1782. 

.  .  .  I  took  occasion  to  speak  to  Lord  Shelburne  of  the 
precipitancy  of  the  dealings  with  the  Americans,  and  I  do  not  con 
ceal  from  you,  Monseigneur,  that  I  spoke  somewhat  reproachfully. 

Lord  Shelburne  observed  that  to  give  me  an  answer  was  a  very 
delicate  thing  as  respects  both  the  Council  and  the  American  Com 
missioners.  Still,  he  said  that  it  is  thought  desirable  here  to  have 
done  with  the  Americans  before  the  next  session  of  Parliament,  and 
with  us  too,  so  as  to  prevent  questionings  and  Parliamentary  inter 
vention  ;  that  moreover  he,  Lord  Shelburne,  had  not  known,  be 
fore  the  report  was  made  to  the  Council,  that  things  had  gone  so  far 
and  had  been  made  so  easy  to  the  Americans,  and  that  he  disap 
proved  of  it  at  heart.  I  attempted  to  take  advantage  of  the  oppor 
tunity  to  make  some  remarks  on  the  embarrassments  which  would 
arise  for  Spain  out  of  that  article  in  the  treaty  which  gives  to  the 
Americans  the  right  of  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  but  Lord  Shel 
burne  replied  in  a  lively  tone  that  this  was  indifferent  to  him  ;  that 
all  that  concerned  Spain  mattered  little  to  him;  that  this  power  de 
served  courtesy  only  as  being  his  Majesty's  ally,  but  that  he  would 
take  no  step  in  its  favor.  It  would  have  been  vain  to  insist.  I 
shall  wait  for  a  calmer  moment  before  I  reply. 


FRAGMENT  FROM  A  DESPATCH  OF  COUNT  DE  VERGENNES 

TO   M.    DE   LA   LUZERNE. 

VERSAILLES,  November  23,  1782. 

The  King  will  not  be  remiss  in  fulfilling  his  engage 
ments  ;  but  there  is  nothing  in  the  treaties  obliging  him  to  continue 
the  war  in  order  to  support  the  ambitious  claims  which  the  Ameri 
cans  may  put  forward  with  regard  either  to  the  fisheries  or  to  the 
extension  of  the  boundaries. 


APPENDIX   D. 


INSTRUCTIONS  TO  THE  COMMISSIONERS  FOR 

PEACE. 

(Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  American  Revolution,  x.,  75,  76.) 

IN  CONGRESS,  June  15,  1781.    ' 

To  the  Honorable  John  Adams,  Benjamin  Franklin,  John  Jay, 
Henry  Laurens,  and  Thomas  Jefferson,  Ministers  Plenipoten 
tiary  in  behalf  of  the  United  States  to  negotiate  a  treaty  of 
peace. 

GENTLEMEN — You  are  hereby  authorized  and  instructed  to  con 
cur,  in  behalf  of  these  United  States,  with  his  Most  Christian  Majesty, 
in  accepting  the  mediation  proposed  by  the  Empress  of  Russia  and 
the  Emperor  of  Germany. 

You  are  to  accede  to  no  treaty  of  peace  which  shall  not  be  such 
as  may,  first,  effectually  secure  the  independence  and  sovereignty  of 
the  Thirteen  United  States,  according  to  the  form  and  effect  of  the 
treaties  subsisting  between  the  said  United  States  and  his  Most 
Christian  Majesty ;  and  secondly,  in  which  the  said  treaties  shall  not 
be  left  in  their  full  force  and  validity. 

As  to  disputed  boundaries  and  other  particulars,  we  refer  you  to 
the  instructions  given  to  Mr.  John  Adams,  dated  August  14,  1779. 
and  October  18,  1780,*  from  which  you  will  easily  perceive  the  de 
sires  and  expectations  of  Congress.  But  we  think  it  unsafe,  at  this 
distance,  to  tie  you  up  by  absolute  and  peremptory  directions  upon 
any  other  subject  than  the  two  essential  articles  above  mentioned. 
You  are  therefore  at  liberty  to  secure  the  interest  of  the  United 
States  in  such  manner  as  circumstances  may  direct,  and  as  the  state 
of  the  belligerent  and  the  disposition  of  the  mediating  powers  may 
require.  For  this  purpose  you  are  to  make  the  most  candid  and 
confidential  communications  upon  all  subjects  to  the  ministers  of 

*  See  these  instructions  in  John  Adams'   Correspondence,  vol.  iv.,  p.   339, 
and  Secret  Journal,  vol.  ii.,  p.  339. 
II 


1 62  Appendix. 

our  generous  ally,  the  King  of  France  ;  to  undertake  nothing  in  the 
negotiations  for  peace  or  truce  without  their  knowledge  and  concur 
rence  ;  and  ultimately  to  govern  yourselves  by  their  advice  and 
opinion,  endeavoring  in  your  whole  conduct  to  make  them  sensible 
how  much  we  rely  upon  his  Majesty's  influence  for  effectual  aid  in 
everything  that  may  be  necessary  to  the  peace,  security,  and  future 
prosperity  of  the  United  States  of  America. 

If  a  difficulty  should  arise  in  the  course  of  the  negotiation  for 
peace  from  the  backwardness  of  Great  Britain  to  acknowledge  our 
independence,  you  are  at  liberty  to  agree  to  a  truce,  or  to  make 
such  other  concessions  as  may  not  effect  the  substance  of  what  we 
contend  for ;  and  provided  that  Great  Britain  be  not  left  in  posses 
sion  of  any  part  of  the  United  States. 

SAMUEL  HUNTINGTON,  President. 


APPENDIX  E. 


OFFICIAL     CORRESPONDENCE    TOUCHING    THE 
PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS. 

(Diplomatic  Correspondence,  x.,  117.) 

THE  PEACE  COMMISSIONERS  TO  ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON,  SECRETARY 

OF  STATE. 

PARIS,  December  14,  1782. 

SIR — We  have  the  honor  to  congratulate  Congress  on  the  signature 
of  the  preliminaries  of  a  peace  between  the  Crown  of  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  of  America,  to  be  inserted  in  a  definitive 
treaty  so  soon  as  the  terms  between  the  Crowns  of  France  and 
Great  Britain  shall  be  agreed  on.  A  copy  of  the  Articles  is  here 
enclosed,  and  we  cannot  but  flatter  ourselves  that  they  will  appear 
to  Congress  as  they  do  to  all  of  us,  to  be  consistent  with  the  honor 
and  interest  of  the  United  States,  and  we  are  persuaded  Con 
gress  would  be  more  fully  of  that  opinion  if  they  were  apprised  of  all 
the  circumstances  and  reasons  which  have  influenced  the  negotia 
tion.  Although  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  go  into  that  detail,  we 
think  it  necessary  nevertheless  to  make  a  few  remarks  on  such  of 
the  Articles  as  appear  most  to  require  elucidation. 

.  .  We  knew  this  Court  and  Spain  to  be  against  our  claims 
to  the  western  country,  and  having  no  reason  to  think  that  lines 
more  favorable  could  ever  have  been  obtained,  we  finally  agreed  to 
those  described  in  this  Article ;  indeed,  they  appear  to  leave  us  lit 
tle  to  complain  of,  and  not  much  to  desire.  Congress  will  observe 
that  although  our  northern  line  is  in  a  certain  part  below  the  lati 
tude  of  forty-five,  yet  in  others  it  extends  above  it,  divides  the  Lake 
Superior,  and  gives  us  access  to  its  western  and  southern  waters, 
from  which  a  line  in  that  latitude  would  have  excluded  us. 

.  .  As  we  had  reason  to  imagine  that  the  Articles  respecting 
the  boundaries,  the  refugees,  and  fisheries  did  not  correspond  with 
the  policy  of  this  Court,  we  did  not  communicate  the  preliminaries 


1 64  Appendix. 

to  the  minister  until  after  they  were  signed  ;  and  not  even  then  the 
Separate  Article.*  We  hope  that  these  considerations  will  excuse 
our  having  so  far  deviated  from  the  spirit  of  our  instructions.  The 
Count  de  Vergennes,  on  perusing  the  Articles,  appeared  surprised, 
but  not  displeased,  at  their  being  so  favorable  to  us. 

.     .     With  great  respect  we  have  the  honor  to  be,  Sir,  your 
most  obedient  and  most  humble  servants, 

JOHN  ADAMS, 
B.  FRANKLIN, 
JOHN  JAY, 
HENRY  LALRENS. 

ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON,  SECRETARY  OF  STATE,  TO  THE  PEACE 
COMMISSIONERS. 

PHILADELPHIA,  March  25,  1783. 

GENTLEMEN — I  am  now  to  acknowledge  the  favor  of  your  joint 
letter  by  the  Washington,  together  with  a  copy  of  the  Preliminary 
Articles  ;  both  were  laid  before  Congress.  The  articles  have  met 
with  their  warmest  approbation,  and  have  been  generally  seen  by 
the  people  in  the  most  favorable  point  of  view. 

The  steadiness  manifested  in  not  treating  without  an  express 
acknowledgment  of  our  independence  previous  to  a  treaty  is  ap 
proved,  and  it  is  not  doubted  but  it  accelerated  that  declaration. 
The  boundaries  are  as  extensive  as  we  have  a  right  to  expect  ;  and 
we  have  nothing  to  complain  of  with  respect  to  the  fisheries.  My 
sentiments  as  to  English  debts  you  have  in  a  former  letter.  No 
honest  man  could  wish  to  withhold  them.  A  little  forbearance  in 
British  creditors  till  people  have  recovered  in  part  from  the  losses 
sustained  by  the  war  will  be  necessary  to  render  this  Article  palat 
able,  and  indeed  to  secure  more  effectually  the  debt. 

.  .  But,  gentlemen,  though  the  issue  of  your  treaty  has  been 
successful ;  though  I  am  satisfied  that  we  are  much  indebted  to  your 
firmness  and  perseverence,  to  your  accurate  knowledge  of  our  situa 
tion  and  of  our  wants  for  this  success,  yet  I  feel  no  little  pain  at  the 
distrust  manifested  in  the  management  of  it,  particularly  in  signing 

*  Separate  Article. — It  is  hereby  understood  and  agreed  that  in  case  Great 
Britain,  at  the  conclusion  of  the  present  war,  shall  recover  or  be  put  in  possession 
of  West  Florida,  the  line  of  north  boundary  between  the  said  province  and  the 
United  States  shall  be  a  line  drawn  from  the  mouth  of  the  river  Yazoo,  where  it 
unites  with  the  Mississippi,  due  east,  to  the  river  Appalachicola. 


Appendix.  165 

the  treaty  without  communicating  it  to  the  Court  of  Versailles  till 
after  the  signature,  and  in  concealing  the  Separate  Article  from  it 
even  when  signed.  I  have  examined  with  the  most  minute  attention 
all  the  reasons  assigned  in  your  several  letters  to  justify  these  suspi 
cions.  I  confess  they  do  not  appear  to  strike  me  so  forcibly  as  they 
have  done  you  ;  and  it  gives  me  pain  that  the  character  of  candor  and 
fidelity  to  its  engagements,  which  should  always  characterize  a  great 
people,  should  have  been  impeached  thereby.  The  concealment 
was  in  my  opinion  absolutely  unnecessary ;  for  had  the  Court  of 
France  disapproved  the  terms  you  had  made  after  they  had  been 
agreed  upon,  they  could  not  have  acted  so  absurdly  as  to  counter 
act  you  at  that  late  day,  and  thereby  put  themselves  in  the  power  of 
an  enemy  who  would  certainly  betray  them,  and  perhaps  justify  you 
in  making  terms  for  yourselves. 

.  .  .  I  intended  to  have  submitted  this  letter  to  Congress, 
but  I  find  there  is  not  the  least  prospect  of  obtaining  any  decision 
upon  it  in  time  to  send  by  this  conveyance,  if  at  all.  I  leave  you  to 
collect  their  sentiments,  as  far  as  I  know  them,  from  the  following 
state  of  their  proceedings.  After  your  joint  and  separate  letters  and 
the  journals  had  been  submitted  to  them  by  me,  and  had  been  read, 
they  were  referred  back  to  me  to  report  upon,  when  I  wrote  them  a 
letter,  and  when  it  was  taken  into  consideration  motions  were  made 
and  debated  a  whole  day.  After  which  the  letter  and  motions  were 
committed,  and  a  report  brought  in.  This  was  under  consideration 
two  days,  when  the  arrival  of  a  vessel  from  Cadiz  with  letters  from 
the  Count  d'Estaing  and  the  Marquis  de  Lafayette,  containing  ac 
counts  that  the  preliminaries  were  signed,  induced  members  to  think 
it  would  be  improper  to  proceed  in  the  report,  and  in  that  state  it 
remains  without  any  express  decision.  From  this  you  will  draw  your 
own  inferences. 

I  make  no  apology  for  the  part  I  have  taken  in  this  business.  I 
am  satisfied  you  will  readily  acquit  me  for  having  discharged  what  I 
conceived  to  be  my  duty  upon  such  a  view  of  things  as  you  presented 
to  me.  In  declaring  my  sentiments  freely  I  invite  you  to  treat  me 
with  equal  candor  in  your  letters,  and  in  sending  original  papers  I 
guard  against  misrepresentations  that  might  give  you  pain.  Upon 
the  whole  I  have  the  pleasure  of  assuring  you  that  the  services  you 
have  rendered  your  country  in  bringing  this  business  to  a  happy  is 
sue  are  very  gratefully  received  by  them,  however  we  may  differ  in 
sentiments  about  the  mode  of  doing  it. 


1 66  Appendix. 

THE  PEACE  COMMISSIONERS  TO  ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON,  SECRETARY 

OF  STATE. 

PASSY,  July  1 8,  1783. 

SIR — We  have  had  the  honor  of  receiving  by  Captain  Barney  your 
two  letters  of  March  26th  and  April  2ist,  with  the  papers  referred  to 
in  them. 

We  are  happy  to  find  that  the  Provisional  Articles  have  been  ap 
proved  and  ratified  by  Congress,  and  we  regret  that  the  manner  in 
which  that  business  was  conducted  does  not  coincide  with  your  ideas 
of  propriety.  We  are  persuaded,  however,  that  this  is  principally 
owing  to  your  being  necessarily  unacquainted  with  a  number  of  cir 
cumstances  known  to  us,  who  are  on  the  spot,  and  which  will  be 
particularly  explained  to  you  hereafter,  and,  we  trust,  to  your  satis 
faction  and  that  of  the  Congress." 

Your  doubts  respecting  the  Separate  Article,  we  think,  are  capa 
ble  of  being  removed  ;  but  as  a  full  state  of  the  reasons  and  circum 
stances  which  prompted  that  measure  would  be  very  prolix,  we  shall 
content  ourselves  with  giving  you  the  general  outlines. 

Mr.  Oswald  was  desirous  to  cover  as  much  of  the  eastern  shores 
of  the  Mississippi  with  British  claims  as  possible  ;  and  for  this  pur 
pose  we  were  told  a  great  deal  about  the  ancient  bounds  of  Canada, 
Louisiana,  etc.,  etc.  The  British  Court,  who  had  probably  not  yet 
adopted  the  idea  of  relinquishing  the  Floridas,  seemed  desirous  of 
annexing  as  much  territory  to  them  as  possible,  even  up  to  the  mouth 
of  the  Ohio.  Mr.  Oswald  adhered  strongly  to  that  object,  as  well 
to  render  the  British  countries  there  of  sufficient  extent  to  be  (as  he 
expressed  it)  worth  keeping  and  protecting,  as  to  afford  a  convenient 
retreat  to  the  tories,  for  whom  it  would  be  difficult  otherwise  to  pro 
vide  ;  and,  among  other  arguments,  he  finally  urged  his  being  willing 
to  yield  to  our  demands  to  the  east,  north,  and  west,  as  a  further 
reason  for  our  gratifying  him  on  the  point  in  question.  He  also  pro 
duced  the  commission  of  Governor  Johnson,  extending  the  bounds 
of  the  Government  of  West  Florida  up  to  the  river  Yazoo,  and  con 
tended  for  that  extent  as  a  matter  of  right  upon  various  principles, 
which,  however,  we  did  not  admit,  the  King  not  being  authorized,  in 
our  opinion,  to  extend  or  contract  the  bounds  of  the  colonies  at 
pleasure. 

We  were  of  opinion  that  the  country  in  contest  was  of  great 
value,  both  on  account  of  its  natural  fertility  and  of  its  position,  it 


Appendix.  167 

being,  in  our  opinion,  the  interest  of  America  to  extend  as  far  down 
towards  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  as  we  possibly  could.  We  also 
thought  it  advisable  to  impress  Britain  with  a  strong  sense  of  the  im 
portance  of  the  navigation  of  that  river  to  their  future  commerce  on 
the  interior  waters,  from  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Lawrence  to  that  of 
the  Mississippi,  and  thereby  render  that  Court  averse  to  any  stipu 
lations  with  Spain  to  relinquish  it.  These  two  objects  militated 
against  each  other,  because  to  enhance  the  value  of  the  navigation 
was  also  to  enhance  the  value  of  the  countries  contiguous  to  it,  and 
thereby  disincline  Britain  to  the  dereliction  of  them.  We  thought, 
therefore,  that  the  surest  way  to  reconcile  and  obtain  both  objects 
would  be  by  a  composition  beneficial  to  both  parties.  We  therefore 
proposed  that  Britain  should  withdraw  her  pretensions  to  all  the 
country  above  the  Yazoo,  and  that  we  would  cede  all  below  it  to  her, 
in  case  she  should  have  the  Floridas  at  the  end  of  the  war ;  and,  at 
all  events,  that  she  should  have  a  right  to  navigate  the  river  through 
out  its  whole  extent.  This  proposition  was  accepted,  and  we  agreed 
to  insert  the  contingent  fact  of  it  in  a  separate  Article,  for  the  express 
purpose  of  keeping  it  secret  for  the  present.  That  Article  ought 
not,  therefore,  to  be  considered  as  a  mere  matter  of  favor  to  Britain, 
but  as  the  result  of  a  bargain  in  which  that  Article  was  a  quid  pro 
quo. 

It  was  in  our  opinion  both  necessary  and  justifiable  to  keep  this 
Article  secret.  The  negotiations  between  Spain,  France,  and  Brit 
ain  were  then  in  full  vigor,  and  embarrassed  by  a  variety  of  clashing 
demands.  The  publication  of  this  Article  would  have  irritated  Spain, 
and  retarded,  if  not  have  prevented,  her  coming  to  an  agreement 
with  Britain. 

Had  we  mentioned  it  to  the  French  Minister  he  must  have  not 
only  informed  Spain  of  it,  but  also  been  obliged  to  act  a  part  respect 
ing  it  that  would  probably  have  been  disagreeable  to  America  ;  and 
he  certainly  has  reason  to  rejoice  that  our  silence  saved  him  that 
delicate  and  disagreeable  task. 

This  was  an  Article  in  which  France  had  not  the  smallest  in 
terest,  nor  is  there  anything  in  her  treaty  with  us  that  restrains  us  from 
making  what  bargain  we  please  with  Britain  about  those  or  any  other 
lands,  without  rendering  account  of  such  transaction  to  her  or  any 
other  power  whatever.  The  same  observation  applies  with  still 
greater  force  to  Spain  ;  and  neither  justice  nor  honor  forbid  us  to 


1 68  Appendix. 

dispose  as  we  pleased  of  our  own  lands  without  her  knowledge  or 
consent.  Spain  at  that  very  time  extended  her  pretensions  and 
claims  of  dominion,  not  only  over  the  tract  in  question,  but  over  the 
vast  region  lying  between  the  Floridas  and  Lake  Superior ;  and  this 
Court  was  also,  at  that  very  time,  soothing  and  nursing  those  pre 
tensions  by  a  proposed  conciliatory  line  for  splitting  the  difference. 
Suppose,  therefore,  we  had  offered  this  tract  to  Spain  ;  in  case  she 
retained  the  Floridas  should  we  even  have  had  thanks  for  it  ?  Or 
would  it  have  abated  the  chagrin  she  experienced  from  being  disap 
pointed  in  her  extravagant  and  improper  designs  on  that  whole 
country  !  We  think  not. 

We  perfectly  concur  with  you  in  sentiment,  Sir,  that  "  honesty  is 
the  best  policy"  But  until  it  be  shown  that  we  have  trespassed  on 
the  rights  of  any  man  or  body  of  men.  you  must  excuse  our  thinking 
that  this  remark  as  applied  to  our  proceedings  was  unnecessary. 

Should  any  explanations,  either  with  France  or  Spain,  become 
necessary  on  this  subject,  we  hope  and  expect  to  meet  with  no  em 
barrassment.  We  shall  neither  amuse  them  nor  perplex  ourselves 
with  .flimsy  excuses,  but  tell  them  plainly  that  it  was  not  our  duty  to 
give  them  the  information  ;  we  considered  ourselves  at  liberty  to 
withhold  it.  And  we  shall  remind  the  French  Minister  that  he  has 
more  reason  to  be  pleased  than  displeased  with  our  silence.  Since 
we^have  assumed  a  place  in  the  political  system  of  the  world,  let  us 
move  like  a  primary  and  not  a  secondary  planet. 

We  are  persuaded,  Sir,  that  your  remarks  on  these  subjects  re 
sulted  from  real  opinion,  and  were  made  with  candor  and  sincerity. 
The  best  men  will  view  objects  of  this  kind  in  different  lights  even 
when  standing  on  the  same  ground ;  and  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at 
that  we,  who  are  on  the  spot  and  have  the  whole  transaction  under 
our  eyes,  should  see  many  parts  of  it  in  a  stronger  point  of  light 
than  persons  at  a  distance,  who  can  only  view  it  through  the  dull 
medium  of  representation. 

It  would  give  us  great  pain  if  anything  we  have  written  or  now 
write  respecting  this  Court  should  be  construed  to  impeach  the 
friendship  of  the  King  and  nation  for  us.  We  also  believe  that  the 
minister  is  so  far  our  friend,  and  is  disposed  so  far  to  do  us  good 
offices  as  may  correspond  with  and  be  dictated  by  his  system  of 
policy  for  promoting  the  power,  riches,  and  glory  of  France.  God 
forbid  that  we  should  ever  sacrifice  our  faith,  our  gratitude,  or  our 


Appendix. 


169 


honor  to  any  considerations  of  convenience ;  and  may  He  also  for 
bid  that  we  should  ever  be  unmindful  of  the  dignity  and  independ 
ent  spirit  which  should  always  characterize  a  free  and  generous 
people. 

.     .     .     We  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc., 

JOHN  ADAMS, 
B.  FRANKLIN, 
JOHN  JAY. 


APPENDIX    F. 


THE  ADVICE  OF  VERGENNES  AND  THE  ACTION 
OF  JAY  AND  FRANKLIN  ON  OSWALD'S  FIRST 
COMMISSION. 

AN  account  of  the  discussion  and  action  on  Oswald's  first  com 
mission  was  given  by  Jay  to  Livingston  in  his  letter  of  November 
17,  1782  (Dip.  Corres.,  viii.,  133  ct  seq.). 

On  July  25,  1782,  the  King  issued  a  warrant  to  his  Solicitor 
General  to  prepare  a  commission  for  Mr.  Oswald  to  treat  with  any 
person  or  persons  appointed  by  any  or  all  of  the  American  colonies 
or  plantations.  Oswald  sent  a  copy  of  it  to  Doctor  Franklin  with 
an  assurance  that  the  commission  would  be  ready  in  a  few  days,  and 
the  doctor,  after  showing  it  to  Jay,  sent  it  to  Vergennes,  who,  on  the 
8th  of  August,  wrote  from  Versailles,  "  I  am  going  to  examine  it 
with  the  greatest  attention,  and  if  you  will  be  pleased  to  come  here 
on  Saturday  morning,  I  shall  be  able  to  confer  about  it  with  you  and 
Mr.  Jay  if  it  should  be  convenient  for  him  to  accompany  you." 

On  August  loth  Franklin  and  Jay  waited  on  the  Count  and  the 
question  was  discussed.  The  Count  de  Vergennes  said  that  it  was 
such  a  one  as  we  might  have  expected  it  to  be,  but  that  we  must 
take  care  to  insert  proper  articles  in  the  treaty  to  secure  our  inde 
pendence  and  our  limits  against  all  future  claims.  ...  I  ob 
served  to  the  Count  that  it  would  be  descending  from  the  ground  of 
independence  to  treat  under  the  description  of  colonies.  He  replied 
that  names  signified  little ;  that  the  King  of  Great  Britain,  styling 
himself  King  of  France,  was  no  obstacle  of  the  King  of  France  treat 
ing  with  him  ;  that  an  acknowledgment  of  our  independence  instead 
of  preceding  must,  in  the  natural  course  of  things,  be  the  effect  of 
the  treaty ;  and  that  it  would  be  reasonable  to  expect  the  effect  be 
fore  the  cause.  He  added  that  we  must  be  mindful  to  exchange 
powers  with  Mr.  Oswald,  for  that  his  acceptance  of  our  powers  in 
which  we  were  styled  Commissioners  from  the  United  States  of 


Appendix.    .  171 

America  would  be  a  tacit  admittance  of  our  independence.  I  made 
but  little  reply  to  all  this  singular  reasoning.  The  Count  turned  to 
Doctor  Franklin  and  asked  him  what  he  thought  of  the  matter.  The 
Doctor  said  he  believed  the  commission  would  do.  He  next  asked 
my  opinion.  I  told  him  that  I  did  not  like  it,  and  that  it  was  best 
to  proceed  cautiously. 

On  returning  I  could  not  forbear  observing  to  Doctor  Franklin 
that  it  was  evident  the  Count  did  not  wish  to  see  our  independence 
acknowledged  by  Britain  until  they  had  made  all  there  was  of  us. 
It  was  easy  for  them  to  foresee  difficulties  in  bringing  Spain  into  a 
peace  on  moderate  terms,  and  that  if  we  once  found  ourselves  stand 
ing  on  our  own  legs,  our  independence  acknowledged,  and  all  our 
own  terms  ready  to  be  granted,  we  might  not  think  it  our  duty  to 
continue  in  the  war  for  the  attainment  of  Spanish  objects,  but  on 
the  contrary,  as  we  were  bound  by  treaty  to  continue  the  war  till  our 
independence  should  be  obtained,  it  was  the  interest  of  France  to 
postpone  that  event  until  their  own  views  and  those  of  Spain  could 
be  gratified  by  a  peace,  and  that  I  could  not  otherwise  account  for 
ministers  advising  us  to  act  in  a  manner  inconsistent  with  our  dig 
nity,  and  for  reasons  which  he  himself  had  too  much  understanding 
not  to  see  the  fallacy  of. 

The  Doctor  imputed  this  conduct  to  the  moderation  of  the 
minister  and  to  his  desire  for  removing  every  obstacle  to  speedy 
negotiation  for  peace.  He  observed  that  the  Count  had  hitherto 
treated  us  very  fairly,  and  that  suspicions  to  their  disadvantage 
should  not  be  readily  entertained.  He  also  mentioned  our  instruc 
tions  as  further  reasons  for  our  acquiescing  in  the  advice  and  opin 
ions  of  the  minister  (p.  136). 

A  day  or  two  later  Jay  had  a  long  conversation  with  Oswald  in 
regard  to  the  commission,  referring  to  the  irritation  it  would  cause 
in  the  States,  and  wrote :  "  I  also  urged  in  the  strongest  terms  the 
great  impropriety  and  consequently  the  utter  impossibility  of  our 
ever  treating  with  Great  Britain  on  any  other  than  on  equal  footing, 
and  told  him  plainly  that  I  would  have  no  concern  in  any  negotia 
tion  in  which  we  were  not  considered  as  an  independent  people. 
Mr.  Oswald  upon  this  as  upon  every  other  occasion  behaved  in  a 
candid  and  proper  manner.  .  .  .  He  wished  his  commission 
had  been  otherwise,  but  was  at  a  loss  how  to  reconcile  it  with  the 
King's  dignity  to  make  such  a  declaration  immediately  after  having 
issued-  such  a  commission.  I  pointed  out  the  manner  in  which  I 


172  •   Appendix. 

conceived  it  might  be  done  ;  he  liked  the  thought  and  desired  me  to 
reduce  it  to  writing.  I  did  so  and  communicated  it  to  Doctor 
Franklin." 

The  Doctor  and  Jay  corrected  the  draft,  Oswald  approved  of  it, 
and  communicated  to  Jay  the  fourth  Article  of  his  instruction  as  fol 
lows  : 

"  In  case  you  find  the  American  Commissioners  are  not  at  lib 
erty  to  treat  on  any  terms  short  of  independence,  you  are  to  de 
clare  to  them  that  you  have  our  authority  to  make  that  cession  ; 
our  ardent  wish  for  peace  disposing  us  to  purchase  it  at  the  price  of 
acceding  to  the  complete  independence  of  the  Western  Colonies." 

Oswald  despatched  a  courier  to  London  to  press  the  ministry  for 
permission  to  acknowledge  America's  independence  without  delay. 
Doctor  Franklin  and  Jay  communicated  to  the  Count  de  Vergennes 
the  arrival  of  the  first  Commissioners  under  the  great  seal,  and  what 
had  passed  with  Mr.  Oswald.  The  Count  renewed  his  argument  in 
favor  of  their  treating  under  the  commission  as  it  stood  ;  Oswald 
was  advised  by  Mr.  Secretary  Townsend  (September  i,  1782)  of 
the  receipt  of  his  letters,  without  assenting  to  the  proposition. 
Jay  learned  that  the  Count  de  Vergennes  had  told  Fitzherbert  that 
the  first  commission  would  do,  and  that  Fitzherbert  had  so  informed 
the  Court,  a  circumstance  to  which  Jay  attributed  the  ill  success  of 
Oswald's  application.  "  These  considerations,"  wrote  Jay,  "  induced 
me  to  explain  to  him  what  I  supposed  to  be  the  natural  policy  of 
this  Court  on  the  subject,  and  to  show  him  that  it  was  the  interest  of 
Britain  to  render  us  as  independent  on  France  as  we  were  resolved  to 
be  on  her.  He  soon  adopted  the  same  opinion,  but  was  at  a  loss 
to  see  in  what  manner  Great  Britain,  considering  what  had  just 
passed,  could  consistently  take  further  steps  at  present.  I  told  him 
that  nothing  was  more  easy,  for  that  the  issuing  of  another  commis 
sion  would  do  it." 

Oswald  asked  Jay  to  put  this  in  writing,  which  he  did  as  follows : 

"  A  commission  (in  the  usual  form)  to  Richard  Oswald  to  treat 
of  peace  or  truce  with  Commissioners  vested  with  equal  power  by 
and  on  behalf  of  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA,  would  remove 
the  objection  to  which  the  present  one  is  liable,  and  render  it  proper 
for  the  American  Commissioners  to  treat  with  him  on  the  subject  of 
preliminaries." 

Jay  then  reminded  Oswald  of  the  several  resolutions  of  Congress 
at  different  periods  not  to  treat  on  any  other  footing  than  that  of 


Appendix.  173 

absolute  independence,  and  intimated  that  he  thought  it  would  be 
best  to  give  this  their  final  and  decided  determination   not  to  treat 
otherwise,  in  writing  in  that  form  of  a  letter. 
The  next  day  he  prepared  the  following  : 


THE  DRAFT  LETTER  TO  OSWALD  DECLINING  TO  NEGOTIATE  EXCEPT 
ON  A  FOOTING  OF  INDEPENDENCE. 

SIR — It  is  with  regret  that  we  find  ourselves  obliged  by  our 
duty  to  our  country  to  object  to  entering  with  you  into  negotiations 
for  peace  on  the  plan  proposed.  One  nation  can  treat  with  another 
nation  only  on  terms  of  equality  ;  and  it  cannot  be  expected  that 
we  should  be  the  first  and  only  servants  of  Congress  who  would  ad 
mit  doubts  of  their  independence. 

The  tenor  of  your  commission  affords  matter  for  a  variety  of 
objections  which  your  good  sense  will  save  us  the  pain  of  enumer 
ating.  The  journals  of  Congress  present  to  you  unequivocal  and 
uniform  evidence  of  the  sentiments  and  resolutions  of  Congress  on 
the  subject,  and  their  positive  instructions  to  us  to  speak  the  same 
language. 

The  manner  of  removing  these  obstacles  is  obvious,  and  in  our 
opinion  no  less  consistent  with  the  dignity  than  the  interest  of  Great 
Britain.  If  the  Parliament  meant  to  enable  the  King  to  conclude  a 
peace  with  us  on  terms  of  independence,  they  necessarily  meant  to 
enable  him  to  do  it  in  a  manner  compatible  with  his  dignity ;  and 
consequently  that  he  should  previously  regard  us  in  a  point  of  view 
that  would  render  it  proper  for  him  to  negotiate  with  us.  What 
this  point  of  view  is  you  need  not  be  informed. 

We  also  take  the  liberty  of  submitting  to  your  consideration 
how  far  his  Majesty's  now  declining  to  take  this  step  would  comport 
with  the  assurance  lately  given  on  that  subject,  and  whether  hesita 
tion  and  delay  would  not  tend  to  lessen  the  confidence  which  those 
assurances  were  calculated  to  inspire. 

As  to  referring  an  acknowledgment  of  our  independence  to  the 
first  article  of  a  treaty,  permit  us  to  remark,  that  this  implies  that  we 
are  not  to  be  considered  in  that  light  until  after  the  conclusion  of 
the  treaty,  and  our  acquiescing  would  be  to  admit  the  propriety  of 
our  being  considered  in  another  light. during  that  interval.  Had  this 
circumstance  been  attended  to,  we  presume  that  the  Court  of  Great 
Britain  would  not  have  pressed  a  measure  which  certainly  is  not  del- 


1 74  Appendix. 

icate,  and  which  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  received  ideas  of 
national  honor. 

You  may  rest  assured,  sir,  of  our  disposition  to  peace  on  reason 
able  terms,  and  of  our  readiness  to  enter  seriously  into  negotiations 
for  it,  as  soon  as  we  shall  have  an  opportunity  of  doing  it  in  the  only 
manner  in  which  it  is  possible  for  one  nation  to  treat  with  another, 
viz.,  on  an  equal  footing. 

Had  you  been  commissioned  in  the  usual  manner,  we  might 
have  proceeded  ;  and  as  we  can  perceive  no  legal  or  other  objection 
to  this,  or  some  other  such  like  expedient,  it  is  to  be  wished  that  his 
Majesty  will  not  permit  an  obstacle  so  very  unimportant  to  Great 
Britain,  but  so  essential  and  insuperable  with  respect  to  us,  to  delay 
the  re-establishment  of  peace  especially,  and  in  case  the  business 
could  be  but  once  begun,  the  confidence  we  have  in  your  candor 
and  integrity  would  probably  render  the  settling  all  our  Articles  only 
the  work  of  a  few  hours. 

We  are,  etc. 

This  draft  was  submitted  to  Doctor  Franklin's  consideration, 
who  thought  it  too  positive  and  therefore  imprudent,  and  suggested 
a  further  difficulty  from  the  instructions  of  Congress,  as  stated  on 
page  33  and  34  of  the  Address.  Neither  of  these  had  weight  with 
Jay,  who  wrote,  "As  to  the  first,  I  could  not  conceive  of  any  event 
which  could  render  it  proper,  and,  therefore,  possible  for  America  to 
treat  in  any  other  character  than  an  independent  nation  ;  and  as  to 
the  second,  I  could  not  believe  that  Congress  intended  we  should 
follow  any  advice  which  might  be  repugnant  to  their  dignity  and  in 
terest." 

When  Oswald  again  spoke  to  Jay  of  the  letter,  Jay  told  him  that 
he  had  prepared  a  draft,  but  that  on  further  consideration  and  con 
sulting  with  Doctor  Franklin,  they  thought  it  best  not  to  take  the 
liberty  of  troubling  the  Court  with  any  arguments  or  reasonings  which 
without  our  aid  must  be  very  evident  to  them. 

Oswald  seemed  disappointed,  and  asked  to  see  the  draft,  which 
he  liked.  He  asked  for  a  copy  of  it,  but  Jay  doubting  the  propriety 
of  this  took  time  to  consider.  It  appeared  to  him,  on  further  reflection, 
that  no  bad  consequences  would  arise  from  giving  him  a  copy  of  the 
paper,  that  though  unsigned  it  would  nevertheless  convey  to  the 
British  ministry  the  sentiments  and  opinions  he  wished  to  impress, 
and  that,  if  finally  they  should  not  be  content  to  treat  with  us  as  in- 


Appendix.  175 

dependent,  they  were  not  ripe  for  peace  or  treaty  with  us.  "  Be 
sides,"  wrote  Jay,  u  I  could  not  be  persuaded  that  Great  Britain, 
after  what  the  House  of  Commons  had  declared,  after  what  Mr. 
Grenville  had  said,  and  Sir  Guy  Carleton  had  been  instructed  to  do, 
would  persist  in  refusing  to  admit  an  independence,  provided  they 
really  believed  that  we  had  firmly  resolved  not  to  treat  on  more 
humble  terms." 

.  A  copy  of  the  draft  letter  and  of  the  resolutions  of  Congress  were 
given  to  Oswald,  who  sent  them  by  express  to  London,  and  the 
matter  was  not  communicated  to  the  Count  de  Vergennes. 

Jay's  conviction  that  the  British  ministry  would  yield  the  point  of 
independence  if  they  really  believed  the  negotiation  would  not  pro 
ceed  without  it,  proved  to  be  correct. 

When  soon  after  this  Vaughan  was  sent  to  England  by  Jay  to 
counteract  the  efforts  of  Rayneval  to  prejudice  our  claims  to  the 
fisheries  and  the  boundaries,  this  seems  to  have  been  the  chief  ques 
tion  with  the  British  Cabinet,  and  when  the  one  question  asked  of 
Vaughan  by  Lord  Shelburne,  Is  the  new  commission  necessary  ?  was 
answered  in  the  affirmative,  the  new  commission  to  treat  with  the 
United  States  of  America  was  instantly  ordered. 

Seldom  has  the  draft  of  an  unsigned  letter  assisted  in  producing 
results  of  such  historical  importance. 


APPENDIX   G. 


EXTRACTS  FROM  CORRESPONDENCE,  CHIEFLY 
PERSONAL,  BEARING  ON  THE  PEACE  NEGO 
TIATIONS. 

GOUVERNEUR  MORRIS  TO  JAY  ON  HIS  APPOINTMENT  AS  ONE  OF  THE 
COMMISSIONERS  TO  NEGOTIATE  A  PEACE. 

(Morris,  i.,  p.  237.) 

PHILADELPHIA,  June  17,   1781. 

ALTHOUGH  I  believe  myself  thoroughly  acquainted  with  you,  yet 
I  cannot  tell  whether  I  ought  to  congratulate  or  condole  with  you 
on  your  late  appointment.  Ere  this  reaches  you,  you  will  have 
learnt  that  you  are  on  the  part  of  this  country  one  of  the  Commis 
sioners  for  negotiating  a  peace.  So  far  is  well,  but  when  you  come 
to  find  by  your  instructions  that  you  must  ultimately  obey  the  dic 
tates  of  the  French  Minister,  I  am  sure  there  is  something  in  your 
bosom  that  will  revolt  at  the  servility  of  the  situation.  To  have  re 
laxed  on  all  sides,  to  have  given  up  all  things,  might  easily  have 
been  expected  from  those  minds  which,  softened  by  wealth  and  de 
based  by  fear,  are  unable  to  gain  and  unworthy  to  enjoy  the  blessings 
of  freedom.  But  that  the  proud  should  prostitute  the  very  little 
dignity  this  country  was  possessed  of,  would  be  indeed  astonishing  if 
we  did  not  know  the  near  alliance  between  pride  and  meanness. 

JAY  TO  LIVINGSTON. 

(Diplomatic  Correspondence,  viii.,  p.  126.) 

PARIS,  September  18,  1782. 

I  am  persuaded  (and  you  shall  know  my  reasons  for  it)  that  this 
Court  chooses  to  postpone  an  acknowledgment  of  our  independence 
by  Britain  to  the  conclusion  of  a  general  peace,  in  order  to  keep  us 
under  their  direction  until  not  only  their  and  our  objects  are  obtained, 
but  also  until  Spain  shall  be  gratified  in  her  demands  to  exclude 
everybody  from  the  Gulf,  etc.  .  .  . 


Appendix.  177 

Count  de  Vergennes  would  have  us  treat  with  Mr.  Oswald 
through  his  commission,  calls  us  colonies,  and  authorizes  him  to 
treat  with  any  description  of  men,  etc.  In  my  opinion  we  can  only 
treat  as  an  independent  nation  and  on  an  equal  footing.  .  . 
This  Court  as  well  as  Spain  will  dispute  our  extension  to  the  Mis 
sissippi.  ...  I  ought  to  add  that  Doctor  Franklin  does  not  see 
the  conduct  of  the  Court  in  the  light  I  do,  and  that  he  believes  they 
mean  nothing  in  their  proceedings  but  what  is  friendly,  fair,  and 
honorable.  Facts  and  future  events  must  determine  which  of  us  is 
mistaken.  .  .  .  Let  us  be  honest  and  grateful  to  France,  but 
let  us  think  for  ourselves. 

JOHN  JAY  TO  GOUVERNEUR  MORRIS. 

(Jay's  Life,  ii.,  p.  105.) 

PARIS,  October  13,   1782. 

DEAR  MORRIS — I  have  received  your  festina  lente  letter,  but 
wish  it  had  been  at  least  partly  in  cipher.  You  need  not  be  informed 
of  my  reasons  for  the  wish,  as  by  this  time  you  must  know  that  seals 
are,  on  this  side  of  the  water,  rather  matters  of  decoration  than  of 
use.  It  gave  me  nevertheless  great  pleasure  to  receive  that  letter, 
it  being  the  first  from  you  that  had  reached  me,  the  Lord  knows 
when.  I  find  you  are  industrious,  and  of  consequence,  useful ;  so 
much  the  better  for  yourself,  for  the  public,  and  for  our  friend  Morris, 
whom  I  consider  as  the  pillar  of  American  credit. 

The  King  of  Great  Britain,  by  letters  patent  under  the  great  seal, 
has  authorized  Mr.  Oswald  to  treat  with  the  Commissioners  of  the 
United  States  of  America.  His  first  commission  literally  pursued 
the  enabling  act,  and  the  authority  it  gave  him  was  expressed  in  the 
very  terms  of  that  act,  viz.,  to  treat  with  the  colonies,  and  with  any 
or  either  of  them,  and  any  part  of  them,  and  with  any  description  of 
men  in  them,  and  with  any  person  whatsoever,  of  and  concerning 
peace,  etc. 

Had  I  not  violated   the   instructions  of  Congress,  their  dignity 
would  have  been  in   the  dust;  for  the  French  Minister  even  took 
pains  not  only  to  persuade  us  to  treat  under  that  commission,  but 
to  prevent  the  second,  by  telling  Fitzherbert  that  the  first  was  suffi 
cient.     I  told  the  minister  that   we  neither   could  nor  would  treat 
with  any  nation  in  the  world  on  any  other  than  on  an  equal  footing. 
We   may  and  we   may  not  have  a  peace  this  winter.     Act  as  if 
the  war  would  certainly  continue.     Keep  proper  garrisons  in  your 
12 


178  Appendix. 

strong  posts,  and  preserve  your  army  sufficiently  numerous  and  well 
appointed  until  every  idea  of  hostility  and  surprise  shall  have  com 
pletely  vanished. 

I  could  write  you  a  volume,  but  my  health  admits  only  of  short 
intervals  of  application.  .  .  . 

(TRANSLATION.) 
COUNT  MONTMORIN  TO  JAY. 

MADRID,  February  22,  1783. 

I  do  not  think,  my  dear  sir,  that  I  could  find  a  more  suitable 
manner  of  sending  you  my  compliments  on  the  peace,  or  one  that 
would  be  more  agreeable  to  you,  than  in  confiding  them  to  M.  le  Mar 
quis  de  la  Fayette,  who  is  your  friend  and  your  adopted  countryman, 
and  who  will  be  numbered  by  posterity  among  those  who  have  con 
tributed  the  most  to  the  great  Revolution  in  which  you  were  one  of 
the  principal  actors,  and  which  the  peace  has  just  completed. 

I  shall  not  speak  of  the  feeling  and  inclinations  of  Spain :  M.  de 
la  Fayette  will  tell  you  better  than  I  what  he  has  seen  of  them.  He 
leaves  here  satisfied  with  what  he  has  been  shown,  and  I  hope  you 
also  will  be  so.  I  shall  have  a  very  real  satisfaction  if  I  see  har 
mony  and  a  good  understanding  established  between  Spain  and  the 
United  States  of  America,  and  I  shall  think  myself  very  happy  if  I 
can  contribute  in  any  way  to  this  end.  You  know  my  sentiments 
with  regard  to  your  country ;  they  always  have  been  and  always  will 
be  the  same. 

M.  de  la  Fayette  is  leaving  immediately  for  Paris,  and  only  gives 
me  time  to  assure  you  of  the  perfect  and  unchangeable  attachment 
with  which  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  my  dear  sir,  your  most  humble 
and  obedient  servant,  MONTMORIN. 

Pray  allow  me  herewith  to  send  to  Mrs.  Jay  the  assurance  of  my 
respect. 

JAY  TO  ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON. 

PARIS,  December  14,  1782. 

DEAR  SIR — From  our  preliminaries  and  the  King's  speech,  the 
present  disposition  and  system  of  the  British  Court  may,  in  my  opin 
ion,  be  collected.  Although  particular  circumstances  constrained 
them  to  yield  us  more  than  perhaps  they  wished,  I  still  think  they 
meant  to  make  (what  they  thought  would  really  be)  a  satisfactory 
peace  with  us.  In  the  continuance  of  this  disposition  and  system 


Appendix.  \  79 

too  much  confidence  ought  not  to  be  placed,  for  disappointed  vio 
lence  and  mortified  ambition  are  certainly  dangerous  foundations  to 
build  implicit  confidence  upon  ;  but  I  cannot  forbear  thinking  that 
we  ought  not,  in  the  common  phrase,  to  throw  cold  water  upon  it 
by  improper  exultation,  extravagant  demands,  or  illiberal  publica 
tions.  Should  such  a  temper  appear,  it  would  be  wise  to  discounte 
nance  it.  It  is  our  policy  to  be  independent  in  the  most  extensive 
sense,  and  to  observe  a  proper  distance  toward  all  nations,  minding 
our  own  business  and  not  interfering  with,  or  being  influenced  by, 
the  views  of  any  further  than  they  may  respect  us. 

.  .  .  Our  affairs  have  a  very  promising  aspect,  and  a  little  pru 
dence  will  secure  us  all  that  we  can  reasonably  expect.  The  boun 
daries  between  the  States  should  be  immediately  settled,  and  all 
causes  of  discord  between  them  removed.  It  would  be  imprudent 
to  disband  the  army  while  a  foreign  one  remains  in  the  country  ; 
and  it  would  be  equally  unwise  to  permit  Americans  to  spill  the 
blood  of  our  friends  in  the  islands,  for  in  all  of  them  there  are  many 
who  wish  us  well. 

ROBERT  MORRIS  TO  JOHN  JAY. 

PHILADELPHIA,  January  3,  1783. 

DEAR  SIR —  ...  I  cannot  take  time  at  present  to  enter  on 
any  political  discussions.  But  you  must  allow  me  to  declare  my 
perfect  satisfaction  in,  and  approbation  of,  your  conduct  in  Europe. 
All  who  have  had  the  opportunity  of  knowing  what  it  has  been  are 
struck  with  admiration  at  your  patience  under  difficulties  and  your 
firmness  in  rising  superior  to  them.  Go  on,  my  friend ;  you  de 
serve  and  will  receive  the  gratitude  of  your  country.  History  will 
hand  down  your  plaudits  to  posterity.  The  men  of  the  present  day, 
who  are  generally  least  grateful  to  their  contemporaries,  esteem  it 
an  honor  to  be  of  your  acquaintance. 

I  am  sorry  to  hear  that  Mrs.  Jay  and  yourself  have  been  indis 
posed,  but  I  hope  you  are  recovered  and  partaking  the  enjoyments 
of  this  season  with  the  gay,  sprightly  inhabitants  of  Versailles  and 
Paris.  My  best  wishes  ever  attend  you.  .  .  . 

JAY  TO  THE  MARQUIS  DE  LAFAYETTE. 

ROUEN,  January  19,  1783. 

.  .  .  If  I  am  not  mistaken,  a  copy  of  the  American  prelimi 
naries  has  been  sent  to  Spain,  and  I  flatter  myself  that  Count  de 


1 80  Appendix. 

Montmorin  will  think  them  perfectly  consistent  with  our  engage 
ments  to  our  allies.  It  appears  to  me  singular  that  any  doubts 
should  be  entertained  of  American  good  faith,  for  as  it  has  been 
tried  and  remains  inviolate  they  cannot  easily  be  explained  on 
principles  honorable  to  those  who  entertain  them.  America  has  so 
often  repeated  and  reiterated  her  professions  and  assurances  of 
regard  to  the  treaty  alluded  to  that  I  hope  she  will  not  impair  her 
dignity  by  making  any  more  of  them,  but  leave  the  continued  up 
rightness  of  her  conduct  to  inspire  that  confidence  which  it  seems 
she  does  not  yet  possess  although  she  has  always  merited. 

Our  warmest  acknowledgments  are  due  to  you  for  the  zeal  you 
manifest  to  serve  America  at  all  times  and  in  all  places,  but,  sir,  I 
have  little  expectation  that  your  plan  of  a  Spanish  loan  will  succeed. 
I  confess  that  I  am  far  from  being  anxious  about  it.  In  my  opinion 
America  can  with  no  propriety  accept  favors  from  Spain.  . 

JOHN  JAY  TO  BENJAMIN  VAUGHAN,  ESQ. 

PARIS,  March  28,  1783. 

.  .  .  So  far  as  the  peace  respects  France  and  America,  I  am 
persuaded  it  was  wise  in  Britain  to  conclude  it.  The  cessions  to 
France  are  not,  in  my  opinion,  extravagant,  and  the  terms  settled 
with  America,  by  removing  all  causes  of  future  variance,  certainly 
lead  to  conciliation  and  friendship. 

It  appears  to  me  that  the  discussion  of  this  subject  might  have 
been  more  ample  and  satisfactory.  Why  was  not  Parliament  told 
of  our  offers  as  to  commerce  and  the  mutual  navigation  of  the 
American  waters  ?  The  word  reciprocity  would  not  then  have  been 
deemed  so  nugatory. 

We  have  received  particular  instructions  on  the  business  of 
commerce,  and  Mr.  Fitzherbert  has  been  informed  of  our  readiness 
to  add  to  the  provisional  treaty  an  article  for  opening  and  regulat 
ing  trade  between  us  on  principles  as  liberal  and  reciprocal  as  you 
please.  What  more  can  be  said  or  done  ?  Mr.  Pitt's  bill  was  a 
good  one,  a  wise  one,  and  one  that  will  for  ever  do  honor  to  the  ex 
tent  and  policy  of  his  views,  and  to  those  of  the  administration 
under  whose  auspices  it  was  formed.  For  my  own  part,  however,  I 
think  that  America  need  not  be  exceedingly  anxious  about  the  mat 
ter,  for  it  will  be  in  our  power  to  derive  from  a  navigation  act  of 
our  own  full  as  many  advantages  as  we  should  lose  by  the  restric 
tions  of  your  laws. 


Appendix.  1 8 1 

The  objections  drawn  from  your  treaties  with  Russia,  etc.,  ap 
pear  to  me  weak  and  have  been  answered  ;  but  why  not  give  them 
similar  terms  on  similar  conditions  ?  They  furnish  you  with  raw 
materials  chiefly  and  you  them  with  manufactures  only ;  the  gain, 
therefore,  must  be  yours.  With  respect  to  carriage  and  navigation 
they  stand  in  a  very  different  predicament  from  us. 

As  to  the  Tories  who  have  received  damage  from  us,  why  so 
much  noise  about  them,  and  so  little  said  or  thought  of  Whigs  who 
have  suffered  ten  times  as  much  from  these  same  Tories,  not  to 
mention  the  desolations  of  an  unjust  and  licentious  war? 

We  forget  our  sufferings  and  even  agree  to  recommend  to  favor 
a  set  of  men  of  whom  very  few  would  consider  the  having  their 
deserts  in  the  light  of  a  blessing.  How  does  reciprocacy  stand  in 
this  account  ? 

Some,  it  seems,  think  that  New  York  should  be  retained  as  a 
rod  to  drive  us  on  in  this  business  of  the  Tories.  Strange  that  the 
idea  of  driving  us  should  still  be  entertained.  I  pledge  myself  to 
you  that  should  such  a  design  be  adopted  and  become  apparent,  the 
refugees  will  get  nothing,  and  the  progress  of  reconciliation  will  be 
as  slow  as  the  warmest  Gallican  could  wish. 

I  hear  there  is  to  be  a  congress  here  ;  that  is,  that  Britain  and 
France  have  requested  the  two  imperial  Courts  to  send  mediatorial 
ambassadors  here  for  the  purpose  of  being  witnesses  to  the  execu 
tion  of  the  definite  treaties — a  very  important  errand,  no  doubt,  and 
very  complimentary  to  those  sovereigns.  Is  it  probable  that  a  con 
gress  should  be  called  for  that  poor,  single,  simple  purpose  ?  Why 
your  Court  agreed  to  it  is  hard  to  conceive. 

I  have  written  to  my  countrymen  that  Lord  Shelburne's  system 
respecting  them  appeared  to  me  to  be  liberal  and  conciliatory,  but 
that  his  hesitations  about  avowing  the  acknowledgment  of  our  inde 
pendence  discouraged  extensive  confidence  without  furtner  facts. 
I  always  think  it  best  to  be  candid  and  explicit.  I  hope  we  shall 
soon  be  in  the  full  possession  of  our  country  and  of  peace,  and  as 
we  expect  to  have  no  further  cause  of  quarrel  with  Great  Britain, 
\ve  can  have  no  inducement  to  wish  or  to  do  her  injury ;  on  the 
contrary,  we  may  become  as  sensible  to  her  future  good  offices  as 
we  have  been  to  her  former  evil  ones.  A  little  good-natured  wis 
dom  often  does  more  in  politics  than  much  slippery  craft.  By  the 
former  the  French  acquired  the  esteem  and  gratitude  of  America, 
and  by  the  latter  their  minister  is  impairing  it.  ... 


1 82  Appendix. 

.  .  .  Mrs.  Jay  charges  me  to  say  civil  things  to  you.  You 
are  a  favorite  of  hers  and  deserve  to  be  so  of  everybody.  ...  I 
must  not,  however,  forget  my  worthy  friend  Mr.  Oswald.  He  de 
serves  well  of  his  country,  and  posterity  will  not  only  approve  but 
commend  his  conduct.  Assure  him  of  my  esteem  and  attach 
ment.  .  .  . 

JOHN  JAY  TO  GEORGE  WASHINGTON. 

PASSY,  June  13,  1783. 

MY  DEAR  SIR — I  have,  within  these  few  days  past,  read  and  ad 
mired  your  address  to  the  army  and  their  proceedings  in  conse 
quence  of  it.  Such  instances  of  patriotism  are  rare,  and  America 
must  find  it  difficult  to  express,  in  adequate  terms,  the  gratitude  she 
owes  to  both.  Such  a  degree  of  glory,  so  virtuously  acquired  and 
so  decently  sustained,  is  as  new  as  our  political  constellation  and 
will  forever  give  lustre  to  it.  -May  every  blessing  be  yours. 

Mr.  Hartley  has  just  informed  me  that  orders  have  been  sent  to 
the  British  commander-in-chief  to  evacuate  the  United  States.  Our 
attention  will  then,  I  hope,  be  turned  to  the  preservation  and  im 
provement  of  what  we  have  gained  ;  and  a  sense  of  the  importance 
of  that  task  leads  me  to  wish  that  the  execution  of  it  may  be  facili 
tated  by  your  counsels  and  application. 

JOHN  JAY  TO  GOUVERNEUR  MORRIS. 

PASSY,  July  17,  1783. 

.  Orders  are  gone  to  evacuate  New  York.  The  present 
British  Ministry  are  duped,  I  believe,  by  an  opinion  of  our  not  hav 
ing  decision  and  energy  sufficient  to  regulate  our  trade  so  as  to  re 
taliate  their  restrictions.  Our  ports  were  opened  too  soon.  Let  us, 
however,  be  temperate  as  well  as  firm. 

Our  friend  Morris,  I  suspect,  is  not  a  favorite  of  this  Court.  They 
say  he  treats  them  as  his  cashier.  They  refuse  absolutely  to  supply 
more  money.  Marbois  writes  tittle-tattle,  and  I  believe  does  mis 
chief.  Congress  certainly  should  remove  to  some  interior  town, 
and  they  should  send  a  minister  forthwith  to  England.  The  French 
ambassador  at  Petersburg  has  thrown  cold  water  on  Dana's  being 
received  before  a  peace. 

The  ministers  of  this  Court  are  qualified  to  act  the  part  of  Pro 
teus.  The  nation,  I  think,  is  with  us,  and  the  King  seems  to  be  well 
disposed.  Adieu. 


Appendix.  183 

JAY  TC  GOVERNOR  LIVINGSTON. 

PASSY,  July  19,  1783. 

.  .  .  I  am  happy  to  hear  that  the  Provisional  Articles  meet 
with  general  approbation.  The  Tories  will  doubtless  cause  some  dif 
ficulty,  but  that  they  have  always  done,  and  as  this  will  probably  be 
the  last  time,  we  must  make  the  best  of  it.  A  universal  indiscrimi 
nate  condemnation  and  expulsion  of  those  people  would  not  re 
dound  to  our  honor,  because  so  harsh  a  measure  would  partake 
more  of  vengeance  than  of  justice.  For  my  part,  I  wish  that  all  ex 
cept  the  faithless  and  the  cruel  may  be  forgiven.  That  exception 
would  indeed  extend  to  very  few ;  but  even  if  it  applied  to  the  case 
of  one  only,  that  one  ought,  in  my  opinion,  to  be  saved. 

The  reluctance  with  which  the  States  in  general  pay  the  necessary 
taxes  is  much  to  be  regretted.  It  injures  both  their  reputation  and  in 
terest  abroad  as  well  as  at  home,  and  tends  to  cherish  the  hopes  and 
speculations  of  those  who  wish  we  may  become  and  remain  an  un 
important,  divided  people.  The  rising  power  of  America  is  a  seri 
ous  object  of  apprehension  to  more  than  one  nation,  and  every 
event  that  may  retard  it  will  be  agreeable  to  them.  A  continental, 
national  spirit  should  therefore  pervade  our  country,  and  Congress 
should  be  enabled,  by  a  grant  of  the  necessary  powers,  to  regulate 
the  commerce  and  general  concerns  of  the  confederacy ;  and  we 
should  remember  that  to  be  constantly  prepared  for  war  is  the  only 
way  to  have  peace.  The  Swiss  on  the  one  hand  and  the  Dutch  on 
the  other  bear  testimony  to  the  truth  of  this  remark. 

The  General  and  the  army  have,  by  their  late  moderation,  done 
themselves  infinite  honor ;  and  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  States  will 
not  only  be  just,  but  generous  to  those  brave  and  virtuous  citizens. 
America  is  at  present  held  in  a  very  respectable  point  of  view, 
but  as  the  eyes  of  the  world  are  upon  her,  the  continuance  of  that 
consideration  will  depend  on  the  dignity  and  wisdom  of  her  con 
duct.  .  .  . 

JOHN  JAY  TO  R.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 

(Jay's  Life,  i.,  p.  174.) 

PASSY,  July  19,  1783. 

DEAR  ROBERT — Our  despatches  by  Barney  must  be  ready  the 
day  after  to-morrow.  The  many  letters  I  have  written  and  have 
still  to  write  by  him,  together  with  conferences,  company,  etc.,  keep 


1 84  Appendix. 

me  fully  employed.  You  will,  therefore,  excuse  my  not  descending 
so  much  to  particulars  as  both  of  us  indeed  might  wish.  As  little 
that  passes  in  Congress  is  kept  entirely  secret,  we  think  it  prudent 
at  least  to  postpone  giving  you  a  more  minute  detail  than  you  have 
already  received,  of  the  reasons  which  induced  us  to  sign  the  Pro 
visional  Articles  without  previously  communicating  them  to  the 
French  Minister.  For  your  private  satisfaction,  however,  I  will 
make  a  few  remarks  on  that  subject. 

Your  doubts  respecting  the  propriety  of  our  conduct  in  that 
instance  appear  to  have  arisen  from  the  following  circumstances, 
viz.  : 

First. — That  we  entertained  and  were  influenced  by  distrusts  and 
suspicions  which  do  not  seem  to  you  to  have  been  altogether  well 
founded. 

Second. — That  we  signed  the  articles  without  previously  com 
municating  them  to  this  Court. 

With  respect  to  the  first :  In  our  negotiation  with  the  British 
Commissioner  it  was  essential  to  insist  on  and,  if  possible,  obtain 
his  consent  to  four  important  concessions. 

1.  That   Britain    should  treat  with  us  as  being  what  we  were, 
viz.,   an   independent  people.     The  French   Minister  thought  this 
demand  premature,  and  that  it  ought  to  arise  from,  and  not  precede, 
the  treaty. 

2.  That  Britain    should   agree    to    the  extent   of   boundary  we 
claimed.     The  French  Minister  thought  our  demands  on   that  head 
extravagant  in  themselves,  and  as  militating  against  certain  views  of 
Spain  which  he  was  disposed  to  favor. 

3.  That    Britain    should   admit    our    right    in   common  to    the 
fishery.     The  French  Minister  thought  this  demand  too  extensive. 

4.  That  Britain  should  not  insist  on   our  reinstating  the  Tories. 
The  French  Minister  argued  that  they  ought  to  be  reinstated. 

Was  it  unnatural  for  us  to  conclude  from  these  facts  that  the 
French  Minister  was  opposed  to  our  succeeding  on  these  four  great 
points  in  the  extent  we  wished  ?  It  appeared  evident  that  his  plan 
of  a  treaty  for  America  was  far  from  being  such  as  America  would 
have  preferred  ;  and  as  we  disapproved  of  his  model,  we  thought  it 
imprudent  to  give  him  an  opportunity  of  moulding  our  treaty  by  it. 
Whether  the  minister  was  influenced  by  what  he  really  thought  best 
for  us,  or  by  what  he  really  thought  would  be  best  for  France,  is  a 
question  which,  however  easy  or  difficult  to  decide,  is  not  very  im- 


Appendix.  185 

portant  to  the  point  under  consideration.  Whatever  his  motives 
may  have  been,  certain  it  is  that  they  were  such  as  opposed  our 
system  ;  and  as  in  private  life  it  is  deemed  imprudent  to  admit  op 
ponents  to  full  confidence,  especially  respecting  the  very  matters 
in  competition,  so  in  public  affairs  the  like  caution  seems  equally 
proper. 

Secondly. — But  admitting  the  force  of  this  reasoning,  why,  when 
the  articles  were  completed,  did  we  not  communicate  them  to  the 
French  Minister  before  we  proceeded  to  sign  them  ?  For  the  follow 
ing  reasons : 

The  expectations  excited  in  England  by  Lord  Shelburne's 
friends,  that  he  would  put  a  speedy  period  to  the  war,  made  it  nec 
essary  for  him  either  to  realize  those  expectations  or  prepare  to  quit 
his  place.  The  Parliament  being  to  meet  before  his  negotiations 
with  us  were  concluded,  he  found  it  expedient  to  adjourn  it  for  a 
short  term,  in  hopes  of  then  meeting  it  with  all  the  advantages  that 
might  be  expected  from  a  favorable  issue  of  the  negotiation.  Hence 
it  was  his  interest  to  draw  it  to  a  close  before  that  adjournment 
should  expire  ;  and  to  obtain  that  end  both  he  and  his  Commissioner 
became  less  tenacious  on  certain  points  than  they  would  otherwise 
have  been.  Nay,  we  have,  and  then  had,  good  reason  to  believe 
that  the  latitude  allowed  by  the  British  Cabinet  for  the  exercise  of 
discretion  was  exceeded  on  that  occasion. 

I  must  now  remind  you  that  the  King  of  Great  Britain  had 
pledged  himself,  in  Mr.  Oswald's  commission,  to  confirm  and  ratify 
not  what  Mr.  Oswald  should  verbally  agree  to,  but  what  he  should 
formally  sign  his  name  and  affix  his  seal  to. 

Had  we  communicated  the  articles,  when  ready  for  signing,  to 
the  French  Minister,  he  doubtless  would  have  complimented  us  on 
the  terms  of  them  ;  but  at  the  same  time  he  would  have  insisted  on 
our  postponing  the  signature  until  the  articles  then  preparing  be 
tween  France,  Spain,  and  Britain  should  also  be  ready  for  signing — 
he  having  often  intimated  to  us  that  we  should  all  sign  at  the  same 
time  and  place. 

This  would  have  exposed  us  to  a  disagreeable  dilemma.  Had 
we  agreed  to  postpone  signing  the  articles  the  British  Cabinet  might, 
and  probably  would,  have  taken  advantage  of  it.  They  might,  if 
better  prospects  had  offered,  have  insisted  that  the  articles  were  still 
res  infecta,  that  Mr.  Oswald  had  exceeded  the  limits  of  his  instruc 
tions,  and  for  both  these  reasons  that  they  conceived  themselves 


1 86  Appendix. 

still  at  liberty  to  depart  from  his  opinions  and  to  forbid  his  execut 
ing,  as  their  Commissioner,  a  set  of  articles  which  they  could  not  ap 
prove  of. 

It  is  true  that  this  might  not  have  happened,  but  it  is  equally 
true  that  it  might ;  and  therefore  it  was  a  risk  of  too  great  impor 
tance  to  be  run.  The  whole  business  would,  in  that  case,  have  been 
set  afloat  again,  and  the  minister  of  France  would  have  had  an  op 
portunity  at  least  of  approving  the  objections  of  the  British  Court 
and  of  advising  us  to  recede  from  demands  which  in  his  opinion 
were  immoderate  and  too  inconsistent  with  the  claims  of  Spain  to 
meet  with  his  concurrence. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  had,  contrary  to  his  advice  and  re 
quest,  refused  to  postpone  the  signing,  it  is  natural  to  suppose  that 
such  refusal  would  have  given  more  offence  to  the  French  Minister 
than  our  doing  it  without  consulting  him  at  all  about  the  matter. 

Our  withholding  from  him  the  knowledge  of  these  articles  until 
after  they  were  signed  was  no  violation  of  our  treaty  with  France, 
and  therefore  she  has  no  room  for  complaint,  on  that  principle, 
against  the  United  States. 

Congress  had  indeed  made  and  published  a  resolution  not  to 
make  peace  but  in  confidence  and  concurrence  with  France. 

So  far  as  this  resolution  declares  against  a  separate  peace,  it 
has  been  incontestably  observed  ;  and  admitting  that  the  words  "  in 
confidence  and  in  concurrence  with  France "  mean  that  we  should 
mention  to  the  French  Minister  and  consult  with  him  about  every 
step  of  our  proceedings,  yet  it  is  most  certain  that  it  was  founded  on 
a  mutual  understanding  that  France  would  patronize  our  demands 
and  assist  us  in  obtaining  the  objects  of  them.  France,  therefore, 
by  discouraging  our  claims  ceased  to  be  entitled  to  the  degree  of 
confidence  respecting  them  which  was  specified  in  the  resolution. 

It  may  be  said  that  France  must  admit  the  reasonableness  of 
our  claims  before  we  could  properly  expect  that  she  should  pro 
mote  them.  She  knew  what  were  our  claims  before  the  negotiation 
commenced,  though  she  could  only  conjecture  what  reception  they 
would  meet  with  from  Britain.  If  she  thought  our  claims  extrava 
gant,  she  may  be  excusable  for  not  countenancing  them  in  their  full 
extent ;  but  then  we  ought  also  to  be  excused  for  not  giving  her  the 
full  confidence  on  those  subjects  which  was  promised  on  the  im 
plied  condition  of  her  supporting  them. 

But  Congress  positively  instructed  us  to  do  nothing  without  the 


Appendix.  187 

advice  and  consent  of  the  French  Minister,  and  we  have  departed 
from  that  line  of  conduct.  This  is  also  true  ;  but  then  I  apprehend 
that  Congress  marked  out  that  line  of  conduct  for  their  own  sake, 
and  not  for  the  sake  of  France.  The  object  of  that  instruction  was 
the  supposed  interest  of  America,  and  not  of  France ;  and  we  were 
directed  to  ask  the  advice  of  the  French  Minister  because  it  was 
thought  advantageous  to  our  country  that  we  should  receive  and  be 
governed  by  it.  Congress  only,  therefore,  have  a  right  to  complain 
of  our  departure  from  the  line  of  that  instruction. 

If  it  be  urged  that  confidence  ought  to  subsist  between  allies,  I 
have  only  to  remark  that,  as  the  French  Minister  did  not  consult  us 
about  his  articles,  nor  make  us  any  communication  about  them,  our 
giving  him  as  little  trouble  about  ours  did  not  violate  any  principle 
of  reciprocity. 

Our  joint  letter  to  you  by  Captain  Barney  contains  an  explana 
tion  of  our  conduct  respecting  the  separate  article.  .  .  . 

BENJAMIN  FRANKLIN  TO  JOHN  JAY. 

PASSY,  September  10,  1783. 

SIR — I  have  received  a  letter  from  a  very  respectable  person  in 
America  containing  the  following  words,  viz.  : 

"  It  is  confidently  reported,  propagated,  and  believed  by  some 
among  us  that  the  Court  of  France  was  at  bottom  against  our  ob 
taining  the  fishery  and  territory  in  that  great  extent  in  which  both 
are  secured  to  us  by  the  treaty  ;  that  our  minister  at  that  Court 
favored  or  did  not  oppose  this  design  against  us  ;  and  that  it  was 
entirely  owing  to  the  firmness,  sagacity,  and  disinterestedness  of  Mr. 
Adams,  with  whom  Mr.  Jay  united,  that  we  have  obtained  these  im 
portant  advantages." 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  dispute  any  share  of  the  honor  of  that 
treaty  which  the  friends  of  my  colleagues  may  be  disposed  to  give 
them,  but  having  now  spent  fifty  years  of  my  life  in  public  offices 
and  trusts,  and  having  still  one  ambition  left — that  of  carrying  the 
character  of  fidelity  at  least  to  the  grave  with  me — I  cannot  allow 
that  I  was  behind  any  of  them  in  zeal  and  faithfulness.  I  therefore 
think  that  I  ought  not  to  suffer  an  accusation  which  falls  little  short 
of  treason  to  my  country  to  pass  without  notice  when  the  means  of 
effectual  vindication  are  at  hand.  You,  sir,  was  a  witness  of  my 
conduct  in  that  affair.  To  you  and  my  other  colleagues  I  appeal 
by  sending  a  similar  letter  with  this,  and  I  have  no  doubt  of  your 


1 88  Appendix. 

readiness  to  do  a  brother  Commissioner  justice  by  certificates  that 
will  entirely  destroy  the  effect  of  that  accusation. 

JOHN  JAY  TO  BENJAMIN  FRANKLIN. 

PASSY,  September  n,  1783. 

SIR— I  have  been  favored  with  your  letter  of  yesterday  and  will 
answer  it  explicitly. 

I  have  no  reason  whatever  to  believe  that  you  was  averse  to  our 
obtaining  the  full  extent  of  boundary  and  fishery  secured  to  us  by 
the  treaty.  Your  conduct  respecting  them  throughout  the  negotia 
tion  indicated  a  strong  and  a  steady  attachment  to  both  these  ob 
jects,  and  in  my  opinion  promoted  the  attainment  of  them. 

I  remember  that  in  a  conversation  which  M.  de  Rayneval,  the 
First  Secretary  of  Count  de  Vergennes,  had  with  you  and  me  in  the 
summer  of  1782  you  contended  for  our  full  right  to  the  fishery  and 
argued  it  on  various  principles. 

•  Your  letters  to  me,  when  in  Spain,  considered  our  territory  as 
extending  to  the  Mississippi,  and  expressed  your  opinion  against 
ceding  the  navigation  of  that  river  in  very  strong  and  pointed  terms. 

In  short,  sir,  I  do  not  recollect  the  least  difference  in  sentiment 
between  us  respecting  the  boundaries  or  fisheries  ;  on  the  contrary, 
we  were  unanimous  and  united  in  adhering  to  and  insisting  on  them  ; 
nor  did  I  ever  perceive  the  least  disposition  in  either  of  us  to  recede 
from  our  claims  or  be  satisfied  with  less  than  we  obtained. 

JOHN  JAY  TO  ROBERT  MORRIS. 

PASSY,  July  20,  1783. 

.  .  The  loan  in  Holland  goes  on,  and  from  that  quarter  your 
bills  must  be  saved,  if  at  all.  Mr.  Adams  set  out  for  Amsterdam 
the  day  before  yesterday  and  will  push  on  that  business.  If  the 
Dutch  began  to  draw  benefit  from  our  trade  they  would  lend  more 
cheerfully. 

The  British  Ministry  have  not  yet  authorized  Mr.  Hartley  to  con 
sent  to  anything  as  to  commerce.  They  amuse  him  and  us  and 
deceive  themselves.  I  told  him  yesterday  that  they  would  find  us 
like  a  globe — not  to  be  overset.  They  wish  to  be  the  only  carriers 
between  their  islands  and  other  countries  ;  and  though  they  are  ap 
prized  of  our  right  to  regulate  our  trade  as  we  please,  yet  1  suspect 
they  flatter  themselves  that  the  different  States  possess  too  little  of 


Appendix.  1 89 

a  national  or  continental  spirit  ever  to   agree  in   any  one   national 
system.     I  think  they  will  find  themselves  mistaken. 

FRANKLIN  TO  LIVINGSTON. 

(Dip.  Corresp.,  iv.,  pp.  138-9.) 

JULY  23,  1783. 

.  .  .  I  will  only  add  that  with  respect  to  myself,  neither  the 
letter  from  Monsieur  Marbois,  handed  in  through  the  British  nego 
tiators  (a  suspicious  channel),  nor  the  conversation  concerning  the 
fishery,  the  boundaries,  the  royalists,  etc.,  recommending  modera 
tion  in  our  demands,  are  of  weight  sufficient  in  my  mind  to  fix  an 
opinion  that  this  Court  wished  to  restrain  us  in  obtaining  any  de 
gree  of  advantage  we  could  prevail  on  our  enemies  to  accord,  since 
these  discourses  are  fairly  resolvable  by  supposing — a  very  natural 
apprehension — that  we,  relying  too  much  on  the  ability  of  France  to 
continue  the  war  in  our  favor,  might  insist  on  more  advantages  than 
the  English  would  be  willing  to  grant,  and  thereby  lose  the  oppor 
tunity  of  making  peace,  so  necessary  to  all  our  friends. 

THE  COUNT  DE  VERGENNES  TO  M.  DE  LA  LUZERNE. 

JULY  21,  1783. 

After  remarking  that  what  would  suit  them  best  was  that  "  the 
United  States  may  not  assume  the  political  consistency  of  which 
they  are  capable,"  and  referring  disapprovingly  to  England's  cession 
to  the  United  States  of  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  the  Count 
expressed  -his  regret  at  learning  that  Franklin  had  requested  his 
recall,  adding,  in  words  to  which  his  secret  correspondence  in  regard 
to  the  peace  negotiation  give  no  little  significance  :  "I  wish  Con 
gress  might  reject  it,  at  least  for  the  present,  for  it  would  be  impos 
sible  to  give  Mr.  Franklin  a  successor  so  wise  and  so  conciliating 
as  himself.  Besides,  I  should  be  afraid  lest  they  should  leave  us  Mr. 
Jay  ;  and  this  is  the  man  with  whom  I  should  like  least  to  treat  of 
affairs.  He  is  an  egoist,  and  far  too  accessible  to  prejudices  and 
humor.  We  are  much  occupied  with  everything  relative  to  our  com 
merce  with  America,  and  we  feel  more  than  ever  the  necessity  of 
granting  it  encouragements  and  favors."  : 

*  Bancroft's  Const.  History,  i.,  p.  325. 


1 90  Appendix. 

(FRANKLIN  TO  R.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 

(Franklin,  ix.,  p.  582.) 

PASSY,  July  22,  1783. 

I  shall  now  answer  yours  of  March  26th,  May  9th,  and  May 
3 1 St.*  It  gave  me  great  pleasure  to  learn  by  the  first  that  the  news 
of  peace  diffused  general  satisfaction.  I  will  not  now  take  it  upon  me 
to  justify  the  apparent  reserve  respecting  this  Court  which  you  dis 
approve.  We  have  touched  upon  it  in  our  general  letter,  f  I  do 
not  see,  however,  that  they  have  much  reason  to  complain  of  that 
transaction.  Nothing  was  stipulated  to  their  prejudice,  and  none  of 
the  stipulations  were  to  have  force  but  by  a  subsequent  act  of  their 
own.  I  suppose,  indeed,-  that  they  have  not  complained  of  it  or 
you  would  have  sent  us  a  copy  of  the  complaint  that  we  might  have 
answered  it.  I  long  since  satisfied  Count  de  Vergennes  about  it  here. 
We  did  what  appeared  to  us  best  at  the  time,  and  if  we  have  done 
wrong  Congress  will  do  right,  after  hearing  us,  to  censure.  Their 
nomination  of  five  persons  to  the  service  seems  to  mark  that  they 
had  some  dependence  on  our  joint  judgment,  since  one  alone  could 
have  made  a  treaty  by  direction  of  the  French  ^Ministry  as  well  as 
twenty. 

ALEXANDER  HAMILTON  TO  JAY. 

PHILADELPHIA,  July  25,  1783. 

.  .  .  I  have  been  witness  with  pleasure  to  every  event  which 
has  had  a  tendency  to  advance  you  in  the  esteem  of  your  country, 
and  I  may  assure  you  with  sincerity  that  it  is  as  high  as  you  could 
possibly  wish.  All  have  united  in  the  warmest  approbation  of  your 
conduct.  I  cannot  forbear  telling  you  this,  because  my  situation 
has  given  me  access  to  the  truth,  and  I  gratify  my  friendship  for  you 
in  communicating  what  cannot  fail  to  gratify  your  sensibility. 

The  peace,  which  exceeds  in  the  goodness  of  its  terms  the  expec 
tations  of  the  most  sanguine,  does  the  highest  honor  to  those  who 
made  it.  It  is  the  more  agreeable  as  the  time  has  come  when  think 
ing  men  began  to  be  seriously  alarmed  at  the  internal  embarrassments 
and  exhausted  state  of  this  country.  The  New  England  people  talk 

*  Dip.  Corres.,  xiv.,  pp.  84,  107,  109.  f  Ibid.,  x.,  p.  187. 


Appendix.  191 

of  making  you  an  annual  fish-offering,  as  an  acknowledgment  of 
your  exertions  for  the  participation  of  the  fisheries. 

We  have  now  happily  concluded  the  great  work  of  independence, 
but  much  remains  to  be  done  to  reap  the  fruits  of  it.  Our  prospects 
are  not  flattering.  Every  day  proves  the  inefficacy  of  the  present 
confederation,  yet  the  common  danger  being  removed,  we  are  re 
ceding  instead  of  advancing  in  a  disposition  to  amend  its  defects. 

.  .  .  After  having  served  in  the  field  during  the  war,  I  have 
been  making  a  short  apprenticeship  in  Congress  ;  but  the  evacua 
tion  of  New  York  approaching,  I  am  preparing  to  take  leave  of  pub 
lic  life,  to  enter  into  the  practice  of  the  law.  Your  country  will  con 
tinue  to  demand  your  services  abroad.  .  .  . 

JOHN  JAY  TO  COL.  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 

PASSY,  September  28,  1783. 

.  .  .  I  am  happy  to  hear  that  the  terms  of  peace  and  the  con 
duct  of  your  negotiators  give  general  satisfaction  ;  but  there  are 
some  of  our  countrymen,  it  seems,  who  are  not  content,  and  that, 
too,  with  an  article  which  I  thought  to  be  very  unexceptional,  viz., 
the  one  ascertaining  our  boundaries.  Perhaps  those  gentlemen  are 
latitudinarians. 

The  American  newspapers  for  some  months  past  contain  advices 
that  do  us  harm  .  .  .  and  impeach  our  good  faith  in  the  opin 
ions  of  some  and  our  magnanimity  in  the  opinions  of  many.  Our 
reputation  also  suffers  from  the  apparent  reluctance  to  taxes  and 
the  ease  with  which  we  incur  debts  without  providing  for  their  pay 
ment.  The  complaints  of  the  army,  the  jealousies  respecting  Con 
gress,  the  circumstances  which  induced  their  leaving  Philadelphia, 
and  the  too  little  appearance  of  a  national  spirit,  pervading,  uniting, 
and  invigorating  the  confederacy,  are  considered  as  omens  which 
portend  the  diminution  of  our  respectability,  power,  and  felicity.  I 
hope  that  as  the  wheel  turns  round  other  and  better  indications  will 
soon  appear.  I  am  persuaded  that  America  possesses  too  much 
wisdom  and  virtue  to  permit  her  brilliant  prospects  to  fade  away  for 
the  want  of  either.  But  whatever  time  may  produce,  certain  it  is 
that  our  reputation  and  our  affairs  suffer  from  present  appearances. 

The  Tories  are  as  much  pitied  in  these  countries  as  they  are 
execrated  in  ours.  An  undue  degree  of  severity  toward  them 
would  therefore  be  impolitic  as  well  as  unjustifiable.  .  .  . 

.     .     .     Victory  and  peace  should,  in  my  opinion,  be  followed 


192  Appendix. 

by  clemency,  moderation,  and  benevolence,  and  we  should  be  care 
ful  not  to  sully  the  glory  of  the  Revolution  by  licentiousness  and 
cruelty.  These  are  my  sentiments,  and  however  unpopular  they 
may  be,  I  have  not  the  least  desire  to  conceal  or  disguise 
them.  .  .  . 

JOHN  JAY  TO  GOUVERNEUR  MORRIS. 

PASSY,  September  24,  1783. 

.  .  You  have  heard  that  the  Ottoman  and  Russian  empires 
are  on  the  point  of  unsheathing  the  sword.  The  objects  of  the  contest 
are  more  easy  to  discern  than  the  issue  ;  but  if  Russia  should  extend 
her  navigation  to  Constantinople  we  may  be  the  better  for  it.  That 
circumstance  is  an  additional  motive  to  our  forming  a  treaty  of 
commerce  with  her.  Your  commercial  and  geographical  knowledge 
render  it  unnecessary  for  me  to  enlarge  on  this  subject.  But  what 
ever  we  may  have  to  do  abroad,  it  is  of  little  consequence  when 
compared  to  what  we  have  to  do  at  home. 

I  am  perfectly  convinced  that  no  time  is  to  be  lost  in  raising 
and  maintaining  a  'national  spirit  in  America.  Power  to  govern  the 
confederacy,  as  to  all  general  purposes^  should  be  granted  and 
exercised.  The  governments  of  the  different  States  should  be 
wound  up  and  become  vigorous.  America  is  beheld  with  jealousy, 
and  jealousy  is  seldom  idle.  Settle  your  boundaries  without  delay. 
It  is  better  that  some  improper  limits  should  be  fixed  than  any  left 
in  dispute.  In  a  word,  everything  conducive  to  union  and  consti 
tutional  energy  of  government  should  be  cultivated,  cherished,  .and 
protected,  and  all  counsels  and  measures  of  a  contrary  complexion 
should  at  least  be  suspected  of  impolitic  views  and  objects. 

The  rapid  progress  of  luxury  at  Philadelphia  is  a  frequent  topic 
of  conversation  here ;  and  what  is  a  little  remarkable,  I  have  not 
heard  a  single  person  speak  of  it  in  terms  of  approbation. 

ROBERT  MORRIS  TO  JOHN  JAY. 

PHILADELPHIA,  November  27,  1783. 

MY  DEAR  SIR — I  congratulate  you  on  the  signing  of  the  definite 
treaty,  and  on  the  evacuation  of  New  York,  which  took  place  on 
Tuesday.  .  .  . 

.  .  .  We  are  dismissing  the  remains  of  our  army  and  getting 
rid  of  expense,  so  that  I  hope  to  see  the  end  of  my  engagement  be- 


Appendix.  193 

fore  next  May,  but  I  doubt  whether  it  will  be  in  my  power  to  ob 
serve  that  punctuality  in  performing  them  which  I  wish  and  have 
constantly  aimed  at. 

I  am  sending  some  ships  to  China  in  order  to  encourage  others 
in  the  adventurous  pursuits  of  commerce,  and  I  wish  to  see  a  foun 
dation  laid  for  an  American  navy. 

OTTO  TO  VERGENNES. 
(Bancroft's  Const.  History,  pp.  479,  480.) 

JANUARY  10,  1786. 

The  political  importance  of  Mr.  Jay  increases  daily.  Congress 
seems  to  me  to  be  guided  only  by  his  directions,  and  it  is  as  difficult  to 
obtain  anything  without  the  co-operation  of  that  minister  as  to  bring 
about  the  rejection  of  a  measure  proposed  by  him.  .  .  .  It  is 
very  unfortunate  for  us  that  for  a  place  so  important  the  choice  of 
Congress  should  have  fallen  upon  the  very  man  who  does  not  love 
us.  The  affair  of  the  fisheries  still  lies  heavy  upon  his  heart.  For 
the  rest,  whatever  the  prejudices  of  this  minister  toward  us  may  be, 
I  cannot  deny  that  there  are  few  men  in  America  better  able  to  fill 
the  place  which  he  occupies.  The  veneration  with  which  he  has 
inspired  almost  all  members  of  Congress  proves  more  than  anything 
else  that  even  the  jealousy  so  inseparable  from  the  American  char 
acter  has  not  prevailed  against  him,  and  that  he  is  as  prudent  in  his 
conduct  as  he  is  firm  and  resolute  in  his  political  principles  and  in 
his  coolness  toward  France. 
13 


APPENDIX  H. 


AN  ERROR  CORRECTED. 

LORD  EDMOND  FITZMAURICE,  in  his  "Life  of  Shelburne  "  (iii., 
252),  says: 

"Jay  also  intimated,  in  order  to  alarm  Oswald,  that  he  was  about 
to  sign  a  treaty  of  commerce  and  alliance  with  Spain,  containing 
claims  in  regard  to  the  conclusion  of  peace  of  a  character  similar  to 
those  in  the  treaty  with  France." 

There  seems  to  be  an  error  here  which  I  think  deserves  correc 
tion.  The  intimation  was  given  by  Franklin  to  Oswald,  and  was 
communicated  by  Oswald  to  Townsend  on  August  5,  1782.  In  one 
of  the  despatches  quoted  in  a  note  Mr.  Oswald  wrote  : 

".  .  .  About  a  week  past,  when  I  was  with  the  Doctor 
[Franklin],  and  having  told  him  1  had  waited  on  Mr.  Jay,  and  hap 
pening  to  say  I  thought  him  a  good-natured  man,  the  doctor  replied 
he  was  so,  and  also  a  man  of  good  sense ;  that  he  had  been  ill 
but  was  now  recovering,  and  at  present  was  busy  with  the  Spanish 
ambassador  ;  that  while  at  Madrid  he  had  been  trying  to  conclude 
a  treaty  with  Spain,  but  they  had  delayed  and  put  him  off  from 
time  to  time,  so  that  he  was  at  last  obliged  to  quit  Spain  and  repair 
to  Paris  to  join  him;  but  that  now  the  Court  of  Spain  had  sent  to 
their  ambassador  here  all  power  to  conclude. 

"I  asked  the  Doctor  what  sort  of  treaty  it  was.  He  said  a  treaty 
of  commerce,  and  after  a  short  hesitation  added  alliance,  and  at 
last  said  it  was  just  the  same  kind  of  treaty  as  they  had  with  France. 
I  said  no  doubt  it  was  so  and  made  no  further  observation. 

"This  information  came  from  the  Doctor  in  the  easy  way  of  con 
versation,  as  any  matter  of  less  importance  would  have  passed  ;  yet 
I  imagined  with  a  view  of  its  being  properly  marked  and  communi 
cated,  and  most  likely  also  with  the  same  intention,  as  on  former  oc 
casions,  of  showing  the  expediency  of  getting  on  with  the  business." 


APPENDIX  I. 


NOTE  OF  THE  DEBATES  ON  THE  PEACE  IN  THE 
HOUSE  OF  COMMONS,  FEBRUARY,  1783,  AS 
CONFIRMATORY  OF  THE  WISDOM  OF  THE 
AMERICAN  COMMISSIONERS. 

IN  the  Congressional  Library  at  Washington  may  be  found  "A 
Full  and  Faithful  Report  of  the  Debates  in  both  Houses  of  Parliament 
on  Monday,  February  17,  and  Friday,  21,  1783,  on  the  Articles  of 
Peace.  London  :  Printed  for  S.  Bladon,  13  Paternoster  Row." 

See  also  the  "Parliamentary  History,"  vol.  xxiii.,  for  the  de 
bate  in  the  Lords,  pp.  373-435?  and  that  in  the  Commons,  pp.  436- 
498. 

The  House  of  Commons,  February  17.  1783,  was  more  crowded 
th'an  had  been  known  for  many  years,  more  than  four  hundred  and 
fifty  members  being  in  the  house  at  one  time. 

Mr.  Thomas  Pitt  rose  to  move  the  Address,  after  the  clerk  at 
the  table  had  read  the  Articles  of  Peace  with  France  and  Spain,  and 
the  Provisional  Articles  with  America. 

Mr.  Pitt  showed  that  the  interest  on  the  public  debt  was  in 
creased  from  less  than  four  and  a  half  millions  at  the  beginning  of 
Lord  North's  war,  to  near  nine  and  a  half  millions  at  the  present  time ; 
that  this  six-year  war  had  cost  us,  therefore,  considerably  more 
than  all  the  successes  of  the  Duke  of  Marlborough  and  Lord  Chat 
ham,  and  all  the  wars  put  together  from  the  time  of  the  Revolution 
for  near  a  century.  Mr.  Pitt  moved  the  address  to  express  "  our  sat 
isfaction  that  his  Majesty  has,  in  consequence  of  the  power  entrusted 
to  him,  laid  the  foundation  by  the  Provisional  Articles  with  the 
States  of  North  America  for  a  treaty  of  peace  which  we  trust  will 
insure  perfect  reconciliation  and  friendship  between  the  two  coun 
tries." 

Mr.  Wilberforce  seconded  the  motion. 


1 96  Appendix. 

He  regretted  and  dwelt  with  intense  emotion  on  the  part  rela 
tive  to  the  loyalists,  but  concluded  by  expressing  the  hearty  appro 
bation  of  the  peace  and  of  the  motion  which  he  rose  to  second. 

Lord  John  Cavendish  moved  an  amendment  of  "  will  consider" 
instead  of  "have  considered,"  which  Mr.  St.  John  seconded. 

Lord  North  said  that  unsuccessful  as  we  had  been  in  the  war 
with  America,  he  was  certainly  prepared  for  concessions  and  sacri 
fices,  but  he  was  free  to  say  that  the  concessions  which  were  made 
had  surpassed  those  which  he  had  ever  had  in  contemplation  in  the 
most  calamitous  state  of  affairs.  .  .  .  He  had  never  dreamed 
of  those  concessions  which  were  now  to  be  made. 

He  condemned  the  treatment  of  the  loyalists  and  the  concession 
of  the  fisheries,  which  was  without  reciprocity,  for  they  were  not  se 
cured  the  right  of  fishing,  which  they  used  formerly  to  have  on  the 
coast  of  America. 

Mr.  Powys  spoke  for  the  original  motion. 

Lord  Mulgrave  said  since  the  peace  was  made  he  would  abide 
by  it. 

Mr.  Geo.  Townsend  defended  the  treaty  and  said:  "In  regard 
to  the  boundaries  of  Canada,  had  they  been  left  in  the  situation  they 
were  prior  to  the  provisional  treaty,  they  would  have  been  an  eter 
nal  bone  of  contention  between  us  and  Canada,  because  some  of 
the  boundaries  of  the  colonies  were  included  in  those  of  Canada." 

Mr.  Burke  said  he  never  heard  in  the  course  of  his  life  anything 
so  ridiculous  as  the  defence  set  up  by  the  honorable  gentlemen  in 
support  of  the  peace. 

He  declared  solemnly  on  the  whole  that  the  articles  were  so  de 
grading  as  to  merit  obliteration,  if  it  were  possible  to  effect  it,  out  of 
the  history  of  the  country  (page  38). 

The  Lord  Advocate  was  very  warm  in  his  panegyric  on  ministers 
and  strenuous  in  the  approval  of  the  peace.  He  was  very  pointed 
on  the  noble  lord  in  the  blue  ribbon,  and  Mr.  Fox,  on  their  sup 
posed  confederacy  and  coalition,  and  on  the  warmth  of  their  zeal  in 
the  honeymoon  of  their  loves. 

Gov.  Johnston  declared  the  peace  unwise,  unpolitic,  and  to  the 
last  degree  dishonorable. 

He  recognized  the  right  of  the  Crown  to  make  peace,  but  con 
tended  that  the  cession  of  any  part  of  the  dominion  of  this  country 
was  not  constitutional  in  the  Crown. 

Mr.  Sheridan  held  that  the  treaty  was  of  the  most  disgraceful  na- 


Appendix.  197 

ture  and  relinquished  everything  that  was  glorious  and  great  in  this 
country  (page  46). 

Among  the  other  speakers  were  Mr.  Banker,  for  the  address ; 
Sir  Wm.  Dreben,  who  was  against  the  right  of  cession  of  territory ; 
Mr.  Mansfield  ;  Sir  Francis  Besset ;  Mr.  James  Grenville  ;  Mr.  Fox, 
who  said,  *'  It  was  everywhere  concession ; "  Mr.  Chancellor  Pitt, 
who  spoke  for  the  address;  and  Mr.  Sheridan,  who  replied.  The  re 
sult  was : 

Ayes  for  amendment 224 

Nays 208 

A  majority  against  the  ministers  of 16 

On  the  same  day,  February  I'jth,  the  debate  took  place  in  the 
House  of  Lords,  where  there  were  present  one  hundred  and  forty-five 
more  persons  than  had  been  present  before  during  the  reign  of 
George  III.  Lord  Pembroke  and  Lord  Carmarthen  were  the  mover 
and  seconder  of  the  address,  and  Lord  Carlisle  the  mover  of  the 
amendment.  Lord  Edmond  Fitzmaurice,  in  his  "  Life  of  Shel- 
burne"  (iii.,  346),  says  : 

"The  chief  supporters  of  the  amendment  in  the  House  of  Lords 
were  Lord  Townsend,  Lord  Stormont,  Lord  Sackville,  Lord  Wal- 
singham,  Lord  Keppel,  and  Lord  Loughborough.  Against  them 
were  ranged  the  Duke  of  Grafton,  Lord  Grantham,  Lord  Howe,  the 
successor  of  Lord  Keppel  at  the  Admiralty,  Lord  Shelburne,  and  the 
Chancellor.  The  Duke  of  Richmond  expressed  himself  dissatisfied 
with  the  preliminaries,  but  refused  to  vote  against  them  ;  Lord  Gower 
adopted  a  similar  course. 

"The  principal  points  selected  for  attack  in  the  American  treaty 
were  the  boundary  line  between  the  two  countries  throughout  its  wh'ole 
length,  the  clause  relating  to  the  fisheries,  and  the  alleged  neglect  of 
the  loyalists.*  In  the  French  and  Spanish  treaties  hardly  a  clause, 

*  Mr.  Lecky,  in  his  History  of  England  (vol.  iv.,  287,  289,  quoting  Sabine's 
American  Loyalists,  pp.  86  and  87,  and  Jones'  History  of  New  York,  ii.,  259, 
268,  500,  509,  and  Wilmot's  Historical  View  of  the  Commission  for  Inquiring 
into  the  Losses  and  Claims  of  the  Loyalists,  pp.  15-16),  estimates  the  loyal  emi 
grants  to  Nova  Scotia  and  New  Brunswick  alone  at  35,000,  and  the  total  number 
of  refugee  not  much  less  than  100,000.  In  178?,  and  for  some  years  later,  Eng 
land  paid  more  than  ^"40,000  a  year  to  315  persons.  Later  additional  sums  were 
voted  in  annuities  and  half-pay,  besides  gra::i~  of  land.  In  1790  the  claimants  in 
England,  Nova  Scotia,  New  Brunswick,  and  Cr.na  Ja  were  5,072,  of  whom  954 


198  Appendix. 

except  that  relating  to  Minorca,  remained  unchallenged.  The  na 
tional  interests,  it  was  declared,  had  been  entirely  abandoned ;  the 
fleet,  it  was  alleged,  especially  by  Keppel,  had  never  been  in  so  ef 
ficient  a  condition,  and  the  glorious  recollections  of  1763  were 
evoked  to  put  to  shame  the  negotiators  and  the  ministers  of  1782, 
who,  it  was  further  asserted,  had  no  right  to  sign  the  treaty  without 
consulting  Parliament.  The  condition  of  the  finances  of  the  coun 
try  was  too  prosaic  a  subject  to  be  deemed  worthy  of  much  attention 
by  the  excited  critics  of  the  day. 

"  The  debate  in  the  House  of  Lords  continued  till  a  very  early 
hour  of  the  following  morning.  Late  at  night  Shelburne  rose  to  re 
ply  to  the  objections  which  had  been  urged  against  the  treaty.  He 
began  by  dwelling  on  the  difficulty  of  the  position  at  the  moment  he 
was  called  to  the  head  of  affairs,  and  pointed  out  how  numerous 
and  intricate  the  questions  which  he  was  called  to  consider.  .  .  . 
As  to  the  cession  of  the  back  lands  of  Canada,  he  showed  that,  con 
sidering  the  small  amount  of  their  exports  and  imports,  it  was  pre 
posterous  to  argue  that  their  loss  would  ruin  the  trade  of  England, 
while  it  should  be  recollected  that  the  best  fur  districts  were  in  the 
country  which  was  retained.  .  .  .  '  What  then,'  he  said,  '  is  the 
result  of  this  part  of  the  treaty  ?  Why,  this  :  you  have  given  Amer 
ica,  with  whom  every  call  under  heaven  urges  you  to  stand  on  the 
footing  of  brethren,  a  share  in  a  trade  the  monopoly  of  which  you 
sordidly  preserved  to  yourselves  at  the  loss  of  the  enormous  sum  of 
^750,000.  Monopolies,  some  way  or  other,  are  ever  justly  pun 
ished.  They  forbid  rivalry,  and  rivalry  is  the  very  essence  of  the 
well-being  of  trade.  This  seems  to  be  the  era  of  Protestantism  in 
trade.  ...  If  there  is  any  nation  under  heaven  which  ought 
to  be  the  first  to  reject  monopoly,  it  is  the  English.  Situated  as  we 
are,  between  the  old  world  and  the  new,  and  between  Northern  and 
Southern  Europe,  all  we  ought  to  covet  upon  earth  is  free  trade  and 
fair  equality.'  .  .  .  On  the  question  of  the  loyalists  Shelburne  ap 
pealed  to  his  own  past  conduct  as  a  proof  that  he  was  not  likely  to 
have  neglected  their  interests.  Lord  Sackville,  he  said,  had  declared 
his  belief  that  the  recommendation  of  Congress  on  their  behalf  would 
prove  of  no  avail;  but  the  word  'recommendation'  was  that  which 

either  withdrew  or  failed  to  establish  their  claims,  and  among  the  remainder 
.£3,110,000  was  distributed.  Comparing  the  number  of  bonafide  claimants  in 
1790  with  the  estimate  of  100,000  refugees,  the  latter  would  seem  to  be  exagger 
ated. 


Appen  dix. 

Congress  had  always  used  to  the  provincial  assemblies  in  all  their 
measures  relating  to  money  and  men.  It  was  difficult,  from  the 
nature  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  to  procure  more 
than  a  recommendation.  ...  In  reply  to  the  question,  *  Why  have 
you  given  America  the  freedom  of  fishing  in  all  your  creeks  and  har 
bors,  and  especially  on  the  banks  of  Newfoundland,  and  why  have 
you  not  stipulated  for  a  reciprocity  of  fishing  in  the  American  creeks 
and  harbors  ? '  he  showed  that  for  the  first  reason  it  would  have 
been  impossible  to  exclude  the  American  fishermen,  while  in  the 
second  there  would  be  plenty  of  room  for  both  parties,  and  no  ne 
cessity  for  the  English  fishermen  to  feel  hampered  by  the  presence 
of  those  of  the  United  States.  .  .  .  But  in  such  a  day  as  this 
your  lordships  must  be  told  what  were  the  difficulties  which  the 
King's  ministers  had  to  encounter  in  the  course  of  the  last  campaign. 

.  .  What  have  been  my  anxieties  for  New  York  !  What  have 
I  suffered  from  the  apprehension  of  an  attack  on  that  garrison, 
which,  if  attacked,  must  have  fallen !  What  have  I  suffered  from 
the  apprehensions  of  an  attack  on  Nova  Scotia  or  Newfoundland  ! 
The  folly,  or  the  want  of  enterprise  by  our  enemies,  alone  pro 
tected  those  places  ;  for  had  they  gone  there  instead  of  to  Hudson's 
Bay,  they  must  have  fallen.  .  .  .  The  noble  Viscount  (Lord 
Keppel)  has  told  us  the  case  of  the  fleet  with  which  he  was  sent 
to  the  relief  of  Gibraltar.  He  could  hardly  venture  to  swim  home 
in  the  Victory.  How  many  of  our  ships  were,  in  fact,  under 
manned?  Did  the  House  know  this  ?  .  .  .  Are  not  these  things 
so,  and  are  not  these  things  to  be  taken  into  the  account  before  min 
isters  are  condemned  for  giving  peace  to  the  country  ?  .  . 
You  will  pardon  me  if  I  have  been  earnest  in  laying  before  your 
lordships  our  embarrassments,  our  difficulties,  our  views,  and  rea 
sons  for  what  we  have  done.  I  submit  them  to  you  with  confi 
dence,  and  rely  on  the  nobleness  of  your  natures,  that  in  judging  of 
men  who  have  hazarded  so  much  for  their  country,  you  will  not  be 
guided  by  prejudice  nor  influenced  by  party." 

The  debate  concluded  with  a  legal  battle  between  Loughborough 
and  Thurlow  on  the  right  of  the  Crown  to  sign  a  treaty  ceding  na 
tional  territory  without  the  previous  consent  of  Parliament.  The 
speech  of  Thurlow  upon  this  occasion  is  generally  considered  to 
have  settled  the  question  in  the  affirmative  (Shelburne's  Life,  in., 

346,  355)- 

At  half-past  four  in  the  morning  the  Lords  divided,  the  contents 


2OO  Appendix. 

and  proxies  being  72,  the  non-contents  and  proxies  59 — a  majority 
for  the  address  of  13.  Of  the  bishops  but  thirteen  were  present, 
and  only  seven  voted  for  the  ministry.  "  Their  consistency,  how 
ever,"  remarks  Lord  Edmond  Fitzmaurice,  "  may  be  admired  in  not 
desiring  to  associate  their  names  with  the  conclusion  of  a  war  which 
they  had  done  so  much  to  excite  end  embitter." 

On  February  2ist  Lord  John  Cavendish  brought  forward  his 
resolution,  "  which,"  says  Lord  Edmond,  "  with  sublime  indiffer 
ence  to  the  declaration  of  its  predecessor  that  the  House  had  not 
yet  had  time  to  examine  the  preliminaries  and  therefore  could  not 
applaud  them,  proposed  to  censure  them  in  the  lump  without  even 
calling  for  papers."  "  Such  a  gross  indecorum,"  says  Walpole,  "  was 
perhaps  occasioned  by  the  desire  of  saving  Lord  North  from  any 
retrospect  the  neglect  of  which  they  could  not  justify  if  they  went 
into  the  article  against  Lord  Shelburne."  Late  in  the  evening  Pitt 
rose  to  reply  to  the  attacks  upon  the  ministry,  and  after  remarking 
that  the  debate  obviously  originated  rather  in  an  inclination  to  force 
the  Earl  of  Shelburne  from  the  Treasury  than  in  any  real  conviction 
'that  ministers  deserved  censure  for  the  concessions  they  had  made, 
'he  pronounced  an  eulogium  upon  his  powerful  abilities,  his  habitual 
'uprightness,  and  the  honest  and  honorable  part  that  he  had  acted, 
remarking,  "  but  his  merits  are  as  much  above  my  panegyric  as  the 
lot  to  which  he  owes  his  defamation  are  beneath  my  attention  " 
.(Shelburne,  iii.,  365).  At  half-past  three  in  the  morning  the  House 
divided — for  the  Government,  190  ;  for  the  opposition,  207  ;  a  majority 
of  17  censuring  the  terms  of  peace.  This  result  led  to  the  resigna 
tion  of  Shelburne  on  February  23d,  recommending  the  King  to 
send  for  Pitt,  who  would  not  undertake  the  task  without  a  moral 
certainty  of  a  majority  in  the  House  of  Commons.  He  then,  on 
March  9th,  sent  for  Lord  Ashburton,  and  after  an  unsuccessful 
attempt  to  resist  the  force  of  the  coalition,  the  King  wrote  to  Shel 
burne  (April  2,  1783)  :  "I  have  taken  the  bitter  potion  of  appoint 
ing  the  seven  ministers  named  by  the  Duke  of  Portland  and  Lord 
North  to  kiss  hands.  ...  I  do  not  mean  to  grant  a  single 
peerage  or  other  mark  of  favor."  On  December  iSth  the  resig 
nation  of  the  two  secretaries  was  demanded  by  the  King,  and 
Pitt  accepted  the  premiership.  On  October  31,  1784,  Shelburne 
•was  made  Marquis  of  Lansdowne. 

Apart  from   the  general  historic  interest  of   the  Parliamentary 


Append.     IUNIVER& 

debates  on  the  treaty  with  America  and  the  admitted  unpopularity 
of  its  concessions,  these  facts  have  an  important  value  in  illustrating 
the  wisdom  of  the  American  Commissioners  in  signing  the  Prelimi 
nary  Articles  without  communicating  them  to  France,  and  showing 
that  the  danger  to  which  Jay  referred  in  his  letter  to  Livingston 
(dated  Passy,  July  19,  1782— Jay's  Life  and  Writings,  i.,  174)  as  likely 
to  occur  had  they  communicated  the  articles  to  Vergennes,  as  Liv 
ingston  thought  they  should  have  done,  would  almost  inevitably 
have  happened. 

The  letter  will  be  found  ante,  in  Appendix,  page  183,  and  shows, 
first,  that  they  were  well  advised  of  Lord  Shelburne' s  position  ;  that 
the  necessity  of  concluding  a  peace  before  Parliament  met  made 
them  less  tenacious  on  some  points  than  they  would  otherwise  have 
been  ;  and  that  they  had  reason  to  suppose  that  the  British  Com 
missioner  and  his  advisers  were  rather  exceeding  the  discretion 
intended  by  the  British  Cabinet.  This  view,  it  may  be  remarked  in 
passing,  would  seem  to  be  confirmed  by  a  passage  in  the  letter  of 
M.  de  Rayneval  to  Mr.  Monroe  on  the  peace  negotiations  (dated 
Paris,  November  14,  1795— Rives'  Madison,  i.,  Appendix,  658)  if 
M.  de  Rayneval' s  statements  had  not  been  so  frequently  proven  to 
be  erroneous  or  exaggerated.  He  says  of  his  second  visit  to  Lord 
Lansdowne  (meaning  Lord  Shelburne)  after  the  signing  of  the 
Preliminary  Articles  : 

"Je  ne  dois  pas  omettre  de  vous  dire,  Monsieur,  que  Milord 
Lansdowne,  chez  qui  j'etais  a  1'instant  ou  il  apprit  cette  signature, 
me  dit  que  c'etait  un  incident  qu'il  ne  concevait  pas,  et  qu'il 
n'aurait  des  idees  nettes  a  cette  egard,  qu'apres  la  lecture  des 
depoches.  Je  revis  le  premier  Ministre  le  lendemain,  et  il  me  dit 
que  le  traite,  dont  il  s'agit  avait  fait  la  plus  vive  sensation  stir  le 
conseil ;  qu'il  avait  retourne  les  esprits." 

Lord  Edmond  Fitzmaurice  states  (Shelburne,  iii.,  302)  that  at  the 
last  moment  it  was  a  question  "whether  the  English  Commissioners 
could  venture  to  sign  without  consulting  their  principals,"  and 
Strachey  wrote  Nepean  (November  29,  1782)  :  "Now  are  we  to  be 
hanged  or  applauded  for  thus  rescuing  England  from  the  American 
war  ?  " 

The  second  point  shown  by  Jay's  letter  is  that  Great  Britain  wag 
pledged  to  ratify  not  what  Oswald  should  verbally  agree  to,  but 
what  he  should  formally  sign  and  affix  his  seal  to  ;  that  if  the 
articles  had  been  shown  to  Vergennes  he  would  have  complimented 


2O2  Appendix. 

the  Commissioners  on  the  terms  obtained,  but  would  have  insisted 
on  a  postponement  of  the  signing  till  the  articles  between  France, 
Spain,  and  Britain  were  also  ready  for  signing.  This  is  clear  from 
the  language  of  Vergennes.  If  the  Commissioners  had  rejected 
such  advice  it  would  have  given  more  offence  to  France  than  their 
doing  it  without  consulting  her,  and  if  she  had  assented  to  delay  the 
signing  the  British  Cabinet  might  have  declined  to  approve  the 
articles  as  still  res  infecta,  and  the  French  Minister  would  have  had 
an  opportunity  at  least  of  approving  the  objections  of  the  British 
Court,  and  of  advising  us  to  recede  from  our  demands  as  immoder 
ate  and  opposed  to  the  wishes  both  of  France  and  Spain. 


APPENDIX   J. 


EXTRACTS  FROM  HISTORICAL  WRITERS  TOUCH 
ING  THE  PEACE. 

No.  i. 

(From  Wraxall's  Memoirs  of  His  Own  Time,  1772-1784.     New  York  and  Lon 
don,  Vol.  II.,  pp.  391.      1884.) 

SIR  WILLIAM  WRAXALL  remarks  (November,  1782)  that  "while 
Lord  Howe  thus  placed  in  security  the  most  brilliant  foreign  possession 
belonging  to  the  British  Crown  in  Europe  [by  relieving  Gibraltar], 
negotiations  of  a  pacific  measure  were  carrying  on  at  Paris,  both  with 
America  and  with  the  other  coalesced  powers.  The  Provisional 
Articles  concluded  with  the  insurgent  colonies  which  were  first 
signed  did  not  indeed  demand  any  considerable  length  of  time  or 
superior  diplomatic  talents  in  order  to  conduct  them  to  a  prosper 
ous  termination,  where  almost  every  possible  concession  was  made 
on  the  part  of  England  merely  to  obtain  from  America  a  cessation 
of  hostilities.  Not  only  their  independence  was  recognized '  in  the 
most  explicit  terms ;  territories,  rivers,  lakes,  commerce,  islands, 
forts  and  fortified  places,  Indian  allies,  loyalists — all  were  given  up 
to  the  Congress.  In  fixing  the  boundaries  between  Canada  and  the 
United  States  ideal  limits  ignorantly  adopted  on  our  part  were  laid 
down  amidst  unknown  tracts." 

Sir  Nathaniel  William  Wraxall,  after  summing  up  the  result  of 
the  general  pacification  to  each  of  the  parties  engaged  in  the  war, 
somewhat  as  Mr.  Lecky  has  done,  remarked  : 

"  America  triumphed  in  the  contest,  and  the  greatest  statesmen 
whom  England  had  produced,  though  they  concurred  in  scarcely 
any  other  political  opinion,  yet  agreed  upon  the  point  that  with  the 
defalcation  of  the  thirteen  colonies  from  the  Crown  the  glory  and 
greatness  of  England  were  permanently  extinguished  "  (pp.  439- 
440).  Wraxall  quotes  as  having  solemnly  expressed  that  idea  at 
different  periods,  the  elder  Chatham,  Shelburne,  Lord  George 


2O4  Appendix. 

Germain,  and  Dunning.  Shelburne  had  said  even  so  late  as  July 
10,  1782,  when  constituted  First  Lord  of  the  Treasury,  "  Whenever 
the  British  Parliament  should  recognize  the  sovereignty  of  the  thir 
teen  colonies,  the  sun  of  England's  glory  was  forever  set"  (p.  440). 

No.  2. 

M.  BRISSOT  DE  WARVILLE  ON  THE  PART 
BORNE  BY  JAY  IN  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIA 
TIONS. 

As  these  pages  are  passing  through  the  press,  the  Magazine  of 
American  History  for  March,  1884,  reproduces  (p.  246)  in  a  paper 
on  "  Brissot  de  Warville  :  His  Notes  on  America  in  1788,"  the  fol 
lowing  translation  of  his  comments  on  the  Peace  Negotiations  of 
1782  : 

When  M.  de  Warville  reached  New  Rochelle  he  wrote  :  "  This 
place  will  always  be  celebrated  for  having  given  birth  to  one  of  the 
most  distinguished  men  of  the  last  Revolution — a  Republican  re 
markable  for  his  firmness  and  his  coolness,  a  writer  eminent  for 
his  nervous  style  and  his  close  logic — Mr.  John  Jay,  present  Min 
ister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  The  following  anecdote  will  give  an  idea 
of  the  firmness  of  this  Republican  :  At  the  time  of  laying  the  foun 
dation  of  the  peace  of  1783  M.  de  Vergennes,  actuated  by  secret 
motives,  wished  to  engage  the  ambassadors  of  Congress  to  confine 
their  demands  to  the  fisheries,  and  to  renounce  the  western  terri 
tory  ;  that  is,  the  vast  and  fertile  country  beyond  the  Alleghany 
Mountains.  This  minister  [Vergennes]  required  particularly  that 
the  independence  of  America  should  not  be  considered  as  the  basis 
of  the  peace,  but  simply  that  it  should  be  conditional.  To  succeed 
in  this  project  it  was  necessary  to  gain  over  Jay  and  Adams.  Mr. 
Jay  declared  to  M.  de  Vergennes  that  he  would  sooner  lose  his  life 
than  sign  such  a  treaty  ;  that  the  Americans  fought  for  independ 
ence  ;  that  they  would  never  lay  down  their  arms  till  it  should  be 
fully  consecrated ;  that  the  Court  of  France  had  recognized  it  ;  and 
that  there  would  be  a  contradiction  in  her  conduct  if  she  should 
deviate  from  that  point.  It  was  not  difficult  for  Mr.  Jay  to  bring 
Mr.  Adams  to  this  determination,  and  M.  de  Vergennes  could  never 
shake  his  firmness.  Consider  here  the  strange  concurrence  of  events. 
The  American  who  forced  the  Court  of  France  and  gave  law  to  the 
English  Minister  was  the  grandson  of  a  French  refugee  of  the  last 


Appendix.  205 

century  who  fled  to  New  Rochelle.  Thus  the  descendant  of  a  man 
whom  Louis  XIV.  had  persecuted  with  a  foolish  rage  imposed  his 
decisions  on  the  descendant  of  that  sovereign,  in  his  own  palace,  a 
hundred  years  after  the  banishment  of  the  ancestor.  Mr.  Jay  was 
equally  immovable  by  all  the  efforts  of  the  English  Minister,  whom 
M.  de  Vergennes  had  gained  to  his  party,  and  his  reasoning  de 
termined  the  Court  of  St.  James.  .  .  .  When  Mr.  Jay  passed 
through  England  to  return  to  America  Lord  Shelburne  desired  to  see 
him.  Accused  by  the  nation  of  having  granted  too  much  to  the 
Americans,  the  English  statesman  desired  to  know,  in  case  he  had 
persisted  not  to  accord  to  the  Americans  the  western  territory,  if 
they  would  have  continued  the  war.  Mr.  Jay  answered  that  he  be 
lieved  it  and  that  he  should  have  advised  it." 


No.    3. 
THE  NEW  YORK  REVIEW  ON  JAY'S  ACTION. 

FROM    A    PAPER  BY  THE    LATE    PROFESSOR    JOHN     McVlCKAR,    D.D., 

OF  COLUMBIA  COLLEGE,  NEW  YORK.     OCTOBER,  1841. 

.  .  Jay's  characteristic  caution,  with  which  his  fame  has 
been  taunted,  was  the  result  of  principle  and  not  of  selfishness. 
His  caution  was  for  his  country's  safety,  not  for  his  own,  still  less 
for  private  benefit.  Not  against  peril,  through  duty,  whether  of 
person,  fame,  or  fortune,  did  Jay  ever  display  it,  but  solely  against 
aught  which  threatened  the  common  good.  " Ne  quid  detrimenti 
respublica  caper et"  On  the  whole,  we  conclude  that  few  men  of 
less  rigidness  of  character  would  so  successfully  have  resisted  the 
alternate  cajoling  and  threatening  arts  by  which,  both  at  Madrid  and 
Paris,  the  American  negotiator  was  literally  beset,  in  the  vain  hope 
that  he  might  be  entrapped  or  browbeaten  into  satisfactory  terms. 
It  affords  to  men  in  all  time  an  instructive  and  comforting  picture 
of  such  contest,  one,  to  the  wordly  eye,  so  fearfully  unequal  as  re 
publican  simplicity  matched  against  the  trained  diplomacy  and  cor 
rupt  management  of  Europe— an  instructive  and  a  proud  picture, 
too,  for  "  the  race  here  was  not  unto  the  swift,  nor  the  battle  to  the 
strong."  Spain  was  finally  caught  inher  own  net:  waiting,  with 
selfish  wisdom,  for~~An7eTlc1mmfancy  tcTsuccumb,  she  foum^JieiseJf 
at  length  in  the  arms  of  a  giant  Hercules,  and,  by  delaying  the  boon 


206  Appendix. 

she  might  have  sold  till  America  jiojonger  needed  itT  she  lost  the 
equivalent  the  young  Republic  stood  ready  atjirst  to  offer. 

\ \  i  The  FrencFF  Government  had"  solicited  and  received, 
from  a  too  confiding  Congress,  the  control  of  an  absolute  guardian 
in  negotiating  the  terms  of  peace.  The  question  is  whether  to  that 
trust  her  acts  showed  her  faithful  or  faithless  ;  for  surely  in  the  latter 
case  it  were  an  act  of  the  highest  wisdom  in  Jay  to  detect  such 
double-dealing,  as  well  as  of  the  highest  patriotism  at  any  risk  to  de 
feat  it.  We  think  it  was  so  proved,  and  rank  Jay  accordingly. 

.  .  .  On  one  point,  at  least,  we  cannot  but  condemn  Frank 
lin,  though  in  a  matter  more,  perhaps,  of  judgment  than  patriotism. 
We  know  that  he  was  for  waiving  the  all-important  honorable  ques 
tion  whether  independence  was  to  precede  or  follow  the  treaty — 
whether  we  were  to  stand  before  England  in  the  light  of  revolted 
colonies  or  of  independent  States.  In  the  celebrated  interview  of 
August  loth,  Jay  made  short  answer  to  what  he  well  termed  Ver- 
gennes'  "singular  reasoning"  on  this  subject  in  favor  of  Oswald's 
commission.  The  Count  then  turned  to  Doctor  Franklin  and  asked 
him  what  he  thought  of  the  matter.  The  Doctor  said  he  believed 
the  commission  would  do.  "  I  told  the  minister,"  says  Jay,  "  that 
we  neither  could  nor  would  treat  with  any  nation  in  the  world  on  any 
other  than  an  equal  footing"  (letter  to  Gouverneur  Morris,  xi., 
1 06).  In  private  conference  too,  with  Jay,  such  was  his  argument, 
"the  good  faith  of  the  French"  and  "obedience  to  instructions  ;" 
and,  in  accordance  with  these  views,  Franklin  declined  putting  his 
name  to  the  letter  drawn  up  by  Jay  refusing  to  treat  except  on 
terms  of  equality.  But  this,  as  before  said,  touches  not  his  love  for 
his  country  or  his  sense  of  duty,  though  still  in  neither  in  accord 
ance  with  ours.  As  to  his  clear-sightedness  into  the  views  of  France, 
Franklin  stands  also,  in  our  estimation,  condemned  of  the  blind 
ness  either  of  partiality  or  culpable  remissness.  The  course  of 
France  in  the  matter  of  American  liberty  during  the  contest  had 
been,  on  the  part  of  individuals,  one  of  high  and  generous  enthusi 
asm,  and  on  the  part  of  her  Government,  one  of  liberal  though  cal 
culating  policy.  This  was  for  the  lowering  of  England.  But  when 
it  came  to  the  question  of  a  solid  and  permanent  independence  to 
the  States,  that  was  another  question ;  and  herein  we  hold  the  pol 
icy  of  the  French  Government  (saving,  perhaps,  the  King  person 
ally)  to  have  been  one  alike  selfish,  arrogant,  and  false,  and  thereby, 
too,  dishonorable,  inasmuch  as  it  was  the  abuse  of  a  guardianship 


Appendix.  207 

with  which  she  herself  had  sought  to  be  entrusted  for  the  benefit  not 
of  herself,  but  of  America,  or  rather,  we  should  say,  through  her 
minister  at  Philadelphia  arrogantly  claimed  (see  Count  Luzerne's 
letter  to  Congress),  and  which  trust  she  now  held  up  to  the  Ameri 
can  negotiators  and  to  the  world  at  large  in  proof  of  her  pledged 
generosity  and  disinterestedness.  She  had  feared,  it  seems,  the  "im 
practicability,"  as  her  minister  worded  it,  of  Adams  as  negotiator  of 
the  treaty,  and  solicited  coadjutors  to  him.  The  selfish  prayer  was 
heard  and  answered,  and  truly  was  a  boon  granted  unto  her  when  Jay, 
"  the  truly  impracticable,"  became  the  substitute.  In  his  quiet  charac 
ter  the  French  Government  obviously  read  not  at  first  their  difficulty, 
and  various  were  the  arts  used,  as  it  opened  upon  them,  to  entrap  or 
overawe  him.  We  refer  more  especially  to  the  interviews  of  August 
loth  and  September  27th,  and  to  the  unofficial  interference  of  M. 
de  Rayneval,  Vergennes'  private  secretary,  a  convenient  agent 
whose  words  and  acts  might  be  sustained  or  abandoned  at  pleasure, 
one  who  might  gain  much  and  could  pledge  nothing.  (See  his  let 
ter  and  memoir  of  September  6th.)  Under  these  circumstances  Jay 
broke  his  instructions,  opened  a  direct  communication  on  his  own 
personal  responsibility  with  the  British  Government,  demanded  and 
obtained  from  their  new  Ministry  the  previous  recognition  of  Ameri 
can  independence — a  starting-point  against  which  not  England,  but 
France,  as  he  had  truly  suspected,  was  the  bar — and  thus  did  he  ef 
fect  the  provisional  treaty,  securing  to  us,  under  our  own  guarantee, 
rights  which,  under  French  guardianship,  we  never  should  have  ob 
tained.  Now,  to  such  conclusion  no  unprejudiced  mind,  we  think, 
but  must  arrive  from  the  documentary  evidence  here  exhibited  in 
Mr.  Jay's  two  volumes.  But  such  conclusion  becomes  demonstration 
under  the  new  proof  we  now  are  enabled  to  adduce.  The  witness 
we  bring  forward  is  an  unquestioned  one — the  late  Lord  St.  Helens, 
then  Mr.  Fitzherbert,  the  English  Minister  Resident  in  Paris,  and  a 
party  to  the  very  negotiation  in  question.  In  returning  to  a  friend, 
through  whom  it  comes  to  us,  a  copy  of  the  volumes  before  us,  lent 
him  for  his  perusal,  Lord  St.  Helens  accompanied  them  with  the 
following  testimony:  "  These  memoirs  are  indeed  highly  deserving 
of  further  attention  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic,  and  as  you  justly 
foresaw,  particularly  interesting  to  myself,  from  my  intimate  acquaint 
ance  and  political  intercourse  with  Mr.  Jay,  when  we  were  respec 
tively  employed  at  Paris  in  1782;  and  I  can  safely  add  my  testi 
mony  to  the  numerous  proofs  afforded  by  these  memoirs,  that  it 


208  Appendix. 

was  not  only  chiefly,  but  solely,  through  his  means  that  the  negotia 
tions  of  that  period  between  England  and  the  United  States  were 
brought  to  a  successful  conclusion." — Grafton  Street,  July  29,  1838. 
To  this  conclusive  language  as  to  Mr.  Jay's  course,  we  would  yet 
add  two  of  his  lordship's  marginal  notes  bearing  upon  the  French 
question. 

(Vol.  i.,  p.  145.) 

"N.B. — This  letter  (Marbois',  in  Appendix,  p.  490)  was  inter 
cepted  by  a  British  cruiser  and  communicated  to  the  American  Com 
missioners,  and  the  sequel  of  this  narrative  (which  is  perfectly  true 
throughout)  will  show  that  this  important  disclosure  of  the  machina 
tions  of  France  led  to  the  immediate  conclusion  of  the  provisional 
treaty  between  England  and  America,  being  in  reality  quite  tanta 
mount  to  a  separate  treaty. — St.  H." 

(Last  visit,  p.  149.) 

"  These  propositions  related  entirely  to  a  certain  enlargement  of 
the  limits  of  the  French  fisheries,  as  defined  by  former  treaties.  But 
in  the  course  of  these  discussions  M.  de  Vergennes  never  failed  to  in 
sist  on  the  expediency  of  a  concert  of  measures  between  France  and 
England  for  the  purpose  of  excluding  the  American  States  from 
these  fisheries,*  lest  they  should  become  a  nursery  for  seamen. — St.  H." 

Such  is  the  new  light  thrown  on  this  once  dark  question,  and  suf 
ficient,  we  think,  to  settle  it  forever.  Let  us  have  no  more,  there 
fore,  of  these  charges  against  Jay  of  "  unfounded  jealousy  of 
France,"  or  against  his  friends  either  of  "  an  overrated  estimate  of 
the  value  of  his  services." 

*  That  this  matter  was  well  understood  at  the  time,  and  that  to  Jay  in  chief 
belonged  the  merit  of  saving  the  fisheries,  is  clear.  In  a  letter  immediately  subse 
quent  Adams  thus  writes  to  Jay  :  "  I  have  received  several  letters  from  Boston 
and  Philadelphia,  from  very  good  hands,  which  make  very  honorable  and  affec 
tionate  mention  of  you.  You  have  erected  a  monument  to  your  memory  in  every 
New  England  heart"  (vol.  ii.,  p.  153).  To  the  same  effect  Hamilton  writes: 
u  The  New  England  people  talk  of  making  you  an  annual  fish  offering  as  an 
acknowledgment  of  your  exertions  fur  the  participation  of  the  fisheries "  (vol. 
ii.,  p.  123). 


Appendix.  209 

No.  3. 
VIEWS  OF  JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS. 

MR.  ADAMS  TO  JUDGE  JAY. 

The  Magazine  of  American  History  for  January,  1879,  con- 
tains  a  correspondence  between  Mr.  Adams  and  Judge  William  Jay. 
From  one  of  Mr.  Adams'  letters,  which  are  marked  by  his  usual 
vigor  of  thought  and  expression,  the  following  is  an  extract : 

QUINCY,  August  18,  1832. 

I  learn  with  great  satisfaction  from  your  letter  of  the  loth  inst. 
that  you  are  occupied  in  preparing  for  the  press  a  memoir  of  your 
father's  life.  The  affectionate  respect  entertained  for  him  by  my 
father  to  the  last  period  of  his  own  life  was  witnessed  by  me  through 
a  long  series  of  years,  and  has  ever  been  cordially  participated  in  by 
myself. 

The  recent  efforts,  to  which  you  allude,  to  exalt  the  reputation 
of  Doctor  Franklin  at  the  expense  of  that  of  his  colleagues  excited 
my  surprise,  until  I  perceived  the  motives  and  impulses  in  which  they 
originated.  They  were  the  more  unjust  in  regard  to  your  father,  as  he 
and  Doctor  Franklin  were,  as  I  have  understood,  always  upon  terms 
of  mutual  good  understanding.  Doctor  Franklin  was  a  great  favorite 
at  the  Court  of  Versailles,  and  particularly  more  in  favor  with  the 
Count  de  Vergennes,  a  very  equivocal  character  in  public  morals, 
though  perhaps  well  adapted  to  the  rotten  condition  of  the  French 
monarchy  at  the  close  of  the  reign  of  Louis  XV.  and  during  that  of 
his  successor  until  the  moment  preceding  his  fall. 

The  political  system  of  Vergennes  toward  our  country  at  the 
commencement  of  our  Revolution  is  disclosed  in  some  remarks  of 
Mr.  Turgot  upon  a  memoir  of  the  Count  in  April,  1776,  upon  the 
question  what  course  France  and  Spain  should  take  on  that  occa 
sion.  He  thought  the  policy  of  France  was  neutrality,  her  interest 
that  the  insurrection  should  be  suppressed ;  because  if  Great  Britain 
should  put  us  down  she  would  be  too  much  weakened  by  the  nec 
essary  exertions  to  keep  us  down  to  be  dangerous  to  France. 

Even  this  policy  he  did  not  honestly  pursue ;  but,  while  profess 
ing  neutrality,  he  did  give  clandestine  assistance  to  keep  the  strug 
gle  up,  and  the  surrender  of  Burgoyne  brought  him  to  another 
14 


2io  Appendix. 

conclusion.  He  then  bound  us  to  France  by  a'treaty  of  commerce 
and  an  eventual  treaty  of  alliance.  The  object  of  these  treaties,  he 
further  declared  in  another  memoir  in  March,  1784,  had  been  to  curb 
the  ambition  and  pride  of  England,  and  to  prevent  the  American 
Revolution  from  turning  to  the  disadvantage  of  France. 

During  the  War  of  the  Revolution  and  at  the  negotiations  for 
peace  Vergennes  was  against  us  upon  the  fisheries,  upon  the  west 
ern  boundary,  upon  the  indemnities  to  the  Tories,  and  upon  the 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi.  This  your  father  and  mine  well  knew, 
and  therefore  did  not  communicate  to  the  Count  de  Vergennes  the 
progress  of  their  negotiations  with  Mr.  Oswald  for  peace,  but  only 
the  substance  of  the  treaty  when  concluded.  That  treaty,  however, 
was  not  to  take  effect  until  the  peace  between  Great  Britain  and 
France  should  also  be  concluded.  This  the  Count  de  Vergennes 
was  negotiating  with  Mr.  Fitzherbert  without  communicating  the 
progress  of  it  to  the  American  Commissioners.  Doctor  Franklin 
did  not  separate  from  his  colleagues  in  withholding  the  details  of 
the  negotiation  from  the  knowledge  of  the  French  Court,  but  he  ap 
pears  to  have  acquiesced  in  it  with  some  reluctance,  and  was  lar 
more  confiding  in  the  friendship  of  France  than  she  merited. 


APPENDIX   K. 


JAY'S   VIEW   OF  THE  POLICY   OF   FRANCE  AND 
THE   COMMENTS   OF  VARIOUS   HISTORIANS. 

IT  may  be  proper  in  closing  this  Appendix  to  quote  the  last 
paragraphs  of  Jay's  elaborate  letter  to  Livingston  of  November  17, 
1782  (Dip.  Corres.,  viii.,  206),  giving  a  history  of  the  negotiation 
from  his  arrival  in  Paris.  It  was  to  this  letter  that  Mr.  Sparks  ap 
pended  his  "  Observations,"  which  have  misled  so  many  at  home 
and  abroad,  by  his  personal  assurance  that  Jay's  view  of  the  policy 
of  France  toward  America  was  contradicted  by  the  secret  corre 
spondence  of  Vergennes  and  his  diplomatic  agents.  I  add  in  notes 
two  or  three  extracts  from  that  correspondence  as  given  by  de  Cir- 
court,  and  additional  passages  of  equal  significance  have  been  al 
ready  given,  which  show  that  Jay  could  hardly  have  portrayed  Ver 
gennes'  policy  more  accurately,  nor  in  words  more  nearly  identical, 
if  the  confidential  instructions  of  that  diplomatist  to  his  agents  at 
Madrid  and  Philadelphia  had  been  lying  before  Jay  as  he  warned 
Livingston  and  Congress  against  the  danger  of  leaning  with  an 
excess  of  confidence  on  the  French  Court,  "  her  love  of  liberty,  her 
affection  for  America,  or  her  disinterested  magnanimity." 

"I  am  sensible,"  said  Jay,  "of  the  impression  which  this  letter 
will  make  upon  you  and  upon  Congress,  and  how  it  will  affect  the 
confidence  they  have  in  this  Court.  These  are  critical  times,  and 
great  necessity  there  is  for  prudence  and  secrecy. 

"  So  far,  and  in  such  matters  as  this  Court  may  think  it  their 
interest  to  support  us,  they  certainly  will,  but  no  further,  in  my 
opinion. 

"They  are  interested  in  separating  us  from  Great  Britain,  and 
on  that  point  we  may,  I  believe,  depend  upon  them  ;  but  it  is  not 


2 1 2  Appendix. 

their  interest  that  we  should  become  a  great  and  formidable  people, 
and  therefore  they  will  not  help  us  to  become  so.* 

"  It  is  not  their  interest  that  such  a  treaty  should  be  formed  be 
tween  us  and  Britain  as  would  produce  cordiality  and  mutual  confi 
dence.  They  will,  therefore,  endeavor  to  plant  such  seeds  of  jealousy, 
discontent,  and  discord  in  it  as  may  naturally  and  perpetually  keep 
our  eyes  fixed  on  France  for  security,  f  This  consideration  must  in 
duce  them  to  wish  to  render  Britain  formidable  in  our  neighbor 
hood,  J  and  to  leave  us  as  few  resources  of  wealth  and  power  as 
possible. 

"  It  is  their  interest  to  keep  some  point  or  other  in  contest  be 
tween  us  and  Britain  to  the  end  of  the  war,  to  prevent  the  possibili 
ty  of  our  sooner  agreeing,  and  thereby  keep  us  employed  in  the 
war,  and  dependent  on  them  for  supplies.  Hence  they  have  fa 
vored,  and  will  continue  to  favor,  the  British  demands  as  to  matters 
of  boundary  and  the  tories.  § 

"  The  same  views  will  render  them  desirous  to  continue  the  war 
in  our  country  as  long  as  possible. 

"  .  .  .  Such  being  our  situation,  it  appears  to  me  advisable  to 
keep  up  our  army  to  the  end  of  the  war,  even  if  the  enemy  should 
evacuate  our  country ;  nor  does  it  appear  to  me  prudent  to  listen 

*  Nous  ne  desirons  pas,  a  beaucoup  pres,  que  la  nouvelle  Republique  qui 
s'eleve  demeure  maitresse  exclusive  de  tout  cet  immense  continent. — Le  Comte 
de  Vergennes  au  Comte  de  Montmorin,  Versailles,  30  Octobre,  1778  (de  Circourt, 
iii.,  310). 

"  Je  dis  sans  interet  parce  que  nous  n'en  avons  aucun  a  voir  1'Amerique  Sep- 
tentrionale  jouer  le  role  d'une  puissance,"  etc. — M.  de  Vergennes  a  M.  de  la 
Luzerne,  25  Septembre,  1779  (ibid.,  p.  284). 

f  "L'independance  de  1'Amerique  Septentrionale  et  son  union  permanente  avec 
la  France  ont  etc  le  but  principal  du  roi." — Memoire  pour  servir  d'instruction  au 
Sieur  Gerard,  approuve  le  29  Mars  1778,  par  le  roi  (de  Circourt,  iii.,  255,  260). 

\  "  Suivant  ce  que  M.  Gerard  me  mande  il  faudra  bien  du  temps,  et  meme  des 
siecles,  pour  que  cette  nouvelle  Republique  prenne  une  consistance  qui  la  mette 
en  etat  de  jouer  un  role  exterieur.  Neanmoins  il  n'en  est  pas  moins  interessant 
que  les  Anglais  demeurent  maitres  du  Canada  et  de  la  Nouvelle-Ecosse  ;  ils  feront 
la  jalousie  de  ce  peuple,  qui  pourrait  bien  se  retourner  ailleurs,  et  de  lui  faire 
sentir  la  necessite  d' avoir  des  garants,  des  allies  et  des  protecteurs." — Le  Comte 
de  Vergennes  au  Comte  de  Montmorin,  30  Octobre  1778  (de  Circourt,  iii.,  311). 

§  "  Here  Rayneval  played  into  the  hands  of  English  ministers  by  expressing  a 
strong  opinion  against  the  American  claims  to  the  Newfoundland  fishery  and  to 
the  valley  of  the  Mississippi  and  the  Ohio." — Life  of  Shelburne  by  Fitzmaurice, 
relating  the  conversation  of  Rayneval  in  England  with  Shelburne  and  Grantham 
(vol.  iii.,  p.  263). 


Appendix.  213 

to   any  overtures  for  carryirfg  a  part  of  it  to  the  West  Indies,  in 
case  of  such  an  event. 

"I  think  we  have  no  rational  dependence  except  on  God  and 
ourselves,  nor  can  I  yet  be  persuaded  that  Great  Britain  has  either 
wisdom,  virtue,  or  magnanimity  enough  to  adopt  a  perfect  and 
liberal  system  of  conciliation.  If  they  again  thought  they  could 
conquer  us,  they  would  again  attempt  it. 

"We  are,  nevertheless,  thank  God,  in  a  better  situation  than  we 
have  been.  As  our  independence  is  acknowledged  by  Britain,  every 
obstacle  to  our  forming  treaties  with  neutral  powers,  and  receiving 
their  merchant  ships,  is  at  an  end,  so  that  we  may  carry  on  the  war 
with  greater  advantage  than  before,  in  case  our  negotiations  for 
peace  should  be  fruitless. 

"  It  is  not  my  meaning,  and  therefore  I  hope  I  shall  not  be  under- 
stood  to  mean,  that  we  should  deviate  in  the  least  from  our  treaty 
with  France  ;  our  honor  and  our  interest  are  concerned  in  inviolably 
adhering  to  it.  I  mean  only  to  say,  that  if  we  lean  on  her  love  of 
liberty,  her  affection  for  America,  or  her  disinterested  magnanimity, 
we  shall  lean  on  a  broken  reed  that  will  sooner  or  later  pierce  our 
hands,  and  Geneva  as  well  as  Corsica  justifies  this  observation. 

"  I  have  written  many  disagreeable  things  in  this  letter,  but  I 
thought  it  my  duty.  I  have  also  deviated  from  my  instructions, 
which,  though  not  to  be  justified,  will,  I  hope,  be  excused  on  account 
of  the  singular  and  unforeseen  circumstances  which  occasioned  it. 

"  Let  me  again  recommend  secrecy,  and  believe  me  to  be,  dear 
sir,  etc." 


APPENDIX   L. 


VIEWS   OF  AMERICAN   AND   SOME   FOREIGN 
AUTHORS. 

MR.  PITKIN'S  HISTORY. 

THE  accuracy  of  Jay's  view  of  the  French  policy,  enforced  by 
the  proofs  from  the  French  archives  alluded  to  in  the  review  of  their 
action  by  the  Cabinet  of  Washington,  were  quoted  by  his  biographer, 
Chief  Justice  Marshall  j  and  the  Honorable  Timothy  Pitkin,  whose 
character  and  services  as  a  statesman  added  weight  to  his  authority 
as  an  historian)  in  his  "  Political  and  Civil  History  of  the  United 
States  of  America,"  published  at  New  Haven  in  1828,  gave  a  fair 
sketch  of  the  peace  negotiations,  and  after  speaking  of  the  policy  of 
Spain,  said  : 

"  From  this  communication  (of  Rayneval)  and  the  claim  made 
by  the  Spanish  ambassador,  there  could  be  no  doubt  that  France  and 
Spain  intended  to  secure  the  western  country  to  themselves,  or 
yield  it  to  Great  Britain  for  an  equivalent  elsewhere.  Nor  was  there 
less  doubt  as  to  the  real  view  of  the  French  Court  with  regard  to  the 
fisheries.  With  respect  to  the  loyalists,  the  Count  de  Vergennes 
himself  expressed  an  opinion  to  Mr.  Adams  in  favor  of  some  pro 
vision  for  them." 

Having  alluded  to  the  decision  of  Jay  and  Adams  to  act  for 
themselves  and  conclude  the  treaty  without  consulting  the  French 
Court,  and  to  Franklin's  agreement  to  act  with  them,  Mr.  Pitkin 
said  :  "  This  negotiation,  so  interesting  to  the  United  States,  was 
fortunately  entrusted  to  gentlemen  distinguished  for  their  fairness,  as 
well  as  talent  and  integrity.  They  knew  too  well  how  much  the 
future  prosperity  and  happiness  of  their  country  depended  on  secur 
ing  the  fisheries,  the  western  country  and  a  part  of  the  lakes,  to  run 
the  hazard  of  losing  them  at  the  suggestion  or  advice  of  any  power 
whatever.'* 


Appendix.  2 1 5 

MR.  JARED  SPARKS. 

Two  years  later,  in  1830,  appeared  the  "  Diplomatic  Correspond 
ence  of  the  American  Revolution,"  in  twelve  volumes,  published  con 
formably  to  a  resolution  of  Congress  of  March  27,  1818,  edited  by 
Jared  Sparks,  and  his  editorial  note  to  Jay's  letter  (viii.,  208,  referred 
to  ante,  pages  16,  17,  41,  42,  112,  and  113)  contained  the  extra 
ordinary  statement  which  he  repeated  in  his  lives  of  Franklin  and 
Gotiverneur  Morris,  and  in  a  review  of  Pitkin's  history  in  the  North 
American  Review  (January,  1830,  p.  15),  and  which  seems  to  have 
been  accepted  with  unquestioning  faith  and  an  almost  childlike 
credulity,  that  the  correspondence  of  Vergennes  developing  the 
policy  and  designs  of  the  French  Court  showed  Jay  to  be  mistaken 
in  regard  to  their  aims  and  their  plans. 

Apart  from  the  mystery  of  Mr.  Sparks'  extraordinary  misreading 
and  misrepresentation  of  the  document,  in  the  French  archives,  now 
brought  to  light,  of  which  the  only  explanation  thus  far  suggested 
beyond  the  personal  eccentricity  which  induced  him  to  improve  the 
style  of  Washington's  letters  (ante,  p.  112,  note)  is  a  possible  want 
of  familiarity  with  the  French  language,  to  which  some  plausibility 
is  given  by  the  mistranslation  already  referred  to  of  a  part  of  a  note 
from  Rayneval  to  Vergennes  (ante,  pp.  41-42,  note),  there  is  an 
other  point  on  which  his  literary  executors  or  friends  may,  perhaps, 
throw  light.  It  is  not  quite  easy  to  understand  why  he  should  have 
taken  such  pains  to  prove  that  JDoctor  Franklin,  was  right  in  his  first 
view  of  the  question  when  he  inclined  to  obey  the  instructions  of 
Congress  to  follow  the  advice  of  Vergennesf  and  to  act  under  the 
first  commission,  which  treated  the  United  States  as  colonies  or 


plantations,  and  when  he  refused  to  sign  the  letter  prepared  by 
Jay.  Had  Doctor  Franklin  continued  to  hold  this  position,  one 
can  understand  a  biographer  desiring  to  vindicate  its  correctness. 
But  Poctor  Franklin  himself  abandoned  his  first  position,  and  on 
the  arrival  of  Adams  announced  his  readiness  to  proceed  with 
Adams  and  Jay  without  consulting  the  French  Court,  and  a  little 
later  Franklin  joined  with  his  associates  in  explaining  to  Congress, 
as  the  apology  for  their  conduct,  that  they  "  knew  that  the  French 
Court  was  against  our  claim  to  the  western  boundary,  and  they  had 
reason  to  imagine  that  the  Articles  respecting  the  boundaries,  the 
refugees,  and  the  fisheries,  did  not  correspond  with  its  policy." 

Then,  again,  even  if  Mn  Sparks  was  himself  insensible  to  the 


2 1 6  Appendix. 

force  of  the  intercepted  Marbois  letter  about  the  fisheries,  and  to  the 
official  pretensions  of  D'Aranda  to  the  western  territory,  and  the 
careful  memoir  presented  to  Jay  as  the  personal  views  of  Rayneval, 
and  to  the  support  given  by  Vergennes  himself  to  the  claims  of 
Spain,  it  does  not  appear  why,  in  making  his  repeated  charge,  that 
"  the  suspicions  of  the  Commissioners  were  sustained  by  no  other  evi 
dence  than  that  of  circumstances,  personal  conjectures,  and  decep 
tive  appearances  :"  he  omitted  to  allude  to  the  review  of  the  whole 
case  by  Washington,  and  the  proofs  quoted  in  Mr.  Pickering's  letter, 
and  referred  to  in  Marshall's  "  Life  of  Washington,"  of  "the  Mach- 
iavelian  policy  "  of  France,  and  of  the  duplicity  "  which  reigned 
over  the  negotiations  for  peace,"  as  shown  by  the  letters  of  Ver 
gennes  and  Montmorin,  which  had  aroused  the  indignation  of  the 
French  Directory. 

MR.  SCHLOSSER'S  HISTORY. 

Among  the  foreign  writers  who  have  quoted  Mr.  Sparks  as  their 
authority  for  distortion  of  historic  truth  and  curious  abuse  of  Jay 
and  Adams  for  obtaining  from  England  such  excellent  terms,  was 
Schlosser,  the  author  of  a  "  History  of  the  Eighteenth  Century," 
etc.  (translated  by  Davidson,  vol.  v.,  295  et  seq.:  London,  1845). 

Schlosser  says  :  "  In  July  Fitzherbert,  afterward  well  known  under 
the  name  of  Lord  St.  Helens,  was  commissioned  to  negotiate  with  the 
European  powers  at  Versailles  concerning  the  preliminaries  of  a  peace, 
and  Oswald  was  despatched  to  treat  with  Franklin  in  Paris  concerning 
North  America.  Franklin  would  willingly  have  delayed  the  final  set 
tlement  of  the  preliminaries  out  of  gratitude  to  France  and  a  sense 
of  propriety,  at  least  till  England  had  come  to  an  understanding 
with  France  at  Versailles ;  but  he  was  overruled  by  Jay  and  Adams, 
and  the  latter  signed  the  .treaty  without  even  asking  Vergennes,  to 
whom  America  owed  so  much.  The  English  ministry  not  only  ac 
knowledged  the  independence  of  the  Republic,  but  made  conces 
sions  with  regard  to  the  territory  beyond  the  Blue  Mountains,  where 
the  most  flourishing  provinces  and  towns  now  are,  as  well  as  in  re 
gard  to  forts,  islands,  and  the  right  of  fishery ;  nay,  in  order  to  sep 
arate  America  from  France  as  soon  as  possible,  they  did  not  even  re 
quire  an  exact  definition  of  the  boundary  on  the  north  of  the  United 
States,  in  consequence  of  which  a  serious  difference  has  arisen 
within  these  last  few  years,  according  to  the  universally  received  prop 
osition  in  America  that  the  principal  end  of  human  wishes  is  and 


Appendix.  2 1 7 

ought  to  be  the  gieatest  wealth  and  external  advantages.  The 
American  lawyers,  Jay  and  Adams,  behaved  very  properly  in  op 
posing  their  colleague  Franklin.  The  American  quibblers  invented 
a  word  on  this  occasion  in  order  to  avoid  that  condition  in  their 
treaty  with  France  according  to  which  they  were  not  to  sign  any 
preliminaries  before  France  had  done  the  same.  They  called  the 
Articles  on  which  they  had  agreed  Provisional  Articles.  The  Eng 
lish  Ministry  were  able  to  excite  the  jealousy  of  the  Americans, 
and  the  latter  urged  on  Franklin's  colleagues  to  out- vote  him,  and  to 
hasten  the  conclusions  of  the  treaty.  Franklin's  most  recent  biog 
rapher  (''Sparks'  Life  of  Benjamin  Franklin,"  vol.  i.,  p.  489)  has 
plainly  asserted  what  Franklin  himself  only  hints  at  in  his  letters,  that 
he  by  no  means  approved  of  the  ruse  by  which  Messrs.  Jay  and 
Adams  had  deceived  the  French  Ministry.  Vergennes  felt  himself 
justly  offended,  and  was  very  much  surprised.  .  .  .  The  States 
of  Holland  were  entirely  French  in  their  opinions  ;  they  trusted  in 
Vergennes  because  he  was  an  honorable  man,*  although  honor  and 

*  England  declared  war  against  Holland  December  20,  1780.  She  had  com 
plained  that  Paul  Jones  had  been  allowed  to  bring  his  prizes  into  Dutch  harbors, 
and  remain  for  weeks,  and  that  American  privateers  were  fitted  out  at  St.  Eusta- 
tius  ;  that  that  island  had  long  been  the  chief  source  of  American  supplies,  and 
that  among  the  papers  of  Henry  Laurens,  when  captured  near  Newfoundland, 
was  an  inchoate  treaty  of  commerce  and  amity  made  by  Neufville,  of  Amster 
dam,  between  Holland  and  the  United  States  (Lecky,  iv.,  172,  174).  The  de 
claration  of  war,  says  Lecky,  was  treated  by  the  English  Opposition  as  a  great 
crime,  and  many  later  writers  have  adopted  the  same  view.  The  plenipoten 
tiaries  of  Holland  in  the  peace  negotiations  were  Berkenroode  and  Brandtzen, 
and  after  suffering  fearfully  during  the  war  she  was  fated  to  suffer  by  the  peace. 
Judge  William  Jay,  in  the  Life  of  John  Jay  (vol.  i.,  p.  173),  says  that  Jay  ob 
tained  a  copy  of  the  instructions  of  the  Dutch  Minister,  and  left  it  among  his 
papers. 

From  this  document  it  appears  that  the  Duke  de  Vauguyon,  French  Am 
bassador  at  the  Hague,  had  there  performed  a  part  similar  to  that  acted  by  Count 
Luzerne  at  Philadelphia  ;  and  that  through  his  representations  the  Dutch  Minis 
ters  were  required  to  act  in  concert  with  the  French  Court,  and  "  to  make  confi 
dential  communications  of  all  things  to  them.  " 

Mr.  Adams  wrote,  on  June  i6th,  of  the  difficulties  experienced  by  the  Dutch, 
and  said  :  "  And  this  difficulty  probably  arises  from  the  instructions  in  question, 
by  which  they  made  themselves  of  no  importance,  instead  of  acting  the  part  of  a 
sovereign,  independent,  and  respectable  power."  If  they  had  held  their  own  ne 
gotiations  in  their  own  hands  they  would  probably  have  obtained  better  terms. 
In  August  Mr.  Adams  wrote  again  that  one  of  the  Dutch  Ministers  in  speaking 
of  the  Count  de  Vergennes  said  :  "  He  certainly  deceived  me.  The  States-Gen- 


2 1 8  Appendix. 

honesty  are  seldom  found  in  connection  with  the  prudence  necessary 
for  a  diplomatist,  and  principally  for  this  reason  Franklin  was  vexed 
at  the  quibble  which  his  colleagues  had  practised  on  two  such  men 
as  Vergennes  and  Louis  XVI. ?' 

MR.  COXE'S  HOUSE  OF  AUSTRIA. 

Mr.  Coxe,  in  his  "History  of  the  House  of  Austria"  (vol.  v.,  p. 
327,  2d  ed.),  viewing  the  negotiations  from  a  different  standpoint, 
and  referring  particularly  to  the  communication  of  the  intercepted 
letters  of  Marbois,  says  :  "  Mr.  Fitzherbert  fulfilled  his  delicate  office 
with  great  ability  and  address.  While  he  treated  with  Vergennes  he 
succeeded  in  alarming  Franklin,  Adams,  and  Jay,  and  prevailed  on 
them  to  sign  a  separate  and  provisional  article." 

MR.  HILDRETH'S  HISTORY. 

Hildreth,  in  his  "  History  of  the  United  States,"  says  :  "  France 
was  inclined  to  favor  the  interests  of  Spain,  her  family  ally  ;  she  was 
also  very  anxious  to  speedily  terminate  a  war,  the  whole  financial 
burden  of  which  her  American  allies  seemed  inclined  to  shift  upon 
her  shoulders.  Such  appears  to  have  been  the  only  foundation  for 
the  suspicions  entertained  of  the  designs  of  the  French  Court.  In 
his  whole  intercourse  with  America,  Vergennes  seems  to  have 
acted  an  honorable  part,  contributing  according  to  his  best  judg 
ment  to  secure  the  professed  object  of  the  treaty  of  alliance,  the 
political  and  commercial  independence  of  the  United  States"  (Hil 
dreth,  iii.,  421). 

In  an  earlier  part  of  the  same  volume,  M.  Hildreth  refers  to  the 
small  encouragement  which  Mr.  Dana  received  in  his  mission  to 
St.  Petersburg  from  the  French  Minister  at  that  capital,  and  re 
marked  that  Dana  and  Adams  concurred  in  the  opinion  that  France 
was  seeking  an  exclusive  control  over  the  foreign  relations  of  the 
United  States. 

MR.  RIVES'  LIFE  OF  MADISON. 

The  late  Honorable  William  C.  Rives,  in  his  "  Life  and  Times 
of  Madison,"  devotes  Chapters  XI.  and  XII.,  Volume  I.,  to  the 

eral  did  very  wrong  to  bind  me  to  leave  so  much  to  the  French  Minister  ;  but  I 
thought  him  an  honest  man,  and  that  I  could  trust  him,  so  I  left  things  to  him 
according  to  my  instructions,  depending  on  his  word,  and  at  last  I  found  myself 
his  dupe  "  (Dip.  Corr.,vii.,  150). 


Appendix.  219 

instructions  and  negotiations  for  peace,  and  under  the  heading 
of  "  Unfounded  Suspicions  of  the  Sincerity  of  France  Manifested  by 
Mr.  Jay  and  Mr.  Adams,"  remarked  : 

"  An  historical  inquirer  [meaning  Mr.  Sparks]  whose  candor  and 
love  of  truth  are  worthy  of  his  superior  industry  and  judgment,  and 
who  nas  had  free  access  to  the  diplomatic  archives  of  both  the  French 
and  British  Governments,  and  especially  the  confidential  corre 
spondence  of  Count  de  Vergennes  and  Monsieur  Rayneval  during 
the  period  of  the  suspected  mission  of  the  latter,  has  in  his  investi 
gations  found  every  one  of  Mr.  Jay's  suspicions  not  merely  unsus- 
tained,  but  contradicted  by  the  record.  How  monitory  this  lesson 
of  the  delusion  to  which  the  highest  intellect  is  exposed  when  swayed 
by  suspicion  and  prejudice,"  etc. 

MR.  FLANDERS'  CHIEF  JUSTICES. 

Mr.  Henry  Flanders,  in  "  The  Lives  and  Times  of  the  Chief 
Justices  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  "  (vol.  i.,  p.  343), 
remarks  : 

".  .  .  This  statement  of  Fitzherbert  (touching  Vergennes 
and  the  fisheries)  is  of  historical  importance.  It  comes  from  an 
actor  on  the  scene,  and  abundantly  confirms  the  suspicions  enter 
tained  by  Mr.  Jay  of  the  object  contemplated  by  the  French  Court. 
The  letter  of  M.  Marbois  spoke  his  sentiments  as  to  the  fisheries, 
and  we  may  safely  conclude  from  thence  that  M.  de  Rayneval  in 
his  letters  and  conversations  equally  spoke  his  sentiments  as  to  the 
Western  lands  and  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi. 

"  .  .  .  Had  the  American  Commissioners  governed  their  con 
duct  by  their  instructions,  and  submitted  to  the  advice  of  Vergennes, 
we  think  it  apparent  that  the  United  States  would  have  been  de 
prived  of  the  fisheries,  of  the  Western  lands,  and  the  navigation'of  the 
Mississippi;  but  in  spite  of  the  conviction  thus  forced  upon  us  we 
cannot  forget  the  generous  aid  France  afforded  this  country  in  her 
struggle  to  secure  a  national  existence.  She  sent  a  fleet  and  army 
to  fight  our  battles  ;  she  loaned  us  eighteen  millions  of  livres  and 
gave  us  twelve  millions.  That  she  should  propose  to  herself  some 
equivalent  gain  for  the  expenses  of  the  war  is  not  surprising.  We 
do  not  look  for  wholly  interested  conduct  in  the  dealings  of  nations. 
But  when  it  is  obvious  that  one  ally  is  endeavoring  by  indirection, 
by  concert  with  the  enemy  and  another  ally,  to  deprive  a  third  one 


.s 
"^ 


2  2  O  Appendix . 

of  advantages  justly  belonging  to  him,  it  is  well  that  the  intrigue 
should  be  counteracted  and  its  profligacy  exposed.  Previous  good 
conduct  may  soften  the  severity  of  our  condemnation,  but  it  cannot 
justify  guilt"  (pp.  343»  344). 


FRANK  LESLIE'S  MONTHLY. 

A  paper  entitled  "The  Treaty  of  Paris,  1783,"  in  Frank  Les 
lie's  Popular  Monthly,  for  September,  1883,  illustrated  by  engrav 
ings  :  "  The  Signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris,"  a  view  of  Versailles,  and 
portraits  of  Laurens,  Franklin,  Jay,  Vergennes,  and  Adams,  curiously 
illustrates  some  of  the  popular  blunders  about  the  relative  positions 
toward  the  American  claims  occupied  by  France  and  Spain  in  the 
peace  negotiations.  The  writer  quotes  "  the  judicious  Jared  Sparks  " 
as  authority  for  the  statement  that  "Jay  was  the  victim  of  ground 
less  suspicions." 

".  .  .  The  Commissioners  met  frequently  at  Mr.  Jay's  rooms, 
.  .  .  but  there  was  little  harmony  at  first,  and  several  times  the 
negotiations  seemed  on  the  point  of  being  suspended  owing  to  the 
opposition  of  Jay. 

"John  Jay  had  been  the  means  of  great  delay  and  apprehensions 
on  account  of  the  distrust  he  seemed  to  have  of  every  nation.  The 
negotiations  were  from  time  to  time  almost  brought  to  an  end 
through  his  distrust  of  France.  . 

"  John  Jay's  persistent  refusal  to  accede  to  the  demands  of  Spain, 
aided  and  abetted  by  Adams  to  more  delay.  Count  de  Vergennes 
in  a  letter  to  the  French  King  alluded  to  Adams  as  being  a  most 
embarrassing  navigator. 

"  .  .  .  England  and  France  were  harmonious  in  nearly  every 
respect,  and  finally  matters  were  arranged  through  the  strenuous 
efforts  of  Rayneval  the  French  plenipotentiary  and  Count  Aranda. 

"  .  .  .  The  treaty  of  Paris  gave  to  the  United  States  all 
and  more  than  they  sought  for  at  first.  .  .  .  Franklin's  .  .  . 
success  was  marvellous.  .  .  .  John  Jay,  whose  enmity  and  dis 
trust  of  France  led  to  so  many  and  vexatious  delays,  was  even  as 
Franklin  himself  said,  '  the  cause  of  the  great  concessions  that  were 
made,  and  all  honor  was  due  to  him  ;  '  .  .  .  sturdy  John  Adams, 
the  most  practical  and  stubborn  of  all  the  Commissioners,  .  .  . 
was  fully  alive  to  the  interests  and  danger  of  the  New  England 
States.'' 


Appendix.  ;  M 

MR.  VAN  SANTVOORD'S  CHIEF  JUSTICES. 

Mr.  George  Van  Santvoord,  in  his  "  Lives  of  the  Chief  Jus 
tices "  (p.  29),  after  quoting  Jefferson  and  Hamilton  in  regard  to  the 
greatness  of  the  terms  obtained  by  the  peace,  justly  remarked  : 
"These  terms  and  this  successful  negotiation  were  not  achieved 
without  the  most  painful  anxiety  and  difficult  labor.  England  was 
of  course  prepared  to  grant  but  few  concessions  to  her  revolted 
colonies,  and  France,  our  generous  ally,  had  her  own  designs  to  sub 
serve,  and  was  as  dangerous  to  America  in  diplomacy  as  she  had 
been  formidable  to  England  in  war." 

MR.  GREENE'S  HISTORICAL  VIEW. 

The  late  George  Washington  Greene,  in  his  "  Historical  View 
of  the  American  Revolution"  (Boston,  1865),  says,  on  the  other 
hand,  of  Adams,  Jay,  and  Laurens  (p.  266) :  "  But  unfortunately  they 
did  not  all  share  Franklin's  well-founded  confidence  in  the  sincerity 
of  the  French  Government.  .  .  .  History  has  justified  his  con 
fidence,  the  most  careful  research  having  failed  to  bring  to  light 
any  confirmation  of  the  suspicions  of  his  colleagues." 

The  researches  of  Mr.  Greene  could  hardly  have  included  a 
careful  reading  of  the  lives  of  Franklin,  Jay,  or  Adams,  of  which  the 
historian  Lecky  says,  "both  Jay  and  Adams  have  found  powerful  de 
fenders  in  their  descendants  and  biographers"  (Lecky,  iv.,  282  note]  • 
nor  the  letter  of  Pickering,  embodying  the  proofs  that  convinced  the 
mind  of  Washington  ;  nor  the  letter  of  the  French  Minister  for  For 
eign  Affairs  when  Genet  was  named  as  Minister  to  America,  of  which 
the  original  is  given  by  Mr.  C.  F.  Adams  (Adams'  "  Life  and  Works," 
Appendix,  p.  675),  and  in  which  he  said  :* 

*  This  letter  was  published  in  the  "  Moniteur  Universe!,"  No.  358,  for  Sun 
day,  December  23,  1792,  as  having  been  read  at  the  seance  of  Friday,  the  2ist,  fol 
lowing  the  letter  in  the  Adams'  Appendix,  i. ,  675,  in  the  address  of  the  French 
Convention  to  the  United  States,  in  which  occurred  this  passage  :  "  Les  £tats 
Unis  de  1'Amerique  auront  peine  a  le  croire ;  1'appui  que  1'ancienne  Cour  de 
France  leur  preta  pour  recouvrer  leur  indeperidance  n'etoit  que  le  fruit  d'une  vile 
speculation ;  leur  gloire  offusquait  ses  vues  ambitieuses  •  et  ses  ambassadeurs 
avaient  1'orde  criminel  d'arreter  le  cours  de  leur  prosperite." 

John  Adams,  in  his  paper  on  the  Peace  Negotiations,  orginally  published  in 
the  Boston  Patriot  in  1811,  and  reprinted  in  the  Appendix  to  his  Life,  says  that 
Vergennes'  system  of  finesse  toward  America  was  presented  in  the  memorial  to 
the  King,  afterward  published  under  the  title  Politique  de  tous  les  Cabinets  de 
1'Europe,  and  he  adds  :  ''  The  publication  of  it  is  a  confirmation  of  all  that  was 
ever  said  or  thought  of  the  Court  by  me  or  by  Mr.  Jay  "  (Adams,  658). 


222  Appendix. 

"  Le  conseil  executif  s'estfait  representer  les  instructions  donnSes 
par  le  Ministre  precedent  aux  agens  dans  ce  pays.  II  y  a  vu  avec 
indignation  que  dans  le  terns  meme  ou  ce  bon  peuple  nous  exprimait 
de  la  maniere  la  plus  touchante  son  amitie  et  sa  reconnaissance, 
Vergennes  et  Montmorin  pensaient  qu'il  ne  convenait  point  a  la 
France  de  lui  donner  toute  la  consistance  dont  il  etait  susceptible  ; 
pas  qu'il  acquerrait  une  force  dont  il  serait  probablement  tente 
d'abuser.  ...  la  meme  duplicite  fut  employee  dans  les  nego- 
ciations  pour  la  paix." 

MR.  PARTON'S  LIFE  OF  FRANKLIN. 

Mr.  James  Parton,  in  his  "  Life  of  Franklin"  (New  York  :  Mason 
Brothers.  1864,  ii.,  chap,  xv.),  followed  with  apparent  confidence 
and  in  a  sportive  tone  the  theory  of  Dr.  Sparks,  and  after  alluding 
for  example  to  Jay's  remark  that  Doctor  Franklin  appeared  to  have  a 
great  degree  of  confidence  in  the  French  Court,  with  Jay's  addition 
as  quoted  by  Mr.  Parton,  "Time  will  show  which  of  us  is  right," 
Mr.  Parton  adds,  "  Time  has  shown,"  and  then  quotes  as  proof  what 
he  calls  "  the  explicit  testimony  of  Dr.  Sparks "  about  the  Ver 
gennes  correspondence — testimony  so  strangely  and  emphatically 
contradicted  by  the  correspondence  itself  that  it  takes  its  place 
among  the  curiosities  of  literature  as  an  unsurpassed  example  of  his 
torical  fictions  which  have  passed  as  facts. 

The  remark  of  Jay  alluded  to  by  Mr.  Parton  occurs  in  his  letter 
to  Livingston  of  September  i8th  (Dip.  Corres.,  viii.,  126,  127),  en 
closing  a  translation  of  Marbois'  intercepted  letter  about  the  fish 
eries,  a  letter  that — whether  from  accident  or  design  does  not  ap 
pear — was  omitted  from  the  volume.  In  that  letter  Jay  said : 

"  This  Court  as  well  as  Spain  will  dispute  our  extension  to  the 
Mississippi.  You  see  how  necessary  prudence  and  circumspection 
will  be  on  your  side,  and,  if  possible,  secrecy.  I  ought  to  add  that 
Doctor  Franklin  does  not  see  the  conduct  of  the  Court  in  the  light 
I  do,  and  that  he  believes  they  mean  nothing  in  their  proceedings 
but  what  is  friendly,  fair,  and  honorable.  Facts  and  future  events 
must  determine  which  of  us  is  mistaken.  .  .  .  Let  us  be  honest 
and  grateful  to  France,  but  let  us  think  for  ourselves." 

Apart  from  the  proofs  afforded  by  the  correspondence  that  the 
Court  of  France  was  against  us  as  regards  the  fisheries,  the  boundaries, 
and  the  Mississippi,  Mr.  Parton  may  note  in  a  future  edition  that 


Appendix.  223 

three  years  before  the  date  of  Jay's  letter,  on  April  12,  1779,  the 
secret  bargain  had  been  concluded  between  De  Vergennes  and  De 
Florida  Blanca,  so  clearly  told  by  Bancroft,  of  which,  in  return  for 
Spain's  joining  in  the  war,  France  was  to  assist  Spain  in  procuring, 


our  expense,  "every  part  of  the  basin  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  and  of  S 
all  the  land   between   that  river  and  the  Alleghanies  "  (Bancroft,  x.,    ^ 
chap.  viii.).  / 

Ignoring  and  ridiculing  as  if  it  were  a  myth,  that  compact  be 
tween  France  and  Spain,  the  existence  and  meaning  of  which  Jay 
and  Adams  detected  and  defeated,  Mr.  Parton  speaks  of  "  those  two 
rare  diplomatists — John  Adams  and  John  Jay — who  "  believed  that 
the  French  Government  wished  to  limit  the  power,  the  growth,  and 
the  boundaries  of  the  United  States"  (p.  501).  "  In  vain,"  he  says, 
"did  Doctor  Franklin  essay  to  remove  these  groundless  impressions 
from  the  mind  of  Mr.  Jay"  (p.  482),  and  of  the  refusal  of  Jay  to  ac 
cept  the  advice  of  Vergennes  to  treat  under  the  designation  of 
colonists,  Mr.  Partoii  speaks  of  Franklin  groaning  "  during  the  / 
month  wasted  upon  this  nonsense  "  / 

A  misconception  of  so  momentous  a  factor  in  the  history  of  the 
negotiation  naturally  leads  to  the  widest  difference  in  the  conclusions 
drawn  by  different  historians  of  the  actors  in  the  transaction.  While 
Lecky  finds  it  impossible  not  to  be  struck  with  the  skill,  hardihood, 
and  good  fortune  which  won  so  much  of  what  was  obtained  by  the 
American  Commissioners  in  opposition  to  the  two  great  powers  by 
whose  assistance  they  had  triumphed,  Mr.  Parton  represents  Jay  as 
a  a  timid  adventurer,"  a  "  slave  of  mistrust,"  and  says  that  Franklin, 
who  was  ready  to  be  guided  by  Vergennes,  knew  the  road  and  could 
have  guided  him  safely  through. 


MR.  GEORGE  T.   CURTIS. 

The  paper  of  the  Honorable  George  Ticknor  Curtis  in  successive 
numbers  of  Harper's  Magazine  for  April  and  May,  1883,  on  "The 
Treaty  of  Peace  and  Independence,"  appeared  some  nineteen  years 
later  than  the  life  of  Franklin  by  Mr.  Parton,  and  in  a  year  when  the 
learned  author  had  the  same  opportunity  of  which  Mr.  Lecky  has  so 
amply  availed  himself  in  his  "History  of  England,"  to  correct  the  mis 
conceptions  of  former  writers  on  the  subject  by  the  light  afforded  by 
the  recent  volumes  of  Bancroft,  de  Circourt,  and  Lord  Edmond 


224  Appen  dix. 

Fitzmaurice,  and,  most  of  all,  by  the  correspondence  so  long  hidden 
and  so  absolutely  misrepresented  of  the  Count  de  Vergennes. 

The  paper  is  illustrated  by  portraits  of  George  III.,  Lords  North, 
Rockingham,  and  Thurlow  ;  of  Burke,  Fox,  Shelburne,  and  Pitt  ; 
of  Louis  XVI.,  and  the  Count  de  Vergennes ;  of  Franklin,  John 
Adams,  and  Henry  Laurens,  while  for  Jay,  by  a  mistake  which  rather 
seemed  to  harmonize  the  illustration  with  the  text,  as  presenting 
with  similar  inexactness  his  features  and  his  diplomacy,  there  was 
given  the  portrait  of  a  gentleman  who,  at  the  signing  of  the  Prelimi 
nary  Articles,  had  not  completed  his  eighth  year,*  and  this  young 
stranger  to  the  negotiation  appeared  among  the  celebrities  associated 
with  that  event  marked  "  John  Jay." 

Mr.  Curtis  very  justly  observes  that  "  there  is  something  quite 
dramatic  in  the  involutions  and  convolutions  of  that  remarkable 
negotiation,  in  which  the  fate  of  our  country  was  entangled  in  the 
affairs  of  Europe,  and  in  the  conflicts  of  parties  in  England." 

As  regards  the  greatness  of  the  powers  whose  differing  policies 
were  involved,  the  eminence  and  skill  of  the  trained  diplomatists  to 
whom  the  furthering  of  these  policies  was  entrusted,  the  grandeur  of 
the  issue  at  stake,  being  in  fact  the  future  of  the  American  continent, 
and  the  profound  interest  of  Christian  civilization — such  was  the  dip 
lomatic  contest  for  which  France  and  Spain  had  been  secretly  pre 
paring  from  the  convention  at  Aranjuez  in  April,  1779,  of  which 
separate  acts  had  been  played  by  Montmorin  and  Florida  de  Blanca 
at  Madrid,  by  Gerard  and  Luzerne  with  the  Congress  at  Philadelphia, 
by  Rayneval,  closely  followed  by  Vaughan,  with  Shelburne  and  Gran- 
tham  at  London,  by  Jay  at  Paris  with  the  Spanish  ambassador 
D'Aranda,  by  Adams,  Jay,  and  Franklin  with  Vergennes,  and  Rayn 
eval,  Oswald,  Fitzherbert,  and  Strachey,  down  to  the  closing  scene 
of  the  signing  of  the  Preliminary  Articles,  which  gave  us  the  great 
territory  at  the  west  and  north,  with  the  Mississippi  and  the  fisheries, 
of  all  which  France  and  Spain  had  combined  to  deprive  us. 

The  American  writer  who  in  our  day  treats  of  the  triumph  by 
the  American  Commissioners,  which  Vergennes  had  deemed  impos 
sible,  and  which  the  English  historian  pauses  to  apostrophize,  may 
see  that  the  results  of  the  intelligence  and  sagacity  which  guided  the 
American  negotiation  may  now  be  seen  not  only  in  the  boundaries 
then  secured  with  820,000  square  miles,  but  in  the  consequent  retire- 

*  The  late  Peter  Augustus  Jay,  eldest  son  of  John  Jay,  who  was  born  Janu 
ary  24,  1776. 


Appendix.  225 

merit  of  France  from  the  territory  of  Orleans  in  1803,  giving  us  a 
yet  larger  area  of  899,000  square  miles,  and  in  the  cession  by  Spain 
of  Florida  in  1819,  leaving  the  Republic  what  Vergennes  wished  it 
might  not  become,  the  virtual  "  mistress  of  this  immense  con 
tinent."  * 

But  the  central  fact  of  this  great  drama  seems  to  have  escaped 
Mr.  Curtis,  who  refers  to  what  he  calls  the  "suspicions"  of  Jay  and 
Adams,  and  says  that  "  these  suspicions  were  honestly  entertained, 
and  that  at  the  same  time  they  were  entirely  unfounded,  seem  to 
me  propositions  equally  clear." 

MR.  GEORGE  SUMNER  ON  SPAIN. 

An  effort  quite  as  hopeless  and  almost  as  grotesque  as  that  of  Mr. 
Sparks  to  show  that  the  Court  of  France  favored  our  claims  to  the 
boundaries  and  the  fisheries,  was  made  some  twenty-five  years  later 
by  the  late  Mr.  George  Sumner,  in  an  oration  before  the  municipal 
authorities  of  Boston,  on  July  4,  1859,  to  awaken  the  sympathy 
and  gratitude  of  the  American  people  to  Spain  for  her  treatment 
of  the  United  States  during  the  war  of  the  Revolution. 

"  When,"  said  Mr.  Sumner,  "  we  are  disposed  to  stretch  the  hand 
of  covetousness  toward  any  possession  of  now  weakened  Spain,  let 
us  remember  the  helping  hand  she  gave  to  us  in  our  hour  of  suffer 
ing  and  of  peril." 

In  that  effort  to  whiten  the  record  of  the  Spanish  Court  during 
our  Revolution,  and  to  establish  for  it  a  claim  to  American  gratitude, 
Mr.  Sumner  was  not  alone,  and  after  referring  to  the  dissent  ex 
pressed  by  the  press  he  wrote  :  "  Let  me  say  here  that  Mr.  Sparks 
fully  concurs  in  the  view  I  have  taken,  and  declares  that  it  is  the 
first  time  justice  has  been  done  by  Spain."  f 

On  September  16,  1781,  Jay,  in  the  draft  of  a  note  to  the  Spanish 
Minister,  written  to  be  submitted  to  the  French  Ambassador,  the 
Count  de  Montmorin,  said  :  "  I  will  only  add  my  most  sincere  wishes 
that  the  annals  of  America  may  inform  succeeding  generations  that 
the  wisdom,  constancy,  and  generous  protection  of  his  Catholic 
Majesty  Charles  the  Third,  and  of  his  minister  the  Count  de  Florida 
Blanca,  are  to  be  ranked  among  the  causes  that  insured  success  to  a 

*  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  October  30,  1778  (de  Circourt,  iii.,  310). 
f  George  Sumner  to  John  Jay — MS.   letter  dated   "  St.   Denis  Hotel,  New 
York,  September  8,  1859." 
15 


226  Appendix. 

revolution  which  patriots  will  consider  as  one  of  the'most  important 
and  interesting  events  in  modern  history  "  (Dip.  Cor.,  vii.,  488). 

Neither  the  King  nor  his  minister  availed  themselves  of  that 
great  opportunity  of  earning  the  eternal  gratitude  of  the  American 
people,  and  it  was  well  understood  before  the  close  of  our  Revolution 
that  Spain  was  the  implacable  enemy  of  our  national  independence 
and  our  national  progress,  and  that  her  course  was  in  great  part  the 
result  of  her  American  colonial  policy,  as  shaped  by  her  dislike  and 
fear  of  our  politics  and  religious  freedom,  and  what  she  conceived  to 
be  our  growing  ambition.  We  knew  that  the  paltry  loans  which,  with 
reluctance  and  delay,  she  ungraciously  made  to  enable  Jay  to  meet 
the  earlier  drafts  rashly  drawn  by  Congress  in  reliance  upon  her 
readiness  to  assist  us,  demanded  small  gratitude  on  our  part  when, 
after  encouraging  a  belief  that  she  would  make  further  advances  to 
sustain  the  credit  of  the  Republic,  she  allowed  that  credit  to  be 
openly  protested,  for  the  want  of  a  paltry  sum  under  circumstances 
which,  as  it  now  appears,  aroused  the  indignation  and  contempt  of 
•the  French  Ambassador,  Count  de  Montmorin,  who  wrote  of  the 
shabby  transaction  to  Vergennes  as  exhibiting  "  the  absolute  in 
difference  or  even  the  repugnance  of  Spain  to  aid  the  establishment 
-.of  the  independence  of  America."  * 

We  knew  from  the  words  and  conduct  of  Rayneval  and  Vergennes 
.at  Paris  that  the  Court  of  France  was  devoted  to  the  support  of 
the  Spanish  pretensions  to  the  valley  of  the  Mississippi,  and  Mr.  C.  F. 
Adams  had  remarked  that  ''nothing  is  more  remarkable  throughout 
the  struggle  than  the  patient  deference  manifested  by  the  Count  to 
all  the  caprices,  the  narrow  ideas,  and  the  vacillations  of  the  Spanish 
Court"  (Adams'  Works,  i.,  310). 

But  we  did  not  know,  as  we  now  know,  the  reasons  for  that  patient 
deference  to  the  Court  of  Spain,  and  his  persistent  efforts  to  accom 
plish  her  policy  of  excluding  us  from  the  Mississippi  and  the  lakes, 
until  Mr.  Bancroft's  disclosure  of  the  secret  compact  at  Madrid  by 
which,  as  the  only  means  of  securing  Spanish  support  in  the  war, 
Vergennes — however  he  may  have  despised  Spain  and  her  selfish 
policy,  and  however  kindly  he  may  have  felt  toward  the  Republic 
which  he  assisted  to  establish — had  agreed  to  betray  and  defeat  the 
claims  of  the  Americans  to  the  great  territories  to  the  West  and 

*  Le  Comte  de  Montmorin  au  Comte  de  Vergennes,  Madrid,  30  Mars,  1782 
(de  Circourt,  iii.,  p.  327). 


Appendix.  227 


North  to  which  they  regarded  themselves  as  entitled  as  essential  to 
their  present;  safety  and  their  future  greatness. 

MR.  BANCROFT'S  HISTORY. 

Mr.  Bancroft's  account  of  the  peace  negotiation  is  contained  in 
his  "  History  of  the  United  States  "  (vol.  x.,  first  edition.  London 
and  Boston,  1874). 

The  opportunity  kindly  given  me  by  Mr.  Bancroft  to  examine  his 
most  interesting  MSS.  bearing  on  the  peace — volumes  which,  from 
the  extent  of  the  ground  they  cover  and  their  high  authority  as  selected 
by  Mr.  Bancroft,  and  copied  under  his  supervision,  should  certainly 
be  secured  by  the  National  Government — enabled  me  to  quote  in  this 
address  several  important  extracts  from  the  secret  correspondence 
from  London  and  Paris  confirmatory  of  those  published  by  the  Count 
de  Circourt,  developing  in  the  clearest  light  the  aims  and  intent  of 
the  hostile  policy  toward  America  of  that  astute  diplomat  the  Count 
de  Vergennes,  which  Jay  and  Adams  so  accurately  divined,  while 
Franklin,  even  so  late  as  July  23,  1783,  wrote  to  Livingston  that  he 
disclaimed  the  "  opinion  that  the  Court  [of  France]  wished  to  restrain 
us  in  obtaining  any  degree  of  advantage  we  could  prevail  on  our 
enemies  to  accord." 

No  previous  writer  has  disclosed  the  secret  documents  which 
show  not  only  the  aims  but  the  methods  of  the  French  Minister 
at  Philadelphia,  notable  among  which  was  that  of  "  donatives."  or 
bribes,  the  sort  of  treaty,  and  the  limited  boundaries,  which  would 
have  resulted  from  an  adherence  to  the  instructions  of  Congress. 

Mr.  Bancroft,  in  his  preface,  justly  remarks  that  it  has  been  pos 
sible  for  him  to  place  some  questions  of  European  as  well  as  Ameri 
can  history  in  a  clearer  light,  and  among  these  questions  stands  pre 
eminent  those  connected  with  the  treaty  of  Aranjuez,  and  bearing 
directly  on  the  negotiations  for  peace.  Mr.  Bancroft  remarks  in  the 
preface  that  "  the  requirement  of  the  change  in  Oswald's  commission, 
so  grateful  to  the  self-respect  of  America,  is  due  exclusively  to 
Jay,"  and  he  suggests  that  "  the  embarrassments  of  Vergennes  " — the 
term  "  embarrassments  "  reminds  us  that  Mr.  Bancroft  is  at  once 
historian  and  diplomat — explain  and  justify  the  proceedings  of  the 
American  Commissioners  in  signing  preliminaries  of  peace  in  ad 
vance. 


228  Appendix. 

These  passages,  written  presumably  after  the  volume  had  been 
completed,  present  a  different  idea  of  the  responsibilities  devolved 
upon  the  Commission  by  the  duplicity  of  Vergennes,  from  that  which 
seems  to  be  implied  by  some  paragraphs  in  the  text,  apparently  of  an 
earlier  date,  and  which  rather  appear  to  proceed  upon  'the  old  fiction 
which  Mr.  Bancroft's  proofs  have  so  thoroughly  exposed,  that  Frank 
lin  was  correct  in  supposing  that  France  favored  the  American  claims, 
and  that  the  American  Commissioners  should  have  obeyed  the 
instructions  of  Congress  and  been  guided  by  the  opinion  of  Ver 
gennes. 

Those  proofs  have  so  completely  revolutionized  the  history  of  the 
negotiation,  as  erroneously  imagined  and  sketched  by  Sparks,  that 
some  who  have  accepted  his  misstatement  of  the  secret  correspond 
ence  of  Vergennes  may  find  it  difficult  at  once  to  appreciate  the 
dangers  threatened  to  America  by  the  compact  made  by  France  and 
Spain  in  1779,  and  which  were  not  dispersed  until  the  signing  of  the 
Provisional  Articles  in  November,  1782. 

But  the  student  of  history  can  now  read  intelligently  in  the  corre 
spondence  of  Vergennes  with  Montmorin,  Gerard,  Marbois,  Luzerne, 
and  Rayneval,  the  progress  and  meaning  of  the  compact  as  described 
by  Mr.  Bancroft  in  his  sixth  and  eighth  chapters,  subjecting  the 
interests  of  America  to  that  of  Spain  ;  and  can  appreciate  the  fact 
thus  brought  to  light,  that  the  scheme  of  the  most  accomplished 
diplomats  of  Europe,  framed  and  directed  at  Paris  and  Madrid,  and 
promoted  at  Philadelphia  with  a  skill  which  deceived  even  Dr. 
Franklin  in  that  day,  and  intelligent  historians  in  our  own,  was 
detected  and  defeated  by  the  vigilance  and  sagacity  of  Jay  and 
Adams. 

Mr.  Bancroft's  presentation  of  that  scheme  to  forestall  the  future 
greatness  of  America,  has  given  a  new  interest  to  the  conduct  of  the 
American  Commission  by  which  it  was  overthrown.  Little  informa 
tion  perhaps  can  be  expected  on  this  branch  of  the  subject,  beyond 
that  given  by  the  dispatches  of  Jay,  the  briefer  account  by  Franklin, 
the  interesting  diary  of  Adams,  and  the  full  and  interesting  letters  of 
Oswald  purchased  by  our  government  with  the  Franklin  papers,  and 
which  should  be  promptly  published.  But  possibly  Mr.  Bancroft, 
from  his  own  rare  collection,  and  especially  from  the  Shelburne 
papers,  of  which  he  was  generously  allowed  by  Lord  Fdmond  Fitz- 
maurice  to  make  transcripts,  can  furnish  some  particulars  in  refer 
ence  to  the  mission  of  Rayneval  and  the  conclusion  reached  by  Lord 


Appendix.  229 

Shelburne  and  the  Council,  after  the  arrival  of  Vaughan  with  Jay's 
memorandum,*  in  addition  to  the  brief  paragraphs  given  by  Lord 
Edmond  in  the  "  Life  "  of  his  grandfather,  to  the  arrivals  of  Rayneval 
and  Vaughan,  almost  simultaneously,  and  producing  suddenly  on  the 
part  of  the  British  Cabinet  a  complete  change  of  policy  in  favor  of 
America.  Mr.  Bancroft's  exposure  of  the  entanglements  of  Ver- 
gennes  with  Florida  Blanca,  and  Lord  Edmond' s  brief  mention  of 
the  disclosure  to  England  of  their  hostility  to  America,  as  expressed 
by  Rayneval,  have  given  an  unusual  interest  to  this  part  of  the 
peace  negotiations,  and  solved  what  has  hitherto  been  an  historic 
problem. 

The  biographers  of  Jay  and  Adams  both  held  that  what  verbal 
overtures  were  made  by  Rayneval  to  the  British  Minister  would  prob 
ably  never  be  known. 

And  now,  after  an  hundred  years,  the  secret  is  disclosed  by  the 
biographer  of  Shelburne  in  the  remark  that  "  Rayneval  played 
into  the  hands  of  the  English  Ministers  by  expressing  a  strong 
opinion  against  the  American  claims  to  the  Newfoundland  fishery, 
and  to  the  valley  of  the  Mississippi  and  the  Ohio,"  and  that  "  these 
opinions  were  carefully  noted  by  Shelburne  and  Grantham." 

Then  followed  Vaughan  with  Jay's  memorandum  answering  the 
points  of  Rayneval  which  had  been  so  accurately  anticipated,  on  the 
boundaries,  the  fisheries,  and  the  Mississippi,  and  recommending  the 
English  Ministers  to  secure  our  confidence  and  our  friendship.      It 
reminded  them  that  America  would   not  treat  except  on  an   equal  < 
footing,  and  that  it  was  the  interest  of  England,  by  a  rqcogni  ion  of  y 
our  independence,  to  cut  the  cord  which  bound  America  to  France,  <• 
whose  policy  it  was  to  oblige  the  Americans  to  continue  in  the  war, 
whereas  with  independence  acknowledged  they  would  be  ready 
make  peace  the  moment  that  Great  Britain  should  be  ready  to  ac 
cede  to  the  terms  of  France  and  America,  without  being  restrain* 
by  the  demands  of  Spain,  with  whose  views  they  had  no  concern. 

Mr.  Bancroft's  suggestion  may  be  here  recalled  (x.,  19),  that  the 
United  States  "were  not  bound  to  continue  the  war  till  Gibraltar 
should  be  taken,  still  less  till  Spain  should  have  carried  out  her  views 
hostile  to  their  interests." 

It  would  be  certainly  interesting  to  have  the  entire  correspond 
ence  and  the  minutes  of  this  meeting  of  "  the  King's  confidential  ser 
vants,"  held  on  the  2oth  September,  when  "  it  was  at  once  agreed  to 
*  For  the  substance  of  this  memorandum  see  ante,  pages  36,  37,  and  38. 


230  Appendix. 

make  the  alterations  in  the  Commission  proposed  by  Mr.  Jay,"  and 
references  to  the  matter  in  the  private  journals  of  the  ministers  would 
all  be  pertinent.  But  the  result  we  know ;  an  immediate  order,  after 
six  weeks  of  delay,  for  the  new  Commission,  which  was  intrusted  to 
Vaughan,  to  whom  it  showed  how  things  stood.  On  the  23d  Octo 
ber,  Shelburne  wrote  to  Oswald  :  "  We  have  put  the  greatest  con 
fidence,  I  believe,  ever  placed  in  man  in  the  American  Commis 
sioners,"  and  in  that  confidence  he  conceded  to  the  United  States 
all  of  which  France  and  Spain  had  desired  to  deprive  them,  granting 
terms  and  boundaries  so  generous  in  their  magnificence  as  to  startle 
and  displease  the  English  Parliament,  to  bewilder  the  French  Cab 
inet,  and  to  surprise  and  delight  the  American  people. 

The  world  is  indebted  to  Mr.  Bancroft  for  having  brought  to  light 
the  magnitude  of  the  task  which  was  devolved  upon  the  American 
Commission  by  the  unfriendly  policy  of  the  Bourbon  houses,  ham 
pered  as  it  was  by  peremptory  instructions  ;  and  it  seems  peculiarly 
fitting  that  his  great  history  of  the  war  should  close  with  the  most 
perfect  presentation  possible  of  the  negotiations  for  peace. 

No  one  could  be  better  fitted,  both  as  a  skilled  historian  and  ex 
perienced  diplomat,  to  understand  the  difficulty  in  defending  the 
Republic  against  the  secret  hostility  of  the  Court  which  was  still  our 
great  and  generous  ally  in  the  war,  or  to  appreciate  the  calmness  and 
firmness,  the  delicacy  and  the  skill,  with  which  each  step  was  taken, 
with  a  single  regard  to  the  national  honor  and  national  interest. 
Next  to  the  completeness  of  the  triumph  secured  by  the  American 
Commissioners  is  the  incident,  not  to  be  forgotten,  that  this  task 
was  accomplished  with  such  loyal  faith  to  our  treaty  obligations 
with  France  that  the  international  harmony  continued  unbroken  ;  and 
with  such  respectful  tact  toward  Doctor  Franklin,  that  the  venqf  able 
philosopher  not  only  followed  the  lead  of  his  younger  associates, 
signing  their  official  letters  and  preserving  the  unity  of  their  action, 
but  to  the  close  of  his  life  maintained  with  Jay  an  affectionate  and 
trustful  friendship. 

LURD  ZDMOND  FITZMAURICE'S  LIFE  OF  SHELBURNE. 

To  the  great  value  of  the  sketch  given  by  Lord  Edmond  Fitz- 
maurice  of  the  peace  negotiations,  from  an  English  point  of  view, 
and  as  illustrated  by  the  papers  of  Lord  Shelburne,  a  just  tribute 
has  already  been  paid  in  the  frequent  use  made  of  that  sketch  in  the 
preparation  of  this  address. 


Appendix.  231 

Lord  Shelburne's  biographer  has  not  only  supplemented  from  his 
papers  the  accounts  given  in  the*  American  despatches  of  all  that 
occurred  at  Paris,  but  he  has  furnished  the  key  to  the  most  impor 
tant  part  of  the  peace  negotiations  when  he  gives  first  the  substance 
of  Rayneval's  communication  to  Shelburne  and  Grantham,  and  then 
the  conclusion  reached  by  the  British  Minister  after  the  arrival  of 
Vaughan  with  the  views  intrusted  to  him  by  Jay. 

These  London  scenes  constituted  the  closing  act  in  the  plot 
whose  action  commenced  with  the  Treaty  of  Aranjuez.  The  mis 
sion  of  Rayneval  developed  the  overtures  to  the  British  Ministry  to 
assist  the  schemes  of  France  and  Spain  for  the  partition  of  the  west 
ern  and  northern  territories  claimed  by  the  United  States  ;  that  of 
Vaughan  showed  the  calm  resolve  of  America  to  resist  the  threat 
ened  wrong,  and  her  reminder  to  England  that  her  honor  and  her 
interest  forbade  her  adoption  of  the  French  and  Spanish  policy. 

These  opposing  missions,  interesting  as  showing  the  aims  and 
methods  that  marked  that  last  great  struggle  for  European  supremacy 
in  America,  are  yet  more  interesting  from  their  results.  They  re 
sulted  in  what  Mr.  Lecky  calls  "  the  curious  spectacle  of  a  kind  of 
alliance  between  the  English  and  American  diplomatists  in  opposi 
tion  to  those  of  France  and  Spain." 

It  was  this  "kind  of  alliance  "  forced  upon  America  by  the  plot- 
tings  of  her  allies  in  the  war  to  deprive  her  of  its  fairest  fruits,  that 
made  the  success  of  the  Republic  in  her  negotiations  for  peace  even 
more  remarkable  than  in  the  war.  With  France  and  Spain  to  assist 
her  in  winning  her  independence,  she  secured  by  the  aid  of  England 
at  its  close,  under  the  far-sighted  guidance  of  Lord  Shelburne,  a  ter 
ritory  as  large  again  as  that  to  which  those  allies  wished  to  confine 
her  ;  and  a  dignity,  power,  and  prestige  which  shattered  the  hopes 
of  Spanish  dominion  in  America,  and  left  the  United  States  free  to 
extend  the  beneficent  influence  of  Anglo-American  civilization  first 
to  the  Mississippi,  and  later  to  the  Pacific. 

To  Lord  Edmond  Fitzmaurice  the  students  of  modern  history, 
and  especially  of  modern  diplomacy,  are  greatly  indebted. 


MR.  LECKY'S  HISTORY  OF  ENGLAND. 

Mr.  Lecky's  fourth  volume  of  the  "History  of  England"  has 
also  been  quoted  with  great  advantage.  Its  breadth  of  view,  dis 
criminating  judgment,  and  careful  research,  including  on  this  subject 


232  Appendix. 

the  latest  publications  of  Bancroft,  de  Circourt,  and  Fitzmaurice, 
enable  the  author  to  relate  with  accuracy  and  to  speak  with  author 
ity,  and  entitle  the  work  to  the  careful  attention  of  American  stu 
dents,  as  exhibiting  the  candid  views  of  one  of  the  most  eminent  of 
English  historians  of  "the  skill,  hardihood,  and  good  fortune  that 
marked  the  American  negotiation  "  (ante,  p.  108). 

Should  Mr.  Lecky  revise  his  ';  History  of  England,"  as  Mr.  Ban 
croft  at  an  age  full  of  years  and  honors  is  revising  his  "  History  of 
America,"  he  may  perhaps  think  proper  to  refer  to  the  details,  which 
will  then  probably  be  better  known,  of  the  secret  missions  to  Eng 
land  despatched  by  Vergennes  and  Jay,  to  which  he  simply  alludes 
(vol.  iv.,  279)  without  giving  either  their  action  or  their  results  as 
related  by  Lord  Edmond. 

Mr.  Lecky  may  perhaps  see  fit  also  to  correct  in  a  future  edition 
what  seems  an  inconsistency  of  expression  in  speaking  of  the  Amer 
ican  negotiation,  which  might  easily  occur  after  reading  what  he 
calls  "  the  valuable  commentary  of  Mr.  Sparks,"  if  one  should  for 
get  for  a  moment  that  Mr.  Sparks'  comments  were  based  upon  an 
assumed  premise  of  fact  which  is  now  shown  to  be  absolutely  incorrect. 

In  his  fourth  volume,  page  282,  Mr.  Lecky  intimates  that  the 
distrust  of  France  by  Jay  and  Adams  was  entirely  groundless,  while 
on  the  opposite  page — 283 — and  also  on  the  preceding  pages — 276, 
277,  and  278 — Mr.  Lecky  has  shown  the  jealousy  entertained  by  the. 
French  Ministers  of  the  expansion  of  the  new  State — their  desire  to 
subject  America  to  the  balance-of-power  principle  of  Europe,  and 
to  deprive  her  of  the  Mississippi,  the  Canadian  border,  and  the  fish 
eries — measures  at  variance  with  the  American  claims  and  all  calcu 
lated  to  keep  the  Republic  "  in  a  state  of  permanent  and  humiliating 
dependence." 

There  w^l  probably  be  some  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  ex 
actness  of  Mr.  Lecky's  remark  on  page  279,  that  by  the  signing  of 
the  Provisional  Articles  "  the  alliance  between  France  and  America 
was  seriously  impaired." 

It  is  undoubtedly  true  that  the  unpleasant  surprise  to  Vergennes 
and  Rayneval  of  the  sudden  and  utter  overthrow  of  the  schemes  to 
which  years  had  been  devoted,  a  defeat  accomplished  without  a  con 
test  and  without  a  warning,  created  on  their  part,  for  the  moment  at 
least,  the  feeling  of  discontent  of  which  something  appeared  in  the 
complaining  note  of  Vergennes  to  Franklin,  to  which  Franklin  re 
turned  so  courtly  and  apologetic  a  reply. 


Appendix.  233 

But  the  confirmation  by  Vergennes  of  the  new  loan  to  America 
was  significant  of  the  consciousness  of  that  cool-headed  and  astute 
statesman  that  the  alliance  with  America,  especially  in  view  of  her 
newly  acquired  dignity  and  power,  was  not  to  be  rashly  broken  ; 
and  there  was  no  little  significance  in  the  remark  of  Vergennes  to 
Lucerne,  July  21,  1783  (Bancroft's  "History  of  the  Constitution," 
i.,  325) :  "  We  are  much  occupied  with  everything  relative  to  our  com 
merce  with  Ameiica,  and  we  feel  more  than  ever  the  necessity  of 
granting  it  encouragement  and  favors." 


MR.  CHARLES  FRANCIS  ADAMS  ON  THE  NEGOTIATION. 

This  eminent  diplomatist,  in  the  life  of  his  father,  to  which  fre 
quent  reference  has  been  made  ("  Works  of  John  Adams,"  vol.  i., 
Boston,  1856),  discusses  the  phases  of  the  peace  negotiation,  the 
policy  of  Vergennes,  and  the  views  and  conduct  of  the  American 
Commissioners,  with  the  same  ability  and  cool  judgment  which 
marked  his  own  judicious  powers  while  representing  the  Republic  at 
the  Court  of  St.  James  during  a  period  of  our  history  second  only  in 
critical  importance  to  that  of  the  Revolution.  The  appendix  con 
tains  several  papers  on  the  subject  of  the  peace  communicated  by 
John  Adams  to  the  Boston  Patriot  in  1811,  and  in  a  note  to  vol.  viii. 
(p.  15)  there  is  a  reference  to  the  confidential  letters  addressed  to 
Lord  Shelburne  by  Mr.  Vaughan,  a  copy  of  which  had  been  deposited 
by  Mr.  Vaughan  with  Hon.  John  Quincy  Adams.  These  letters 
should  be  pramptly  secured  by  the  Government  at  Washington  as 
supplying  an  interesting  link  in  the  history  of  the  negotiation. 

Mr.  Adams'  diary  and  letters  pending  the  negotiation  are  charac 
terized  by  his  robust  sense  and  sturdy  patriotism  ;  and  their  rebuke 
of  the  blind  credulity  on  which  Congress  had  based  its  instructions 
should  not  be  forgotten  in  our  own  day. 

"  I  have  lived  long  enough,"  he  wrote  to  Livingston,  "  and  had 
experience  enough  of  the  conduct  of  governments  and  people,  na 
tions  and  courts,  to  be  convinced  that  gratitude,  friendship,  unsus 
pecting  confidence,  and  all  the  most  amiable  passions  in  human 
nature  are  the  most  dangerous  guides  in  politics"  (Adams,  viii.,  27). 
He  scouted  the  idea  that  Jay  and  himself  had  been  guided  in  their 
departure  from  the  instructions  of  Congress  by  "suspicion."  "We 
knew,"  he  wrote  to  Livingston  (July  9,  1783),  "  they  [the  French 
Court]  were  often  insinuating  to  the  British  Minister  things  against 


234  Appendix. 

us  respecting  the  fisheries  lines,  etc.,  during  the  negotiation,  and 
Mr.  Fitzherbert  told  me  that  the  Count  de  Vergennes  had  fifty  times 
reproached  him  for  ceding  the  fisheries,  and  said  it  was  ruining  the 
English  and  French  both.  It  was  not  suspicion,  it  was  certain 
knowledge  that  they  were  against  us  on  the  points  of  the  Tories — 
fisheries,  Mississippi,  and  the  western  country — all  this  knowledge, 
however,  did  not  influence  us  to  conceal  the  treaty  ;  we  did  not  in 
fact  conceal  it." 

Of  Jay  he  wrote  to  Livingston  (February  5,  1783): 

"  If  I  had  the  honor  to  give  my  vote  in  Congress  for  a  minister 
at  the  Court  of  Great  Britain,  provided  injustice  must  be  finally 
done  to  him  who  was  the  first  object  of  his  country's  choice,  such 
have  been  the  activity,  intelligence,  address,  and  fortitude  of  Mr.  Jay, 
as  well  as  his  sufferings  in  his  voyage,  journeys,  and  hard  services, 
that  I  should  think  of  no  other  object  of  my  choice  than  that  gentle 
man"  (Adams,  viii.,  40). 

Touching  the  complaint  of  Livingston  of  their  want  of  confidence 
in  the  French  Court,  Adams  wrote  (Paris,  May  10,  1783) : 

"To  talk  in  a  general  style  of  confidence  in  the  French  Court  is 
to  me  a  general  language  which  may  mean  almost  anything  or  almost 
nothing.  To  a  certain  degree,  and  as  far  as  the  treaties  and  engage 
ments  extend,  I  have  as  much  confidence  in  the  French  Court  as  Con 
gress  has,  or  even  as  you,  sir,  appear  to  have.  But  if  by  confidence 
in  the  French  Court  is  meant  an  opinion  that  the  French  Office  of 
Foreign  Affairs  would  be  advocates  with  the  English  for  our  rights 
as  to  the  fisheries,  or  to  the  Mississippi  River,  or  our  western  terri 
tory,  or  advocates  to  persuade  the  British  Minister  to  give  up  the 
cause  of  the  refugees  and  to  make  parliamentary  provision  for  them, 
I  own  I  have  no  such  confidence,  and  never  had.  Seeing  and 
hearing  what  I  have  seen  and  heard,  I  must  have  been  an  idiot  to 
have  entertained  such  confidence.  I  should  be  more  of  a  Machiavel- 
ian  or  a  Jesuit  than  I  ever  was  or  will  be  to  counterfeit  it  to  you  or 
to  Congress  "  (Adams,  viii.,  89). 

Of  the  dangers  which  they  had  escaped  Adams  wrote  to  Robert 
Morris  (July  6,  1783)  : 

"  I  thank  you,  sir,  most  affectionately  for  your  kind  congratula 
tions  on  the  peace.  .  .  .  When  I  consider  the  number  of  nations 
concerned,  the  complication  of  interests,  extending  all  over  the  globe, 
the  character  of  the  actors,  the  difficulties  which  attended  every  step 
of  the  progress  \  how  everything  labored  in  England,  France,  Spain, 


Appendix.  235 

and  Holland ;  that  the  armament  at  Cadiz  was  on  the  point  of  sailing, 
which  would  have  rendered  another  campaign  inevitable;  that  an 
other  campaign  would  probably  have  involved  a  continental  war,  as 
the  Emperor  would  in  that  case  have  joined  Russia  against  the 
Porte ;  that  the  British  Ministry  was  then  in  so  critical  a  situation 
that  its  duration  for  a  week  or  a  day  depended  on  its  making  peace ; 
that  if  that  Ministry  had  been  changed  it  could  have  been  succeeded 
only  either  by  North  and  company  or  by  the  coalition;  that  it  is 
certain  that  neither  North  and  company  nor  the  coalition  would 
have  made  peace  on  any  terms  that  either  we  or  the  other  powers 
would  have  agreed  to ;  and  that  all  these  difficulties  were  dissipated 
by  one  decided  step  of  the  British  and  American  Ministers,  I  feel 
too  strongly  a  gratitude  to  heaven  for  having  been  conducted  safely 
through  the  storm  to  be  very  solicitous  whether  we  have  the  appro 
bation  of  mortals  or  not"  (Adams,  viii.,  82). 

JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS  ON  FRANKLIN  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES. 

Two  letters  of  the  Honorable  John  Quincy  Adams  to  Judge 
William  Jay  in  1832  (Magazine  of  American  History,  January,  1879), 
one  of  which  has  been  partly  quoted  (ante,  p.  209),  may  be  named 
among  the  papers  from  eminent  statesmen  bearing  upon  the  differ 
ences  of  view  between  Doctor  Franklin  and  his  colleague. 

JUDGE  WILLIAM  JAY  ON  THE  PEACE. 

I  cannot  close  this  mention  of  authors  who  have  treated  of  the 
peace — a  mention  which  may  possibly  prove  convenient  to  future 
students  of  that  satisfactory  and  brilliant  chapter  of  American  diplo 
macy — without  alluding  to  the  sketch  of  the  negotiation  given  by  my 
father  ("  Life  of  John  Jay,"  by  his  son,  William  Jay.  J.  &  J.  Harper, 
New  York,  1833.  Chapters  V.  and  VI.),  which  was  the  fullest  that  had 
appeared  until  the  recent  appearance  of  the  Life  of  Lord  Shelburne, 
by  his  grandson,  Lord  Edmond  Fitzmaurice. 

The  historic  narrative  of  Judge  Jay,  its  exposition  of  the  policy 
of  France  and  Spain,  and  the  significant  action  of  their  chief  diplo 
matists,  was  conscientious  and  exact  :  it  was  illustrated  and  en 
forced  by  the  writer's  researches,  and  by  the  views  of  Vergennes, 
Montmorin,  Luzerne,  Marbois,  and  Rayneval,  so  far  as  they  were 
then  known;  and  all  the  light  thrown  upon  the  subject  during  the 
last  half  century  has,  I  believe,  discovered  no  single  error  in  his 


236  Appendix. 

statements.  The  disclosure  of  the  confidential  correspondence  of 
France  and  Spain  gathered  by  Mr.  Bancroft,  which  has  so  completely 
overthrown  the  guesses  and  assumptions  of  visionary  commentators 
who  have  attempted  to  shape  history  to  their  own  wishes,  and  to 
•establish  fanciful  theories  by  the  bold  assertion  of  imaginary  facts, 
has  as  thoroughly  confirmed  the  correctness  of  Judge  Jay's  portrai 
ture  of  the  negotitation,  as  it  has  proven  the  profound  sagacity  of 
Jay  and  Adams. 

Mr.  Sparks,  when  he  supplemented  his  bold  attempt  to  improve 
the  style  of  Washington's  letters,  by  an  endeavor  as  editor  of  the 
"  Diplomacy  of  the  Revolution,"  to  reform  on  the  historic  page  the 
efforts  of  France  and  Spain,  at  the  conclusion  of  the  war,  to  restrain 
the  future  greatness  of  America  :  and  to  modify  or  reverse  by  sturdy 
denials  the  instructions  given  by  Vergennes,  seems  to  have  regarded 
with  equal  dislike  the  clear-sighted  diplomacy  of  Jay  and  the  faithful 
record  of  it  by  his  son. 

Mr.  Sparks  condemned  Jay's  refusal  to  treat  except  on  a  footing  of 
equal  dignity.  The  change  which  Jay  demanded  and  obtained  in  the 
British  Commission  from  "Colonies  or  Plantations"  to  "the  United 
States " — a  change  from  subserviency  and  weakness  to  national 
dignity  and  strength — Mr.  Sparks  pronounced  "  a  thing  of  form  and 
not  of  substance  "  (Franklin,  i.,  484).  He  declared  that  what  he 
called  Jay's  surmises  and  suspicions  "  had  no  just  foundation  in 
fact"  (Franklin,  i.,  493),  apparently  unconscious  that  the  secret  cor 
respondence  to  which  he  appealed  as  disproving  them  would 
more  than  confirm  their  truth  ;  and  then  turning  from  Jay  to  his  life 
by  his  son,  Mr.  Sparks  met  its  careful  narrative  and  the  logic  of  its 
facts  with  the  complaint,  that  "  the  author  adopts  all  Mr.  Jay's  sus 
picions  of  the  French  Court  as  historical  facts  [as  they  are  now 
shown  to  be],  and  appears  to  have  acquired  but  a  limited  knowledge  of 
the  actual  history  of  the  negotiation" — "actual  history"  here  seem 
ing  to  refer  to  the  exploded  fictions  which  by  many  were  so  long 
accepted  with  unquestioning  credulity. 

The  direct  tribute  paid  to  the  accuracy  of  my  father's  narrative 
by  the  late  Lord  St.  Helens  (ante,  p.  208)  was  the  tribute  not  simply 
of  an  actor  in  the  Parisian  scenes,  but  of  an  actor  whose  distin 
guished  position,  marked  abilities,  and  acknowledged  services  in  the 
American  negotiation,  give  to  his  testimony  the  highest  authority. 

Important  use  has  been  made  of  Judge  Jay's  volumes  by  Lord 
Edmond  Fitzmaurice  in  his  Life  of  Shelburne,  and  by  Mr.  Lecky 


Appendix.  '237 

in  his  "History  of  England,"  and  the  revelations  of  the  French 
policy  both  as  regards  its  aims  and  its  methods  made  in  the  Life 
of  Shelburne,  the  history  of  Bancroft,  and  the  inedited  documents 
printed  by  de  Circourt,  combine  to  show  the  accuracy  and  truth 
fulness  of  my  father's  history  of  the  negotiation. 

As  illustrating  the  far-sighted  views  of  thoughtful  European  states 
men  of  the  effects  of  the  favorable  terms  obtained  at  the  peace 
upon  the  future  of  the  Republic,  there  may  be  properly  added  as  the 
conclusion  to  this  appendix  an  allusion  to  a  still  unpublished  let- 
ler  of  Signer  Dolfin,  Ambassador  to  France  from  Venice,  dated 
February  10,  1783.  The  letter  occurs  in  the  Venetian  correspond 
ence  bearing  upon  the  American  negotiation,  procured  by  his  Ex 
cellency  George  P.  Marsh,  under  the  instruction  of  Mr.  Evarts, 
and  very  courteously  submitted  to  me  (May  7,  1881)  by  Mr.  Sec 
retary  Elaine,  Avith  other  interesting  correspondence  on  the  subject. 
After  describing  at  length  the  terms  of  the  preliminary  articles  dated 
November  3,  1782,  which  Signer  Dolfin  thought  would  be  forever  a 
memorable  epoch  in  the  history  of  the  nation,  his  Excellency  re 
marks  that  "if  the  union  of  the  American  provinces  shall  continue, 
they  would  become  by  force  of  time  and  of  the  arts  the  most  formi 
dable  power  in  the  world." 

A  brief  extract  from  an  unpublished  note  of  Lord  Lansdowne  to 
John  Jay,  dated  Bowood  Park,  4th  of  September,  1785,  indicates  his 
interest  in  our  country  and  his  particular  regard  for  Jay  ;  while  Jay's 
reply  contains  an  honorable  tribute  to  Lord  Lansdowne  for  far- 
sighted  statesmanship  in  his  plan  of  peace,  looking  to  a  permanent 
friendship  with  America.  Lord  Lansdowne  wrote  : 

"  I  have  great  pleasure  in  telling  you  that  the  new  principles  re 
garding  both  trade  and  finance  are  making  an  evident  progress  among 
the  public.  It  must  be  expected  that  they  will  meet  with  some  inter 
ruption  from  the  influence  of  old  prejudice  and  the  activity  of  parties. 
But  I  have  no  doubt  of  their  overcoming  both,  if  they  are  not  pre 
cipitated  or  too  rigorously  pushed  in  every  instance. 

"  I  am  anxious  to  hear  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
has  taken  a  solid  countenance  upon  those  wise  and  comprehensive 
foundations  which  you  stated  to  me.  I  shall  always  look  upon  this 
country  as  deeply  interested  in  whatever  regards  your  prosperity 
and  reputation,  and,  above  all,  your  internal  tranquillity. 

"  I  am,  with  particular  esteem  and  regard,  sir, 

"Your  faithful  and  most  obedient  servant, 

"  LANSDOWNE." 


238-  Appendix, 

Jay's  answer  to  the  letter  dated  New  York,  April  20,  1786,  is 
given  in  full  in  the  second  volume  of  Jay's  "  Life,"  pages  183  and  185. 
It  is  marked  by  a  hopeful  view  that  things  would  gradually  come 
right,  and  a  very  frank  suggestion  "  that  a  little  more  good  nature  on 
the  part  of  Britain  would  produce  solid  and  mutual  advantages  to 
both  countries,"  is  followed  by  this  frank  tribute  to  the  wise  policy 
adopted  by  Lord  Lansdowne  in  the  peace  after  the  visit  of  Rayneval 
and  Vaughan  had  disclosed  the  plans  of  France  and  Spain  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  firm  resolution  of  the  Republic  on  the  other  : 

"  My  Lord,  I  write  thus  freely  from  a  persuasion  that  your  ideas 
of  policy  are  drawn  from  those  large  and  liberal  views  and  principles 
which  apply  to  the  future  as  well  as  the  present,  and  which  embrace 
the  interests  of  the  nation  and  of  mankind  rather  than  the  local  and 
transitory  advantages  of  partial  systems  and  individual  ambition ;  for 
your  lordship's  plans  on  the  peace  were  certainly  calculated  to  make 
the  revolution  produce  only  an  exchange  of  dependence  for  friend 
ship,  and  of  sound  and  feathers  for  substance  and  permanent  bene 
fits." 

The  century  that  has  passed  since  those  prominent  actors  in  the 
negotiations  for  peace  laid  the  foundation  of  a  permanent  friendship 
between  the  two  countries,  has  confirmed  their  policy  and  verified 
their  hopes  ;  and  this  brief  review  of  that  interesting  business  whose 
importance  increases  as  time  advances  may  fitly  close  with  the  or 
der  made  by  the  President  at  Yorktown  on  October  19,  1881. 

The  salute  to  the  British  flag  by  the  army  and  navy  of  the  United 
States  crowned  the  centennial  festival  in  which  our  countrymen  were 
joined  by  our  European  Triends  from  across  the  sea,  and  especially 
by  the  representatives  of  Lafayette,  Rochambeau,  De  Grasse,  and 
their  brave  companions  of  the  army  and  navy  of  France,  to  whom 
that  decisive  victory  was  so  largely  due. 

The  salute  was  more  than  a  picturesque  and  sentimental  feature 
of  the  occasion.  It  illustrated  the  peace  of  an  hundred  years  ago, 
and  emphasized  the  gravest  lesson  which  history  can  present  to  the 
diplomatist  and  the  statesman. 

In  recognition  of  the  friendly  relations  so  long  and  so  happily 
subsisting  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  in  the  trust 
and  confidence  of  peace  and  good-will  between  the  two  countries 
for  all  centuries  to  come,  and  especially  as  a  mark  of  the  profound 


Appendix. 


239 


respect  entertained  by  the  American  people  for  the  illustrious  sov 
ereign  and  gracious  lady  who  sits  upon  the  British  throne,  it  is  hereby 
ordered  :  that  at  the  close  of  these  services  commemorative  of  the 
valor  and  success  of  our  forefathers  in  their  patriotic  struggle  for  in 
dependence,  the  British  flag  shall  be  sainted  by  the  forces  of  the 
army  and  navy  of  the  United  States  now  at  Yorktown.  The  Sec 
retary  of  War  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  will  give  orders  accord 
ingly.  CHESTER  A.  ARTHUR. 

By  the  President  : 

JAMES  G.  BLAINE, 

Secretary  of  State. 


ERRATA. 

Page  47,  fifth  line,  for  Granville  read  Grtfmille. 
Page  109,  third  line  from  foot,  for  guest  read  quest. 
Page  112,  note,  for  Prescott  read  Trescott. 


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